ORDER
1. After hearing the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, as well as
Government Pleader for Roads & Buildings, I do not find any valid grounds to entertain this writ petition.
2. In this writ petition the petitioner seeks to question the validity of the order dated 19-8-1998 by which the third respondent rejected the representation of the petitioner dated 12-8-1998 for taking into consideration the rates quoted by him in figures instead of the rates in words in the tender filed by him. It may be mentioned that the petitioner has earlier approached this Court by filing WP No.23094 of 1998 for declaring the action of the respondents particularly respondents 2 and 3 in not considering the said representation as arbitrary and illegal. That writ petition was disposed of by this Court on 20-8-1998 recording the submission made by the learned Government Pleader that the representation of the petitioner dated 12-8-1998 has been considered and rejected and the rejection order also has been communicated to the petitioner. In view of the said representation made by the learned Government Pleader, the writ petition was disposed of with the observation that no further orders are required to be passed in the writ petition. The present writ petition is filed seeking to question the said order of rejection passed by the third respondent on 19-8-1998.
3. It is a mute question whether it is open to the petitioner to file a fresh writ petition regarding the self-same matter in the absence of any such reservation in the earlier order passed by this Court. However, since there was no adjudication on merits in the earlier writ petition, I will proceed on the footing that it is open to the petitioner to file this writ petition.
4. It is not in dispute that there is a discrepancy between the rates quoted by the petitioner in figures and words in the tender filed by him. The rate quoted by him in figures in ‘2025’ whereas in words it is mentioned as “Two Thousand One Hundred Twenty Five”. Condition No.11.1(a) of the tender notice provides that in case of any discrepancy
between the rates quoted in words and figures the rates quoted in words shall prevail. In case contractor quoted rates only in words and does not quote in figures or vice versa for any one or more items of work, such tender shall be treated as incomplete and rejected. By the impugned order dated 19-8-1998, the third respondent held that in accordance with Clause 11.1(a) of the tender notice the rate of Rs.2,125/- quoted by the petitioner in words for item No.3(c) to (t) vide pages 5 and 6 of Schedule ‘A’ was considered and accordingly informed.
5. The learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that Clause 11.1(a) is only directory but not mandatory, that the rate quoted by the petitioner in words was merely a clerical mistake and as such the rate quoted by the petitioner in figures can be taken into account inasmuch as the petitioner immediately made a representation on 12-8-1998 itself and that the third respondent erred in rejecting his representation. In support of his contention, the learned Counsel for the petitioner sought to place reliance mainly on the decision of this Court in J. Karunakara Rao v. Commissioner, of Tenders, , where an identical clause in the tender notice was held to be only directory but not mandatory. In that case the tender of the petitioner was rejected on the sole ground that the rates were quoted in words only and not in figures. The Court held that automatic rejection of the tender on that sole ground would amount to non-application of mind and arbitrary exercise of power and that the paramount consideration in taking the decision should be public interest. The Court further held that the object of the clause requiring the rates to be quoted in words as well as in figures is only to see that there is no scope for manipulations as to the rates quoted in the tender schedule and that where the rates are quoted in words there is no scope for such manipulation. The following observations made by the Court in that context are apposite:
“The purpose of stipulating such condition is so clear that there should be no room for
any manipulation and precisely for that reason, the instructions would show that in case of discrepancy between the rates quoted in words and figures, the rates quoted in words shall prevail, because it is not possible to alter the rates quoted in words. Clause 10 of Tender Schedule has to be read in the context of Clause 3(ii) of the instructions contained in G.O. Ms. No. 85, dated 20-3-1993. If so read, I am of the considered opinion, the tender of the petitioner cannot be rejected where the rates are mentioned in words and not in figures. May be a tender is liable to rejected where the rates are mentioned only in figures but not in words as there is always possibility of altering the figures in the tender schedule. The condition that rates should be mentioned both in words and figures cannot be held to be a mandatory one.”
The above observations in my view, far from rendering any assistance to the petitioner in this case seem to go against him. For the purpose of this case it may not be necessary for me to go into the question whether Clause No.11.1(a) is mandatory or directory. Even assuming that it is not mandatory but is only directory, it is only means that the tender issuing authority has a discretion whether to strictly follow the said clause or to waive the same. In the instant case the authority has chosen to follow the said clause. Unless it is shown that the discretion exercised by the authority in doing so is arbitrary or perverse, it will not be proper for this Court to interfere in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. By no stretch of imagination can it be said that the action of the authority in going by the clause is arbitrary or unreasonable or perverse. The general rule is that the tender issuing authority is bound by the conditions in the tender notice and is expected to adhere to the same strictly. There is a rationale behind the said clause in that it does not give any scope for manipulation and also rules out any vagueness or uncertainty.
6. The learned Counsel has also drawn my attention to the judgment rendered by me in
M/s. Nataraja Detenator Ltd. v. Commissioner of Women Development and Child Welfare, 1997 (3) An. WR 772, in that case the action of the tender issuing authority in awarding the contract to the lowest bidder by extending time for filing certain documents to fulfil the eligibility criteria was questioned. It was held that the said action of the authority in granting some time to the lowest bidder did not cause any prejudice to the petitioner who was not the lowest bidder and the action was neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. As such it was upheld. I do not think that even this judgment is of any assistance to the petitioner. In this context the following observations made by the Supreme Court in M/s. G.J. Fernandas v. State of Karnataka, arc very relevant:
“Thirdly, the conditions and stipulations in a tender notice like this have two types of consequences. The first is that the party issuing the tender has the right to punctiliously and rigidly enforce them. Thus, if a party does not strictly comply with the requirements of paras III, V or VI of the NIT, it is open to the KPC to decline to consider the party for the contract and if a party comes to Court saying that the KPC should be stopped from doing so, the Court will decline relief.”
That is exactly the position in the present case where the tender issuing authority has chosen to go according to the clause in the tender notice. The petitioner, therefore, cannot complain or seek any relief from this Court.
7. I do not, therefore find any merit in the writ petition and it is accordingly dismissed. No costs.