ORDER
O.P. Garg, J.
1. A highly vexed question whether a revision application under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was (for short the ‘Code’) lies before the High Court at Allahabad of its Bench at Lucknow is the subject matter of this designation. The complex question sometimes is the product of the vested interest. More often then not, the conflict of territorial jurisdiction is sharpened stark when the impugned order is passed, by a Court located in either of the twelve districts of Avadh. The controversy in turn involves interpretation in its true perspective, of the provisions of the United Provinces High Court’s (Amalgamation) Order, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Amalgamation Order), particularly the provisions of clause 14. The complex question has travelled more than once up to the Apex Court. This question has again been raised before this Court in the following circumstances :
2. A devil daring and horrendous crime was committed in Ravindra Puri, Jawahar Nagar Extension, P.S. Bhelupur in Varanasi city, Nand Kumar Rungta, an affluent person of considerable means, was the victim of crime. He was abducted form his offence in Ravindrapur sometimes in the noon of 21-1-1997. The obvious purposes, as was unfolded by subsequent events, was to extract substantial amount of ransom. His brother Mahabir Prasad Rungta laid an F.I.R. under Sections 364A and 365-A of the Indian Penal Code which gave rise to Case Crime No. 19 of 1997 at P.S. Bhelupur. As usual investigation of the case dragged on. In Writ Petition No. 1932 of 1997 filed by Smt. Shanti Rungta, wife of the victim this Court ordered for investigation of the crimes by the Central Bureau of Investigation (for short ‘CBI’) The CBI registered case crime No.RC 4(5)/97 at Lucknow. S.I.C. Core Branch Delhi investigated the case and ultimately as charge sheet under Sections 364A and 120B, IPC was filed in the Court of Special Judicial Magistrate (Environmental Protection and CBI), Lucknow against the present application revisionist Mukhtar Ansari and others. Subsequently, a supplementary charge sheet was also submitted. Some of the accused were reported to be absconding. The Special Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow committed the case for trial to the Court of Session, Lucknow. The committal order gave rise to S.T. No. 8 of 1999 which is presently pending in the Court of XIVth Additional Sessions Judge, Lucknow. The applicant revision is moved an application under Section 227 of the Code claiming discharge on the ground that the evidence which has appeared and has been collected during the course of investigation does not indicate that there is sufficient grounds to proceed against the applicant revisionist. By the detailed impugned order dated 10th May, 1999 the plea of the applicant revisionist was rejected and he has been charged along with other accused person of the offences punishable under Sections 364, 364A, 386, read with Sections 120B and 34, IPC. A date for evidence has been fixed in the trial. It is against the order that the applicant revisionist has approached this Court by filing the present criminal revision application under Section 397 of the Code.
3. A preliminary objection has been raised by the Section Officer/Stamp Reporter of the Registry of this Court that since the order under challenge has been passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Lucknow, revision application is entertainable only by the Lucknow Bench of this Court. In reply to this objection, it was submitted that earlier a Criminal Misc. Revision No. 492 of 1998 on behalf of Vijay Kumar Misra, one of the co-accused persons, in the case was entertained decided by Hon’ble O.P. Jain, J. (since retired) who by order dates 13-11-1998 observed that sufficient evidence did not appear against Vijay Kumar Misra to foist a charge against him. It was submitted that the office failed to report that a revision application of a co-accused has already been decided by this Court and if the revision application of one of the co-accused persons alleged to be involved in the same crime has been entertained and decided by this Court, the other co-accused i.e. the applicant revisionist should not be discriminated in the matter by denying him hearing at Allahabad.
4. Heard Sri D.N. Wali, learned counsel for the applicant revisionist, on the hand, and S/Sri Vinod Swarup, Additional Advocate General for the State of U.P. Girdhar Nath for CBI and Sri S. B. Goswami, learned counsel at considerable length.
