ORDER
1. When these Criminal Revision Cases were taken up for hearing on 14-2-1996, Counsel representing the petitioners stated that they had no case on merits, and they pleaded for application of certain Government orders, passed by the State Government, notifying certain remissions to accused, similarly placed like the petitioner. At that point of time, it was urged by Mr. R. Raghupathi, learned Additional Public Prosecutor that, in terms of the Government Order of 1987 (G.O. Ms. No. 1762, Home, dated 20-7-1987) petitioners cannot seek remission for the offence punishable under 471, I.P.C. and 224, I.P.C. Time was afforded to the petitioner till the next day (15-2-1996) to choose the course of action, they intended following.
2. On 15-2-1996 counsel stated that there was no decision which had specifically taken note of the 1987 Government Order, except one by me, holding that the 1987 Government Order will stand in the way of applying the subsequent Government Orders on remission, in so far as the offences mentioned in the 1987 Government Order were concerned. They also stated that a contra view stood taken by Jugadeesan, J., in a writ petition, but there was not much of discussion and my view also had not been taken note of. On their request, further hearing was adjourned to today, to help them to look up, for further case law.
3. Today, when the matters were taken up, representation was made on behalf of Mr. K. Sukumaran, learned counsel on record in Cri.R.C. No. 293 of 1992 and on behalf of Mr. N. Baskaran, learned counsel representing the petitioner in Crl.R.C. No. 294 of 1992, that further time should be granted for perusing the 1987 Government Order, though they did not have any further authority to cite. Since the 1987 Government Order was carefully seen, by all the counsel, in the Court itself on 14-2-1996 and 15-2-1996, I directed them to conduct the revisions for, the ground on which the adjournment was sought for cannot be accepted. Both the counsel had no further arguments to advance. As far as the other revisions are concerned, there was not even a representation.
4. It is fairly clear that Counsel on record in Crl.R.C. Nos. 293 and 294 of 1992 have no arguments to advance and the counsel on record in the other cases had deliberately absented himself, clearly showing lack of interest in conducting all these revision cases. In this context, I have no alternative other than disposing of these revisions, after considering, the only ground of remission in sentence, urged.
5. Brief facts, which led to these prosecutions will have to be stated. Petitioner in Crl.R.C. No. 293 of 1992 was A-3 in C.C. No. 1968 of 1986 on the file of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Madras, while petitioners, single in each of the revisions, Crl.R.C. Nos. 294 and 295 of 1992 were A-2 and A-1 respectively, in the same calendar case. They were convicted under s 120-B r/w. 468, 469 and 471, I.P.C. (3/2 counts) and sentenced to undergo two years’ rigorous imprisonment. They were further convicted under 420, I.P.C., and sentenced to undergo three years’ rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 100, in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one more month. The substantive sentence of imprisonment were directed to run concurrently. S. Ganesan, Petitioner in Crl.R.C. No. 295 of 1992, is the petitioner in in Crl.R.C. 296, 297 and 298 of 1992 as well. Crl. RC No. 296 of 1992 arises out of C.C. No. 1969 of 1986 on the file of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Madras wherein Ganesan was the sole accused. In this Calendar Case, petitioner was convicted under 468, I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo three years’ rigorous imprisonment. He was also convicted under 471 r/w. 468, I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 100/-, in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three more months. He was further convicted under 420 r/w. 511, I.P.C., and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and pay a fine of Rs. 100/-, in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three more months. Substantive sentences of imprisonment were directed to run concurrently. Crl.R.C. Nos. 297 and 298 of 1992 arise out of C.C. Nos. 2156 of 1986 and 2995 of 1988 on the file of the same Magistrate wherein as well Ganesan was the solitary accused. In C.C. No. 2156 of 1986, petitioner was convicted under 420, 468 and 471, I.P.C. (two counts each) and also under 420 r/w. 511, I.P.C. The sentence was three years’ rigorous imprisonment under each count with an additional fine of Rs. 100/-, in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three more months. Substantive sentences of imprisonment were directed to run concurrently. In C.C. No. 2995 of 1988, petitioner was convicted under 224 I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo one year rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three months. Petitioners in Crl.R.C. Nos. 294 and 295 of 1992 preferred Crl. Appeal No. 153 of 1990, while petitioner in Crl.R.C. No. 293 of 1992 preferred Crl. Appeal No. 175 of 1990 challenging the correctness of their convictions and consequent sentences, before the Principal Sessions Judge, Madras. Similarly, Ganesan, Petitioner in Crl.R.C. Nos. 296, 297 and 298 of 1992 preferred Crl. Appeal Nos. 154/90, 155/90 and 189/90 before the same Appellate Court. All the appeals were dismissed, on the learned appellate Judge concurring with the findings recorded by the trial Magistrate. Hence these revisions.
6. The petitioners had borrowed monies from Tamil Nadu Industrial Investment Corporation, Madurai. Officers at Madurai, of this Corporation were insisting on these petitioners, to repay the loans obtained. Presuming that if those officers were transferred, they could free themselves from these liabilities, the allegedly prepared forged letters as though signed by then Chief Minister, Thiru M. G. Ramachandran and then Religious Endowments Minister, Thiru R. M. Veerappan and addressed to the Branch Manager and General Manager respectively. They then used those forged letters prepared on manufactured pseudo official letter pads with forged blocks as though genuine and obtained wrongful gain for themselves. Crl.R.C. No. 296 of 1992 relates to escape from lawful custody of the petitioner therein. There proof of forgery and overwhelming evidence was let in by the prosecution and accepted by both the Courts below. That is the reason, why, the counsel stated, fairly enough, that they had no case on merits. The findings recorded by the Courts below, are impeccable.
