CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 3303 of 2007 PETITIONER: Municipal Corporation of Delhi RESPONDENT: Qimat Rai Gupta & Ors DATE OF JUDGMENT: 27/07/2007 BENCH: S.B. Sinha & Harjit Singh Bedi JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3303 OF 2007
[Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 3553 of 2005]
S.B. SINHA, J :
1. Leave granted.
2. The meaning of the word ‘made’ occurring in sub-section (4) of
Section 126 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (hereinafter
called and referred to, for the sake of brevity, as ‘the Act’), is in question in
this appeal which arises out of a judgment and order dated 25.08.2004
passed by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in L.P.A. No. 162 of
2003, reversing the judgment and order dated 21.10.2002 passed by a
learned Single Judge of the said court.
3. Before adverting to the question involved in this appeal, we may
notice the basic fact of the matter.
4. Respondents herein are the owners of a property bearing No.1/2 of 1
(1&3) Part, Ram Kishore Road, Civil Lines, Delhi, which was proposed to
be assessed for property taxes by the competent authority of Municipal
Corporation of Delhi, a notice wherefor was issued in March 1997 purported
to be under Section 126 of the Act to fix the rateable value thereof at
Rs.50,00,000/- with effect from 01.04.1996. Respondents herein objected to
the said proposal. They filed various documents in support of their case
stating that the property in question had jointly been purchased by Anil
Gupta, Qimat Rai Gupta and Vinod Gupta by four separate deeds of sale for
a total consideration of Rs.32,00,000/-. The market value of the land was
assessed by the assessee at Rs. 89,93,100/- comprising of the value of the
land at Rs.42,19,000/- and cost of construction at Rs.51,00,000/-. The said
market value disclosed by the assessee was not accepted by the assessing
authority. The assessing officer upon hearing the respondents assessed the
value at Rs.1,40,90,100/- and determined the rateable value therefor at Rs.
11,97,660/- with effect from 01.04.1996. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied with
the said order of assessment, Respondents preferred an appeal in the Court
of Additional District Judge, Delhi, in terms of Section 169 of the Act, inter
alia, on the ground that the order of assessment was barred by limitation.
By reason of an order dated 14.12.2000, the appellate authority opined that
no amendment in terms of sub-section (1) of Section 126 of the Act could be
made after lapse of period of three years from the end of the year in which
the notice was given and as the notice in the case had been issued in the
period ending 31.03.1997, the order of assessment could be made only upto
31.03.2000.
It was further held :
“Now coming to the questions what is meaning of
word ‘made’ whether it has to be taken as a date of
passing the order or the date when it was communicated
to the party concerned. The dictionary meaning of
word ‘made’ is built or formed. This is discussed in
AIR 1956 Madras 79 wherein it has been held that term
‘made’ has to be liberally construed as the date on
which the order is communicated to the concerned
parties and reaches them. Taking the same into
consideration, the present order cannot be said to have
been communicated to the assessee/appellants within
three years which is illegal. Accordingly, I set aside the
impugned order dated 31.3.2000 being time barred.
The property be assessed on the RV already in
existence prior to the passing of order dated 31.3.2000.
No order as to cost. File be consigned to R/R.”
5. Appellant herein being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said
order dated 14.12.2000 filed a writ petition before the Delhi High Court,
which was marked as Writ Petition No. 3227 of 2002. A learned Single
Judge of the said Court allowed the said writ petition remanding the matter
to the appellate authority directing it to determine the question on merits and
in accordance with law.
6. Respondents field an intra-court appeal thereagainst. By reason of the
impugned judgment and order dated 25.08.2004, a Division Bench of the
High Court reversed the said decision of the learned Single Judge opining
that the date of the order ‘made’ in terms of Section 126(4) of the Act
should be taken to be the date when the same was communicated to the
assessee and not the one when it was signed.
7. Before embarking on the question involved in this appeal, we may
place on record that the order of assessment was signed on 15.03.1999 and
the same was diarized in the despatch register on 31.03.1999.
8. The said Act was enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to
the Municipal Government of Delhi. Chapter VIII of the said Act provides
for taxation. Levy of property taxes is envisaged under sub-section (1) of
Section 113 of the Act. Section 114 provides for the components of
property tax. Section 114A provides for building tax. Section 114C provides
for vacant land tax. Section 123A provides for submission of returns.
