ORDER
H. W. Dhabe, J.
1. Parties by counsel, Rule. Heard forthwith.
2. The petitioner challenges in this writ petition the action of the Maharashtra State Financial Corporation i.e. the respondent No. 1 in disposing of the unit of the petitioner for non-payment of loan advanced to it for the purpose of the said Unit, It also claims that the possession of its unit should not be handed over to the Intervener i.e. M/ s. Indian Ice-Creams Limited Bombay, but should be handed over back to it. It further claims that the respondent No. 1 should grant all the facilities for rehabilitation of its unit.
3. The facts are that the petitioner is a Private Limited Company registered under I the Companies Act, 1956. According to the petitioner, it was established with an object to manufacture all kinds of milk products and ice-creams etc. It applied to the respondent No. 1 for grant of loan of Rs. 35,00,000/- on 7-12-1988. The respondent No. 1, however, sanctioned it a loan of Rs. 32.5 lakhs on 7-12-1988. After the loan was sanctioned, the petitioner Company executed necessary documents in favour of the respondent No. 1. A charge was created as per the Mortgage Deed dated 3-9-1989 upon the assets of the petitioner Company for securing payment of loan advanced to it by the respondent No. I. The petitioner, thereafter, installed its unit in question. However, according to it, there was escalation in prices during the period of the installation of its unit because of which there was paucity of funds for its proper functioning. It could not thus make proper arrange-
ments for marketing of its product. It therefore, asked for additional term loan of Rs. 5.5 lacs on 14-1-1990 but the same, according to it, was not given to it by the respondent No. 1 on the ground that it did not pay even the interest upon the amount of loan already advanced to it by reason of which it was a defaulter.
4. After the Unit of the petitioner started functioning, it is its case that it was required to face fierce competition from other reputed units. Further, for lack of funds, it could not advertise its product properly. The result, according to it, was that its Unit became sick as its product did not have much demand and could not be sold profitably.
5. The petitioner submits that it was in these circumstances that it was not able to pay any instalment of loan to the respondent No. 1. It is material to see that that the petitioner has not uptill now paid a single pie to the respondent No. 1 towards its loan and interest. After waiting for a long time, when the respondent No. 1 found that the petitioner had not paid any instalment towards its loan and interest, it issued to it a notice on 30-12-1991 under S. 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 (for short “the Acts”) for taking over possession of its entire unit, if it failed to clear its dues before 15-1-1992. The petitioner, by its letter dated 8-1-1992, submitted its explanation to the aforesaid notice dated 30-12-1991 issued under S. 29 of the Act by the respondent No. 1. It explained in its aforesaid letter dated 8-1-1992 the difficulties faced by it and the reasons why it was not able to pay the dues of the respondent No. 1 within time. The respondent No. 1 thereafter granted 15 days’ time to the petitioner to clear off the dues but the dues were not paid by the petitioner within the stipulated time. The respondent No. 1 did not still take possession of the Unit of the petitioner immediately, but there was further correspondence between the parties upon the question of taking over possession of the Unit of the petitioner.
6. It appears from the letter of the
respondent No. 1, dated 16-5-1992 that along with the letter dated 6th March, 1992, the petitioner had enclosed a post-dated cheque in the amount of Rs. 50,000/- which was returned back unpaid. The respondent No. 1 had then informed the petitioner by the said letter dated 16-6-1992 that no arrangements were made by it for payment against the said cheque. It was also pointed out to the petitioner in the said letter dated 16th June, 1992 that it was to give a concrete programme of repayment after entering into an Agreement with the Wadilal Enterprise Limited, but no such programme of repayment was submitted by it to the respondent No. 1. It was further pointed out to the petitioner that as per its letter dated 6-3-1992, the respondent No. 1 had requested it to submit month-wise details of the payment to be made by it to the respondent No. 1 towards clearance of its dues latest by 25-3-1992, but neither such detailed proposal was given, nor any arrangement for payment was made by it. However, by the said letter dated 16-6-1992, a further period of 15 days was given to the petitioner for submitting detailed programme for payment of the dues of the respondent No. 1 failing which, the respondent No. 1 was to proceed to take over possession of its Unit
for realisation of its dues.
