PETITIONER: NAGPUR IMPROVEMENT TRUST AND ANOTHER Vs. RESPONDENT: VITHAL RAO AND OTHERS DATE OF JUDGMENT11/12/1972 BENCH: SIKRI, S.M. (CJ) BENCH: SIKRI, S.M. (CJ) SHELAT, J.M. RAY, A.N. PALEKAR, D.G. DUA, I.D. BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH DWIVEDI, S.N. CITATION: 1973 AIR 689 1973 SCR (3) 39 1973 SCC (1) 500 CITATOR INFO : F 1973 SC 696 (1,9) F 1973 SC1383 (1,12) RF 1973 SC1461 (1202) F 1974 SC1202 (12,13,15) RF 1980 SC1438 (18) D 1986 SC 468 (34) D 1989 SC1796 (6,7,8,9,11) ACT: Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936 and Land Requisition Act 1894 Different terms of compensation for land acquired under the two Acts-Where Government could acquire land under one Act or the other at its choice there was discrimination violative of Art. 14 of Constitution-There can be no valid classification as to payment of compensation with reference to purpose for which land is acquired or of, Act under which it is acquired. HEADNOTE: The petitioner was tenant of some fields in a village in Patwari Circle 10, Nagpur. He had applied to the Agricultural Lands Tribunal under a local Act for fixing the purchase price of the said fields. The land in question was however acquired under the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act; 1936. Dissatisfied with the compensation awarded the petitioner filed a petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution. In this petition the validity of the Improvement Act was challenged on various grounds, one of the grounds being that the Improvement Act was in violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as it empowered the acquisition of lands at prices lower than those which would have been payable if they had been acquired under the Land Acquisition Act 1894. The High Court allowed the petition and set aside the award. Appeal in this Court against the High Court's judgment was filed with certificate. Dismissing the appeal. HELD : The effect of the modifications made by Improvement Act in the Land Acquisition Act in two respects is tremendous. First the owner where land is acquired under the Improvement Act is paid compensation not according to the market value of the I and but the market value according to the use to which the land was put at the date with reference to which the market value is to be determined in that clause. In other words, if the land is being used for agricultural purposes even though it has a potential value as a building site, the potential value is to be ignored. The second respect in which the owner suffers if the land is acquired under the Improvement Act is that he does not get a solatium of 15% which he would have got if the land had been acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. It is true that be has some minor advantage but they have no comparison in value to the loss suffered by virtue of the market value being determined according to the use to which the land was being put or the loss of 15% of the market value of the land. [146D] It is quite clear especially in View of s. 17A as inserted in the Land Acquisition Act by para 6 of the Schedule to the Improvement Act, that the acquisition will be by the Government and it is only on payment of the cost of acquisition by the Government that the land-vest in the Trust. It is true that the acquisition is for the Trust and may be at its instance, but nevertheless the acquisition is by the Government. If this is so, it enables the State Government to discriminate between one owne'r equally situated from another owner. [45G] 40 It is now well-settled that the State can make a reasonable classification for the purpose of the legislation provided it is based on intelligible differentia having a rational relation with the object sought to be achieved by the legislation in question. In this connection it must be home in mind that the object itself should be lawful. [47D] The legislature cannot lay down different principles of _ compensation for lands acquired say for a hospital or a school or a Government building. An three objects are public purposes and so far as the owner is concerned it does not matter to him whether it is one public purpose or the other. Art. 14 confers an individual right and in order to justify a classification there should be something which justifies a different treatment to this individual right. Ordinarily a classification based on the public purpose is not permissible under Art. 14 for the purpose of determining compensation. [48A] Similarly different principles cannot be laid if the land is acquired for or by an Improvement Trust or Municipal Corporation or Government because so far as the owner is concerned it does not matter to him whether the land is acquired by one authority or the other. [48D] It is equally immaterial whether it is one Acquisition Act or another Acquisition Act under which the land is acquired; if the existence of two Acts enables the State to give one owner different treatment from another ,equally situated the owner who is discriminated against can claim the protection of Art. 14. [48E] TO accede to the contention of the appellant and the intervening states would be destructive of the protection afforded by Art. 14 of the Constitution. The States would only have to constitute separate acquiring bodies for each city, or Division or indeed to achieve one special public purpose and lay down different principles of compensation. [49D] Nandeshwar Prasad v. U.P. Govt., A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1217, P. Vairavelu mudaliar v. Special Deputy Collector, Madras, [1965] 1 S.C.R. 614; 619 and Balammal & Ors. v. State of Madras, [1969] 1 S.C.R. 90, JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2139 of 1968.
