JUDGMENT
Divecha, J.
1. The grievance voiced in this petition pertains to incorrect application of the principle or rule of seniority be and on behalf of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 resulting in heart-burning to the petitioners on account of grant of promotion inter alia to respondents Nos. 3 and 4 in supersession of the better and superior claims of the petitioners on the basis of their seniority.
2. In order to understand the nature of grievance voiced by and on behalf of the petitioners in this petition, it would be quite proper to take stock of certain fact situation. It is not in dispute that the petitioners were appointed as Production Operators. Petitioner No. 2 was appointed on 22nd September, 1972, petitioner No. 3 on 10th October, 1972 and petitioner No. 1 on 11th October, 1972. A copy of the appointment order in the case of petitioner No. 1 is at Annexure-A to this petition. It is not in dispute that the appointment orders of the other petitioners No. 1 as reflected in the appointment order at Annexure-A to this petition is styled to be on ad hoc basis for six months. It is not in dispute that appointment of the other two petitioner was also styled as on ad hoc basis for six months. It is again not in dispute that all the three petitioners continued to remain in their job uninterruptedly till their appointment was regularised by one order passed on 10th March, 1975. Its copy is at Annexure-B to this petition. It appears that respondents Nos. 3 and 4 were appointed as Production Operators on regular basis on 25th October, 1972 and 28th October, 1972 respectively as transpiring from paragraph of 5 of the affidavit-in-reply. It appears that the post of production Operators were renamed as Junior Technicians (Production). It appears that, by one order passed on 21st September, 1982, some five Junior Technicians (Production) came to be promoted as Chargemen (Production). Those five persons included respondents Nos. 3 and 4 herein. A copy of the aforesaid order of promotion is at Annexure-C to this petition. The petitioners considered themselves to be senior to respondents Nos. 3 and 4. They were, therefore, aggrieved by the promotion given to respondent Nos. 3 and 4, in supersession of the former’s better and superior claims for the promotional posts. They have, therefore, approached this Court by means of this petitioner under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India for redressal of their grievances against supersession of their better and superior claims for the promotional posts.
3. A preliminary objection as to the maintainability of this petition was raised by Shri Mehta for respondents Nos. 1 and 2. It has been urged that this petition suffers from the vice of delay and laches on the part of the petitioners in espousing their grievances against treating respondents Nos. 3 and 4 as senior to the petitioners, and this Court need not entertain this petition espousing such belated claim. As against this, Shri Shah for the petitioners has urged that this point was not specifically taken in the reply-affidavit on behalf of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and the petitioners had no occasion to meet with that point as it is taken for the first time at the time of hearing. Besides, runs the submission of Shri Shah for the petitioners, in paragraph 9 of the petition the petitioners have clearly urged that the seniority list showing respondents Nos. 3 and 4 as senior to the petitioners in the cadre of Junior Technicians (Production) was not given any wide publicity and the petitioners came to know that they were treated junior to respondents Nos. 3 and 4 practically and only at the time of issuance of the order or promotion at Annexure-C to this petition on 21st September, 1982. It has been urged that the averments made by the petitioners in paragraph 9 of the petition have not come to be controverted in any manner in the reply affidavit filed by and on behalf of respondents Nos. 1 and 2, in this case.
4. I think Shri Shah for the petitioners seems to be right in his submission that the averments made by the petitioners in paragraph 9 of the petition have not come to be controverted by or on behalf of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 in any manner in their reply-affidavit. Even at the cost of repetition, it may be reiterated that the petitioners have clearly averred in paragraph 9 of the petition that they came to know practically at the time of passing the order of promotion at Annexure-C to this petition that in the seniority list they were treated junior to respondents Nos. 3 and 4. The petitioners have also clearly averred in paragraph 9 of the petition that the seniority list showing respondents Nos. 3 and 4 as senior to the petitioners was not given any wide publicity. In that view of the matter, it can safely be assumed that the petitioners were never informed that they were junior to respondents Nos. 3 and 4 at any reasonable point of times so as to enable them to make any grievances against their placement in the seniority list. It is not the case of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 in their reply-affidavit that the seniority list of Production Operators or Junior Technicians (Production) was given the required publicity and representations there against were invited from such employees against their respective placement in the seniority list. Besides, respondents Nos. 3 and 4 have also not come forward with the case that the petitioners were in know of their respective position in the seniority list of Production Operators of Junior Technicians (Production). If it was so, respondents Nos. 3 and 4 would have immediately rushed to this Court and filed their reply-affidavit in this case controverting the case set up by the petitioners in paragraph 9 of the petition. In that view of the matter, I think it can safely be inferred that the petitioners were never informed prior to any reasonable time from the date of the order of promotion at Annexure-C to this petition that they were placed far below respondents Nos. 4 in the seniority list of Production Operators or Junior Technicians (Production) as on 1st April, 1979 as averred in paragraph 6 of the reply-affidavit. I am, therefore, of the opinion that this petition cannot be thrown out on the ground of the so-called delay and laches on the part of the petitioners when they are not found to be guilty of any such delay and/or laches on their part.
