ORDER
P. Sathasivam, J.
1. An interesting question arises for consideration in this transfer petition. The petitioner prays for an order to transfer Revision Petition (Pa. Ma.) 22/99/A4, pending on the file of District Revenue Officer (Revenue Court), Dindigul to any other Revenue Divisional Officer (Revenue Court) in any other district. The present petition for transfer has heen filed under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
2. Before considering the present claim of the petitioner, it is useful to refer the case of both parties. According to the petitioner, he is in possession and enjoyment of 288 sq. feet of land in S.F. 129/A-1 in Oddanchatram village. He put up a construction in the said land some 25 years ago wherein he is run-ningateashop. Like him, there are a number of persons who are also in occupation of
small portion of land in the said S.F. No. and have also put up construction therein for running petty shops. He continues to pay water tax, house tax, electricity charges etc., to the local body.
3. Due to their long and continuous occupation of the land, they submitted an application to the Zonal Deputy Tahsildar, Oddanchatram for issue of joint patta with respect to the lands wherein they, the petty shop owners are in occupation. After verifying the entire records and after inspecting the physical feature of the lands, the Zonal Deputy Tahsildar, Oddanchatram in his proceedings dated 29-10-1997 issued joint Patta No. 1078 in Section No. 129/A-l to about 17 persons including the petitioner. It is further stated that while so, the Tahsildar without issuing notice or holding any enquiry, in his suo motu proceedings dated 11-3-1998, cancelled the patta No. 1078 granted to them. Aggrieved by the order of theTahsildar, the petitioner and others preferred an appeal to the Revenue Divisional Officer, Palani, who in his proceedings dated 23-5-1999 allowed the appeal by restoring the order of the Zonal DeputyTahsildar, Oddanchatram dated 29-10-1997 and set aside the order of the Tahsildar, Oddanchatram dated 11-3-1998. Aggrieved by the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer, one Selvin alias Selvam preferred a revision to the District Revenue Officer, Dindigul claiming that he is the owner of the entire land in S.F. No. 129/A-1. The District Revenue Officer without hearing him, in his proceedings dated 1-6-1999-granted stay of the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer, Palani. It is further stated that taking advantage of the order of the District Revenue Officer, the said Selvan was taking all efforts to remove the superstructure put up by the petitioner. Therefore, the petitioner filed a writ petition before this Court in W.P. 11213/99 and the same was disposed of by this Court on 1-7-1999 with directions. It is further stated that the rival party being related to ruling political party M.L.A., and also close nexus with the Ministers openly telling that the petitioner cannot get any favourable order, accordingly he apprehends that he will not get justice from the District Revenue Officer. In such a circumstance, he has filed the present petition for transfer.
4. First respondent-Selvin alias Selvam has filed a counter-affidavit wherein it is
stated that the present application for transfer under Section 24. C.P.C. filed by the petitioner is unsustainable in law. The District Revenue Officer is not a Court as defined under the Civil Procedure Code so as to attract the provision of Section 24 of the said Code. With regard to merit, he has denied all the averments made by the petitioner.
5. Second respondent has filed a counter-affidavit supporting the claim made by the petitioner.
6. Admittedly the matter relates to grant of patta’ in favour of the petitioner. The respondents are opposing the claim of the petitioner. As on date, the matter in dispute is pending before the District Revenue Officer, Dindigul. In the present transfer petition, though the petitioner has impleaded the District Revenue Officer, Dindigul as first respondent and other contesting parties as respondents 2 to 7 and also prepared the affidavit in such a manner, for the reasons best known to him, he has deleted the District revenue Officer, Dindigul from the array of parties and impleaded only party respondents as respondents 1 to 6. Likewise, it is not clear even though the patta proceedings is pending before the District Revenue Officer as per the statement made by the petitioner, in the transfer petition, he is seeking an order to transfer the said revision petition to other Revisional Divisional Officer. It is not clear particularly when the matter is pending before a District Revenue Officer, why the petitioner wants it to be transferred to the Revenue Divisional Officer of the other District. Apart from these infirmities, I shall consider whether an order can be passed as claimed by the petitioner under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 24 is as follows :–
“24. General power of transfer and withdrawal.–11) On the application of any of the parties and after notice to the parties and after hearing such of them as desired to be heard, or of its own motion without such notice, the High Court or the District Court may at any stage-
(a) transfer any suit, or other proceeding pending before it’for trial or disposal to any Court subordinate to it and competent to try or dispose of the same; or
(b) withdraw any suit, appeal or other proceeding pending in any Court subordinate to it, and
(i) try or dispose of the same; or (ii) transfer the same for trial or disposal to any Court subordinate to it and competent to try or dispose of the same; or
(iii) retransfer the same for trial or disposal to the Court from which it was withdrawn.
