ORDER
Thanikkachalam, J.
1. C.R.P. No. 401 of 1995 is directed against the order dated 17.10.1984 made in E.P. No. 68 of 1983 in O.S. No. 100 of 1951 on the file of the District Munsif, Devakottai.
C.R.P. No. 402 of 1995 is directed against the order passed in E.P. No. 159 of 1982 in O.S. No. 101 of 1951 on the file of District Munsif Devakottai.
2. The petitioners in the court below are eight Karai Vallambara Community of Ariyakadi, Idayur and Vettiyur villages on whose behalf O.S. Nos. 100 and 101 of 1951 were filed in a representative capacity.
3. O.S. No. 100 of 1951 was filed by one (1) S. Andiappan and (2) S.P. Palaniappan as representatives of Eight Karai Vallambars of Ariyakudi, Idayoor and Vettiryur village under the provisions of Order 1, Rule 8, C.P.C. against some leading Udayars and Ariyakudi Sri Thiruvengadamudayan Devasthanam. The suit O.S. No. 100 of 1951 was for recovery of possession of four items of properties, viz:
(1) 3 acres 70 cents being a portion of T.S. No. 507;
(2) 4 acres and 55 cents of land in T.S. No. 510 and T.S. No. 238.
(3) 1 acre 50 cents out of 12 acre 60 cents in T.S. No. 491;
(4) 6 acres land east of Railway line.
In O.S. No. 101 of 1951 the suit is for recovery of possession of five items of properties; viz:
(1) 2 acres 14 cents of Punja in T.S. No. 515;
(2) 2 acres 29 cents of Punja in T.S. No. 521;
(3) 2 acres 16 cents in T.S. No. 522;
(4) 1 acre 70 cents in T.S. No. 523;
(5) 66 cents in T.S. No. 524;
In O.S. No. 100 of 1951 the trial court, after taking elaborate evidence, decreed the suit on 31.8.1963 in respect of items 1, 2, and 3 and dismissed the suit in respect of 6 acres of land on the east of railway line. The appeal in A.S. No. 308 of 1963 filed by the defendants and the cross-objections filed by the plaintiff in respect of 6 acres of land were dismissed by the District Court, Madurai, Aggrieved, the defendants filed S.A. No. 593 of 1977 before the High Court.
4. In O.S. No. 101 of 1951 the trial court, after elaborate evidence, decreed the suit in respect of item 3, viz; T.S. No. 522 and dismissed the suit in respect of items 1, 2, 4 and 5. The plaintiffs filed A.S. No. 303 of 1963 and the defendant filed A.S. No. 305 of 1963 in support of their respective claims before the District Court, Madurai. The plaintiff’s appeal A.S. No. 303 of 1963 was partly allowed, viz., decree passed with respect to item No. 1, viz. T.S. No. 515 and item 5, viz., T.S. No. 524. The defendant’s appeal A.S. No. 305 of 1963 was dismissed. Thus pursuant to the appellate Court’s judgment, the plaintiffs hold a valid decree in respect of three items as against five items claimed in the suit. The three items are: (1) T.S. No. 515, (2) T.S. No. 522 and (3) T.S. No. 524. The first defendant, aggrieved by the first appellate Court’s judgment, approached the High Court in S.A. No. 594 of 1977. The High Court, while disposing of the second appeals S.A. Nos. 593 and 594 of 1977, in its common judgment dated 12.12.1980 held as under:
Accordingly, the second appeals are allowed insofar as they relate to that portion of the building and site which is comprised in T.S. No. 507/4 in respect of which S. Arulandu Udayar was giyes a ryotwari patta under Ex. B-23 as also in respect of T.S. Nos. 510 and 522/3 for which a 11(a) patta was granted in favour of Arulandu Udayar. In other respects, the second appeals are dismissed.
5. Based on the decree of the High Court in S.A. No. 593 of 1977 the decree-holders filed E.P. No. 68 of 1983. The decree-holders have specifically excluded the properties covered in T.S. Nos. 507/4 and 510 in terms of the decree passed by the High Court in S.A. No. 593 of 1977 and E.P. No. 68 of 1983 is confined only to the other items.
6. Based on the decree of this Court in S.A. No. 594 of 1977, the decree-holders filed E.P. No. 159 of 1982. The decree-holders have specifically excluded the properties covered in T.S. No. 522/3 in terms of the High Court’s decree in S.A. No. 594 of 1977 and E.P. No. 159 of 1982 is confined only to the other items.