5. Shri Shah for the petitioners has rightly submitted that the appointment of no petitioner was on any ad hoc basis. The description of the appointment of the petitioners “on ad hoc basis” in their respective appointment orders was a misnomer. This becomes manifestly clear from term “(ii) (a)” as found contained in paragraph 2 of the appointment order of petitioner No. 1 at Annexure-A to this petition. It may be mentioned that in that term the appointment was to be treated as on probation for a period of one year from the date of appointment. It would pass any one’s comprehension that a person’s period of probation exceeds the duration of his service. It cannot be gainsaid that a person is put on probation at the time of his initial appointment in order to test his suitability for the job. If he is found suitable, he would be continued in the job. That appears to be the dominant consideration behind placing an appointee on probation at the time of his initial appointment. It would mean that the period of probation should be shorter than the ordinary duration of his service. If duration of service is only six months, his period of probation should be shorter than that period. But it cannot be for one year. That would be contradiction in terms. If the period of probation is for one year, the appointee is likely to continue in service for a period longer than a period of probation if he is found suitable for the job. The prescription of probation for a period of one year as transpiring from the appointment order at Annexure-A to this petition would militate against the appointee’s appointment on ad hoc basis for six months. It is not in dispute that the other petitioners were appointed on similar terms. In that view of the matter, though the appointment of the petitioners was styled as on ad hoc basis, in fact and in reality the petitioners were nor appointed on ad hoc basis but on temporary basis and on probation for a period of one year from the date of their appointment.
6. There is one more circumstance appearing on record buttressing my aforesaid view. One Office Order of 25th/28th October, 1972 with respect to appointment of petitioners Nos. 1 and 3 is annexed as Annexure-E to the affidavit-in-reply. Some five persons including the aforesaid two petitioners were shown to have been appointed as Production Operators and their respective dates of appointment have been shown therein. In that appointment order at Annexure-E to the reply-affidavit it has been mentioned : “The above posts are sanctioned vide office order No. 20/48/Estt/72/23 dated 2-5-1972 and 7/16/72 Estt/1320 dated 19.6.1972 from General Manager, ONGC, Baroda.” It thus becomes clear that the posts to which petitioners Nos. 1 and 3 were appointed were regularly created posts. It is not the case of the respondents or any of them, much less of respondents Nos. 1 and 2, that the posts to which the petitioners were appointed were created for a limited period or purpose. It is again not the case of the respondents or of any of them, much less of respondents Nos. 1 and 2, that the appointment of the petitioners thereto was by way of some stop-gap arrangement. If a person is appointed on probation, it would ordinarily mean at the most a temporary appointment. An appointment on probation would mean continuance of such appointment subject to suitability of the appointee for the job. An ad hoc appointment need not be confused with a temporary appointment. Such appointment could be akin to some stop-gap arrangement. For example, a post is created only for a limited period. The appointment to such post could therefore, be on some ad hoc basis. The reason therefore is quite simple. The post is created only for a limited period and the appointment cannot continue beyond that period. A vacancy might arise with respect to a permanent post on account of the incumbent’s proceeding on some long leave. An appointment can be made during the leave period. Such appointment would naturally be for the fixed period during which the regular incumbent might remain on leave. In that case, an appointment could be on some ad hoc basis. It is possible that some new posts are created and they might be required to be filled in by candidates selected after following some procedure prescribed in that regard. Till those posts are filled in according to the prescribed procedure, appointment can be made on ad hoc basis to man such posts. These are but a few examples of appointments on ad hoc basis.