Appeal by certificate from the judgment and order dated July
16, 17, 1968 of the Bombay High Court in S.C.A. No. 504 of
1967.
V. M. Tarkunde, Y. R. Dandige and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for
appellant No. 1.
S. V. Natu, K. K. Khamberker, P. Kesava Pillai and M. R.
K. Pillai, for respondent No. 1.
B. D. Sharma, for respondent No. 2.
Y. S. Dharinadhjkari, Advocate-General, Madhya Pradesh and
1. N. Shroff, for Advocate-General Madhya Pradesh
(InterVener)
O. P, Rana, for Advocate-General U.P. (Intervener).
41
D. Goburdhan, for Advocate-General, Bihar (Intervener).
A. V. Rangam and A. Subhashini, for Advocate-General,
Tamil Nadu (Intervener).
K. M. Nair, for Advocate-General, Kerala (Intervener).
O. N. Tikku and Vineet Kumar, for AdvocateGeneral, J. & K.
(Intervener).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Sikri, C.J. This appeal by certificate of fitness granted by
the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, is
directed against the Judgment of the High Court in Writ
Petition No. 504 of 1967 filed under arts. 226 and 227 of
the Constitution, by Vithal Rao, respondent *fore us,
hereinafter referred to as the petitioner.
The petitioner was a tenant of some fields in village
Binakhi in Petwari Circle No. 10, Nagpur. He had applied to
the Agricultural Lands Tribunal under a local act for fixing
the purchase price of the said fields. On May 3, 1962, a
notice was issued under s. 39 of the Nagpur Improvement
Trust Act, 1936-hereinafter referred to as the Improvement
Act. Section 39 of this Act deals with the preparation,
publication and transmission of notice as to improvement
schemes and supply of documents to applicants.
On November 17, 1961 the Improvement Trust applied for
sanction of its scheme by the Government, and on January 9,
1965, the Government sanctioned the scheme under s. 45 of
the Improvement Act. On February 28, 1966 proceedings were
started before the Land Acquisition Officer and on June 12,
1967 an award was passed by the Land Acquisition Officer
fixing the compensation at Rs. 45,910/- for 44.19 acres of
land acquired.
On June, 15, 1967 the petitioner filed the writ petition
under arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution. In this
petition the validity of the Improvement Act was challenged
on various grounds, one of the grounds being that the
Improvement Act was in violation of Art. 14 of the
Constitution inasmuch as it empowered the acquisition of
lands at prices lower than those which would have been
payable if they had been acquired under the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894.
The High Court held that as the acquisition is by the State
in all cases where the property is required to be acquired
for the purposes of a scheme framed by the Trust and such
being the position, it is not permissible without violating
the guarantee under Article 14 of the Constitution for the
State to acquire any property
42
under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act as amended
by the Improvement Trust Act in so far as they relate to the
basis of determination and payment of compensation. It
must, therefore, be held that the provisions of paragraphs
10(2) and 10(3) in so far as they add a new Clause (3) (a)
to Section 23 and a proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 23
of the Land Acquisition Act are ultra vires as violating the
guarantee of Article 14 of the Constitution.
In the result the petition was allowed, the award set aside,
and the matter was remanded to the Land Acquisition Officer
for determination of compensation according to the law and
in the light of the decision by the High Court.