7. In the abovesaid Execution petitioners, the petitioners herein contended that in the abovesaid second appeals, the High Court clearly held that when patta was granted in the settlement proceedings, thereafter the jurisdiction of the civil court is ousted in the matter of claiming title over the land for which patta was granted. According to the petitioners herein some of the items of the lands covered by certain survey numbers for which pattas were issued by the Settlement Officer were not included in the decree granted by the High Court in the abovesaid second appeals. Inasmuch as pattas were issued for those items of lands and even though the said lands were not included in the decrees granted in the second appeals by the High Court, inasmuch as the High Court held in the second appeals that after patta was granted by the Settlement Officer, the jurisdiction of the civil court is ousted, the Execution Court can go behind the decree and exclude from the execution petitions those items of land for which pattas were issued, but not included in the decrees granted by the High Court in the second appeals. However, the Execution Court refused to accede to the request made by the petitioners herein. According to the Execution Court, it cannot go behind the decree granted by the High Court in the second appeal, and if there is any mistake in the decree it is always open to the petitioners herein to approach the High Court for rectification. Accordingly the Execution Court directed the judgment-debtors to hand over the possession of the items of properties as enumerated in the decrees granted by the High Court in the second appeals.
8. It is against these orders passed by the Execution Court, the petitioners herein are in revisions before this Court.
9. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners herein submitted that in S.A. Nos. 593 to 596 of 1977 this Court rendered a judgment to the effect that once patta has been granted by the Settlement Officer, thereafter the jurisdiction of the civil court is ousted in the matter of deciding the title between the parties. The judgment of the High Court is reported in Sowrimuthu Udayar v. S.P. Palaniappa Ambalam and Ors. (1982) 1 M.L.J. 257 : 1981 T.L.N.J. 115. Even the Supreme Court in Vetticherugheu Village Panchayat v. Nori Venkatachala Deekshithulu , has held that when patta has been granted by the Settlement Officer, the jurisdiction of the civil court is ousted in deciding the rival claims between the parties. In the abovesaid second appeals, in the decrees granted by this Court, certain survey numbers for which pattas were granted, were not included. Therefore, the decree-holder cannot file execution petition for possession of those items of land for which pattas were issued. Since the High Court has held in the above cited decision that if once patta has been granted, the jurisdiction of the civil court is ousted in deciding the dispute with regard to title, no execution petition can be laid for possession of those items of land for which pattas were issued, but which were not included in the decree granted by this Court in the second appeals. In such circumstances, the Execution Court can go behind the decree and find out that no execution can be laid for possession of those items of land for which pattas were issued even though they were not included in the decrees granted in the second appeals. In order to support this line of argument, reliance was placed upon the decisions reported in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan and Sunder Dass Parkash . It was, therefore, pleaded that the order, passed by the Execution Court in refusing to exclude certain items of land for which pattas were issued should be set aside and those items of land for which pattas were issued and which does not find a place in the decrees granted by this Court in the second appeals should be directed to be excluded from the execution proceedings.
10. On the other hand, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents, submitted as under: It is not correct to state that when once patta has been granted the jurisdiction of the civil court is ousted in deciding the title between the rival claimants. After the decision rendered by this Court in the abovesaid second appeal, which was reported in Sowrimuthu Udayar v. S.P. Palaniappa Ambalam (1982) 1 M.L.J. 257 : 1981 T.L.N.J. 115, this Court held in State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Swamigal Madam , the patta granted by the Settlement Officer will not oust the jurisdiction of the civil court and the civil court can always go into the question of deciding the title between the rival claimants. The decision rendered by this Court in Ramalinga Samigal Madam’s case, was confirmed by the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Swamigal Madam . The decision in the above cited Supreme Court was rendered on 1.5.1985. The decision in the above cited Sowrimuthu Udayar v. S.P. Palaniappa Ambalam 1981 T.L.N.J. 115 was rendered on 12.12.1980. The decision relied on by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners herein in Vetticherugheu Village Panchayat v. Nori Venkatachala Deekshithulu , is concerned with A.P. Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1956. In this judgment, the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court earlier in Ramalinga Swamigal Madam’s case was not overruled. In the later decision rendered by this Court in Samsuddin Rowther v. Avvammal (1992) 1 L.W. 207 this Court pointed out that the decision of the Supreme Court in will be applicable only to the provisions contained in A.P. Inams Abolition Act. It was further pointed out that the provisions contained in the A.P. Act are different from the provisions contained. In the Madras Act. It was further submitted that in A.P. Act, there was a machinery for granting patta, but in the Madras Act, there is no such machinery. Therefore, it is submitted that the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in (1991) 2 Section C.R. 531 wherein it was held that after the patta was granted, the jurisdiction of the civil court is ousted, cannot be made applicable to the cases arising the under the Tamil Nadu Minor Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act.