(2) Where any suit or proceeding has been transferred or withdrawn under Sub-section (1). the Court which is thereafter to try or dispose of such suit or proceeding may, subject to any special directions in the case of an order of transfer, either re-try it or proceed from the point at which it was transferred or withdrawn.
(a) Courts of Additional and Assistant Judges shall be deemed to be subordinate to the District Court.
(b) “proceeding” includes a proceeding for the execution of a decree or order.
(4) The Court trying any suit transferred or withdrawn under this section from a Court of Small Causes shall, for the purposes of such suit, be deemed to be a Court of Small Causes.
(5) A suit or proceeding may be transferred under this section from a Court from has no jurisdiction to try it.”
By pointing out the expression “other proceeding” in Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 24, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that this Court is competent to transfer the proceeding pending before the District Revenue Officer to any other officer. He very much relied on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ram Chandra v. State of U. P., . The question raised in that decision was whether the provisions of Section 24(1)(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure are available with respect to a proceeding arising out of reference under Section 146(1), Criminal Procedure Code. Their Lordships, after referring to the relevant portion of Section 24, C.P.C., have made the following observations (at pp 1891 -92) :–
“It plainly speaks of “other proceeding pending any Court subordinate to it” and not only to the civil proceeding pending before a subordinate Court. The decisions of the Privy Council and one decision of this Court which we have earlier quoted would warrant the application of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure generally to a
proceeding before a civil Court arising out of a reference to it by a Magistrate under Section 146(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The expression “proceeding” used in this section is not a term of art which has acquired a definite meaning. What its meaning is when it occurs in a particular statute or a provision of a statute will have to be ascertained by looking at the relevant statute. Looking to the context in which the word has been used in Section 24(1)(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure it would appear to us to be something going on in a’Court in relation to the adjudication of a dispute other than a suit or an appeal. Bearing in mind that the term “proceeding” indicates something in which business is conducted according to a prescribed mode it would be only right to give it, as used in the aforesaid provision, a comprehensive meaning so as to include within it all matters coming up for judicial adjudication and not to confine it to a civil proceeding alone. In a recent case Kochadai Naidu v. Nagavasaml Naidu, ILR , Ramachandra Iyer, J., (as he then was) was called upon to consider the very question which arises before us. The learned Judge held that a proceeding before a civil Court arising out of a reference to it under Section 146(1), Cr.P.C. can be transferred by the High Court or District Court under Section 24, C.P.C. because it is in any case a “proceeding”. He has also considered this question from the angle of the nature of the proceeding and expressed the view that the proceeding was a civil proceeding to which the procedure for suits could, with the aid of Section 14, C.P.C. be applied. If indeed the term “proceeding” in Section 24 is not confined to a civil proceeding there is no need whatsoever of taking the aid of Section 141, C.P.C. Upon this view we dismiss the appeal.”
It is clear that their Lordships have nowhere considered a matter pending before Revenue authority relating to patta proceeding. After going through the factual position in that case and the law laid down by their Lordships. I am of the view that the said decision is not helpful to the petitioner’s case.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied” on a Division Bench decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in J. Sitarama Rao v. State, . Before the Division Bench, two transfer C.M.Ps., under Section 24 of the C.P.C.. for transfer
of suits from the Agency Court to a Civil Court came up for consideration. Tr. C.M.P. No. 5301/77 was filed for transfer of the suit. O, S. No. 5/77 on the file of the Agent to Government at Khammam to the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Khammam. Tr. C.M.P. No. 7231/77 was for the transfer of O. S. No. 8/76 on the file of the Agent to the State Government (District Collector), Warangal, to the file of the subordinate Judge’s Court or District Judge’s Court at Warangal. Both the suits were filed against the State of Andhra Pradesh represented by the District Collector who is also designated as the Agent to the Government in the respective areas. The contention of the Government was that Civil Procedure Code does not apply to Agency area or Agency Court and. In any event, the transfer of suit pending in a Agency Court could be made only to another Agency Court but not to a civil Court. After considering the claim of all the parties as well as the provisions of the Agency Act and Rules, their Lordships have held that,
“24. In view of the above discussion we are clearly of the view that the Agency Court constituted under the Scheduled District Act and the Andhra Pradesh Agency Rules framed thereunder is a Court subordinate to the High Court and the High Court has power under Section 24, C.P.C. to transfer the suit pending in such Agency Court either to another Agency Court or to a Civil Court…..”