As the case was important, the High Court granted a certifi-
cate under art. 1 3 2 ( 1 ) and art. 1 3 1 ( 1 ) (c) of the
Constitution.
Before, we deal with the contentions of the learned counsel
for the appellant we may briefly examine the relevant
provisions of the Improvement Act. This Act came into force
on December 25, 1936. It was passed before the Government
of India Act, 1935 came into force. The Preamble states :
“Whereas it is expedient to make provision for the im-
provement and expansion of the Town of Nagpur in the manner
hereinafter provided……”
Section 3 of the Act creates the Nagpur Improvement Trust as
a body corporate. Chapter IV of the Act deals with the
Improvement schemes. Section 26 provides for the matters
which may be included in an improvement scheme. One of the
matters is “the acquisition by purchase, exchange, or
otherwise of any property necessary for or affected by the
execution of the scheme.” Section 27 describes various types
of improvement schemes. They are (a) a general improvement
scheme, (b) a re-building scheme; (c) a re-housing scheme;
(d) a street scheme; (e) a deferred street scheme (f) a
development, scheme; (g) a housing accommodation scheme; (h)
a future expansion or improvement scheme and (i) a drainage
or drainage including sewage disposal scheme.
The scheme in pursuance of which the lands in the present
case were acquired was a housing accommodation scheme.
Section 3,9, as stated above, provides for the issue of a
notice after an improvement scheme has been, framed.
Unders. 41, the Trust is obliged to serve a notice of the
proposed acquisition of land on certain persons. Section 43
enables the Improvement Trust to abandon an improvement
scheme after considering any objection, representation or
statement of dissent received and after hearing all persons,
or to apply to the State Government for sanction to
43;
the scheme with such modifications, if any, as the Trust may
consider necessary. The decision would be that of the
Improvement Trust.
Section 44 gives wide powers to the Government to sanction
with or without modification or to refuse a sanction or to
return for, consideration any improvement scheme submitted
to it under s. 43. Under s. 45 the State Government is
obliged to notify the sanction of an improvement scheme.
Section 46 enables the Trust to alter an improvement scheme
‘before it has been completed, subject to certain
conditions.
Chapter V deals with the powers and duties of the Trust
where a scheme has been sanctioned. Chapter VI deals with
acquisition and disposal of land. Under s. 58 the Trust is
enabled’ to acquire by purchase, lease or exchange any land
within the area comprised in a sanctioned scheme. Section
59 deals with, compulsory acquisition and may be set out in
full : It provides
“59 The Trust may, with the previous sanction of the, State
Government, acquire land under the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, as modified by the provisions of this
Act, for carrying out any of the purposes of this Act.”
Section 60 says that “a Tribunal shall be constituted, as
provided in section 62, for the purpose of performing the
functions of the Court in reference to the acquisition of
land for the Trust, under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.”
Section 61 modifies the Land Acquisition Act in the
following words:
“For the purpose of acquiring land under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, for the Trust-
(a), the Tribunal shall except for the purposes of section
(54) of that Act, be deemed to ‘he the Court,
and the President of the Tribunal shall be
deemed to be the Judge thereunder;
(b) the Act shall be subject to the further modifications
as indicated in the Schedule;
(c) the President. of the Tribunal may summon witnesses and
enforce their attendance and may compel the
production of documents, by the same means,
and so far as may be, in the same, manner, as
is provided in case of a Civil Court under the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; and
(d) the award of the Tribunal shall be deemed to be the
award of the. Court under the Land Acqui-
sition Act, 1894, and shall be final.”
44
We need not deal with the provisions dealing with the
constitution of the Tribunal, remuneration of its members,
etc.
Section 68 enables an owner to apply to the Trust requesting
that the acquisition of land not required for the purposes
of a scheme may be abandoned on his executing an agreement
to ,Observe conditions specified by the Trust in respect of
the development of the property and to pay a charge to be
calculated in accordance with subsection (2) of section 69
of the Act. The Trust can abandon an acquisition without
requiring sanction of the Government.