7. It does not appear that the petitioner had given’ to the respondent No. 1 any proposal for payment of its dues in compliance with the above letter dated 16-6-1992. The respondent No. I, therefore, issued-another notice dated 5-8-1992 to the petitioner to take over the possession of its Unit under section 29 of the Act. It however, appears from the letter of the petitioner dated 28-8-1992 addressed to the respondent No. 1 Corporation that there were some talks between the petitioner and the respondent No. 1 about taking possession of the Unit of the petitioner. According to the petitioner there was an understanding between it and the respondent No. I that after handing over possession of the Unit of the petitioner, the respondent No. 1 should not issue a notice for
its sale for the next 45 days, The said time was taken by the petitioner in order to see whether it can dispose of its unit itself by holding negotiations with some private parties, who, it appears from the said letter dated 28-8-1992, had approached the petitioner. The petitioner was then to quote the price offered by them to the respondent No. 1. The purpose of permitting the petitioner to sell its Unit through private negotiations seems to be that according to the petitioner, its unit would fetch more value by direct negotiations with the private parties rather than by disposing it of by Advertisement in the newspapers. It is with this understanding that according to the petitioner, the possession of its Unit was handed over by the petitioner to the respondent No. 1 on 28-8-1992, i.e. on the same date on which the above letter was addressed to the respondent No. 1 by the petitioner.
8. After taking possession of the Unit of the petitioner, the respondent No. I, through its letter dated 9-9-1992, informed it that it was granting time of 45 days more i.e. till 12-10-1992 to clear off its entire dues, which were then Rs. 49,24,559, together with the expenses and the compound interest till realisation failing which it was made clear that the Unit of the petitioner would be disposed of by inviting tenders and observing usual procedure laid down in that regard. When no proposal for payment of outstanding dues was received from the petitioner for about 30 days, the respondent No. 1 sent to it a reminder on 6-10-1992 that if no proposal for payment was received till 12-10-1992 it would proceed to dispose of its property in its possession as per the usual procedure laid down in that regard.
9. The respondent No. 1 had even after 12-10-1992 waited for appreciable time to enable the petitioner to clear off the dues but it did not take any steps to do so. The respondent No. 1, therefore issued.’ an Advertisement on 23-1-1993 in the Times of India for sale of its Unit. However, there was no response to the said Advertisement. The respondent No. 1, therefore, again issued an
advertisement on 4-5-1993 in the Times of India. Pursuant to the said Advertisement dated 4-5-1993 there were two offers received by the respondent No. 1. One offer was by M/s. Indian Ice-creams Limited, i.e. the Intervener for Rs.35,00,000/- on deferred payment by basis and the other was from the Bharat Traders Co. Ltd., for Rs. 25,00,000/-upon the same deferred payment basis. Since the respondent No. I felt that the amount offered was very low, the respondent No. 1 published an advertisement in July, 1993 in the Times of India as also in Local newspapers i.e. Nagpur Times, Tarun Bharat and Nav Bharat, pursuant to which it again received an offer from the Intervener i.e. M/s. Indian Ice-Cream Ltd. The Intervener now offered Rs.42,00,000/- on deferred payment basis or Rs. 35,00,000/- on cash down basis.
10. By its letter dated 28-7-1993, the respondent No. 1 accepted the above offer of Rs. 42,00,000/ – given by the Intervener on the condition that it should pay Rs.21,00,000/-within one month from the date of receipt of its aforesaid letter dated 28-7-1993 and should pay the balance amount within two years thereafter in quarterly instalments starting three months from the date of execution of the Agreement of sale or taking our over possession of the assets of the petitioner whichever was earlier. As per the said letter dated 28-7-1993, the Intervener was liable to pay all the dues of MIDC, MSEB and the Gram Panchayat. The Intervener was also to pay the interest at the rate of 18.5% per annum upon the balance amount of Rs. 21,00,000/- to be paid within two years and if the Intervener were to commit any default in payment of the instalment, it was to pay an additional interest of 3 per cent per annum upon the defaulted amount for the defaulted period. According to the Intervener, it had accepted the terms in the aforesaid letter dated 28-7-1993. It is the case of the Intervener that he received the letter dated 28-7-1993 on 10-8-1993 and had thereafter paid an amount of Rupees twenty lakhs to the respondent No. 1 on 10-9-1993.
11. It is then material to see that the petitioner addressed a letter to the respondent No. 1 on 14-6-1993, presumably after sensing that its unit is likely to be disposed of by the respondent No. 2, in which it stated that after it could not find a buyer it had handed over its unit to the respondent No. 1 with the sole aim to repay its dues but it found that in spite of the Advertisements being given to the newspapers the respondent No. 1 could not also find a buyer for its unit, because the entire Icecream Industry was facing sales-problems and was highly competitive. The petitioner further stated in the aforesaid letter dated 14-6-1992 that the marketing prospects for the products have since then improved and it intends therefore, to start the business in collaboration with the third parties by making the petitioner Company a Public Limited Company and by expanding its business by adding to it the other allied businesses like Milk processing. However, the petitioner pointed out that their negotiations with the third parties could not progress when they learnt that the possession of the Unit was not with it. In the circumstances, the petitioner requested the respondent No. 1 to return back the possession of its Unit so that it could be started again. By its further letter dated 14-9-93, the petitioner again requested the respondent No. 1 to restore the possession of the Unit to it in the light of its aforesaid letter dated 14-6-1993 and also because till then there was no buyer found by it to purchase the Unit.