11. It was further submitted that the Execution Court cannot go behind the decree. The two decisions, viz., Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan and Sunder Dass Parkash , were rendered where there is a lack of initial jurisdiction. But in the present case, there is no lack of initial jurisdiction in deciding the second appeals. The learned Counsel for the respondents further submitted that if the petitioners herein are aggrieved, they could have approached the High Court which passed the decree in the second appeals by way of filing rectification applications. For these reasons, it was submitted that the order passed by the Execution Court in refusing to exclude certain survey numbers for which pattas were granted is in order and no interference is called for.
12. Heard the rival submissions. The fact remains that two suits, O.S. Nos. 100 and 101 of 1951 were filed for declaration of title and possession. In O.S. No. 100 of 1951, the plaintiffs claimed title over four items of properties. The trial court granted decreed in respect of three items of properties. The first appellate court confirmed the judgment and decree rendered by the trial court. Aggrieved, the defendants filed second appeal, S.A. No. 593 of 1977 before this Court. So also in O.S. No. 101 of 1951 the suit was filed for declaration of title and possession with regard to five items of properties. The trial court decreed the suit in respect of one item and dismissed the suit in respect of four items. The plaintiffs and the defendants filed appeals before the first appellate court. The plaintiffs’ appeal was partly allowed and a decree was granted in respect of two other items. The defendant’s first appeal was dismissed. Thus, the plaintiffs obtained a decree for three items as against five items claimed in the suit. Aggrieved, the defendants filed a second appeal, S.A. No. 594 of 1977. Both the second appeals were disposed of and the High Court allowed the appeals in part. The concluding portion runs as under:
Accordingly, the second appeals are allowed insofar as they relate to that portion of the building and site which is comprised in T.S. No. 507/4 in respect of which Section Arulandu Udayar was given a ryotwari patta under Ex. B-23 as also in respect of T.S. Nos. 510 and 522/3 for which a 11(a) patta was grantedin favour of Arulandu Udayar. In other respects, the second appeals are dismissed.
Thereafter, the plaintiffs/decree-holders filed execution petitions before the Execution Court for obtaining possession. The judgment-debtors in the executing Court submitted that some items of lands for which pattas were issued should be excluded from the execution proceedings, because in the second appeal it was held that after the patta was issued by the Settlement Officer, the jurisdiction of the civil court is ousted. It was further submitted that the Execution Court can go behind the decree in a matter like this and grant the relief asked for by the judgment-debtors.
13. In the decision reported in Sowrimuthu Udayar v. S.P. Palaniappa Ambalam (1982) 1 M.L.J. 257 : 1981 T.L.N.J. 115., this Court held that “Therefore, in a case where there is a claim by a person other than the land-holder for a ryotwari patta under Section 11 and that claim is resisted by another who, in turn claims the right in himself, the decision given by the Settlement Officer is final and binding on the parties when the same dispute is to be decided in a civil Court.
14. In Vetticherugheu Village Panchayat v. Nori Venkatachala Deekshithulu . The Supreme Court held grant of ryotwari patta is not a title, but a right coupled with possession to remain in occupation and enjoyment, subject to payment of the land revenue to the State.
15. The decisions of the Revenue Tribunal, are final and conclusive between the parties or persons claiming right, title or interest through them. The trick of pleadings and the camouflage of the reliefs are not decisive, but the substance or the effect on the order of the Tribunal under the Inams Act are decisive. The civil suit except on grounds of fraud, misrepresentation or collusion of the parties is not maintainable. The necessary conclusion would be that the civil suit is not maintainable when the decree directly nullified the ryotwari patta granted under Section 3 of the Inams Act. Relying upon these two decisions, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the Execution Court should exclude certain survey numbers for which pattas were issued even though they were not included in the decrees granted in the second appeals.