7. It would be quite proper at this stage to look at the dictionary meaning of the term “ad hoc”. It is a Latin phrase. In Chambers English Dictionary (The Indian Edition of 1989) the term “Ad hoc” has been defined to mean : “For this special purpose”. In Webster’s New Dictionary it has been defined to mean : “Pertaining to or for the sake of this case alone”. In the Random House Dictionary its meaning has been given as : “For this special purpose with respect to this subject or thing”. The meaning of the term in the The Concise Oxford Dictionary (The Indian Edition of 1990) is : “For a particular (usually exclusive) purpose”. In view of the aforesaid dictionary meanings of the term “Ad hoc”, an ad hoc appointment would mean an appointment for a specific purpose. A specific purpose could be appointment in a leave vacancy, appointment to a post created for a limited period or duration, appointment to a post till the regularly selected candidate after following the prescribed procedure is made available and the like. An ad hoc appointment need not be confused with a temporary appointment.
8. In the instant case, the appointment order at Annexure-E to the reply-affidavit makes it clear that the posts were regularly created. As pointed out hereinabove. It is not the case of the respondents or any of them much less of respondents Nos. 1 and 2, that the posts in question were created only for a limited period or duration. The appointment order at Annexure-E to the reply-affidavit makes it clear that the appointee was to be on probation for a period of one year if he was found suitable for the job. Simply because the expression “The appointment is on ad hoc basis for six months” is used in the appointment order Annexure-A to this petition, the appointment does not become ad hoc. The appointment was not subject to availability of the regularly selected candidates after following the prescribed procedure. That is not found mentioned in the appointment order in question. In that view of the matter, there is no escape from the conclusion that the initial appointment of all the three petitioners was on temporary basis on the regular establishment but it can never be styled as on any ad hoc basis. To describe their appointment as on ad hoc basis would be a misnomer.
9. Shri Mehta for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 has then urged that the petitioners were appointed on ad hoc basis because they were appointed without following the prescribed procedure like interview. It is the case of the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 in their reply-affidavit that respondents Nos. 3 and 4 were appointed on the regular basis after interviewing them. According to Shri Mehta for respondents Nos. 1 and 2, respondents Nos. 3 and 4 have passed through the process of selection at the time of their initial appointment on the regular basis. As against the said respondents, according to Shri Mehta for respondents Nos. 1 and 2, the petitioners were given appointment without subjecting them to any interview according to the prescribed procedure for recruitment. That may be so. It is however, an admitted position on record that the petitions were subsequently interviewed some time 1973 and their appointments were regularised. Once a person is appointed without following the prescribed procedure of recruitment and his services are subsequently regularised after interviewing him and finding him suitable for the job, his initial service cannot be obliterated for the purpose of fixing his seniority. Seniority in service has ordinarily to be counted from the date of his initial appointment. Unless his service comes to be interrupted in any manner, such an employee, though recruited without following the prescribed procedure, does not lose his seniority if he subsequently passes through the procedure of recruitment.
10. I am fortified in my view by the binding ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Rajbir Singh v. Union of India reported in AIR 1991 S. C. 518. In that case, certain persons were appointed against substantive vacancies and were promoted on ad hoc basis and their promotion was also regularised subsequently. In that context it has been held that the period of their ad hoc service should be taken into account in determining seniority. The relevant observations in that case are :
“If a person is appointed against a substantive vacancy and is subsequently promoted to continue on ad hoc basis to hold such posts for a number of years, then, in that case the appointment though made on ad hoc basis has to be taken into consideration in reckoning the seniority of the holder on that basis. Thus, where the appellants, railway employees who were already members of the service be being appointed in Class IV posts and subsequently promoted on ad hoc basis after holding regular tests and finding them qualified to be promoted in Class III service and their services were subsequently regularised in the said post, it cannot be said that such ad hoc service for a period of above 11 years would not be taken into account in determining the seniority of the holders of the Class III post, i.e. the appellants.”
The aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court is on all fours applicable in the present case. As pointed out hereinabove, the posts manned by the petitioners were created not for a limited period. The said posts were created on the regular establishment of respondent No. 1. The petitioners can, therefore, be said to be appointed against substantive vacancies though without following the prescribed procedure of recruitment. They were regularised in service subsequently after interviewing them by the order at Annexure-B to this petition. Their services prior to regularisation cannot be obliterated for fixing their seniority in view of the aforesaid bending ruling of the Supreme Court.