12. However, according to the petitioner, there was no response of the respondent No. 1 to the above letters of the petitioner. On the contrary, the petitioner learnt that the respondent No. 1 was disposing of its Unit by calling tenders without valuing it and without intimating it. Hence, it preferred the instant writ petition in this Court claiming the relief that the respondent No. 1 should be directed to restore the possession of the Unit to it and grant it all the facilities for its. rehabilitation.
13. The respondent No. 1 filed its written submissions in which it emphasised the fact
that the petitioner did not pay a single instalment of the principal amount and of interest thereon regularly. It also pointed out that the petitioner never approached it for any “nursing facilities” on the ground that it had become sick. However, according to it, considering the initial difficulties found by it, it had allowed reschedulement — consisting of funding of interest as well as extension of repayment period by two years as per its letter dated 13-2-1991. It is the case of the respondent No. 1 that the petitioner committed default in payment of rescheduled instalments also. Further, it emphasised the facts earlier referred to that the petitioner itself admittedly found it difficult to run the business, had financial stringency and could not find any buyer to dispose of the Unit to repay its dues and had therefore, voluntarily handed over possession of the Unit to the respondent No. 1 for recovery of its dues. It then pointed out that even after taking possession, time was given to the petitioner to bring a buyer to purchase its Unit who would give better price for it, but it brought none because of which and also because the dues were not cleared it issued advertisements in the newspapers, pursuant to which it received the above referred offer of the Intervener which it accepted. It thus agreed to sell the Unit of the petitioner to the intervener as hereinbefore stated upon the terms and conditions incorporated in its letter dated 28-7-1993 whereafter the intervener had paid to it Rs. 21,00,000/- as per the agreement. The respondent No. 1 had thus submitted that since the petitioner could not and would not pay its dues and since the Unit was already agreed to be sold to the Intervener the proposal of the petitioner for restoration of the Unit to it cannot be accepted.
14. Turning now to the contention raised
on behalf of the petitioner, the same is
principally based upon the judgment of the
Supreme Court, in the case Of Mahesh-
chandra v. Regional Manager, U,P., Finan-
ciai “Corporation,’ AIR 1993 SC;;93S/The
teamed counsel for the petitioner has brought
to our notice the directions issued by the Supreme Court in para 22 of its judgment cited(supra). In the light of the said directions the grievance made on behalf of the petitioner is two-fold. The first grievance is that before advertising the sale of its Unit, the respondent No. 1 has not arrived at its proper valuation after giving the petitioner an opportunity to raise objections to the valuation determined by it 10 judge the adequacy of the offer. The other grievance is that the respondent No. 1 has not communicated to the petitioner the offer which it has received from the intervener and the facilities granted to it so as to enable the petitioner to make the same offer and get the same facilities for restoration of its Unit to it. It is, therefore, urged on behalf of the petitioner that the sale of its Unit to the intervener is thus illegal and is liable to be set aside and further that the possession of the Unit should be restored to the petitioner upon the same terms and conditions which are offered to the intervener as the petitioner is willing to pay the same sale price and is ready to accept the same terms and conditions which are offered to the intervener.
15. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1 as well as the intervener have strenuously opposed the above submissions made on behalf of the petitioner. Apart from urging that the above judgment of the Supreme Court is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the instant case, what is urged is that the petitioner was and is unable to pay the loan advanced by the respondent No. 1 to it which fact, according to the respondent No. 1, was even admitted by the petitioner in its correspondence with the respondent No. 1 hereinbefore referred to and for which reason in fact the petitioner had voluntarily handed over the possession of its Unit to the respondent No. I so that it could recover its out standing loans. It is also urged that as claimed by the petitioner, there was an opportunity given to it to bring a buyer who would pay a better price for its unit, but it could not bring any such buyer which fact is also admitted by the petitioner in its
correspondence with the respondent No. 1. It is then urged in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of U.P. Financial Corporation v. M/s. Gem Cap (India). Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1993 SC 1435, that although the Financial Corporation is not like an ordinary money-lender or a Bank which lends money as it is lender with a purpose — the purpose being promoting the small and medium industries, it is still necessary at the same time to keep certain basic facts in view viz that the relationship between the Corporation and the borrower is that of creditor and debtor and that the Corporation is not supposed to give loans once and go out of business. It is submitted that it has to recover its loans so that it can give fresh loans to others. The submission thus is that since the petitioner as per its admission was unable to pay the huge loan amount outstanding against it, the respondent No. I had no other alternative but to put its Unit to sale for recovering its loan. As regards the submission on behalf of the petitioner that no information was given about the advertisement for sale of the Unit and the offer of the Intervener and the facilities given to it the case of the respondent No. 1 is that the petitioner was aware of the same.
