REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1206 OF 2006
Munigadappa Meenaiah ...Appellant
Vs.
The State of Andhra Pradesh ...Respondent
JUDGMENT
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of the
Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court upholding
the conviction recorded by III Additional District and Sessions
Judge, Ranga Reddy District, holding the appellant guilty for
the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (in short `IPC’) and sentencing him imprisonment
for life.
2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
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The accused Munigadapa Meenaiah is native of
Thimmapuram, Bommalaramaram of Nalgonda District. He
was doing fruit business at Medchal. Ten years back, his
younger brother Mallaiah died. After demise of Mallaiah, his
wife Yellamma (hereinafter referred to as the `deceased’), along
with her two sons took shelter at the house of the accused.
During that period, he developed illegal intimacy with the
deceased and both were living together and her sons were
living separately. Suspecting the fidelity of the deceased, the
accused used to pick up quarrels with her, as a result of
which, he separated and took another portion at Medchal.
While so, the accused hatched up a plan to liquidate the
deceased. On 3.6.2001 at about 9.00 A.M. the accused went
to the house of deceased and invited her to house to
consume toddy and both of them went to the toddy shop of
PW 2, purchased two bottle of toddy and brought the same to
his house in a tumbler and both of them consumed toddy.
While consuming toddy, the accused picked up quarrel with
the deceased on the ground of her chastity. As a consequence
of which the deceased grew wild and abused him by denying
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the allegations of illegal contacts with others. On that, the
accused brought a pestle and murdered the deceased by
hitting the same on her head and laid the body on the road in
front of his house, cleaned the blood stains in the room and
tried to obliterate the scientific evidence so as to throw the
suspicion on other persons. On the report given by P.W.1, a
case in Cr. No.117 of 2001 of Medchel Police Station was
registered for the offence under Section 302 IPC and after
completion of investigation, charge sheet was filed.
Accused abjured guilt and demanded trial. The
prosecution examined 10 witnesses, and marked Exs P 1 to P
21 and Mos 1 to 5. On the other hand, no oral evidence was
adduced on behalf of the accused, Ex. D1 contradiction was
marked.
After scrutinizing the entire material on record and after
hearing the learned counsel on both sides, the learned District
Judge found the accused guilty of the offence punishable
under Section 302 IPC, convicted and sentenced him to suffer
imprisonment for life.
3. The Trial Court placed reliance on the evidence of
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PWs. 1 and 10 who spoke to have seen the deceased last in
the company of the appellant. Reference was also made to the
evidence of PW5 relating to certain recoveries by PW. 19. PW
2 also deposed to have seen accused and deceased together
when they purchased toddy and thereafter the dead body of
the deceased was found in front of the house of the accused
with injuries on her head and other parts of the body. As
noted above, the learned Trial Court found the accused guilty.
4. Before the High Court the stand was that PWs. 1 and
10 are sons of the deceased and are interested witnesses and
should not have been believed. It was also submitted that the
circumstances highlighted do not make a complete chain of
circumstances. The High Court did not find any substance in
the plea and dismissed the same by the impugned judgment.
5. In support of the appeal learned counsel for the
appellant reiterated the stands taken before the High Court.
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6. In response, learned counsel for the State supported
the judgment of the Trial Court and the High Court.
7. We shall first deal with the contention regarding
interestedness of the witnesses for furthering prosecution
version. Relationship is not a factor to affect credibility of a
witness. It is more often than not that a relation would not
conceal actual culprit and make allegations against an
innocent person. Foundation has to be laid if plea of false
implication is made. In such cases, the court has to adopt a
careful approach and analyse evidence to find out whether it
is cogent and credible.
8. In Dalip Singh and Ors. v. The State of Punjab (AIR
1953 SC 364) it has been laid down as under:-
“A witness is normally to be considered
independent unless he or she springs from
sources which are likely to be tainted and that
usually means unless the witness has cause,
such as enmity against the accused, to wish to
implicate him falsely. Ordinarily a close
relation would be the last to screen the real
culprit and falsely implicate an innocent
person. It is true, when feelings run high and5
there is personal cause for enmity, that there
is a tendency to drag in an innocent person
against whom a witness has a grudge along
with the guilty, but foundation must be laid
for such a criticism and the mere fact of
relationship far from being a foundation is
often a sure guarantee of truth. However, we
are not attempting any sweeping
generalization. Each case must be judged on
its own facts. Our observations are only made
to combat what is so often put forward in
cases before us as a general rule of prudence.