5. Sri D.N. Wali, learned counsel for the applicant-revisionist was very much emphatic in his submission that since the crime has been committed and the FIR has been laid in a district which is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Lucknow Bench, the revision application against the order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, even though posted at Lucknow, i.e. one of the districts, which fall within the territorial jurisdiction of the erstwhile Chief Avadh Court, is maintainable before this Court at Allahabad in view of the Head Note 5 of the celebrated leading case decided by a four Judges Bench of Apex Court, reported in AIR 1976 SC 331, Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Head Note 5 which is the sheet anchor of the case of the applicant-revisionist, reads as follows :–
(5) A criminal case arises where the offence has been committed or otherwise as provided in the Criminal Procedure Code. That will attract the jurisdiction of the Court at Allahabad or Lucknow. In some cases depending on the facts and the provision regarding jurisdiction, it may arise in either place.”
On the strength of the above observations of the Apex Court Sri Wali painstakingly urged that since the offence was committed in Varanasi and the FIR was lodged at Varanasi itself, this Court, which undoubtedly has the jurisdiction over district Varanasi, cannot refuse to entertain the revision application. It was also pointed out that the applicant-revisionist being an accused is dominis litis to have his forum convenience and may file the revision application either before this Court at Allahabad or before the Lucknow Bench. This submission has been repelled by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite parties. The simplicity of the submission made by Sri Wali, though attractive, is perlexing.
6. With a view to understand the implications of the controversy, the matter may be considered in its historical retrospective as to under what circumstance the twelve disricts case within the fold of the territorial jurisdiction of the Lucknow Bench. Oudh was annexed to the territories of British East India Company by Lord Dalhousie, Governor General in 1856; and twelve districts, Lucknow, Bara Banki, Faizabad, Sultanpur, Hardoi, Rae Bareli, Pratapgarh, Unnao, Gonda, Bahraich, Sitapur and Khari were constituted into a separate Province of Oudh, under a Chief Commissioner. After some time the Civil Administration of Avadh was united under one Local Government with the district administered by the Lt. Governor of the North Western Provinces, and the territories thus united became known as the North-Western Provinces and Oudh. Subseqeuntly, by Act VII of 1902 passed by the Governor General in Council United Provinces (Destination) Act, the designation was changed into the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh. Ever since the said Annexation, there were separate courts to administer the laws in Oudh (Avadh) and the laws were codified by Act XVIII of 1876 (The Oudh Laws Act) passed by the Governor General in Council. The Judicial, including the highest Court of appeal, was distinct from courts of the sister province of the North-Western Provinces and there were separate cadres of subordinate Courts until the year 1948. After the Annexation, the highest Court of appeal was established in Lucknow in 1856 with a judicial Commissioner for the disposal of Civil and Criminal Cases. It continued to function for nearly 7 decades except for a short interrogation during the Mutiny of 1857-58. At first there was one Judicial Commissioner. At that unsettled time, Judicial Commissioner was not the highest Court of appeal in rent and revenue cases. But there was a Financial Commissioner as the highest Court. By Act XXXII of 1871, the post of Financial Commissioner was abolished and his work was entrusted to Judicial Commissioner of Oudh (Vide Section 84). The cases in the Judicial Commissioner’s Court continued to increase. In order to cope with the increasing volume of work, an Act (IV of 1885) was passed “to provide for temporary” appointment, from time to time, of an “Additional Judicial Commissioner”, Subsequently, by Act XIV of 1891 (Oudh Courts Act), provision was made by Section 4 for the appointment of a permanent Additional Judicial Commissioner, by the Local Government with the previous sanction of the Governor-General-in-Council. In 1897, another Act (XVI of 1897) (Oudh Courts (Amending) Act) was passed, making provision for the appointment of a Second Additional Judicial Commissioner. (See Article under the caption “History of the Court In Avadh from 1856 A.D. up to Present Time” compiled by Sri H.K. Ghose, Bar at Law, President, Avadh Bar Association, Lucknow (Published from page 185 onwards in the Allahabad High Court Centenary Volume I).