The Schedule modifies the Land Acquisition Act in various
respects. The relevant modifications are these :
1. After clause (e) of section 3, the following clause
shall be deemed to be inserted, namely,-
“(ee) the expression ‘local authority’ includes the Trust
constituted under the Nagpur improvement Trust Act, 1936.”
2. (1) The first publication of a notice of an im-
provement scheme under section 39 of the Nagpur Improvement
Trust Act, 1936, shall be substituted for, and have the same
effect as publication in the official Gazette, and in the
locality of, a notification under subsection (1) of section
4, except where a declaration under section 4 or section 6
has previously been made and is still in force.
(2) subject to the provisions of clauses IO and II of this
Schedule, the issue of a notice under sub-section (4)of
section 32 of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936, in the
case of land acquired under that sub-section, and in any
other case the publication of a notification under section
45 of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936, shall be
substituted for, and have the same effect as a declaration
by the State Government under section 6, unless a
declaration under the last mentioned section has previously
been made and is in force.
3.The full-stop at the end of section II shall be deemed
to ‘be changed to a semi-colon, and the
following shall be deemed to ‘be added, namely
“and
(iv)the costs which, in his opinion, should be allowed to
any person who is found to be entitled to compensation and
who is not entitled to receive the additional,sum of fifteen
percentum mentioned in sub-section (2)
45
of section 23 as having been actually and reasonably in–
curred by such person in preparing his claim and putting,
his case before the Collector.
The collector may disallow wholly or in part costs, incurred
by any person, if he considers that the claim
made by such person for compensation
is extravagant.”
4……………………..
5.(1) In sub-section (3) of section 17 after the figure
“24”‘ the words, figures, and letter “or section 24-A” shall
be deemed to be inserted.
(2)To section 17, the following shall be deemed to be added,
namely.:
“(5) When proceedings have been taken under this section for
the acquisition of any land, and any person sustains damage
in consequence of being suddenly dispossessed of such land,
compensation shall be paid to such person for such
dispossession.”
Para 6 of the Schedule inserts section 17-A.
It reads :
“17-A. In every case referred to in section 16 or section
17, Collector shall, upon payment of the cost of
acquisition, make overcharge of the land to the Trust and
the land shall thereupon vest in the Trust, subject to the
liability of the Trust to pay any further costs which may be
incurred on account of its acquisition.”
Para 10 amends section 23 thus :-
“10(i)…………………………..
10(2) The full-stop at the end of sub-section (2) of section
23 shall be deemed to be changed to a colon, and the
following proviso shall be deemed to be added :-
“Provided that this sub-section shall not apply to any land
acquired under the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936, ex-
cept-
(a) buildings in the actual occupation of the owner or
occupied free of rent by a relative of the owner, and land
appurtenant thereto, and
(b) gardens not let to tenants but used by the owners as a
place of resort.”
10 (3) For the purposes of clause first of sub-section
(1) of this section-
(a) the market value of the land shall be the market value
according to the use to which the land was
46
put at the date with reference to which the market-value is
to be determined under that clause;…………….”
Another advantage which is said to accrue to these persons
is provided by S. 48-A, as inserted by para 14. It reads :
“48-A. (1) If within a period of two years from the date of
the publication of the declaration under section 6 in
respect of any land, the Collector has not made an award
under section 1 1 with respect to such land, the owner of
the land shall, unless he has been to a material extent
responsible for the delay, be entitled to receive
compensation for the damage suffered by him in consequence
of the delay.
(2)The provisions of Part III of this Act shall apply so
far as may be, to the determination of the compensation
payable under this section.”