16. Since there is heavy reliance placed by the petitioner upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Maheshchandra’s case cited supra, it is necessary to examine the said case in detail. The facts in the said case would show that the petitioner therein had made certain payments towards the loan amount and interest thereon and was ready to pay to the Financial Corporation therein the amount of Rs. 5,03,165/-which was inclusive of simple interest, but was exclusive of compound interest charged to him, in full satisfaction of his entire dues under “one time Settlement Scheme”, provided the compound interest was waived by the respondent Fiancial Corporation in the said case. However, the respondent Financial Corporation in the said case was not ready to accept the said proposal and, therefore,
invited tenders for sale of the unit of the petitioner therein. It appears that the price offered by the purchaser of the said unit was Rs. 2,55,000/- in 1986 when the valuation of that unit made in 1980 was 6 lakhs and odd which should have normally appreciated in 1986 when the offer of only Rs. 2,65,000./-was made by the purchaser. It is thus clear that the , proposal made in that case by the petitioner was better than the price offered by the transferee. The question thus posed in the said case by the Supreme Court was whether the Financial Corporation had gained by the sale of the Unit of the petitioner in that case. It is in the above set of facts that the ratio of the above case needs to be appreciated.
17. The directions issued by the Supreme Court to the Financial Corporation for exercising the power under Section 29 of the Act are contained in para 22 of its Judgment cited supra. Perusal of the said para would show that according to the Supreme Court every endeavour should be made to make the unit viable and to be put on working condition. However, if it is not workable and needs to be disposed of for recovery of the loan of the Financial Corporation, the following procedure should be followed:
i) Sale of a Unit should always be made by
public auction.
ii) Valuation of a Unit for purpose of determining adequacy of offer or for determining if bid offered was adequate should always be intimated to the unit holder to enable him to file objection, if any, as he is vitally interested in getting the maximum price.
iii) If tenders are invited then the highest price on which tender is to be accepted must be intimated to the unit holder.
iv) (a) If the unit holder is willing to offer the sale price, as the tenderer, then he should be offered same, facility and unit should be transferred to him. And the arrears remaining thereafter should, be “rescheduled to be recovered in instalments with interest after the
payment of last instalment fixed under the agreement entered into as a result of tendered amount.
(b) If lie brings third parties with higher “offer it would be tested and may be accepted.
v) Sale by private negotiation should be permitted only in very large concerns where investment runs in very huge amount for which ordinary buyer may not be available for the industry itself may be of such nature that by normal buyers may not be available. But before taking such steps there should be advertismeats not only in daily newspapers but business magazines and papers.
vi) Request of the Unit holder to release any
part of the property on which the cocnern is
not standing of which he is the owner should
normally be granted on condition that sale
proceeds shall be deposited in loan account.
18. The purpose underlying the said directions is that the sale of the Unit should fetch the best price for which the procedure to be followed is of public auction permitting, however, the owner of the Unit to bring a party with higher offer which can be accepted; by the Fiancial Corporation. It is in cases of only large concerns and that too after giving due publicity to the sale of the Unit in question that the Financial Corporation is permitted to effect sale of the Unit in question by private negotiations. For safeguarding the interest of the loanee/owner of the Unit it is required that valuation of his Unit made by the Financial Corporation for the purposes of public auction should be informed to him so that if he wants, he can raise objections to the same and can even give his own proper valuation. The Financial Corporation is then required to intimate the owner of the Unit the highest bid offered by the intending purchaser and the facilities afforded to him by the Financial Corporation so that, if he wants to get back possession of his Unit by payment of the said price offered by the purchaser and by availing of the facilities afforded to him by the Financial Corporation, he can give such offer to the Financial Corporation which it can
accept and if there are any arrears remaining thereafter, their payment by instalment with interest can be rescheduled.