7. The system of Judicial Administration in Oudh was found inadequate and antiquated. Thereafter, in order to meet the public demand, an Act, U.P. Act IV of 1925 (Avadh Courts Act) was passed by U.P. Legislature with the previous sanction of the Governor-General as required by Sub-section (3) of Section 80A of the Government of India Act, 1919 “to amend and consolidate the law relating to Courts in Oudh “. This Act was subsequently repealed by Act No. IX of 1939. There was another changed in the Act by modification of Section 4 of the said Act by the Government of India (Adaptation of Laws) Order, 1937 whereunder it was provided that “Chief Court shall consist of a Chief Judge and such other Judges, as may be appointed under the Government of India Act, 1935”. Under this provision, a sixth Judge was appointed in 1945 from the Bar. After the attainment of Independence by India, the historical anomaly of existence of two highest Courts of appeal within the same province, the territories known as Agra and Oudh having come under one local Government as far back as the year 1902, was keenly felt. By the Amalgamation Order, the Chief Court of Oudh was amalgamated with the High Court of Allahabad and the new High Court was conferred the jurisdiction of both the Courts so amalgamated. The amalgamation of the Chief Court with the Allahabad High Court by the Amalgamation Order of 1948 was made by the Governor General under Section 229 of the Government of India Act, 1935 after presentation of address by both the Chambers of U.P. Legislature to the Governor of Uttar Pradesh, which was submitted to the Governor General. After amalgamation, the two separate Courts became one Court by name of “High Court of Judicature at Allahabad”. By this Order which came into force w.e.f. 19th July, 1948, the ‘jurisdiction of the Court (at Allahabad) under the Letters Patent and that of the Chief Court under the Oudh Courts Act was preserved. On the advent of the Constitution of India, the position as was obtaining prior to 26th January, 1950 was recognised and as it is the Amalgamation Order continues to be operative. In view of the above survey of the past events, the territory of the Lucknow Bench of this Court extends to the above named twelve districts.
8. The conflict of territorial jurisdiction between the High Court at Allahabad and the Bench at Lucknow generally originates and takes shape from the provisions of Clause 14 of the Amalgamation Order. The blurred areas has come to be canvassed and determined with reference to the following provision;
14. The new High Court and the Judges and division courts thereof shall sit at Allahabad or at such other places in the United Provisions as the Chief Justice, may, with the approval of the Governor of the United Provinces, appointed :
Provided that unless Government of the United Provinces with the concurrence of the Chief Justice, otherwise directs, such Judges of the new High Court, not less than two in number as the Chief Justice may, from time to time nominate, shall sit at Lucknow in order to exercise in respect of cases arising in such areas in Oudh, as the Chief Justice may direct, the jurisdiction and power for the time being vested in the new High Court.
Provided further that the Chief Justice may in his discretion order that any case or class of cases arising in the said areas shall be heard at Allahabad.
The above provisions came to be considered and interpreted by the Apex Court in the case of Nasiruddin (AIR 1976 SC 331) (supra). It summoned up the entire legal position in paragraphs 37 and 38 of the Report, which may be copiously quoted for better appreciation of the controversy :–
37. To sum up, our conclusions are as follows. First, there is no permanent seat of the High Court at Allahabad. The seats at Allahabad and at Lucknow may be changed in accordance with the provisions of the Order. Second, the Chief Justice of the High Court has no power to increase or decrease the areas in Oudh from time to time. The areas in Oudh have been determined once by the Chief Justice, and, therefore, there is no scope for changing the areas. Third, the Chief Justice has power under the second proviso to paragraph 14 of the Order to direct in his discretion that any case or class of cases arising in Oudh areas shall be heard at Allahabad. Any case or class of cases are those which are instituted at Lucknow. The interpretation given by the High Court that the word “heard” confers powers on the Chief Justice to order that any case or class of cases arising in Oudh areas shall be instituted or filed at Allahabad instead of Lucknow is wrong. The word “heard” means that cases which have already been instituted or filed at Lucknow may in the discretion of the Chief Justice under the second proviso to paragraph 14 of the Order to be directed to be heard at Allahabad. Fourth the expression “cause of action” with regard to a civil matter means that it should be left to the litigant to institute cases at Lucknow Bench or at Allahabad Bench according to the cause of action arising wholly or in part within either of the areas. If the cause of action arises wholly within Oudh areas then the Lucknow Bench will have jurisdiction. Similarly, if the cause of action arises wholly outside the specified areas in Oudh then Allahabad will have jurisdiction. If the cause of action in part arises in the specified Oudh areas and part of the cause of action arises outside the specified areas, it will be open to the litigant to frame the case appropriately to attract the jurisdiction either at Lucknow or at Allahabad. Fifth, a criminal case arises where the offence has been committed or otherwise as provided in the Criminal Procedure Code. That will attract the jurisdiction of the Court at Allahabad or Lucknow. In some cases depending on the facts and the provision regarding jurisdiction it may arise in either place.