It would be seen that the effect of the modifications in two respe
cts is tremendous. First, the owner whose land is
acquired under the Improvement Act is paid compensation not
according to the market value of the land but the market
value according to the use to which the land was put at the
date with reference to which the market value is to be
determined in that clause. In other words, if the land is
being used for agricultural purposes, even though it has a
potential value as a building site, the potential value is
to be ignored. The second respect in which the owner
suffers if the land is acquired under the Improvement Act is
that he does not get a solatium of- 1 5 % which he would
have got if the land had been acquired under the Land
Acquisition Act. It is true that he has some minor
advantages which have been pointed out by the learned
counsel but they have no comparison in value to the loss
suffered by virtue of the market value being determined
according to the use to which the land was being put or the
loss of 15% of the market value of the land.
The first point which was raised was : whether it is the
State which is the acquiring authority or it is the
Improvement Trust which is the acquiring authority, under
the Improvement Act. it seems to us that it is quite clear,
especially in view of. s. 17A as inserted by para 6 of the
Schedule, that the acquisition will be by the Government and
it is only on payment of the cost of acquisition to the
Government that the lands vest in the Trust. It is true
that the acquisition is for the Trust and may be at its
instance, but nevertheless the acquisition is by the
Government.
If this is so, then it is quite clear that the Government
can acquire for a housing accommodation scheme either under
the ‘Land Acquisition Act or under the Improvement Act. If
this is
47
so, it enables the State Government to discriminate between
one owner equally situated from another owner.
This Court held in Nandeshwar Prasad v. U.P. Govt.(1) that
the fact that the lands could be acquired for a scheme under
the Kanpur Urban Development Act. (U.P. Act VI of 1945) did
not preventthe Government from acquiring the lands for
the same purposeunder the Land Acquisition Act (as
amended by the Kanpur Act). We may mention that the
Kanpur Act amended acquisition of land for the Board in a
similar manner as in the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act.
A similar point was abandoned in P. Vaijravelu Mudaliar v.
Special Deputy Collector, Madras(2) by Mr. Viswanatha Sastri
in view of the above decision of this Court in Kanpur case.
The question then arises whether the High Court is right in
holding that the impugned provisions were hit by Art. 14 of
the Constitution.
It is now well-settled that the State can make a reasonable
classification for the purpose of legislation. It is
equally wellsettled that the classification in order to be
reasonable must satisfy two tests (i) the classification
must be founded on intelligible differentia and (ii) the
differentia must have a rational relation with the object
sought to be achieved by the legislation in question. In
this connection it must be borne in mind that the object
itself should be lawful. The object itself cannot be
discriminatory, for otherwise, for instance, if the object
is to discriminate against one section of the minority the
discrimination cannot be justified on the ground that there
is a reasonable classification because it has rational
relation to the, object sought to be achieved.
What can be reasonable classification for the purpose of
determining compensation, if the object of the legislation
is to compulsorily acquire land for public purposes ?
It would not be disputed that different principles of
compensation cannot be formulated for lands acquired on the
basis that the owner is. old or-young, healthy or ill, tall
or short, or whether the owner has inherited the property
or built it With his own efforts, or whether the owner is ‘a
politician or an advocate. Why is this sort of
classification not sustainable ? Because the object being to
compulsorily acquire for a public purpose, the object is
equally achieved whether the land belongs to one type or
another type.
Can classification be made on the, basis of the public
purpose for the purpose of compensation for which land is
acquired ? In
(1) A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1217.
(1) [1965] 1 S.C.R. 614, 619.
48
other words can the legislature lay down different
principles of compensation for lands acquired say for a
hospital or a school or a Government building ? can the
legislature. say that for a hosPital land will be acquired
at 50% of the market value for a school at 60% of the value
and for a Government building at 70% of the, market value ?
All three objects are Public Purposes and as far as’ the
owner is concerned it does not matter to him whether it is
one Public Purpose or other. Art. 14 confers an individual
right and in order to justify a classification there should
be something which justifies a different treatment to this
individual right. It seems to us that ordinarily a
classification based on the public purpose is not
permissible under Art. 14 for the purpose of determining
Compensation. The Position is different when the owner of
the land himself is the, recipient of benefits from an
improvement scheme, and the benefit to him is taken into
consideration in- fixing compensation. Can classification
be made on the basis of the authority acquiring the land ?
