High Court Patna High Court - Orders

Mustafa Kamal @ Md. Mustafa Kamal vs Mahmooda Khatoon & Ors on 27 September, 2011

Patna High Court – Orders
Mustafa Kamal @ Md. Mustafa Kamal vs Mahmooda Khatoon & Ors on 27 September, 2011
                    IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
                             First Appeal No.52 of 2011
                          Mustafa Kamal @ Md. Mustafa Kamal
                                          Versus
                               Mahmooda Khatoon & Ors
                             ----------------------------------

                                             ORDER

08. 27.09.2011. I have heard the learned counsel, Mr. Waliur

Rehman on behalf of the appellant and Mr. S.S. Dwivedi,

the learned senior counsel on behalf of the respondents on

the interlocutory application No.3632 of 2011. The parties

have filed counter affidavit, supplementary affidavit and

rejoinder etc.

(2) The plaintiff-appellant has filed this appeal

against the Judgment and Decree dated 07.01.2011

passed by Subordinate Judge 8th Saran at Chapra in Title

Suit No.184 of 1997 dismissing the plaintiff suit for

declaration of title and further for declaration that the

defendants have no title over the suit property. The

learned Court below dismissed the said suit.

(3) The appellant filed the interlocutory

application No.3632 alleging that during the pendency of

this appeal, the defendant-respondent transferred major

portion of the suit property to different persons by

executing sale deeds through power of attorney holder,

Fahin Akhtar. Many sale deeds have been annexed with

the injunction application. The learned counsel for the

appellant submitted that if the respondents are not

restrained from transferring the suit property further the
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appellant shall suffer loss and irreparable injury and in the

event if the appeal will be allowed, he will not be able to

recover the possession of the property from various

transferee and moreover, it will lead to multiplicity of

proceedings. The learned counsel further submitted that

the transferee is trying to make construction over the

transferred land during the pendency of the appeal. In

such view of the matter, the appellant had no option but

to file the application for injunction.

(4) It appears that subsequent transferee has

been added as respondent in this First Appeal on the

application filed by the appellant who are respondent No.5

to 25.

(5) A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of

the respondent No.1 and 2 and also on behalf of the

transferees. In the counter affidavit on behalf of the

respondent No.1 and 2 written as rejoinder at paragraph

22, it has been mentioned that these defendants-

respondents are giving undertaking that they will not

alienate any property in future without permission of the

Court. The learned senior counsel in support of the said

statement has submitted before the Court that because of

family requirement, the property has been sold and,

therefore, the necessity has been fulfilled. In such

circumstances, the respondent No.1 & 2 will not transfer

any further land and if necessary will arise in future during

the pendency of the appeal, they will file application for
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permission to transfer but at this stage, their undertaking

may be noted. In view of these undertaking given by the

respondent No.1 & 2 that they will not transfer the

property without the permission of the Court, the same is

recorded here in this order so as to bind them.

(6) So far the counter affidavit of respondent

No.3 to 25 is concerned, they have stated that they may

be allowed to construct the residential house at their own

risk and if the appeal will be allowed, they will not claim

equity and the appellant will get the possession of the

property with structure thereon. Because, they have

purchased the property with a view to construct a

residential house. The learned counsel for the respondent

submitted that this appeal is of the year 2011 and it is not

likely to dispose of in near future and, therefore, for

unlimited period, the purchasers who are bonafide

purchasers cannot be restrained from enjoying the fruits

of their property because by the transfer, the defendant-

respondent have got valid title.

(7) In reply to the above submission, the learned

counsel for the appellant submitted that on the ground

that the appeal will not be disposed of in near future, the

respondents cannot be allowed to construct residential

house because in such circumstances, the real difficulty

will be faced by the appellant only after if the First Appeal

is allowed.

(8) The respondent cannot be allowed to
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construct even at their own risk because if they are

restrained, there will be no hardship to them but if they

are not restrained, the appellant shall suffer irreparable

loss if the appeal is allowed.

(9) In a decision reported in A.I.R. 2005

Supreme Court 104(Maharwal Khewaji Trust vs.

Baldev Dass), the Hon‟ble Apex Court at paragraph 10 has

held as follows:

“We do not think in the facts and
circumstances of this case, the lower appellate
Court and the High Court were justified in
permitting the respondent to change the nature of
property by putting up construction as also by
permitting the alienation of the property, whatever
may be the condition on which the same is done.
In the event of the appellant’s claim being found
baseless ultimately, it is always open to the
respondent to claim damages, or, in an appropriate
case, the Court may itself award damages for the
loss suffered, if any, in this regard. Since the facts
of this case do not make out any extraordinary
ground for permitting the respondent to put up
construction and alienate the same, we think both
the Courts below, namely, the lower appellate
Court and the High Court erred in making the
impugned orders. The said orders are set aside and
the order of the trial Court is restored.”

(10) In A.I.R. 1962 Supreme Court 527

(Manohar Lal Chopra vs. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth

Hiralal), the Apex Court has held that “Section 151 itself

says that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or

otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make

orders necessary for the ends of justice. In the face of

such a clear statement, it is not possible to hold that the

provisions of the Code control the inherent power by

limiting it or otherwise affecting it. The inherent power has

not been conferred upon the Court; it is a power inherent
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in the Court by virtue of its duty to do justice between the

parties before it. Further, when the Code itself recognizes

the existence of the inherent power of the Court, there is

no question of implying any powers outside the limits of

the Code. Thus, there being no such expression in S.94

which expressly prohibits the issue of a temporary

injunction in circumstances not covered by Order 39 or by

any rules made under the Code, the Courts have inherent

jurisdiction to issue temporary injunctions in

circumstances which are not covered by the provisions of

Order 39, C.P.C., if the Court is of opinion that the

interests of justice require the issue of such interim

injunction.”

(11) In (2001) 2 P.L.J.R. 268 (Dharam Nath

Ojha vs. Raghunath Ojha), this court has held that “law

is well settled that if a lis has been admitted for

adjudication, then it becomes the duty of the Court to

preserve the subject matter of the litigation by an

appropriate order so that the same is available at the time

of final adjudication and the decree does not become a

barren one.”

(12) It appears that the submission advanced by

the learned counsel for the respondent was the

submission before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case

of Maharwal Khewaji Trust (Supra). It appears that in

that case, the lower appellate Court and also the High

Court set aside the order of injunction granted by the trial
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Court. The Apex Court held that the appellate Court and

the High Court were not justified in permitting the

respondent to change the nature of the property by

putting of construction. It further appears that the order

of the trial Court was set aside by High Court on the

ground that the transfer and / construction will be hit by

Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Apex

Court also considered the hardship to the parties.

(13) In view of the above settled principle of law,

in my opinion, this is a fit case where the subsequent

purchasers should be specifically restrained from

transferring or making any construction over the suit

property which they have purchased as admittedly they

are not the purchasers during the pendency of the list. I,

therefore, restrained the respondent No.3 to 25 from

transferring and / or making any construction whatsoever

on the suit property.

(14) In view of the nature of the order passed

above, it is desirable that the appeal be heard and

disposed of at an early date. In such view of the matter,

the office is directed to make the appeal ready so that the

same may be heard as early as possible. Thus, the

interlocutory application is allowed in terms of the order

indicated above.

(Mungeshwar Sahoo, J.)

Patna High Court, Patna
The 27thday of September, 2011
Sanjeev/A.F.R.