38. Applications under Article 226 will similarly lie either at Lucknow or at Allahabad as the applicant will allege that the whole of cause of action or part of the cause of action arose at Lucknow within the specified areas of Oudh or part of the cause of action arose at a place outside the specified Outh areas.
An unsuccessful attempt was made by a Division Bench of this Court in Chini Mill’s case to whittle down the above dictum of the Apex Court on the ground that in view of the change of law w.e.f. 1-2-1977 adding an explanation to Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the law laid down as above does not hold good. The Division Bench comprising of Hon’ble B.M. Lal, J. (as His Lordship then was) and Hon’ble S. R. Singh, J. observed as follows :–
The theory of ’cause of action’ originates from the Code of Civil Procedure which is of general character and is, therefore, a general law. In the present case, the theory of exercise of jurisdiction revolving on the place of sitting ‘originates from the Amalgamation Order, 1948, which is of special character and is, therefore, in the shape of special law. It applies to a limited contingency i.e. where the case falls within the territorial jurisdiction of one High Court and the Judges sit at two places in order to exercise jurisdiction of the High Court.
Thus, where the controversy pertains to the territorial jurisdiction of two different High Courts, certainly the theory of ’cause of action’ in the shape of Sub-clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India comes into play with full force but where the controversy pertains to the exercise of jurisdiction of one High Court as’ is in the present case, the theory of ‘exercise of jurisdiction revolving on the place of sitting’ comes into play.
Both the theories have got different fields to operate but at the appropriate occasion, the theory having characteristic of special law will have overriding effect in preference to the theory having characteristic of general law, is the well settled position of law…. As far as the theory of cause of action attracting jurisdiction of Lucknow Bench even in the cases pertaining to those districts which are situated outside the Oudh area is concerned. Nasiruddin’s case AIR 1976 SC 331 (supra) is of no avail to the petitioners in view of the change in law with effect from 1-2-1997 (adding Explanation to Section 141, CPC) and in view of the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in the recent pronouncements in Oil and Natural Gas Commission’s case (supra) and Navodaya Vidyalaya Samiti’s case (supra).
The question of law decided by the Bench in Chini Mill’s case was later on reconsidered by a Full Bench of this Court, which overruled the decision of the Division Bench as it ran counter to the law laid down in Nasiruddin’s case (AIR 1976 SC 331) (supra). There arose a functional crisis and the matter came up for consideration by the Apex Court in the case of U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad, Lucknow v. State of U. P. AIR 1995 SC 2148. The decision of the Division Bench declining to follow the interpretation given in Nasiruddin’s case (supra) was not appreciated by the Apex Court by observing that the Division Bench of this Court fell into patent error in holding that the interpretation placed by the Supreme Court on Clause 14 of the Amalgamation Order has ceased to be operative after the incorporation of the Explanation to Section 141, CPC. It was further observed that the Supreme Court in Nasiruddin’s case did not rely on the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. In fact, the Apex Court did not even notice any of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Division Bench of this Court took shelter behind the Explanation to Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure without any justification. It created an argument when none existed. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that they have no hesitation in holding that the reasoning of this Court in not following the law laid down by Apex Court in Nasiruddin’s case was wholly perverse. In view of the decision in U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad, Lucknow (AIR 1995 SC 2148) (supra), there can be no doubt about the fact that the interpretation as put in Nasiruddin’s case (AIR 1976 SC 331) (supra) the provision of Clause 14 of the Amalgamation Order still holds good and is to be accepted as the guiding principle while deciding the controversy with regard to territorial jurisdiction.
