JUDGMENT
S.K. Jain, J.
1. The demised premises were let out by Muni Lal to M/s Yashpal Rai Parshotam Lal Soni at a monthly rent of Rs. 55/-. By filing rent application No. 40 of April 24, 1985, the landlord sought eviction of his tenant on the following grounds :-
(i) Non-payment of arrears of rent;
(ii) Bonafide personal requirement; and,
(iii) the demised premises having become unsafe and unfit for human habitation.
2. On being served, the tenant tendered the arrears of rent on the first date of hearing and controverted the grounds of personal necessity and the building having become unsafe and unfit for human habitation. He also took objection that the demised premises having been let out for commercial purposes, could not be got vacated on the ground of personal necessity.
3. On the pleadings of the parties, learned Rent Controller framed the following issues :-
1. Whether the tender of arrears of rent etc. made by the respondent is not valid ? OPA
2. Whether the demised premises forms part of residential house and the applicant requires the same for his own bona fide personal use ? OPA
3. Whether the demised premises is unfit and unsafe for human habitation ? OPA
4. Relief.
4. Arrears of rent having been tendered on the first date of hearing, the finding on issue No. 1 was returned against the landlord. Under issue No. 2, it was held that the premises formed part of main residential building and could, therefore, be got vacated on the ground of personal necessity. It was further held that the landlord required the premises for his bona fide personal requirement. The finding on issue No 2, therefore, was returned in favour of the landlord. On issue No. 3 it was found that the premises had not been rendered unsafe and unfit for human habitation and, therefore, this issue was decided against the landlord. In view of the finding on issue No. 2 the learned Rent Controller, vide his order of October 26, 1987 allowed the application and directed the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the demised premises within a period of three months from the date of the order.
5. Feeling aggrieved, the tenant had preferred rent appeal No. 15 of 1987. It was heard and decided by Additional District Judge exercising the powers of the Appellate Authority under the Act. He affirmed the findings of the Rent Controller on issues No 1 and 3 but reversed the finding on issue No. 2 holding that the landlord bad not been able to establish that he required the demised premises for his personal use and occupation or for the occupation of the other members of his family. As a result of this finding he accepted the appeal and set aside the order of the Rent Controller.
6. The said judgment of the Appellate Authority, Hoshiarpur, of August 18, 1988 has been challenged in this revision petition under Section 15(5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949.
7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and with their help perused the record. Vide para No. 9 of his judgment, the Appellate Authority had affirmed the finding of the Rent Controller that the demised premises formed part of residential building and the landlord could get the same vacated on the ground of bona fide personal requirement or for the occupation of members of his family. This finding of the Appellate Authority has not been challenged on behalf of the tenant. Therefore, the sole question for decision in this petition under Section 15(5) of the Act before this Court is as to whether the finding of the Appellate Authority on issue No. 3 with regard to his bona fide personal requirement was correct.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the Appellate Authority has legally erred in setting aside the well reasoned finding of the Rent Controller on issue No. 3 with regard to the requirment of the landlord for additional accommodation. It has been established on record that there were eighteen members of the family of the landlord whereas he was in possession of 8 or 9 rooms including a kitchen and a store. During the pendency of the litigation two more grand children were added to his family and, therefore, it was evident that the accommodation in his possession was insufficient in as much as one room was required by the landlord and his wife; four for his four sons and their wives; one for his grand daughter, studying in eleventh class; one for his two grand sons studying in seventh and ninth class; respectively; two rooms, for remaining school going grand children; and one room for two married sons and one married daughter residing out of town for their stay on their visit to the landlord.
9. On the other hand learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the judgment of the Appellate Authority is of August 18, 1988. The copy was applied on behalf of the petitioner on August 22, 1988. It was ready on August 29, 1988 and was delivered on September 3, 1988. The revision petition was filed on May 9, 1991. So the petition was hopelessly time barred.
10. Secondly, he has argued that the landlord has intentionally not filed any site plan of the house in order to mislead the Court as he had a number of other rooms in his occupation besides 8 or 9 rooms which have been mentioned to be in his possession in the judgments of the Courts below.
11. The question of bona fide requirement of the landlord first. In order to assess the requirement of the landlord, besides others, following factors are to be taken into consideration :-
(i) Number of members of the family of the landlord and their respective ages; and,
(ii) accommodation already in his possession.