Section 123B provides for self-assessment and submission of return.
9. Appellant has, thus, a statutory power to impose property tax.
Section 124 of the Act provided for assessment list, sub-section (1) whereof
reads as under :
“(1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the
Corporation shall cause an assessment list of all lands
and buildings in Delhi to be prepared in such form and
manner and containing such particulars with respect to
each land and building as may be prescribed by bye-
laws.”
10. Section 126 of the Act empowers the Commissioner to amend the
assessment list in terms of one or the other modes provided for therein.
Sub-section (2) thereof provids for giving an opportunity to the assessee of
being heard before an order of amendment is made. Sub-section (3) of
Section 126 obligats the Commissioner to consider the objections which
may be made by such persons. Clause (b) of sub-section (4) of Section 126
reads as under :
“(4) No amendment under sub-section (1) shall
be made in the assessment list in relation to
xxx xxx xxx
(b) the year commencing on the 1st day of April,
1988 or any other year thereafter, after the expiry of three
years from the end of the year in which the notice is
given under sub-section (2) or sub-section (3), as the case
may be.”
11. Mr. Amarendra Sharan, learned Additional Solicitor General of India
appearing on behalf of the appellant, submitted that the Division Bench of
the High Court committed a manifest error in reversing the judgment of the
learned Single Judge insofar as it proceeded on the premise that the
expression ‘made’ occurring in sub-section (4) of Section 126 of the Act
would necessitate communication of the order.
12. It was urged that a distinction must be made between
‘communication’ of the order and making thereof inasmuch as whereas
‘communication’ may be necessary so as to enable an assessee to prefer an
appeal against the order of assessment but only signing of the order would
subserve the purpose of saving the period of limitation prescribed therein
and in that view of the matter the period of three years prescribed under sub-
section (4) of Section 126 being the period of limitation, the expressions ‘no
amendment under sub-section (1) shall be made’ should be given a liberal
interpretation. Strong reliance in this behalf has been placed on Collector of
Central Excise, Madras v. M/s M.M. Rubber and Co., Tamil Nadu [1992
Supp. (1) SCC 471].
13. Mr. P. Narasimha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondents, on the other hand, contended that the said Act having been
enacted for the purpose of controlling the abuse of power on the part of the
Commissioner, the same should be given a purposive meaning so as to fulfil
the purport and object of the legislation. Reliance in this behalf has been
placed on Surendra Singh and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh [AIR 1954
SC 194], Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land Acquisition
Officer and Another [AIR 1961 SC 1500] and K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran
Vaidhyan Balan and Another [(1999) 7 SCC 510].
14. Commissioner in terms of the provisions of the said Act exercises a
statutory power. A proceeding initiated for the purpose of amending the
assessment list is a quasi judicial one. Commissioner of the Municipal
Corporation is a statutory authority. The terms and conditions of his
appointment are governed by Section 54 of the Act. He can be appointed
only by the Central Government. The power of amendment can be exercised
at any time, as would appear from sub-section (1) of Section 126 of the Act;
the only limitation therefor being that a fresh order would not relate back to
the end of the financial year in which the notice is issued.
15. Indisputably, the Parliament did not intend to confer unbriddled power
on the Commissioner to amend the assessment list. For that purpose only a
period within which the jurisdiction is to be exercised was contemplated,
namely, before the expiry of three years from the end of the year in which
the notice is given, but the same would not mean that the restriction imposed
should be given a restricted meaning so as to narrow down the scope thereof
any further.
16. In interpreting a provision dealing with limitation, a liberal
interpretation in a situation of this nature should be given. Although an
order passed after expiry of the period of limitation fixed under the statute
would be a nullity, the same would not mean that a principle of
interpretation applied thereto should not be such so as to mean that not only
an order is required to be made but the same is also required to be
communicated.
17. When an order is passed by a high ranking authority appointed by the
Central Government, the law presumes that he would act bona fide. Misuse
of power in a situation of this nature, in our opinion, should not be readily
inferred. It is difficult to comprehend that while fixing a period of
limitation, the Parliament did not visualise the possibility of abuse of power
on the part of the statutory authority. It advisedly chose the word ‘made’
and not ‘communicated’. They, in ordinary parlance, carry different
meanings.