9. In the instant case, the controversy has been raised with reference to a criminal case, procedure of which is governed by the Code. Adjective criminal law provides a machinery for the punishment of offenders against the substantive criminal laws. Criminal Procedure Code, though mainly an adjective and procedural law, deals with many other things it deals with the constitution of criminal Courts, classifies them, defines their power, lays down procedure for criminal proceedings, enquiries or trials, prescribes the duties of the Police in arresting the offenders and investigating offences and also contains provisions for their prevention. Unlike the concept of ’cause” of action’, as contemplated in civil proceedings, there are distinct and different provisions about the place of enquiry and trial as contained in Chapter XIII of the Code. The place where the First Information Report is lodged by itself is not sufficient to afford a cause of action or to indicate the Court where the enquiry or the trial shall proceed. In Dr. Balram Dutt Sharma v. State of U. P. (Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 14207 of 1997) (reported in 1999 All LJ 1478) connected with other bail applications relating to the popularly known Ayurvedic scame, a Division Bench of this Court was seized of the question which is skin to the one in hand. In the decision dated 9-4-1999, it was observed that they very initiation of an F.I.R. may not be deemed to be a cause of action for a bail application. Therefore, it is not necessary that enquiry and trial of an offence/case should be by the Court of the place where the crime was committed or the F.I.R. was laid. Various provisions of the Code have to be looked into to clear the point.
10. Section 177 contained in Chapter XIII dealing with the jurisdiction of the criminal Courts in inquiries and trials provides that every offence shall ordinarily be enquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. The expression ‘ordinarily’ means except where provided otherwise in the Code. The State Legislature is competent to provide for the trial of offences created by its statutes otherwise than is prescribed by Section 177 but it must clearly appear from the relevant provision of the special Statute that a departure from the general principal by Section 177 is intended. (See AIR 1960 SC 1329, Narumal v. State of Bombay). In the family of the various sections contained in Chapter XIII, which is intended to enlarge as much as possible the ambit of the sites in which the trial of an offence might be held and to minimize as much as possible the inconvenience caused by a technical plea of want of territorial jurisdiction there is a provision in the form of Section 185 which runs as follows :–
185. Power to order cases to be tried in different sessions divisions : Notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding provisions of this Chapter, the State Government may direct that any cases or class of case committed for trial in any district may be tried in any sessions division.”
This Section has been re-drafted and engrafted to expressly override all other venue provisions. Provisions of Section 177 are general in nature while that of Section 185 are by way of an exception. These Sections have to be read in conjunction with the expression ‘local jurisdiction’ as defined in the Code. Section 2(j) defines ‘local jurisdiction’ to mean, in relation to a Court, or Magistrate, the local area within which the Court or Magistrate may exercise all or any of its or his powers under the Code and such local area may comprise the whole of the State, or any part of the State, as the State Government may, by notification, specify, Similarly, Sub-section (4) of Section 9 relating to the Court of Session provides that the Sessions Judge of one sessions division may be appointed by the High Court to be also an Additional Sessions Judge of another division and in such case, he may sit for the disposal of cases at such place or places in the other division as the High Court may direct. A provision has been made in Section 11 of the creation of special Courts of Judicial Magistrates, Proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 11 provides that the State Government may, after consultation with the High Court, establish, for any local area, one or more Special Courts of Judicial Magistrates of the first class or of the second class to try any particular case or particular class of cases, and where any such Special Court is established, no other Court of Magistrate in the local area shall have jurisdiction to try any case or class of cases for the trial of which such Special Court of Judicial Magistrate has been established. The above provision clearly indicates that the place of enquiry and trial which is ordinarily determined with reference to the provisions of Section 177 are not applicable if the State Government in consultation with the High Court establishes a Special Court with regard to local area, which may take within its sweep more than one districts or the sessions division and if such a Special Court either of the Judicial Magistrate or of the Sessions Judge is established, the other Courts which otherwise ordinarily have jurisdiction shall cease to have jurisdiction over the matters entrusted to the Special Court.