19. We now refer to the subsequent Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Gem Cap (India) Private Limited, AIR 1993 SC 1435 cited supra relied upon on behalf of the respondent No. 1. In the said case before the Supreme Court, the action of Financial Corporation in taking over the possession of the Unit of the respondent before the Supreme Court for recovery of its loan pursuant to the notice under Section 29 of the Act was under challenge. The Supreme Court found that the respondent Company in that case did not make any repayment of loan which therefore necessitated action under Section 29 of the Act against it. As regards the Judgment of the High Court which had allowed the Writ Petition filed by the respondent Company, it observed that it did not keep in mind the well recognized limitations upon its jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. It held in para 10 of its Judgment in the above case, that the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Art. 226 does not sit in appeal over the decision of the Administrative authorities. The obligation upon the Administrative authority is to act fairly i.e. reasonably. The Administrative acation or decisions of the Financial Corporation regarding recovery of its loan from its debtor can be interfered with by the High Court in its jurisdiction under Art. 226 in two situations viz. (i) if there is statutory violation by the Financial Corporation or (ii) if it were to act unfairly i.e. unreasonably. (See also Neelima Misra v. Harinder Kaur Paintal. ).
20. Perusal of para 3 of the Judgment shows that the Supreme Court has criticised the approach of the High Court viz. that the Financial Corporation which is instrumentality of the State within Article 12 of the constitution is supposed to act in the best interest of the industrial concern with the object primarily of promoting and advancing the industrial activity, It was found in that
case that not a single pie was paid by the respondent Comparty to the Financial Corporation towards repayment of its loan and interest and although there were huge ‘arrears to be paid without any prospect of recovery, the other Financial Institutions were asked by the High Court, four years after its closure, to invest money for rejuvenating the sick unit. The Financial Corporation was thus not allowed to sell the Unit with the result that there was grave financial risk to the Financial Corporation of being caused loss of more than 1 crore of rupees.
21. Para 10 of the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case cited supra shows as to what the approach of the Courts should he in such matters. Its relevant observations which emphasise the duty of a Corporation as a creditor, viz., to effect recovery of its loan from its debtor company are reproduced below:
“We agree that the Corporation is not like an ordinary moneylender or a Bank which lends money. It is a lender with a purpose –the purpose being promoting the small and medium industries. At the same time, it is necessary to keep certain basic facts in view. The relationship between the Corporation and the borrower is that of creditor and debtor. The Corporation is not supposed to give loans once and go out of business. It has also to recover them so that it can give fresh loans to others. The Corporation no doubt has to act within the four corners of the Act and in furtherance of the object underlying the Act. But this factor cannot be carried to the extent of obligating the Corporation to revive and resurrect evey sick industry irrespective of the cost involved. Promoting industrialisation at the cost of public funds does not serve the public interest; it merely amounts to transferring public money to private account. The fairness required of the Corporation cannot be carried to the extent’ of disabling it from recovering what is due to it. While not insisting upon the borrower to honour the commitments undertaken by him, the Corporation alone cannot be shackled
hand and foot in the name of fairness. Fairness is not a one way street, more parti-cualrly in matters like the present one.”
22. The Supreme Court has distinguished Mahesh Chandara case of its Judgment in the above case, pointing out that it was a case where the debtor was anxious to pay off the debt and had taken many steps to discharge his obligation. It was, therefore, held in that case that the Corporation was acting unreasonably in selling his Unit. The Supreme Court also distinguished Mahesh Chandra’s case by pointing out that it was dealing with the procedure to be adopted by the Corporation while selling the Unit under Section 29 of the Act, which aspect was not involved in the above case before it.
23. Examining first the question whether the Financial Corporation has acted fairly or reasonably in taking action under Section 29 of the Act in the instant case, it has to be seen that as in the above case of M/s. Gem Cap (India) Privated Limited (AIR 1993 SC 1435), the petitioner herein had also not paid a single instalment of loan and interest to the Financial Corporation in spite of the fact that taking into consideration the difficulties of the petitioner, the instalments were rescheduled by the respondent No. 1. Although initially, the notice under Section 29 of the Act was given on 30-12-1991, for taking over possession of the entire Unit of the petitioner, if it failed to clear off its dues before 15-1-1992, the said notice was not acted upon by the respondent No. 1 giving thus sufficient time to the petitioner to make the payment. The petitioner had through its correspondence with the respondent No. 1 sought to explain the reasons why it was not able to pay the dues of the respondent No. 1. It had promised the respondent No. 1 that it would give a programme of repayment of its dues after entering into an agreement with the Wadilal Enterprises as is clear from the letter of the respondent No. 1 dated 16-6-1992 addressed to the petitioner, but no such concrete programme of repayment was
actully given by the petitioner. A cheque in the amount of Rs. 50,000; sent along with its letter dated 6th March, 1992 by the petitioner was returned back unpaid and no arrangements were made for payment against the said cheque. The respondent No. I as per its letter dated 6-3-1992 had still given time to the petitioner up to 25-3-1992 to submit the proposal for clearing of its dues. However, neither any dues were paid by the petitioner nor any proposal given for their payment by the petitioner. Still as perits letter dated 16-6-1992, a further period of 15 days was given by the respondent No. 1 to the petitioner for submitting the detailed programme of payment of its dues failing which, the respondent No. 1 had made it clear that it would proceed to take over possession of its Unit for realisation of its dues.