18. Even if a statute requires strict interpretation, words thereto would not
be added.
19. The word ‘made’ is past and past participle of the word ‘make’ which
means “cause to exist or come about; bring about or perform” [See Concise
Oxford English Dictionary, 10th Edition].
20. In P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s Advanced Law Lexicon, 3rd edition, page
2822, it is stated:
“Made. A receiving order or other order of Court is
“made” on the day it is pronounced, not when it is
drawn up. [In re Manning (1885) 30 Ch D 480. See
also 4 All 278: 2 AWN 26.
*** *** ***
The word ‘made’ in this rule might refer to the
proclamation of sale as well as the announcement
of the sale, as it says that it shall be made and
published in the manner provided by the Rule
54(1). The word ‘made’ cannot be taken to
include the preparation of proclamation of sale.
Seshatiri Aiyar v. Valambal Ammal, AIR 1952
Mad 377, 381 [O. XXI, R. 54(1). C.P.C. (5 of
1908)]
*** *** ***
An order by a Chancery judge in Chambers is
“made” not when it is pronounced, but when it is
signed and entered, or otherwise perfected
(Heatley v. Newton, 19 Ch. D. 326)”
21. The meaning of a word, it is trite, would depend upon its text and
context. It will also depend upon the purport and object it seeks to achieve.
With a view to understand the proper meaning of the said word, we may
notice the decisions cited at the Bar.
22. In Surendra Singh (supra), a three-Judge Bench of this Court while
considering the provisions of Section 369 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898 opining that a judgment being a declaration of the mind of
the court as it is at the time of pronouncement, made a distinction between a
civil case and a criminal case, stating :
“10. In our opinion, a judgment within the
meaning of these sections is the final decision of the
court intimated to the parties and to the world at large by
formal “pronouncement” or “delivery” in open court. It is
a judicial act which must be performed in a judicial way.
Small irregularities in the manner of pronouncement or
the mode of delivery do not matter but the substance of
the thing must be there : that can neither be blurred nor
left to inference and conjecture nor can it be vague. All
the rest – the manner in which it is to be recorded, the
way in which it is to be authenticated, the signing and the
sealing, all the rules designed to secure certainty about its
content and matter – can be cured; but not the hard core,
namely the formal intimation of the decision and its
contents formally declared in a judicial way in open
court. The exact way in which this is done does not
matter. In some courts the judgment is delivered orally or
read out, in some only the operative portion is
pronounced, in some the judgment is merely signed after
giving notice to the parties and laying the draft on the
table for a given number of days for inspection.”
23. In view of the fact that in that case one of the judges expired before
signing of the judgment prepared by the brother Judge, it was held therein
that the same did not constitute a judgment of the Division Bench.
24. In Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra), the award of a Collector
made under the Land Acquisition Act was treated to be fructified when the
same was communicated on the premise opining that an award was an
‘offer’ made by the Collector on behalf of the Government to the owner of
the property and, thus, the date of the award cannot be determined solely by
reference to the time when the award was signed by the Collector or
delivered by him in his office, it must involve the consideration of the
question as to when it was known to the party concerned either actually or
constructively.
25. In K. Bhaskaran (supra), a notice required to be given in terms of
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was construed
liberally, stating :
“19. In Black’s Law Dictionary, ‘giving of notice’
is distinguished from ‘receiving of the notice.’ (vide page
621) “A person notifies or gives notice to another by
taking such steps as may be reasonably required to
inform the other in the ordinary course, whether or not
such other actually comes to know of it.” A person
‘receives’ a notice when it is duly delivered to him or at
the place of his business.
20. If a strict interpretation is given that the drawer
should have actually received the notice for the period of
15 days to start running no matter that the payee sent the
notice on the correct address, a trickster cheque drawer
would get the premium to avoid receiving the notice by
different strategies and he could escape from the legal
consequences of Section 138 of the Act. It must be borne
in mind that the Court should not adopt an interpretation
which helps a dishonest evader and clips an honest payee
as that would defeat the very legislative measure.