7. Mr. R. Reghupathi, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, brought to my notice the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in P. V. Bakthavatchalam v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1991 Cri LJ 1870. That Division Bench had occasion to consider the effect of G.O. Ms. No. 1762, Home, dated 20-7-1987. Though the case related to the premature release of a life convict, on the basis of the Government Order mentioned above, that Division Bench was of the opinion that persons, who were not eligible for premature release, as per G.O. Ms. No. 1762, Home, dated 20-7-1987, were ordered to be released erroneously. That Division Bench observed that under 433, Cr.P.C. prisoners were not entitled to be released prematurely as a matter of right. Either under 433 or under any other of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it was entirely the discretion of the Government to release the prisoners prematurely. As a self-imposed restriction, accepting the recommendation of the All India Committee on Prison Reforms, the Government had issued that Government Order, to the effect that prisoners sentenced under certain s of the Indian Penal Code were not eligible for premature release. One of such s was 396, I.P.C. which they had taken into consideration. In the instant cases, the relevant s are 471 and 224, I.P.C. The decision of the Division Bench is binding on me.
8. G.O. Ms. No. 1762, Home (Prisoners/I) Department, dated 20th July, 1987, read as hereunder :
“In para 17.2 of Chapter XX of its report, the All India Committee has recommended that the following categories of prisoners should not be eligible for consideration of premature release :-
i) Prisoners convicted of rape, forgery, dacoity, terrorist crimes, offences against the State and Prisoners sentenced under 224, 376, 396 to 400, 402, 467, 471, 472, 474, 489-A, 498-B and 489-D of the Indian Penal Code;
ii) Prisoners convicted of economic offences, black marketing, smuggling and misuse of Powers and Authority;
iii) Prisoners sentenced under Prevention of Corruption Act, Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, Drugs Act and Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.
2. As there is no provision either in the Tamil Nadu Prison Manual, Volume II or in the guidelines issued – Vide G.O. Ms. No. 1064, Home, dated 24-4-1986 for not considering any category of Prisoners for premature release, the Government after careful consideration accept the recommendation of All India Committee on Prison Reforms in para 17.2 of Chapter XX of its report and direct that the following category of prisoners should not be considered for premature release.
i) Prisoners convicted of rape, forgery, dacoity, terrorist crimes, offences against the State and Prisoners sentenced under s 224, 376, 396, to 400, 402, 467, 471, 472, 474, 489-A, 489-B and 489-D of the Indian Penal Code.
ii) Prisoners convicted of economic offences, black marketing, smuggling and misuse of Power and Authority;
iii) Prisoners sentenced under Prevention of Corruption Act, Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, Drugs Act and Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.
3. The Inspector General of Prisons is requested to send necessary draft amendment of Rule 341 of Tamil Nadu Prison Manual, Volume II.
(By order of the Governor)
Sd/- T.V. Venkataraman,
Special Commissioner and Secretary to Government.”
9. That apart, in S.L.P. Nos. 1202-1228/95, the Supreme Court in its order dated 28-10-1994, while considering the effect of G.O. Ms. No. 1762, dated 20th July, 1987, stated as hereunder –
“The occurrence took place way back in the year 1978. The respondents have faced trial and other proceedings in the appellate Court. Though a question of law does arise with regard to G.O. Ms. No. 1762, dated 20th July, 1987 being considered in these matters, we do not think that we should disturb the status quo, as resorted to by the High Court of Madras. Leaving the question of law open, we dismiss the Special Leave Petitions.”
10. I have taken a similar view in Crl.R.C. No. 433 of 1990, dated 7-7-1995. The case related to conviction under 3(1) fo the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956. The stand of the prosecution was that, in view of the prohibition under G.O. Ms. No. 1762, dated 20-7-1987, petitioner therein was not entitled to plead for premature release, on the basis of remissions. However, petitioner’s counsel contended that none of the subsequent remissional Government Orders had excluded application of remissional provisions to persons convicted for the offence under the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act and hence it should be held that G.O. Ms. No. 1762, dated 20-7-1987 was not applicable. In that context, I have stated as hereunder –
“I have considered the effect of G.O. Ms. No. 1762, dated 20-7-1987 and the subsequent plethora of remissional Government Orders. Even in the subsequent Government Orders, remission, of sentences, to certain categories of prisoners stands excluded. It is easily possible to comprehend, that such exclusion is on the basis of the nature of offence allegedly committed and the impact that it would have on the social fabric. If that should be the criterion governing the remissions, I am unable to understand as to why G.O. Ms. No. 1762, dated 20-7-1987 would cease to have any application so long as it has not been rescinded.”
11. S. Jagadeesan, J. in B. Sri Ramulu v. Secretary to Govt. of Tamil Nadu, (1965) 2 Mad LW 670, held that the plea of the respondents therein, that in view of G.O. Ms. No. 1762, dated 20-7-1987, no remission can be granted to persons sentenced under the Prevention of Corruption Act, cannot be upheld. I am unable to find any detailed discussion on this aspect. As I have stated earlier, the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in P. V. Bakthavatchalam v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1991 Cri LJ 1870, will be binding on me. I am satisfied that the petitioners will not be entitled to remissions, as claimed by them in view of G.O. Ms. No. 1762, Home, dated 20-7-1987 .
12. All the Criminal Revision Cases shall stand dismissed.
13. Revision dismissed.