11. The reason why the Special Courts are established is not too far to seek. It is common knowledge that in our country, long delays are taking place in the criminal Courts because of slow motion in which the work is done. Some times the accused or at some other time the prosecution is guilty of the same. If the work is in the hands of one Special Magistrate, he may be able to keep a vigil and on account of acquisition of expertise may speed-up the disposal of the cases. The Constitutionality and propriety of the creation of Special Courts has been the subject-matter of controversy in a number of cases, in an earlier decision in State v. V.C. Shukla AIR 1980 SC 1382, the Apex Court negatived the attack on the establishment of special Courts. It was held that Article 14 of the Constitution would not be attracted even if the procedure provided by the Act is held to be harsher than the one that is available under the ordinary law provided the classification is reasonable. Another decision to which a reference may be made is reported in In re, Special Court’s Bill AIR 1979 SC 478. The propositions numbered as propositions numbered as proposition Nos. 6 and 7 in the judgment of the Supreme court in the Special Courts Bill case may be reproduced below :
6. The law can make and set apart the classes according to the needs and exigencies of the society and as suggested by experience. It can recognize even degree of evil, but the classification should never be arbitrary, artificial or evasive.
7. The classification must not be arbitrary but must be rational, that is to say, it may not only be based on some qualities or characteristics which are to be found in all persons grouped together and not in others who are left put but those qualities or characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the object of the legislation. In order to pass the test, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (1) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differential which distinguishes those that are grouped together from others and (2) that the differential must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act.
The question whether the State Government is empowered to establish one Special Court of a Judicial Magistrate laying down that the Court alone will have jurisdiction to try and case or class of cases exclusively came to be considered by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bharat Traders v. Special Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad 1988 Cri LJ 1117. Upholding the validity of the Special Court of Magistrate at Allahabad for dealing with the economic crimes, it was observed that after the amendment of Section 2(f) of the Code by Act 45 of 1978 the State Government is empowered to declare the whole of the State or any part as local jurisdiction. The State Government now has power to issue a notification including the whole of the State within the local jurisdiction of a Magistrate. So also under Proviso to Section 11(1) the State Government could establish one Special Court in respect of the case for the whole of State which it was advised to do in consultation with the High Court.
12. The matter came up for pointed discussion and decision in a recent case of this Court in Bhagwan Das Khandelwal v. C.B.I. Establishment, New Delhi 1998 Cri LJ 651, in which it was held :–
…Section 11(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 as it stood before its amendment by Act 45 of 1978 envisaged establishment of Courts of Judicial Magistrates of the 1st class and of the Second Class in every district, but the proviso inserted to Sub-section (1) of Section 11 by Section 3 of Act 45 of 1978 w.e.f. 18-12-1978, clearly provides that the State Government may after consultation with the High Court, establish for ‘any local area’ one or more special Courts of Judicial Magistrates of the 1st Class and of the Second Class to try any particular case or particular class of cases and where any such special Court is established, no other Court of Magistrate in the local area shall have jurisdiction to try any case or class of cases for the trial of which such special Court of Judicial Magistrate has been established. Prior to insertion of the proviso to Sub-section (1) by Act 45 of 1978, Sub-section (1-A) of Section 11 was inserted by Section 3 of U. P. Act No. 16 of 1976 with effect from 30-4-1978 and it provides that the State Government may likewise establish as many Courts of Judicial Magistrates of 1st Class and of the second class in respect to particular cases or to particular class of cases, or in regard to cases generally in ‘any local area’ and by Section 4 of the said U.P. Act: 1976 the words ‘in any local area’ were substituted in place of words ‘in any district’ in Section 13 of the Code. The notification by which the Court of Judicial Magistrate of 1st Class having its place of sitting at Lucknow was established to enquire, try or commit to the Courts of Session, the offences, investigated by Special Police Establishment, New Delhi stood validated by Section 1(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (U.P. Amendment) Act, 1976″.
