JUDGMENT
Markandeya Katju, C.J.
1. This writ petition has been filed against the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 29.1.2002. By the said judgment the learned Single Judge has disposed of 5 writ petitions.
2. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
3. Since the facts are the same in these LPAs we are disposing them of by a common order.
4. The petitioner in writ petition No. 21/2000 filed the writ petition for a writ of mandamus directing the Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board (DSSSB)/respondent No. 2 in this writ petition to publish the name of the petitioner for appointment to the post of teacher. The petitioner also prayed for a mandamus to the respondents MCD and NDMC to accept the joining of the petitioner to the post to which he should have been appointed and pay salary to him.
5. It is alleged in paragraph 4 (a) of the writ petition that on 11.6.1998 the DSSSB issued an advertisement calling for applications for appointment to the post of Primary Teacher/Nursery Teacher/Assistant in the MCD, NDMC and Directorate of Education, Government of Delhi. The petitioner applied for appointment.
6. Between 28.5.1999 to 16.6.1999 the DSSSB published the final list of appointed candidates but the petitioner’s name was missing from the said list. The petitioner alleged that he was entitled to have been declared as a successful candidate as he had a score above the cut off point. The petitioner alleged that he has a B.Ed degree from Hindi Sahitya Sammellan, Allahabad in 1997 which is called ‘Shiksha Visharad’ and is allegedly equivalent to B.Ed degree. Some other petitioners got their degree/diploma from Sampurnanad Sanskrit Vishwavidyalaya, Varanasi.
7. It is alleged that DSSSB is illegally not recommending the name of the petitioners for appointment as a teacher.
8. A counter affidavit was filed by the DSSSB in the writ petition and we have perused the same.
9. It is alleged in paragraph 4M of the counter affidavit that the petitioner’s degree is not considered equivalent to BED or JBT and, therefore, the petitioner was not eligible.
10. A counter affidavit was also filed by the MCD and we have perused the same. It is alleged in the preliminary submissions in the counter affidavit that the petitioner passed Shiksha Visharad from the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan, Allahabad in 1997 but that degree is not a recognised degree. In this regard a circular has been issued by different Government Authorities. Pursuant to information sought by the MCD by its letter dated 5.8.1999, the Directorate of Central Hindi, Ministry of Human Resource Development, Education Department, Government of India by its letter dated 13.8.1999 has communicated that no examination passed from the Hindi Institute is equivalent in respect of the degree/diploma in the general set up of the examination. The degree even by the said institute is limited for the purpose of Hindi knowledge only.
11. There is another circular dated 5.5.1988 of the Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India which mentioned a list of equivalency of Hindi examination of various university. This list does not includes Shiksha Visharad. It is alleged that this means that the Government of India does not recognise the Shiksha Visharad course run by such institutes like Hindi Sahitya Sammelan which are only for the purpose of propagating knowledge of Hindi. Hindi Sahitya Sammelan and other similar institutes are set up only for extention or promotion of Hindi language. The course run by the institute are not equivalent to the degree/diploma in the general set up of education.
12. In paragraph 1 of the counter affidavit, it is stated that the petitioner is not eligible for the post of primary teacher in MCD as he has no recognised degree of professional qualification such as B.Ed or JBT. He has passed Shiksha Visharad from the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan, Allahabad which is not recognised by the MHRD, Government of India.
13. From the facts of the case, it is evident that the writ petitioner in writ petition No. 21/2000 had obtained his degree/diploma in Hindi which is not recognised by the Ministry of Education, Government of India.
14. Some of the petitioners in the connected writ petitions have acquired their B.Ed degree from Sampurnand Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya, Varanasi (hereinafter referred to SSV). This degree is also not recognised by the Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India.
15. The advertisement issued by the MCD inter alia prescribes the following qualification ‘One year teachers training certificate from a recognised Institute. Note: B.Ed, B.T., L.T., trained teachers are also eligible.’ On similar lines is the advertisement of DSSSB. Hence, it is evident that only a candidate who has a degree equivalent to BA degree from a recognised institute is eligible for the post of teacher. The writ petitioners were evidently not holding degree/diploma from a recognised institute and hence in our opinion they were ineligible for the appointment claimed.
16. The learned Single Judge in his impugned judgment has held that the writ petitioner did not have qualification from an institute recognised by the National Council of Teacher Education. However, it was contended before him that the petitioners had obtained their degree before the NCTE Act, came into force.
17. Under Section 17(4) of the NCTE Act a qualification obtained from an institution not recognised by the NCTE is not valid for the purpose of employment under the Central Government/State Government or by a University or a School or College aided by the Central or State Government. However, the writ petitioners contended that the embargo contained under Section 17(4) would not be applicable to their cases since at the time when they got their degrees, these degrees were recognised by the Government of India.
18. The learned Single Judge relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Suresh Pal v. State of Haryana and Ors. and following the said decision has allowed the writ petition.
19. The learned Single Judge has relied on the letter of the Government of India dated 29.12.2000 but in our opinion he has misinterpreted the said letter. That letter merely states that degrees granted by the universities which are recognised by the Central Government are automatically considered to be recognised.
20. In the present case we have to see whether the degree of Shiksha Shastri degree is recognised for the purpose of employment as primary teacher (General). As per the circulars of the Government of India referred to above, the said degree is not recognised for the purpose of employment for primary teacher (General). Hence, it appears to us that the learned Single Judge has taken an erroneous view.
21. The circular dated 21.11.1990 specifically states that the Sampurnand Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya, Varanasi is not recognised for the purpose of employment for primary teacher (General). The same view have been taken in the circular of the Ministry of Education, Government of India dated 23.1.1964 and the circular dated 29.11.1969 of the Government of India which does not recognise the degree of Shiksha Visharad for the purpose of employment as a general teacher.
22. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Suresh Pal’s case (supra) which was relied on by the learned Single Judge has subsequently been considered by the Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan and Ors. v. Lata Arun .
23. In paragraph 15 of the said judgment the Supreme Court has clearly observed that the earlier decision in Suresh Pal’s case (supra) was confined to its own facts and does not lay any general principle of law. Hence, the said decision in Suresh Pal’s case (supra) cannot be of any avail to the respondents.
24. In paragraph 13 of the said judgment in State of Rajasthan and Ors. v. Lata Arun the Supreme Court observed:-
It is not for courts to decide whether a particular educational qualification should or should not be accepted as equivalent to the qualification prescribed by the authority.
25. In our opinion, it is for the authorities concerned and not the Court to decide whether there is equivalence or not. It is not proper for the Court to encroach into the executive domain. The judiciary must exercise restraint in this connection.
26. For the reasons given above, this appeal and other connected appeals are allowed and the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside and the writ petitions are dismissed.