ORDER
Mohan Shantanagoudar, J.
1. Petitioner being accused No. 1 in C.C. No.5/2005 (P.C.No. 18/04) pending on the file of Prl.Civil Judge (Jr.Dn.,) & JMFC, Hospet, has sought for quashing the proceedings. The trail Court has issued process against the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 420, 193 r/w. Section 34 of IPC.
2. The complaint discloses that the accused has given a false affidavit before the Executive Officer of Town Panchayat and got her name mutated to the exclusion of the complainant. On coming to know of the said fact, the private complaint is lodged, alleging the aforesaid offences.
3. The principle contention raised by the petitioner is that the Court should not have taken cognizance of the offence except on the complaint in writing by the authority concerned. According to the petitioner, as the offence is committed before the Executive Officer of Town Panchayat, the said officer should lodge the complaint. In other words, the Court should not have taken the cognizance of the offence based on the private complaint lodged by the private person i.e., respondent herein.
4. Section 193 of IPC does not come within the purview of Section 195(1)(a) of Cr.P.C. Hence, the authority concerned need not file complaint. However, Section 193 IPC it falls under Section 195(1)(b) of Cr.P.C. It is relevant to note the provisions of Section 195(1)(b) & Section 195(3) of Cr.P.C. at this stage. Section 195(1)(b) & Section 195(3) of Cr.P.C. read thus:
“Section 195 : Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of public servants, for offences against public justice and for offences relating to documents given in evidence.-
(1) No Court shall take cognizance-
(a) xxx xxx xxx xxx
(b) (i) of any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), namely, Sections 193 to 196 (both inclusive), 1999, 200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court, or
(ii) of any offence described in Section 463, or punishable under Section 471, Section 475 or Section 476, of the said Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a documents produced or given to evidence in a proceeding in any Court, or
(iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit, or attempt to commit, or the abatement of, any offence specified in Sub-clause (i) or Sub-clause (ii),
except on the complaint in writing of that Court, or of some other Court to which that Court is subordinate.
Section 195(3) :-In Clause (b) of Sub-section (1), the term “Court” means a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, and includes a tribunal constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act, if declared by that Act to be a Court for the purposes of this section.”
The aforesaid provisions make it clear that, if the offence is not committed in a judicial proceeding, then it will fall outside Section 195(1)(b) of Cr.P.C., which applies only when the offence is committed in or in relation to a proceeding in Court, and there is, in consequence, no bar to a complaint being made in respect thereof unaffected by the restrictions contained in Section 195(l)(b) of Cr.P.C.
5. The contention of the petitioner as stated supra, is based on the assumption that the Chief Executive Officer of Town Panchayat is a Court within the meaning of Section 195(l)(b) of the Code. Sub-section (3) of Section 195 legislatively defines the expression “Court” as meaning a civil, Revenue or Ciminal Court and includes a tribunal . constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act if declared by that Act to be a Court for the purposes of the Section.
There are two tests to determine if a particular officer is a Court or not, namely, the authority to take evidence on oath and the authority to render a final decision in the matter. Broadly, what distinguishes a Court from a quasi-judicial tribunal is that it is charged with a duty to “decide disputes” in judicial manner and declare the “rights of parties in a definitive judgment”. In such process, the parties are entitled, as a matter of right, to be heard in support of their claims and to adduce evidence in proof of it. It also imports an obligation on the part of the authority to decide the matter on a consideration of the evidence adduced and in accordance with law. When a question therefore arises as to whether an authority created by an Act is a Court as distinguihsed from a quasi-judicial tribunal, what has to be decided is, whether having regard to the provisions of the Act it possesses all the attributes of a Court, as observed in the case of Virindar Kumar Satyawadi v. The State of Punjab, 1956 Cri. L.J. 326.
6. The mere fact that the procedure adopted by the Executive Officer of Taluka Panchayat is of a legal character, will not impart to him the status of court. The proceedings before executive officer do not determine the rights of the parties in a definitive judgment nor is there any finality in such proceedings. It is a familiar feature of modern legislations to set up bodies and Tribunals, and entrust them with work of Judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative character, but they are not courts in the accepted sense of that term, though they may possess some of the trappings of Court.
7. It is not disputed that the authorities constituted by the Act have not been declared to be the “court” for the purposes of Section 195. Sub-section (3) of Section 195 of Cr.P.C. 1973, has brought about a change in law. In view of this change, a tribunal constituted under Central, Provincial or State Act can be deemed to be “Court” only if it is declared to be so by that Act for the purposes of Section 195. As the Executive Officer of Taluka Panchayat is not declared as Court under the Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act 1993, the Court cannot deen the said authority or Tribunal to be a Court. It is no more a question of interpretation, but one of express enactment. Thus, it can be safely concluded that Executive Officer of Taluka Panchayat is not a “Court” within the meaning of Section 195 of Cr.P.C. There is, therefore, no substance in the contention that cognizance of the offence could not have been taken except on a complaint by the authority concerned.
In view of the above, I do not find any illegality in the proceedings initiated before the Court below based on the complaint lodged by the respondent herein.
Petition is therefore dismissed.