It is not much in dispute that the family of the landlord comprised, besides himself and his wife, of his four married sons and their nine children residing with him. His two other sons and one married daughter were residing out of the town and used to visit him. Those two sons ware also married. Now on to the accommodation already in possession of the landlord. The landlord has appeared as AW1 before the dent Controller and testified that he had no other residential house in Hoshiarpur except the accommodation in his possession in the demised house. He was in occupation of 8 or 9 rooms on the ground door as well as on the first floor of the house. He had let out two rooms out of the entire house. la the absence of the site plan of whole of the house including all the floors it cannot be ascertained as to, in all, how many rooms were there in the house because according to the landlord he had let out only two rooms and, therefore, whole of the remaining house was in his possession. Site plan Ex. Al purports to be that of the house of the landlord but it doss not lead the Court anywhere. Two rooms measuring 18′ x 1.6′ and 18′ x 7′ 9″; two kitchens; two bathrooms; and two Courtyards each measuring 13′ x 12′ have been shown in red colour, i.e. to be in possession of the landlord whereas one room measuring 18′ x 7′ 9″ and another room having two portions measuring 18′ x 8′ 3″ each are in occupation of the tenant. But the landlord has himself stated that he was in occupation of 8 or 9 rooms on the ground floor and first floor of the house. It is thus evident that Ex. Al does not show the whole of the house of the landlord. There is no clear evidence on the record with regard to the accommodation in possession of the landlord. In the absence of the plan of the whole of the house and that of the portion in occupation of the landlord it is not possible to give any clear finding as to whether the landlord required the demised premises for his personal use Hence it cannot be said that the premises already in his possession were not reasonably sufficient for his needs In holding the above view I am fortified by the ratio laid down in Mohan Lal Jain v. Mohan Lal, (1973) 75 P. L. R. 350. In view of the above discussion no fault can be found with the finding of the Appellate Authority returned on issue No. 3 in so far as he has reversed the finding of the learned Rent Controller.
12. Now on to the question of limitation. A perusal of the certified copy of the judgment would show that it is of August 18, 1988. The copy was applied on 22,8.88. It was ready for delivery on 29.8.1988 and was actually delivered on 8.9.1988. The revision petition was instituted on 9.5.1991 i.e. after about 2-3/4 years. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that no limitation is provided for filing a revision petition under Section 15(5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act against the order of the Appellate Authority and, therefore, the petition was well within limitation. In support of his argument he has cited at the bar following judgments :-
(1) Dev Raj v. Harcharan Singh, (1988-1) 93 P. L. R. 39.
(2) Madhusudan Lal v. Sadhu Ram, (1984) 86 P. L. R. 101.
(3) Rajinder Kumar v. Dr. Rajwant Rai Sood, (1983) 85 P. L R 177.
I have gone through the above said judgment but none of them could help the petitioner. In Dev Raj’s case (supra) the tenant instead of filing the petition in the High Court had been wrongly advised to file appeal before the Appellate Authority and when that appeal was held not maintainable a revision petition was filed in the High Court and in the peculiar circumstances of that case it was held that the prosecution of the appeal before the Appellate Authority was clearly bona fide and could at the worst be treated to be the result of the wrong advice of the counsel who filed the appeal. But the facts of this case are tangent apart from the above said case. In Mahusudan Lal’s case (supra) a revision petition under Section 15(5) of the Act was filed after 93 days and under those circumstances revision petition was considered to be within limitation. So this judgment is also of no avail to the petitioner. In Rajinder Kumar’s case (supra) the delay of 2 1/2 years in filing the revision had occurred due to the petitioner having filed an appeal in the first instance before the Appellate Authority under Section 15(2) of the Act against the order passed by the Rent Controller under Section 19 of the Act. Herein it is altogether a different case.
13. In Smt. Rama Talwar v. Maya Devi, (1991-2) 100 P. L. R. 109 it was held by this Court that no period of limitation is prescribed for filing revision before the High Court under the Act but still it must be filed within a reasonable time.
14. Here, in this case, the revision petition was filed 2 3/4 years after the impugned order was passed and no explanation whatsoever for the said delay is coming forth. Hence the above said judgment also does not cover the case in hand.
15. As a sequal to the above discussion, the impugned order can not be faulted and the same is affirmed. Consequently this revision petition is dismissed. No costs.