24. The respondent No. 1 had thereafter issued another notice dated 5-8-1992 to the petitioner under Section 29 of the Act to take over the possession of its Unit. There were some talks between the petitioner and the respondent No. 1 thereafter as is clear from the letter of the petitioner dated 28-8-1992 addressed to the respondent No. 1, according to which there was an understanding that the respondent No. 1 was not to issue notice for sale of the Unit of the petitioner for 45 days to enable it to see whether it could dispose of its Unit itself by holding negotiations with some private parties, who according to the petitioner had approached it. The purpose was to permit the petitioner to get the best offer for its Unit. However, it then appears from the letter dated 28-8-1992 of the petitioner addressed to the respondent No. 1 that the petitioner was not able to get such buyer and, therefore, he voluntarily handed over the possession of its Unit on the same date i.e. on 28-8-1992 to the respondent No. 1. Even after taking possession of the Unit of the petitioner, the respondent No. 1 through its letter dated 9-9-1992, again granted it further time of 45 days i.e till 12-10-1992 to clear of its entire dues, which were then in the amount of Rs. 49,24,559.00/- together with expenses and the compound interest till realisation,
failing which it was made clear that its Unit would be disposed of by inviting tenders and observing usual procedure laid down in that regard. It is after waiting till 12-10-1992, that the respondent No. 1 proceeded to dispose of the Unit of the petitioner by giving advertisements in the papers as hereinbefore shown. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the respondent No. 1 had not acted fairly and reasonably in taking action against the petitioner under Section 29 of the Act.
25. The next question which is raised by the petitioner is that as per the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Mahesh Chandra’s case cited supra, no opportunity was given to the petitioner for raising objections to the valuation of the Unit made by the respondent No. 1 for the purpose of its sale. In this regard, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Unit of the petitioner was grossly undervalued by the respondent No. I when according to although the cost of the plot and structure of its unit was Rs. 15,00,00l)/- and the cost of its plant and machinery was Rs. 80,00,000/- the total costs thus being about Rs. 95,00,000/-, the respondent No. 1 had valued the same in the meagre amount of Rs. 47,62,213.00. The submission thus is that had the petitioner been given an opportunity to raise the objections to the said valuation made by the respondent No. 1 and had its Unit been properly valued, it would have received better and higher offers from the buyers.
25A. In reply, it is urged on behalf of the respondent No. 1 that admittedly, the petitioner was aware of the advertisement issued by the respondent No. 1 for sale of its Unit and further according to if, the representatives of the petitioner, who always used to visit its office were aware about its sale by advertisement and the valuation placed by the respondent No. 1 upon its Unit. It is thus urged that, it was open to the petitioner to raise objections to the valuation made by the respondent No. 1 and submit its own valuation also and, therefore, it cannot now make any griveance about it. It is also not necessary
for us to decide the question whether the representatives of the petitioner were aware of the valuation of the Unit of the Petitioner made by the respondent No. 1 or not or whether the petitioner had actually an opportunity to raise objections to the valuation made by the respondent No. 1 or not in the facts and circumstances of the instant case.
26. It is necessary to emphasize as observed by the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Gem Cap (India) Private Limited (AIR 1993 SC 1435) cited supra that although the Financial Corporation is not like an ordinary moneylender or Bank which lends money, the relationship between the Corporation and the borrower is that of Creditor and Debtor and if the Corporation has to give fresh loans to others, and not to go out of business, after giving the loans once, it has to be allowed to recover its previous loans. Admittedly, in the instant case, the petitioner himself has tried to get the best price for its Unit by private negotiations but as has failed to get such a buyer, although, he was given sufficient time to do so. The respondent No. 1 had issue advertisement three times, first two in the “Times of India” and the third one in the local Newspapers in addition to the Times of India. However, the offer received was not more than Rs.42,00,000/- by the Intervener and that too on deferred payment basis. Even, at that time, it is clear from the letter of the petitioner dated 14-6-1993 addressed to the respondent No. 1 that, because of market difficulties and serious competition, in Icecream Industry, it was not possible for it to find any buyer to its Unit. In these circumstances, it is difficult to see how the Unit of the petitioner could have fetched the value near about 95.00,000/- at which the petitioner had sought to value it. If the respondent No. 1 has to recover its loans, it has to dispose it of for the best offer, which it receives and not wait or not dispose it of until the ideal offer sought to be placed by the petitioner is received. It is material to see that if it were wait, it would further increase the dues of the petitioner also, because of further compound interest chargeable to it. It is further pertinent to see
that looking to the offers received for the Unit of the petitioner, although it is not necessary for us to decide the said question, as has 1 already been stated, the valuation of the Unit of the petitioner made by the respondent No. 1 in the amount of Rs. 47,62,213/-cannot be said to be grossly inadequate. For all these reasons, we cannot accept the above contention raised on behalf of the petitioner, about not giving it opportunity for proper valuation of its Unit.