13. It is an indubitable fact that two Courts of Special Magistrates have been established in the State for dealing with the criminal cases, the investigation of which has been conducted by the CBI. Such two Courts are one at Dehradun and the other at Lucknow. Initially a Special Court of Magistrate was established at Lucknow to exercise jurisdiction throughout the State but subsequently one more Court was created at Dehradun for the specified districts. The relevant notification dated 16-11 -1976 published in Official Gazette dated 4-12-1976 reads as follows :–
In exercise of the powers under sub-sections (1) and (1-A) of Section 11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act No. 2 of 1974) as amended in its application to Uttar Pradesh by the Code of Criminal Procedure Uttar Pradesh (Amendment) Act, 1976 (U.P. Act No. 16 of 1976) read with Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (Act No. X of 1897) and in suppression of Government Notification No. 1592/VII-AN-208-74, dated April 20, 1974, the Governor, after consultation with the High Court, is pleased to establish with effect from the date, the Presiding Officer takes over charge at Dehradun, the Courts of Judicial Magistrates of First Class specified in Column 2 of the Scheduled below to exercise jurisdiction in the local areas specified against each in Column 3 thereof to try or inquire into and commit to the Court of Session all such cases arising within their respective local areas in which investigations are made or charge-sheets filed by the Special Police Establishment constituted under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (Act No. XXV of 1946).”
Varanasi district for the purpose falls within the local area of the Special Judicial Magistrate stationed at Lucknow. As soon as the investigation of the case in completed, CBI has to forward the charge sheet to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence as contemplated under Section 173 of the Code. The expression ‘cognizance’ has not been defined under the Code. ‘Cognizance’ of an offence is taken by the Magistrate under the provisions of Section 190 of the Code. Under Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 190, a Magistrate may take cognizance of any offence upon a Police report. Cognizance is taken of an offence and not as against an offender. In the instant case, for purposes of Section 173 of the Code, the Special Magistrate, Lucknow is empowered to take the cognizance of the offence on a report submitted by the CBI.
14. Now, a pertinent question may arise as to which would be the Court of Session to which the case may be committed for trial in respect of an offence which has taken at Varanasi but the charge sheet after investigation has been submitted by the C.B.I, before the Special Magistrate at Lucknow. This aspect of the matter has not gone unnoticed by the Legislature. A specific provision has been made in Sub-section (3) of Section 14 of the Code. It provides that where the local jurisdiction of a Magistrate, appointed under Section 11, extends to an area beyond the district in which he ordinarily holds Court, any reference in the Code to the Court of Session, shall, in relation to such Magistrate, through the area within his local jurisdiction, be construed, unless the context otherwise requires, as a reference to the Court of Session, exercising jurisdiction in relation to the said district. Section 14(3) has carved out a niche for itself and should be considered as an exception to the provisions contained in Section 177 of the Code. See, Prafulla Chandra Ghadei v. Union of Republic of India 1997 Cri LJ 201 (Orissa H.C.) In view of this provision the Session Judge of Lucknow shall exercise all the powers in respect of Sessions Division, Varanasi as the Special Magistrate which is empowered to take cognizance of the offence is located/stationed at Lucknow. From the above provisions, therefore, it is clear that even though the offence in the instant case came to be committed at Varanasi which is not amongst one of the 12 districts over which Lucknow Bench of this Court has exclusive territorial jurisdiction, it shall have jurisdiction by reason of the fact that a Special Court in whose local jurisdiction Varanasi also falls is located at Lucknow. Of necessity, in view of provision of Section 14(3) of the Code, the Special Magistrate has to commit the case for trial by the Court of Session at Lucknow. It is on account of the location of the Court of Special Magistrate at Lucknow, that the Sessions Judge, Lucknow is seized of the matter, even though it relates to another sessions division, outside his local jurisdiction.
15. Revisional power is exercised by High Court under Section 397 of the Code. Subsection (1) provides that the High Court may call for and examine record of any proceeding before any ‘inferior criminal Court’ situate within its local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed and as to the regularity of any proceeding of such ‘inferior Court’. The revisional jurisdiction of High Court, therefore, pervades over all inferior criminal Courts. The expression ‘inferior’ with reference to criminal Court came to be construed and interpreted in Nobin Kristo Mookerjee v. Rassick Lall Laha (1884) ILR 10 Cal 268 and Full Bench reference in Opendro Nath Ghose v. Dukhini Bewa ILR (1885) 12 Cal 473, to mean that a Court is only inferior to another Court when it is subject to its appellate jurisdiction. It was observed that if we take the ordinary meaning of the word ‘inferior’ there can be no question but that all subordinates are inferior to the authority to which they are subordinate; although inferiors are not necessarily subordinates. So within the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court all other Criminal Courts are inferior to it and in a session division the sessions Court is superior to all other local criminal Courts and all such other Courts are inferior to it. In AIR 1949 Bom 29, Krishnaji Vithal Kangutkar v. Emperor, it was held that inferior criminal Court only means judicially inferior to the High Court. All the criminal Courts located in the 12 districts are inferior to the Lucknow Bench of this Court and, therefore, the revision application against an order passed by an inferior Court located in any one of the 12 districts! is entertainable only by the Lucknow Bench.
