JUDGMENT
Vijender Jain, J.
1. Aggrieved by the order passed by the Rent Control Tribunal allowing the appeal of the respondent under Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, the present appeal has been filed by the appellant. Originally, the petition was filed under Section
14(1)(b), (c), (h) and (k) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. That petition was dismissed by the Additional Rent Controller on 23rd April, 1994. The eviction petition was filed somewhere in 1983 by the respondent against the present appellant. Aggrieved by the said order, the respondent filed an appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal limiting their prayer only under Clause (h) of Section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Mr. Warrier, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the premises were being used for commercial purposes right from the inception of the tenancy and, therefore, no order could have been passed under Section 14(1)(h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. In support of his contention he has cited Dr. Gopal Dass Verma Vs. Dr. S. K. Bhardwaj and Another and Smt. A. N. Kapoor Vs. Smt. Pushpa Talwar .
2. The second argument advanced by counsel for the appellant before me was that when the landlord has consciously and deliberately relinquished his right it amounts to implied waiver of his right for determining the purpose of letting and he can not get an order of eviction on that account. Respondent filed appeal limited to the provision of Sub-section (h) of Section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act leaving Section 14(1)(c) of the Act. Mr. Warrier has contended that a notice was issued by the landlord dated 4th June, 1979 (page 134 of the paper book, Annexure.H) inter-alia, taking the ground that premises were let out to be used for residential purposes and the appellant was using the same for commercial purposes. That notice was replied back by the appellant on 11th June, 1979 controverting the fact that premises were let out for composite purpose. Thereafter, respondent issued another notice dated October 19, 1982 Ex. AW1/6 in which it was not mentioned that the premises were used for commercial purposes. What learned counsel for the appellant wants to contend before me is that after waiting from 1979 till 1982 the respondent has waived his right with regard to the purpose of letting and, as a matter of fact, has acquiesced to the user by the appellant for composite purposes.
3. On the other hand, Mr. Makhija, learned counsel for the respondent has contended that all the grounds mentioned under Section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act are independent grounds. A landlord can maintain the eviction petition on the basis of all or one of the grounds as mentioned in the aforesaid Section. He has further contended that there was no waiver by the landlord with regard to the purpose of letting. Mr. Makhija has further contended that in view of the stand taken by the appellant in the written statement that the premises were used partly for residential and partly for non-residential purposes and in view of the fact that before the Additional Rent Controller, a definite stand was taken by the appellant that he has acquired accommodation at Sarvodya Enclave, the appeal was restricted only on the ground mentioned under Section 14(1)(h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Learned counsel for the respondent has also cited V.S. Talwar Vs. Prem Chand 1984 RLR 346.
4. I have given my careful consideration to arguments advanced by counsel for the parties. I do not find any force in the arguments of learned counsel for the appellant that there was any waiver in view of the notice of 1979 and 1982. As a matter of fact, in the first notice of 4th June, 1979, especially it was mentioned that the purpose of letting was residential. It was also brought to the notice of the respondent that in the
breach of letting purpose, he was using the premises for non-residential purposes. What a landlord can do thereafter. He can not physically stop the misuser of the premises. The rigours of the Delhi Rent Control Act comes in his way. After waiting for some time, he issued another notice in 1982 again taking the plea that the premises were let out for residential purposes, He has reiterated the purpose of letting in the second notice also. The reiteration of the purpose of letting can not be equated with acquiescence or waiver. Even otherwise, the appellant has been taking shifting stands, as has been recorded by the Rent Control Tribunal. The Rent Control Tribunal has recorded that in the written statement, the plea of the appellant was that the premises were let out for residential as well as for commercial purposes whereas the evidence brought on record by the appellant was that the premises were let out for commercial purposes alone. The Rent Control Tribunal has dealt with in detail that at the time of the induction of appellant as a tenant, the premises could not have been used for commercial purposes. The defense Colony area in 1984, the superior lessor allowed the premises to be used for commercial purposes, for the reasons stated in the impugned order, I do not find any infirmity in the impugned order.
Dismissed.