27. As regards the other question urged on behalf of the petitioner, viz., that he should have been given intimation about the offer given by the Intervenor in the light of the directions given by the Supreme Court in Mahcshchandra’s case cited supra, so as to give him an opportunity to give the same offer with the same facilities which are given to the Intervenor, it is difficult I to see why the petitioner should not have approached the respondent No. 1 in that regard when admittedly he knew about the advertisements issued by the respondent No. 1. In this regard it may be seen that the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Mahesh | Chandra’s case (cited supra) was rendered on I 12-2-1992 and was reported much later. It cannot be held that the said judgment was known to the parties’ including the petitioner when the process of sale of the Unit of the petitioner was undertaken by the respondent No. 1 upon whom the mandatory obligation is sought to be cast by the petitioner regarding the intimation to be given to it of the offer given by the Intervener. However, the question of giving intimation to the petitioner about the offer of the Intervenor, is hyper technical in the instant case because the possession of the Unit of the petitioner is not handed over to the Intervener by reason of the interim order passed in this writ petition and the petitioner has thus an opportunity to make the same offer as that of the Intervener which offer in fact, it has made in this writ petition. This contention need not therefore, detain us any more.
28. The principal question which thus
needs consideration is whether the offer made by the petitioner in the instant case can be accepted in the light of the Judgment in Mahesh Chandra’s case cited supra. In our view, merely because, the borrower is ready to give the same offer, as that of the Tenderer, it cannot be said to be the ratio of the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Mahesh Chandra’s case that such offer must be accepted by the Financial Corporation. It must be borne in mind that the question of recovery of the dues of the Financial Corporation is given primacy over the question of rehabilitation of the sick Unit of the borrower in the later Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Gem Cap (India) Private Limited (AIR 1993 SC 1435) cited supra as shown hereinbefore and therefore, the directions of the Supreme Court in Mahesh Chandra’s case have to be read and understood harmoniously with the above ! object focussed in the said case. Thus, before accepting such offer of the borrower it would be open to the Financial Corporation to examine in the light of all the facts and circumstances in each case whether the borrower making such offer would be able to comply with such offer particularly, when the payment is to be made by instalments spread over an appreciable period. In other words, the conduct of the borrower, past and present must inspire confidence in the Financial Corporation that it would be able to recover its dues, if similar facilities which are being given to the Tenderer are also given to the borrower. Further, it must also feel confident that its dues remaining after payment of the last instalment of the price agreed to would be paid by the borrower in instalments which are again rescheduled. It is pertinent to see that in Maheschandra’s case, the conduct of the borrower had inspired such confidence when apart from making payment towards his dues, he had made to the respondent No. 1 a substantial offer of about Rs. 5,00,000/- and odd forfull and final settlement of his dues. On the other hand, in public auction the price received was much lower.
29. However, turning to the facts in the instant case, which are like the lads in the case of M/s. Gem Cap (India) Private Limited (AIR 1993 SC 1435) cited supra, it is clear that there was no payment made by the petitioner towards its dues to the respondent No. 1, although because of the difficulties expressed by it, its instalments were rescheduled and more than enough time was given to it to clear off its dues, as is clear from the correspondence hereinbefore referred to. Further, even no proposal for the clearance of the dues of the respondent No. 1 was submitted by the petitioner in spite of the fact that sufficient time was granted to it for the said purpose by the respondent No. 1.
29A. What is necessary to be pertinently seen is that when the Unit of the petitioner was being put to sale by advertisements in the Newspapers, which fact the petitioner was aware of the petitioner had addressed a letter dated 14-6-1993 to the respondent No. I followed by a reminder dated 14-9-1993 in which although the petitioner claimed that its Unit should be transferred back to it and that with collaboration with some third parties and by addition of additional allied businesses such as of Milk Products, it should be allowed to run, it, there is not a whisper in the said letter dated 14-9-1993 about any proposal or arrangement for payment of the dues of the respondent No. 1. Even in the petition or at any stage during the hearing of the petition, the scheme for payment of the balance of the dues after payment of the price agreed to was not given by the petitioner who had given such proposal at the fag-end of his reply only when it was pointed out to him that he had not given any such proposal.