In view of this conspectus, an order passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Lucknow which is obviously a Court inferior to the High Court, is subject to revision by the Lucknow Bench only. In view of the Amalgamation Order, this Court at Allahabad shall have a no jurisdiction to entertain the revision application against the order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Lucknow or for that matter, of any inferior criminal Court, located within the twelve districts of Oudh.
16. During the course of arguments, Sri Girdhar Nath informed that a Criminal Misc. Petition No. 802 of 1998 under Section 482 of the Code was filed by the present applicant-revisionist before the Lucknow Bench which is in seisin of the matter and that the impugned order dated 10-5-1999 has been passed by the 14th Additional Sessions Judge, Lucknow pursuant to the order dated 21-4-1999 passed by the Lucknow Bench on the pending application Under Section 482 of the Code. This fact is also incorporated in the penultimate paragraph of the impugned order. It was urged that the applicant-revisionist knowing it full well that Lucknow Bench alone has exclusive jurisdiction in the matter has filed the present revision application before this Court with an oblique motive. This submission of Sri Girdhar Nath is not without force.
17. Finding himself in deep and difficult waters, Sri Wali urged that since the revision application filed by Vijay Kumar Misra, one of the co-accused has been decided by this Court, there can possibly be no objection in entertaining the present revision application by this Court. This submission again does not commend itself for acceptance. It is not only otiose but unwarranted. A perusal of the order passed in Criminal Misc. Revision No. 492 of 1998 decided on 13-11-1998 would indicate that the objection with regard to territorial jurisdiction had not been raised, argued or decided that revision application. Moreover, if a decision has been given by a wrong Court having no jurisdiction, it would not stop the opposite parties from taking a preliminary objection about the maintainability of the present revision petition. In any case, this Court is not to be swayed away with the decision on the revision petition of Vijay Kumar Misra. If a wrong has been committed in the past, there is nothing to prevent to rectify the same in future. The earlier wrong cannot be repeated. After all two wrongs put together would not make a right. There is another aspect of the matter. It has been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides and not what logically follovs from it. See AIR 1987 SC 1 )73, Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat. Precedents are not to be mechanically applied; they are of assistance only in so far as they furnish guidance by compendiously summoning up principle of-law. It is well settled that a precedent is an authority only for what it actually decides and not for what may remotely or even logically follows from it. See AIR 1968 SC 647, State of Orissa v, Sudhansu Sekhar Misra. A decision on a question which has not been argued cannot be treated as a precedent, see, M/s. Good Year India Ltd. v. State of Haryana AIR 1990 SC 781. Vijay Kumar Misra’s case (supra), therefore, is not a precedent for the purpose of the decision of the controversy raised in the petition in hand.
18. The present applicant-revisionist got aggrieved only on account of the order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge at Lucknow. The grievance of the applicant arose at Lucknow which is within the Avadh area and as such, on the plain reading of the relevant provision of Clause 14 of the Amalgamation Order, Bench at Lucknow alone has the jurisdiction to entertain the revision application.
19. In the conspectus of the analysis of facts and the legal position, I would constrict myself within the narrow parameters within which the issue arises and negative the plea taken by Sri Wali that the revision application is maintainable before this Court. In the backdrop of the legal position, mentioned above, my firm view of the matter is that an order passed by an inferior criminal Court stationed at Lucknow or in any one of the twelve districts, which exclusively come within the jurisdiction of the Lucknow Bench, shall lie to the Lucknow Bench and not before this Court. The revision application should have been presented before the Lucknow Bench. It is, therefore, directed that the Registry of this Court shall immediately transmit the record of this revision-application along with instant order to Lucknow for being placed before the appropriate Bench.