JUDGMENT
P. Ramakrishnam Raju, J.
1. The unsuccessful defendants are the appellants. The suit is filed for recovery of Rs. 20,710/- on the foot of a promissory note dated 25-9-1976 alleged to have been executed by the appellants Nos. 1 and 2. Appellant No. 1 is the father of the other appellants. The appellants constitute a joint, Hindu family and are carrying on business in the name and style of Nalluri Pattabhiramayya and Company. The appellants were purchasing tobacco from the respondent and thereby they became indebted to him on that account and also towards hire charges for employing the tractor for ploughing their land and also borrowed some hand loan. The appellants settled the account on 25-9-1976 and the outstanding came to Rs. 16,000/- and accordingly they executed the suit promissory note marked as Ex.A-1. The purpose for which the pronote was executed was clearly mentioned. Before filing the suit a registered notice was also issued on 11-7-1979, office copy of which is marked as Ex.A-2 for which the appellants gave a contentious reply. Hence the suit.
2. In the written statement the appellants besides denying the material allegations in the plaint have stated that the suit promissory note was never executed by appellant Nos. 1 and 2 and that it is forged and fabricated. It is also not supported by any consideration.
3. In the suit, the respondent examined 4 witnesses including himself as P.W. 1 and marked Exs.A-1 to A-3; while the appellant Nos. 1 and 2 examined themselves as D.Ws. 1 and 2 besides marking Exs. B-1 to B-6. The trial Court after framing appropriate issues, decreed the suit with future interest. Hence the appeal. The point for consideration is whether the suit pronote is true and if so not supported by consideration?
Point:- Sri B.V. Subbaiah, the learned Counsel for the appellants submits that there is difference in the version contained in the registered notice, Ex.A-2 and the plaint averments. When once the account is settled and the suit pronote is executed, the question of executing two more pronotes as contended by the respondent does not arise. The respondent has not filed any documents to show that his tractor was employed for ploughing, as such adverse inference should be drawn against the respondent. Even the evidence of P.Ws is not inspiring since there is no corroboration on material particulars about the discussion before arriving at the settlement and about the vouchers under Exs.B-1 to B-6. P.W. 2 being the scribe was removed from the service of the appellants and as such his evidence cannot be relied on. In any event, the promissory note contains an alteration in the year from 1977 to 1976, and as such, the instrument is void and unenforceable.
4. No doubt in the registered notice, a copy of which is marked under Ex.A-2 dated 11-7-1979, it is stated therein that appellant Nos. 1 and 2 have borrowed a sum of Rs. 16,000/- on 25-9-1976 and executed a pronote. But in the plaint it is clearly mentioned that the appellants have purchased tobacco from the respondent and as such they became indebted on that account and that they had to pay ploughing charges for using his tractor and also indebted by way of hand loan. This version of plaint is amply corroborated by the recitals in Ex.A-1 as well as the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 3. In view of these circumstances, the mere fact that Ex.A-2 contains a recital about the cash consideration does not in my view alter the situation. The pronote should be supported, by lawful consideration under law and it need not be any specific consideration. Therefore, this submission in my view has no force.
5. The learned Counsel for the appellants submits that when the account is settled on 25-9-1976 under Ex.B-1 to B-6 and when once the suit pronote is executed for the entire liability the question of executing the other pronotes does not arise. I may straight away reject this contention since I am not concerned here with the truth or otherwise of the other pronotes which are the subject-matter of other suits. Therefore, the mere fact that other pronotes were executed does not in any way detract the truth or genuineness of the suit pronote. It is also submitted that the respondent should have produced evidence regarding ploughing the land of the appellants by his tractor and as he has not filed any proof an adverse inference should be drawn. I am not convinced that such a contention can be swallowed when the pronote recites that the consideration is partly towards the dues of hire charges for ploughing. Therefore the mere fact that the accounts are not filed by the respondent does not affect the liability of the appellants.
6. It is the contention of the appellants that P.W. 2 is a clerk and as he was removed from service his evidence cannot be relied on. He is the scribe of the pronote. It is not as if the lower Court has grounded its findings on the evidence of P.W. 2. The evidence of P.W. 2 has been amply corraborated in all material particulars by P.W. 3 an attestor as well as P.Ws. 1 and 2. Under these circumstances, the evidence of P.W. 2 even assuming that he was removed from service cannot be rejected as it is consistent with the recitals of the pronote Ex.A-1 as well as the evidence of the other P.Ws.
7. The learned Counsel for the appellants finally submitted that the year in the suit promissory note has been altered, and therefore, the burden is on the promisee to establish under what circumstances the year has been altered. Every alteration in the pronote is not a material alteration. Material alteration is one which affects the rights of the parties. In this case whether the year is 1977 or 1976, the suit is within time and therefore by alteration no material change is going to happen either with regard to the last date of limitation or with regard to the liability of the appellants. However, the learned Counsel for the appellants relies on Loonkaran Sethia v. Ivan E. John, . The Supreme Court observed as follows:
“A material alteration, according to this authoritative work is one which varies the rights, liabilities, or legal position of the parties as ascertained by the deed in its original state, or otherwise varies the legal affect of the instrument as originally expressed, or reduces to certainity some provision which was originally unascertained and as such varies, or which may otherwise prejudice the party bound by the deed as originally executed.”
In this case there is no variation of the rights or liabilities of the parties or the legal affect of the document in any manner. As such, I cannot accept the contention that there is any material alteration rendering the instrument void. It may not be out of place to mention that the amendment of the written statement was sought for by the appellants taking a plea of material alteration of the instrument on 9-8-1983, by which time, evidence of both parties is closed on 5-7-1983, and as such, there is practically no opportunity to the respondent-plaintiff to adduce any evidence touching this plea.
8. The learned Counsel for the appellants next relied on Sri Jayantilal Goel v. Suit. Znbeda Khartum, 1985 (2) APLJ 10 (SN) wherein the learned single Judge of this Court observed that when the date is in a different ink other than the ink used for the body of the pronote, and when it is found to be an insertion may amount to material alteration and the person who is in custody of the document is therefore has to discharge the burden of establishing that it is not subsequently altered. I have no quarrel with this observation. As already stated, amendment petition was filed after entire evidence is recorded, and therefore, I would not be justified in insisting that the respondent should have explained the difference. Even otherwise as there is no change in the rights or liabilities of parties, or the nature of indebtedness including the question of limitation, I am of the view that there is no material alteration rendering the document void and unenforceable. In view of the overwhelming evidence, the execution of the suit pronote has been established and the appellants who have denied their signatures having obtained photostat copies of the pronote and other admitted signatures failed to send the suit pronote for comparison to hand writing expert advisedly. The lower Court on a comparison of the disputed signatures with the admitted signatures in the Vakalat etc., found that they are similar.
9. For all these reasons, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances without costs.