There is no such general rule. Each case must
be limited to and be governed by its own
facts.”
9. The above decision has since been followed in Guli
Chand and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan (1974 (3) SCC 698) in
which Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras (AIR 1957 SC 614)
was also relied upon.
10. We may also observe that the ground that the
witness being a close relative and consequently being a
partisan witness, should not be relied upon, has no
substance. This theory was repelled by this Court as early as
in Dalip Singh’s case (supra) in which surprise was expressed
over the impression which prevailed in the minds of the
Members of the Bar that relatives were not independent
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witnesses. Speaking through Vivian Bose, J. it was observed:
“We are unable to agree with the learned
Judges of the High Court that the testimony of
the two eyewitnesses requires corroboration.
If the foundation for such an observation is
based on the fact that the witnesses are
women and that the fate of seven men hangs
on their testimony, we know of no such rule.
If it is grounded on the reason that they are
closely related to the deceased we are unable
to concur. This is a fallacy common to many
criminal cases and one which another Bench
of this Court endeavoured to dispel in –
`Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan’ (AIR 1952
SC 54 at p.59). We find, however, that it
unfortunately still persists, if not in the
judgments of the Courts, at any rate in the
arguments of counsel.”
11. Again in Masalti and Ors. v. State of U.P. (AIR
1965 SC 202) this Court observed: (p, 209-210 para 14):
“But it would, we think, be unreasonable to
contend that evidence given by witnesses
should be discarded only on the ground that it
is evidence of partisan or interested
witnesses…….The mechanical rejection of
such evidence on the sole ground that it is
partisan would invariably lead to failure of
justice. No hard and fast rule can be laid
down as to how much evidence should be
appreciated. Judicial approach has to be
cautious in dealing with such evidence; but
the plea that such evidence should be
rejected because it is partisan cannot be7
accepted as correct.”
12. To the same effect is the decision in State of Punjab
v. Jagir Singh (AIR 1973 SC 2407) and Lehna v. State of
Haryana (2002 (3) SCC 76).
13. As observed by this Court in State of Rajasthan v.
Teja Ram and Ors. (AIR 1999 SC 1776) the over-insistence on
witnesses having no relation with the victims often results in
criminal justice going awry. When any incident happens in a
dwelling house or nearby the most natural witnesses would
be the inmates of that house.
14. It has been consistently laid down by this Court that
where a case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the
inference of guilt can be justified only when all the
incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be
incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of
any other person. (See Hukam Singh v. State of Rajasthan AIR
(1977 SC 1063); Eradu and Ors. v. State of Hyderabad (AIR
1956 SC 316); Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka (AIR
1983 SC 446); State of U.P. v. Sukhbasi and Ors. (AIR 1985
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SC 1224); Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1987 SC
350); Ashok Kumar Chatterjee v. State of M.P. (AIR 1989 SC
1890). The circumstances from which an inference as to the
guilt of the accused is drawn have to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely
connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred from
those circumstances. In Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab (AIR
1954 SC 621), it was laid down that where the case depends
upon the conclusion drawn from circumstances the
cumulative effect of the circumstances must be such as to
negative the innocence of the accused and bring the offences
home beyond any reasonable doubt.
15. We may also make a reference to a decision of this
Court in C. Chenga Reddy and Ors. v. State of A.P. (1996) 10
SCC 193, wherein it has been observed thus:
“In a case based on circumstantial evi-
dence, the settled law is that the circum-
stances from which the conclusion of guilt is
drawn should be fully proved and such cir-
cumstances must be conclusive in nature.
Moreover, all the circumstances should be
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complete and there should be no gap left in
the chain of evidence. Further the proved cir-
cumstances must be consistent only with the
hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and to-
tally inconsistent with his innocence….”.