In other words can different-principles of compensation be
laid if the land is acquired for or by an Improvement Trust
or Municipal Corporation or the Government ? It seems to us
that the answer is in the negative because as far as the
owner is concerned it does not matter to him whether the
land is acquired by one authority or the other.
It is equally immaterial whether it is one Acquisition Act
or another Acquisition Act under which the land is acquired.
If the existence of two Acts enables the State to give one
owner different treatment from another equally situated the
owner who is discriminated against, can claim the protection
of Art. 14.
It was said that if this is the true position the State
would find it impossible to clear slums, to do various other
laudable thing,. If this argument were to be accepted it
would be totally destructive of the protection given by Art.
14. It would enable the State to have, one law for
acquiring lands for hospital, one law for acquiring lands
for schools, one law acquiring lands for clearing slums, anoth
er for acquiring lands for Government buildings; one
for acquiring lands in New Delhi and another for acquiring
lands in old Delhi. It was said that in many cases, the
value of the land has increased not because of any effort by
the owner but because of the general development of the city
in which the land is situated. There is no doubt that this
is so, but Art. 14 prohibits the expropriation of the un-
earned increment of one owner while leaving his neighbour
untouched. This neighbour could sell his land reap the
unearned increment.. If the object of the legislation is to
tax unearned increment it should be done throughout the
State. The State cannot achieve this object piece-meat by
compulsory acquisition of land of some owners leaving others
alone. If the object is to clear
49
slums it cannot be done at the expense of the owners whose
lands are acquired, unless as we have said the owner are
directly benefited by the scheme. If the object is to build
hospitals it cannot be done at the expense of the owners of
the land which is acquired. The hospital, schools etc. must
be built at the expense of the whole community.
It will not be denied that a statute cannot tax some owners
of land leaving untaxed others equally situated. If the
owners of the land cannot be taxed differently how can some
owners be indirectly taxed by way of compulsory acquisition
? It is urged that if this were the, law it,will tic the
hands of the State in undertaking social reforms. We do not
agree. There is nothing in the Constitution which debars
the State from bettering the lot of millions of our
citizens. For instance there is nothing to bar the State
from taxing unearned increment if the object is to deny
owners the full benefit of increase of value due to
development of a town. It; seems to us, as we have already
said that to accede to the contentions of the appellant and
e States would be destructive of the protection afforded by
Art. 14 of the Constitution. The States would only have to
constitute separate acquiring bodies for each city, or
Division or indeed to achieve one special public purpose and
lay down different principles of compensation.
In P. Vajravelu Mudaliar v. Special Deputy Collector,
Madras(1) there were two Acts under which the land of an
owner could be acquired. The land could have been acquired
for various schemes under the Land Acquisition Act, referred
to as the Principal Act, in the judgment, and the Amending
Act (The Land Acquisition (Madras Amendment) Act, 1961).
Court observed :
“The land could have been acquired for all the said purposes
under the Principal Act after paying the market value of the
land. The Amending Act empowers the State to acquire land
for housing scheme at a price lower than that the State has
to pay if the same was acquired under the Principal Act.”
The Court examined various justifications for the classi-
fications which were put forth by the State, and then con-
cluded:-
“From whatever aspect the matter is looked at, the alleged
differences have no reasonable relation to the object sought
to be achieved. It is said that the object of the Amending
Act in itself may project the differences in the lands
sought to be , acquired under the two Acts. This argument
puts the cart before the horse. It is one thing to say that
the existing differ-
(1) [1965] 1 S.C.R. 614.
