JUDGMENT
Charanjit Talwar, J.
(1) All the above appeals have been filed by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi directed against the orders of acquittal passed against the respective respondents for offence punishable under Section 7 read with Section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. In each case the cognizance of offence was taken by the Magistrate as the Commissioner of Municipal Corporation of Delhi had given written consent to institute the complaints as required under the provisions of section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (hereinafter called the Act). In these appeals, the first question which arises for consideration is whether these are barred by limitation. The period of limitation is provided under Sub-Section 5 of Section 378 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It reads : “5.No application under Sub-Section (4) for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall be entertained by the High Court after the expiry of six months where the complainant is a public servant and 60 days in every other case computed from the date of that order of acquittal.”
(2) Learned counsel for the appellant admit that applications seeking special leave to appeal from all the orders of acquittal were filed after the expiry of sixty days of passing of the impugned orders. The applications were, however, filed before the expiry of six months. It seems that the Municipal Corporation of Delhi was of the view when the said applications for special leave to appeal were filed, that the limitation for filing the same was six month’ computed from the date of the order of acquittal.
(3) The very question which has arisen in all these appeals has been decided by a Division Bench of this Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. S.K. Join & Ors. 1984 (2) Fac 289. In that case also the appeal had been filed after sixty days but before the expiry of six months. The plea of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi was that the complainant was a public servant who had been authorised to file the complaint on behalf of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi and thus the limitation for filing of the appeal was six months. After noticing Section 20 of the Act, as it existed, the Division Bench observed that “It is a question of fact as to who is a complainant in a particular case. In the present case it was by and in the name of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi that complaint was filed through Shri Ganga Ram”. It was held that the complainant in the said case was Municipal Corporation of Delhi which was not a public servant.
(4) We have gone through the complaints in the present cases and we find that the samples in question were purchased in each one of these cases prior to 1st April, 1976, the date from which the amendment of Section 20 came into force vide the Act 34 of 1976. The provision for Cognizance and trial of offences’ as per Section 20 at the relevant time read as under : “(1)No prosecution for an offence under this Act, shall be instituted except by, or with the written consent of, the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority or a person authorised in this behalf by general or special order, by the Central Government or the State Government or a local authority : Provided that a prosecution for an offence under this Act maybe instituted by a purchaser referred to in Section 12, if he produces in Court a copy of the report of the Public Analyst Along with the complaint. (2) No Court inferior to that of a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence under this Act.”
By the said amendment, in sub-section (1), the words “local authority” were omitted. We are not called upon in these appeals to adjudicate upon the effect of the omission of those words, i.e., “local authority” as the offences were committed prior to 1st April, 1976, arid the complaints were filed by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi. Thus the law laid by the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Jagdish Lal and Another, 1973 Fac 266 wherein it was held that even if the complaint had been filed by and in the name of a person authorised in that behalf by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, it was the Municipal Corporation of Delhi who was the complainant, is applicable in the present cases also. We agree with respect with the decision of the Division Bench in S.K Jain’s case (Supra) that the Municipal Corporation of Delhi is not a public servant and thus the period of limitation within which appeals by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi could be filed was sixty days from the date of the order of acquittal. We were informed that Municipal Corporation of Delhi has not challenged the said judgment.
(5) It is unnecessary to make calculations regarding the time spent in obtaining the certified copies of the impugned judgments as the learned counsel for the appellant have themselves prepared a chart showing that none of these appeals was filed within sixty days from the date of order of acquittal. We hold that the present appeals are barred by limitation and are thus liable to be dismissed. We dismiss all of them and maintain the acquittal of the respondents. We may notice that in Cr. Appeal No. 124/79, we were informed that respondent No. 2 expired during the pendency of the appeal.