16. In Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P. and Ors. (AIR
1990 SC 79), it was laid down that when a case rests upon
circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy the
following tests:
“(1) the circumstances from which an
inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must
be cogently and firmly established;
(2) those circumstances should be of a
definite tendency unerringly pointing towards
guilt of the accused;
(3) the circumstances, taken
cumulatively should form a chain so complete
that there is no escape from the conclusion
that within all human probability the crime
was committed by the accused and none else;
and
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(4) the circumstantial evidence in order
to sustain conviction must be complete and
incapable of explanation of any other
hypothesis than that of the guilt of the
accused and such evidence should not only be
consistent with the guilt of the accused but
should be inconsistent with his innocence.
17. In State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava, (1992
Crl.LJ 1104), it was pointed out that great care must be taken
in evaluating circumstantial evidence and if the evidence
relied on is reasonably capable of two inferences, the one in
favour of the accused must be accepted. It was also pointed
out that the circumstances relied upon must be found to have
been fully established and the cumulative effect of all the facts
so established must be consistent only with the hypothesis of
guilt.
18. Sir Alfred Wills in his admirable book “Wills’
Circumstantial Evidence” (Chapter VI) lays down the following
rules specially to be observed in the case of circumstantial
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evidence: (1) the facts alleged as the basis of any legal
inference must be clearly proved and beyond reasonable
doubt connected with the factum probandum; (2) the burden
of proof is always on the party who asserts the existence of
any fact, which infers legal accountability; (3) in all cases,
whether of direct or circumstantial evidence the best evidence
must be adduced which the nature of the case admits; (4) in
order to justify the inference of guilt, the inculpatory facts
must be incompatible with the innocence of the accused and
incapable of explanation, upon any other reasonable
hypothesis than that of his guilt, (5) if there be any reasonable
doubt of the guilt of the accused, he is entitled as of right to
be acquitted”.
19. There is no doubt that conviction can be based solely
on circumstantial evidence but it should be tested by the
touch-stone of law relating to circumstantial evidence laid
down by the this Court as far back as in 1952.
20. In Hanumant Govind Nargundkar and Anr. V. State
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of Madhya Pradesh, (AIR 1952 SC 343), wherein it was
observed thus:
“It is well to remember that in cases where
the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the
circumstances from which the conclusion of
guilt is to be drawn should be in the first
instance be fully established and all the facts
so established should be consistent only with
the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused.
Again, the circumstances should be of a
conclusive nature and tendency and they
should be such as to exclude every
hypothesis but the one proposed to be
proved. In other words, there must be a chain
of evidence so far complete as not to leave
any reasonable ground for a conclusion
consistent with the innocence of the accused
and it must be such as to show that within all
human probability the act must have been
done by the accused.”
21. A reference may be made to a later decision in
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (AIR 1984
SC 1622). Therein, while dealing with circumstantial evidence,
it has been held that onus was on the prosecution to prove
that the chain is complete and the infirmity of lacuna in
prosecution cannot be cured by false defence or plea. The
conditions precedent in the words of this Court, before
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conviction could be based on circumstantial evidence, must be
fully established. They are:
(1) the circumstances from which the
conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be
fully established. The circumstances
concerned `must’ or `should’ and not `may be’
established;
(2) the facts so established should be
consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt
of the accused, that is to say, they should not
be explainable on any other hypothesis except
that the accused is guilty;
(3) the circumstances should be of a
conclusive nature and tendency;
(4) they should exclude every possible
hypothesis except the one to be proved; and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so
complete as not to leave any reasonable
ground for the conclusion consistent with the
innocence of the accused and must show that
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in all human probability the act must have
been done by the accused.
22. These aspects were highlighted in State of Rajasthan
v. Rajaram (2003 (8) SCC 180) and State of Haryana v. Jagbir
Singh (2003 (11) SCC 261).
23. In the instance PWs 1 and 10 as well as PW2 saw the
deceased and the accused together in the night of the
occurrence. In the morning, dead body of the deceased was
found in front of the house of the accused. Additionally, on
the basis of information given by the accused certain articles
were recovered and one of them was the pestle used for
inflicting the injury on the head. That being so, the judgment
of the Trial Court and the High Court do not suffer from any
infirmity.
24. The appeal is without merit, deserves dismissal,
which we direct.
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………………………………………J.
(Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)
………………………………………J.
(Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA)
New Delhi,
July 23, 2008
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