11. To the same effect is the binding ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers’ Association v. State of Maharastra reported in 1990 II CLR 235. The principle of law enunciated therein is to the effect :
“If the initial appointment is not made by following the procedure laid down by the rules but the appointee continues in the post uninterrupted till the regularisation of his service in accordance with the rules, the period of officiating service will be counted.”
The aforesaid binding dictum of law would hold the field in the instant case.
12. In view of my aforesaid discussion, I am of the opinion that the petitioners should be considered as senior to respondents Nos. 3 and 4 in the cadre of Junior Technicians (Production) or by whatever nomenclature that cadre is known. Their case for promotion to the post of Chargeman (Production) ought to have been considered at the time the promotion was given to respondents Nos. 3 and 4 by the order at Annexure-C to this petition. It is an admitted position on record that the case of the petitioners was not considered for promotion at the relevant time on account of incorrect application of the principle or rule of seniority on the part of respondents Nos. 1 and 2. In that view of the matter, respondents Nos. 1 and 2 deserve to be directed to consider the case of the petitioners for promotion as on the date of the order of promotion at Annexure-C to this petition with all consequential benefits flowing therefrom, including the benefit of further promotion, if any.
13. Shri Mehta for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 has then urged that any acceptance of this petition at this stage would affect a large number of employees of respondent No. 1 inasmuch as during the intervening period quite a few promotions and further promotions have come to be granted. According to Shri Mehta for respondents Nos. 1 and 2, all such employees of respondent No. 1 getting such promotion and further promotion during the intervening period ought to have been joined as parties-respondents to this petition and their non-joinder would be fatal to this petition. I think the aforesaid submission urged by Shri Mehta for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 deserves to be stated only to be rejected. The reason therefore is quite simple. One the date of the petition, respondents Nos. 3 and 4 came to be promoted in supersession of the better and superior claims of the petitioners by virtue of their seniority over respondents Nos. 3 and 4. These promotees have obviously been made parties to this petition. The petitioners in paragraph 16(B) of their petition have also prayed for an interim relief inter alia restraining respondents Nos. 1 and 2 herein from promoting other juniors to the petitioners to the higher posts in preference to the petitioners. By the order passed by this Court on 16th December, 1982, this Court granted an interim relief only to the effect that further promotion, if any, shall be subject to the result of this petition. It may be mentioned that, when the petition was placed for its preliminary hearing on 27th September, 1982, this Court issued a notice to the respondents calling upon them to show cause why this petition should not be admitted to final hearing. Only thereafter at the stage of its further preliminary hearing on 16th December, 1982, this Court issued Rule and granted the aforesaid interim relief. At that stage the affidavit-in-reply filed by and on behalf of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 was very much on record. It is thus clear that the aforesaid interim relief was granted after hearing the learned Advocate for respondents Nos. 1 and 2. In that view of the matter, it does not lie in the mouth of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to urge before this Court that the acceptance of this petition at this stage would affect promotions and further promotions given to the employees in the cadre of Junior Technicians (Production) or by whatever nomenclature that cadre is known. In that case, respondent No. 1 ought to have made clear to such promotees that their promotion was subject to the result of this petition. The petitioners cannot be denied the relief they are found entitled to on acceptance of this petition simply because respondent No. 1 has not chosen to inform such promotees that their promotion or further promotion was subject to the result of this petition. Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 cannot be heard to voice their grievance that the petitioners have not chosen to implead such promotees as parties-respondents to this petition.
14. In the result, this petition is accepted. Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 are directed to consider within six months from the date of the receipt of the writ in this case, the case of the petitioners for promotion as on the date of the order of promotion at Annexure-C to this petition, that is, on 21st September 1982, in the light of this judgment of mine considering the petitioners to be senior to respondents Nos. 3 and 4. If the petitioners are found fit to be given promotion on that date, respondents Nos. 1 and 2 will have to give all benefits of promotion to the petitioners with effect from that date including benefits of further and future promotion, if any, treating them as senior to respondents Nos. 3 and 4 in the cadre of Junior Technicians (Production) or by whatever nomenclature that cadre is known. In order to give effect to that decision, respondents Nos. 1 and 2 may create supernumerary posts in that regard whenever and wherever necessary. It would be open to the petitioners to produce a certified copy of this judgment before the competent authority of respondent No. 1 for taking up the case for consideration of their promotion. In that case, the time-limit of six months would start from the date of production of such certified copy. Rule is accordingly made absolute to the aforesaid extent with no order as to costs.
15. Rule made absolute.