16. While considering this decision of the Supreme Court in Vetticherugheu Village Panchayat v. Nori Venkatachala Deekshithulu , this Court in the decision reported in Samsuddin Rowther and Anr. v. Awammal and two Ors. (1992) 1 L.W. 207 held as under:
There is no merit in the contention of learned Counsel that in view of the subsequent ruling in Vetticherugheu Village Panchayat v. Nori Vekatachala Deekshithulu , my judgment requires reconsideration. The above case arose under the Andhra Pradesh Grama Panchayat Act (2 of 1964) and Andhra Pradesh Inams Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari Act (37 of 1958). No doubt, the Bench in the above case observed that the historical perspective and the real purpose and proper scope and operation of the Estates Abolition Act was not focused to the notice of the Court in the earlier case. After referring to the earlier rulings of the Supreme Court, it was observed in paragraph 26 as follows:
‘Thus we have no hesitation to hold that the ratio in all these cases are clearly distinguishable and render little assistance to the Gram Panchayat.’ The Bench proceeded to refer to the provisions of the Andhra Act and held that it was a self-contained Code expressly providing rights and liabilities and prescribing procedure and remedies of appeal and revision, thereby excluding the jurisdiction of the civil court. I am unable to find anything in the judgment to run counter to my reasoning in Ramanujam Kavirayar’s case (1988) 2 L.W 513. The judgment of the Supreme Court will not apply to the present case. The provisions of the Tamil Nadu act are different from the provisions of the Andhra Act. In Ramalinga Swamigal Madam case the Supreme Court pointed out the distinction between the Andhra Act and the Tamil Nadu Act inasmuch as the latter did not retain Section 56 which provided for decision of a dispute between two rival claimants. The Court also placed reliance on the words ‘for the purpose of the Act’ found in Section 64-C of the Tamil Nadu Act, which were absent in the Andhra Act. In ‘the Act’ in the present case Section 46 provides for finality of the orders passed under the Act, Sub-Section (1) reads thus:
Any order passed by any officer, the Government or other authority or any decision of the Tribunal or the Special Appellate Tribunal under this Act in respect of matters to be determined for the purpose of this Act shall subject only to any appeal or revision provided under this Act be final’ (Underlining mine.) The underlined words show that it is similar to Section 64-C of the Abolition Act 26 of 1948 and the same language is employed. The reasoning of the Supreme Court in Ramalinga Swamigal Madam case would apply and the ruling in the later judgment of the Supreme Court in Vetticherugheu Village Panchayat v. Nori Vekatachala Dekishithuru A.I.R. 1991 S.C.W. 1303, will not apply. Hence, there is no necessity for reconsideration of my judgment in Ramanujam Kavirayar’s case (1988) 2 L.W. 513.
17. The decision rendered in Samsuddin Rowther v. Awammal (1992) 1 L.W. 207 was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Tamil Nadu State Wakf Board v. Umai Salai Mohamed Sait and 38 Ors. (1993) 2 L.W. 663 and held as under:
The ratio of the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Swamigal Madam is to the effect that the jurisdiction of the civil Court to decide questions of title is not ousted by the provisions of the Minor Inams Act. In view of the said decision wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court confirmed the decisions of this Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Swamigal Madam (1969) 2 M.L.J. 281 upholding the decision of this Court that the jurisdiction of the civil Court is not ousted, the finding of the learned single Judge as well as the trial Court relying on the decision of this Court in Chinnappa Gounder v. S. Seshadri A.I.R. 1981 Mad. 8 that the civil Court cannot go into the question, of title when once patta was granted under the Tamil Nadu Minor Inams Abolition Act, is not sustainable, and accordingly we answer this question in favour of the appellant.
18. In State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Swamigal Madam the Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction of the civil Court to decide questions of title is not ousted even though patta was granted under the provisions of the Minor Inams Act. Therefore, in view of the abovesaid decisions, it is not possible for the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners herein to contend that after the patta was issued by the Settlement Officer, the jurisdiction of the civil Court is ousted in the matter of deciding the title. This decision was not over-ruled by the Supreme Court in the later decision in Vetticherugheu Village Panchayat v. Nori Venkatachala Deekshithulu .
19. In order to support his contention that the Execution Court can go behind the decree and grant relief to the petitioners herein, reliance was placed upon the two decisions reported in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan and Sunder Dass Parkash . According to the facts arising in those cases, the Courts which passed the judgments and decrees lacked initial jurisdiction. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the Execution Court can go behind the decree and grant the relief asked for. But in the present case, the High Court which passed the decrees in the second appeals did lack any initial jurisdiction to entertain the second appeals and dispose of them as merits and in accordance with law. Therefore, in the present case, the decrees granted in the second appeals are not suffering from want of jurisdiction. Therefore, the above cited two decisions are not applicable to the facts arising in this case. In view of the foregoing discussions, I hold that the Execution Court was right in refusing to exclude some of the survey numbers from the execution proceedings for which patta stated to have been granted by the Settlement Officer especially when those survey numbers do not find a place in the judgment and decree granted by this Court in S.A. Nos. 593 and 594 of 1977, dated 12.12.1980. Accordingly, these two civil revision petitions are dismissed. No costs.