21. In Maxwell’s ‘Interpretation of Statues’ the
learned author has emphasized that “provisions relating
to giving of notice often receive liberal interpretation,”
(vide page 99 of the 12th edn.) The context envisaged in
Section 138 of the Act invites a liberal interpretation for
the person who has the statutory obligation to give notice
because he is presumed to be the loser in the transaction
and it is for his interest the very provision is made by the
legislature. The words in Clause (b) of the proviso to
Section 138 of the Act show that payee has the statutory
obligation to ‘make a demand’ by giving notice. The
thrust in the clause is on the need to ‘make a demand’. It
is only the mode for making such demand which the
legislature has prescribed. A payee can send the notice
for doing his part for giving the notice. Once it is
despatched his part is over and the next depends on what
the sendee does.”
[See C.C. Alavi Haji v. Palapetty Muhammed & Anr. 2007 (7) SCALE 380]
26. The question, however, in our opinion, stands concluded by a three-
Judge Bench of this Court in M/s M.M. Rubber and Co., Tamil Nadu
(supra), wherein Ramaswami, J. speaking for the Bench succinctly stated the
law thus :
“12. It may be seen therefore, that, if an authority
is authorised to exercise a power or do an act affecting
the rights of parties, he shall exercise that power within
the period of limitation prescribed therefor. The order or
decision of such authority comes into force or, becomes
operative or becomes an effective order or decision on
and from the date when it is signed by him. The date of
such order or decision is the date on which the order or
decision was passed or made: that is to say when he
ceases to have any authority to tear it off and draft a
different order and when he ceases to have any
locuspaetentiae. Normally that happens when the order or
decision is made public or notified in some form or when
it can be said to have left his hand. The date of
communication of the order to the party whose rights are
affected is not the relevant date for purposes of
determining whether the power has been exercised within
the prescribed time .”
It was further held :
“18. Thus if the intention or design of the statutory
provision was to protect the interest of the person
adversely affected, by providing a remedy against the
order or decision any period of limitation prescribed with
reference to invoking such remedy shall be read as
commencing from the date of communication of the
order. But if it is a limitation for a competent authority to
make an order the date of exercise of that power and in
the case of exercise of suo moto power over the
subordinate authorities’ orders, the date on which such
power was exercised by making an order are the relevant
dates for determining the limitation. The ratio of this
distinction may also be founded on the principle that the
Government is bound by the proceedings of its officers
but persons affected are not concluded by the decision.”
27. A distinction, thus, exists in the construction of the word ‘made’
depending upon the question as to whether the power was required to be
exercised within the period of limitation prescribed therefor or in order to
provide the person aggrieved to avail remedies if he is aggrieved thereby or
dissatisfied therewith. Ordinarily, the words ‘given’ and ‘made’ carries the
same meaning.
28. An order passed by a competent authority dismissing a Government
servant from services requires communication thereof as has been held in
[See State of Punjab v. Amar Singh Harika – AIR 1966 SC 1313], but an
order placing a Government servant on suspension does not require
communication of that order. [See State of Punjab v. Khemi Ram – AIR
1970 SC 214]. What is, therefore, necessary to be borne in mind is the
knowledge leading to the making of the order. An order ordinarily would be
presumed to have been made when it is signed. Once it is signed and an
entry in that regard is made in the requisite register kept and maintained in
terms of the provisions of a statute, the same cannot be changed or altered.
It, subject to the other provisions contained in the Act, attains finality.
Where, however, communication of an order is a necessary ingredient for
bringing an end-result to a status or to provide a person an opportunity to
take recourse of law if he is aggrieved thereby; the order is required to be
communicated.
29. The Division Bench of the High Court, in our opinion, proceeded on a
wrong premise insofar as it misconstrued and misinterpreted the word
‘made’ in the context of sub-section (4) of Section 126 of the Act opining
that the power can be misused by the Commissioner. The Division Bench,
with respect, failed to notice that there exists a presumption that the official
act is presumed to have been done in regular course of business. There also
exists a presumption that a statutory functionary would act honestly and
bona fide.
30. We are, therefore, are not in a position to persuade ourselves to follow
the line of reasoning adopted by the Division Bench of the High Court that
unless the order is communicated, it should be deemed to have not been
made.
31. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be
sustained, which is set aside accordingly and that of the learned Single Judge
is restored. The appeal is allowed. No costs.