ORDER
V.S. Sirpurkar, J.
1. The above mentioned three writ petitions shall be disposed of by this order. Though the details of facts differ in each petition, the sub-stratum of the challenge is identical in all the three cases.
2. All the three petitioners are vendees and they purchased some immovable property in Palghat District, Kerala. Along with that, they also purchased some immovable property situated in the State of Tamil Nadu. Needless to mention that the Sub-Registrar who registered the sale deed was the same, i.e. at Vadakancherry in Kerala State. The other property was in Salem District, Tamil Nadu and the Sub-Registrar Komarapalayam would have been the proper Sub-Registrar for effecting this transaction, but probably since the Kerala rates of registration are lower than that of Tamil Nadu, the petitioners chose to get their properties registered in Kerala State. There is no dispute that the properties were registered there. In all the three petitions, the petitioners challenge the orders passed against them, by which the petitioners have been directed to pay certain sums on account of the non-payment of proper registration fees. In all the three petitions, the challenged orders are in the nature of a final notice directing the petitioners to pay certain amounts on account of their not having paid proper registration charges. Admittedly, the action appears to be under Section 47 of the Indian Stamp Act {hereinafter referred to as “the Act”}. These notices have been challenged on various grounds.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioners points out that though this is a notice, it is obvious that some orders came to be passed earlier, initiating the proceedings under Section 47-A of the Indian Stamp Act and thereafter, in those proceedings, the concerned officers came to the conclusion behind the back of the petitioners that the proper registration charges were not paid. The learned counsel’s main ground is that it is only this final notice that has been sent to the petitioners in all the three cases and they have been kept in dark in respect of the earlier notices and thus, the final intimations which have been sent and which are in challenge in the three petitions are null and void since the petitioners have never been heard at all.
4. (All these facts have been picked up from Writ Petition No.42/94). In their writ petitions, in paragraph 15, it is pointed out that no notice was ever served on the petitioner and there was no occasion for the petitioner to submit any explanation and that if the 1st respondent had given the petitioner, a proper opportunity before passing the impugned order, the petitioner would have submitted a detailed explanation and convinced the respondent that there was no irregularity in the registration of the document in question. This claim, it goes without saying, has been refuted by the Government in its counter and the assertion is made that the proper notices were sent to all the three petitioners. It is to be found that in paragraph 10 of its counter, a specific averment is made that the petitioners were sent three notices, they being on 30.4.1991, 26.10.1993 and 22.12.1993 and all the three notices were turned down by the petitioner and the petitioners did not appear for the inquiry. It is also pointed out that the petitioners, if felt aggrieved by any order of the respondents, could have preferred an appeal as provided under Section 47-A (5) of the Act and they could not have come straightaway to this Court by way of a writ petition.
5. Finding that the language in the counter was not satisfactory, and that there was no clear assertion in the counter that the notices sent were served on the petitioners, and further, in view of a very strong assertion made by the learned counsel for the petitioners that no notice was ever served upon the petitioners, the Court directed the Government Pleader to produce the files. It is found from the files that atleast the last notice dated 22.12.1993 has been served upon the petitioner in writ petition No.42. The situation is no different in the case of the other petitioners as the notices were issued on the identical dates to all the three petitioners which will be clear from the counter filed. Therefore, the main basis of the petitioners’ case that the petitioners were never issued any notice falls down. All the three petitioners were obviously issued the notices.bThose notices were also accepted on their behalf. There is a proper proof of service and it is obvious that the plea of not having received any notice in respect of the proceedings under Section 47-A of the Act is obviously factually incorrect. It is obvious that even before the initiation of all the proceedings, the notices have been sent, but all the petitioners have, for reasons best known to them, chosen to keep quiet and have chosen not to appear before the authority who conducted the inquiry and came to the conclusion that the proper registration fees was not tendered by the petitioners. The main ground therefore goes.
6. It is obvious that the petitioners in all the three petitions have come up only against the final intimation directing them to pay the short amount and they have not chosen to file any appeal against the main orders. Even this would be completely objectionable since Section 47-A(5) specifically provides an appeal in these matters. Therefore, it is obvious that the petitioners have not chosen to exhaust their statutory remedy provided under the Act and have instead chosen to approach this Court directly on the specious and factually incorrect plea that they have never been noticed and therefore, not heard. Since the factual plea of no notice having been sent to them is found to be incorrect, the petitioners would not be allowed to raise the plea that they had no opportunity to file an appeal. Even after receiving the intimation to pay up the short amounts, the petitioners could have filed an appeal, which they have not done. Therefore, for these reasons also, the petitions are liable to be dismissed.
7. The learned counsel then, almost by way of desperate argument,raised a point that the Sub-Registrar concerned had no jurisdiction. The contention is that under sub-section 2 of Section 47-A, the powers can be exercised only on receipt of a reference under sub-section (1) and those powers can be exercised only by the Collector. The term “Collector” has been defined in the Act. It means and includes a Deputy Commissioner and any officer whom the State Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, appoint in this behalf. In their counter, the Government have specifically contended that the officer who started the proceedings under Section 47-A did have that power as the said officer was acting under the orders of the Special Deputy Collector. It is pointed out that the 1st respondent is a subordinate of the 2nd respondent and as such, there was nothing wrong if the 1st respondent initiated the proceedings and referred them to the 2nd respondent who was the empowered officer. The question of jurisdiction therefore has to be answered against the petitioners.
8. Lastly, the petitioners’ counsel raised an argument that the whole exercise was beyond the period of limitation as contemplated in Section 47-A of the Act. He contends that the exercise should have been initiated within two years of the registration. The learned counsel relies on Section 47-A (3) of the Act. In this case, the learned counsel for the Government has pointed out that the transactions were dated 27.10.1989, 30.10.1989 and V.S. Sirpurkar, J. 7.12.1990 whereas the proceedings have been initiated within two years thereof as the first notice is dated 30.4.1991 itself. Even the record shows that the petitioners have been served with notices in the year 1991 itself. In that view, there would be no question of the proceedings being late and beyond two years. In view of all these, it is obvious that the petitioners have no case whatsoever.
9. All the three petitions are therefore dismissed with costs of Rs.1,000/- (Rupees one thousand only) each in all the petitions.