It is clear that Agency Courts have been constituted by a special enactment, namely. Agency Court Act and Agency Rules. It is also clear that Code of Civil Procedure are made applicable to proceedings pending before Agency Court. In such a circumstance, the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court is right in holding that the High Court has power under Section 24, C.P.C. to transfer the suit pending in such Agency Court either to another Agency Court or to a Civil Court. Patta proceedings pending before the District Revenue Officer cannot be compared with proceedings before the Agency Court created under an enactment, hence the said decision is also not helpful to the petitioner’s contention.
8. Learned counsel appearing for the contesting first respondent has very much relied on another Division Bench decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Jagannadha Rao v. Venkateswara Rao, . In the civil revision petitions, a
preliminary objection was raised as to whether an order passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer in an appeal against the order of the Tahsildar under Section 16 of the Andhra Tenancy Act (XVIII of 1956) is liable to be revised under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. After considering the power conferred on the Tahsildar and the Revenue Divisional Officers and their nature of work, their Lordships have concluded thus :–
“(5) in our opinion, the Tahsildar and Revenue Divisional Officer on whom certain powers are conferred to decide certain disputes between the landlord and the tenant as indicated in the section, are administrative Tribunals empowered to discharge functions of a quasi-judicial nature. Assuming that the functions that they discharge are judicial in nature, still it is difficult to treat them as civil courts subordinate to the High Court. The mere fact that a Tribunal has all the trappings of a Court does not necessarily make it a Court. That is not a conclusive factor.”
Further, in order to invoke Section 115, C.P.C., their Lordships have observed that it should be established that, in addition to its being a Court, it is a Court, which is subordinate to the High Court. After referring to Section 3 C.P.C., their Lordships have also held that it is only the hierarchy of Courts mentioned therein that are subordinate to the High Court which alone are governed by Section 115. C.P.C. While considering the question further, their Lordships have held thus,
“(12). The ruling of a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Abdul Sattar v. Special Deputy Collector, Vizagapatam. ILR 47 Madras 357 : AIR 1924 Mad 442 (FB) is also pertinent in this regard. The question there was whether the Collector, who refused to make a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, was a Court subordinate to the High Court so as to attract the provisions of Section 115, C.P.C., and the Full Bench answered it in the negative. The learned Judges opined that though the Collector was acting judicially in deciding whether a reference should be made under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act or not, it was very doubtful if he sat as a Court and that, at any rate, he was not a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115, C.P.C. In the course
of the judgment, Schwabe C.J.. who spoke for the Court, observed thus :
“There is no power of appeal from his decision to any one. either to the District Court or to this Court. There is nothing in the Act to show that he is, in the true sense of the word in any way subordinate to the High Court. As far as Madras is concerned, the Courts recognised arc those Courts, which are referred to in various statutes, such as the Madras Civil Courts Act. His Court, if a Court at all must be a Civil Court. The Civil Courts are enumerated in the Civil Courts Act, and the Court of the Collector sitting under the Land Acquisition Act finds no place in that enumeration.” Applying this ratio decidendi there can be no doubt that the position of a Tahsildar or a Revenue Divisional Officer discharging functions under Section 16 of the Andhra Tenancy Act cannot be equated to that of a Court, since they do not fall within the category of Courts enumerated in the Madras Civil Courts’ Act.”
Though the said decision arose under the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 115, C.P.C., the dictum laid down particularly with reference to the position of a Tahsildar or a Revenue Divisional Officer discharging certain functions under a Statute cannot be equated to that of a Court since they do not fall within the category of courts enumerated in the Madras Civil Courts Act. In spite of the fact that the words “other proceeding” used in Section 24, in view of the fact that the Revenue authorities, namely, Tahsildar, Revenue Divisional Officer and the District Revenue Officer are exercising the functions under the powers conferred upon them under the provisions of Revenue Standing Orders regarding the inclusion or non-inclusion ot the names of the respective parlies in the patta, they cannot be equated to that of a Court. I am of the view that the view of the Division Bench is an answer to our question,
9. Though the petitioner has described the Revenue Divisional Officer and the District Revenue Officer as Revenue Court, there is no basis for calling them as Revenue Court. As a matter of fact, learned counsel for the petitioner is unable to place any statutory provision calling them as Revenue Court. I am also satisfied that the Revenue authorities, namely, Tahsildar, Revenue Divisional Officer and District Revenue Officer are exercising the functions under the powers conferred upon them in terms of the provisions of the Revenue Standing Orders regarding the inclusion or deletion of the names of the respective parties in the patta pass-book with respect to the lands in question. In other words, the said authorities are exercising the statutory functions conferred upon them. Hence, I hold that District Revenue Officer is not a Court as defined under the Code of Civil Procedure so as to attract the provision of Section 24 of the said Code. Accordingly, the Transfer C.M.P., is dismissed as not maintainable. No costs. Consequently, other C.M.Ps., are closed.