-L631 Supreme Court/73
50
ences between persons and properties have a reasonable
relation to the object sought to be achieved and it is
totally a different thing to say that the object of the Act
itself created the differences. Assuming that the said
proposition is sound, we cannot discover any differences in
the people owning lands or in the lands on the basis of the
object. The object is to acquire lands for housing schemes
at a low price. For achieving that object, any land falling
in any of the said categories can be acquired under the
Amending Act. So, too, for a public purpose any such land
can be acquired under the principal Act. We, therefore,
hold that discrimination is writ large on the Amending Act
and it cannot be sustained on the principal of reasonable
classification. We, therefore, hold that the Amending Act
clearly infringes Art. 14 of the Constitution and is void”.
In Balammal & Ors. v. State of Madras(1) in which the facts
are substantially similar, the Board constituted under the
Madras City Improvement Trust Act, (Madras Act 16 of 1945)
was authorised by virtue of sec. 71, with the previous
sanction of the Government, to acquire land under the
provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for carrying
out any of the purposes of the Act which included Town
Expansion Scheme (This sec. 71 is equivalent to see. 59 of
the Improvement Act). For the purpose of acquiring land for
the Board under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 sec. 73
provided inter alia, that the, said Act shall be subjected
to the modifications specified in the Schedule (This section
73 corresponds to sec. 61 of the Improvement Act). The
Schedule to the Act provided for modification in the Land
Acquisition Act for certain specific purposes. The Madras
Act of 1945 as replaced by the Madras City Improvement Trust
Act (Madras Act 37 of 1950) made an important change
inasmuch as the result was that by the change persons whose
lands were compulsorily acquired under the Madras Act 37 of
1950 were deprived of the right to the solatium which would
be awardable if the lands were acquired under the Land
Acquisition Act. In this connection this Court observed :
“But, in our judgment, counsel for the owners is right in
contending that sub-cl. (2) of cl. 6 of the Schedule to Act
37 of 1950, insofar as it deprived the owners of the lands
of the statutory addition to the market value of the lands
under S. 23 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act is violative of
the equality clause of the Constitution, and is on that
account void. If the
(1) [1969] 1 S.C.R. 90.
51
State had acquired the lands for improvement of the town
under the Land Acquisition Act, the acquiring
authority was bound to award in addition to
the market value 15% statutory under s. 23(2)
of the Land Acquisition Act. But by acquiring
the lands under the Land acquisition Act as
modified by the Schedule to the Madras City
Improvement Trust Act 37 of 1950 for the
Improvement Trust which is also a public pur-
pose the owners are, it is claimed, deprived
of the right to that statutory addition. An
owner of land is ordinarily entitled to
receive the solatium in addition to the
market-value for compulsory acquisition of his
land, if it is acquired under the Land
Acquisition Act, but not if it is acquired
under the Madras City Improvement Trust Act.
A clear case of discrimination which infringes
the guarantee of equal protection of the law
arises, and the owners of the lands which are
compulsorily acquired must on the decisions
of, it his Court, be deemed invalid”.
After reviewing some earlier cases, the Court held:
” We. therefore, hold that cl. 6 sub-cl. (2) of the Schedule
read with s. 73 of Madras Act 37 of 1950 which deprives the
owners of the statutory right to solarium at the rate of 15%
on the market-value of the lands, is invalid, and the owners
of the lands are entitled to the statutory solatium under S.
23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act in consideration of
compulsory acquisition of their land.”
The learned counsel was not able to satisfy us that the above
case was distinguishable. We are of the opinion that the
case was rightly decided and must govern this case. In this
view of the matter, it is not necessary to refer to all the
cases referred to us at the Bar. We may mention that Mr.
Tarkunde also placed reliance on Art. 31 (A) (1) (a) of the
Constitution. It is now well settled that Art. 3 1 (A)( 1
)(a) has relevance to agrarian reforms and development. It
has nothing to do with acquisition of land for building of a
capital of a State.
In the result the appeal, fails and is dismissed with costs.
U.C. Appeal
dismissed.
52