30. It is further material to see that there is merely a vague statement in the letter dated 14-9-1993 that the petitioner in collaboration with some third party wants to form a Public Limited Company and start the Unit by adding additional allied businesses such as Milk Products, etc. to it. No concrete proposal or scheme of rehabilitation of the Unit
with specific names of the third parties, the agreements, if any, finalised, or proposed to be finalised with them is given by the petitioner either in its letter dated 14-9-1993 or in its writ petition or in the recent affidavit filed by it on 20-1-1994.
31. For all the above reasons, the conduct of the petitioner, past and present, does not and cannot inspire any confidence in the repsondent No. I that it is restored to the possession of its Unit on the basis of the same price, which is offered by the Intervener by further giving it the same facilities given by the respondent No. 1 to the Invervener it would be able to pay the said price within the period allowed to the Intervener, much less the balance of the dues remaining thereafter. Moreover, along with the affidavit filed by it on 20-1-1994, it had not given any security or guarantee to enthuse confidence in the mind of the respondent No. 1 about its future performance. In fact, looking to its past conduct, it was expected to do better than merely stating in its affidavit filed on 20-1-1994 that it had approached the Banks and the Financial institutions for raising loan of Rs. 21 lacs within three months or within the shorter time granted to it by this Hon’ble Court, It is necessary to see that the above amount is only the first instalment to be paid towards price offered by the Intervener.
32. The factual matrix of the proposal of the Intervener and the terms and conditions agreed to between it and the respondent No. 1 for handing over possession of the Unit to it would illustrate the stupendousness and the seriousness of the problem, if the possession of the Unit were to be restored to the petitioner. As hereinbefore pointed out, the price of Rs. 42,00,000/- offered by the Invervener is accepted, by the respondent No. 1. Further, as per the terms and conditions agreed to between the panics and incorporated in the letter of the respondent No. 1 dated 28-7-1993 addressed to the Intervener, the Intervener has to and had actually paid half of the said amount i.e. Rs.21,00,000/-within one month from the date of receipt of
the said letter dated 28-7-1993 which amount the intervener has actually paid to the respondent No. 1. As per the said letter dated 28-7-1993, the balance amount of Rs. 21,00,000/-is to be paid by the Intervener within a period of two years in quarterly instalments commencing from three months from the date of execution of the agreement of sale or from the date of handing over the possession of the Unit to the Intervener whichever is earlier. The Intervener has also to pay the dues of the M.S.E.B. MIDC and Grampanchayat as per the aloresaid letter dated 28-7-1993. The Intervener has pointed out in his Intervention Application that the amount on account of the dues of the MSEB and MIDC is to the tune of Rs.4,00,000/- which liability the petitioner will have to undertake and which in fact is otherwise its own liability.
33. When the Unit is to be transferred back to the petitioner, it is material to see that it cannot escape the liability of its outstanding dues upto date which amount continues to increase till realisation by reason of compound interest payable upon it. According to the respondent No. I, the dues of the petitioner are in the amount of Rs. 82,00,428/- as on today. According to the petitioner as per its affidavit filed on 20-1-1994, he is ready to pay Rs.21,00,000/- within four months although the Intetvener has paid it within one month or any shorter period which payment is dependent upon the loan which it is seeking to raise from the Banks or the Financial Institutions. It is then material to see that the interest charged by the respondent No. 1 to the Intervener is 18.5 per cent per annum. Therefore, even assuming that the petitioner pays an amount of Rs. 21,00,000/ – within one month or four months, the balance amount would be carrying the above rate of interest. The petitioner has then to pay the balance amount of ks. 21,00,000/- within 2 years by quarterly instalments as per the agreement between the Intervt ler and the respondent No. 1. The petitioner thereafter, as per its affidavit dated 20-1-1994 wants to pay the remaining dues of the respondent No. 1 in three quarterly instalments, the first of these
being payable after 27 months from the date of taking over possession of its Unit. It is clear that according to the above proposal of the petitioner, it would take about 3 years’ time to fully repay the loan of the respondent No. 1 with interest and expenses. During this period looking to the rate of interest the amount which would be outstanding against the petitioner would be nearly double. Considering thus this factual aspect, it cannot be held that the petitioner would be able to abide by the commitments in its affidavit dated 20-1-1994 looking to its entire conduct, past and present, hereinbefore shown. We cannot, therefore, accept the submission made on behalf of the petitioner that it should be given the same facilities which are offered to the Intervener and that the balance amount of loan should be rescheduled.
34. In the result the instant writ petition fails and is dismissed. However, in the circumstances, there would be no order as to
costs.
35. The learned counsel for the petitioner has to this stage urged before us that we should continue the interim status quo granted by us during the pendency of this petition for a further period of two months so as to enable it to approach the Supreme Court of India and obtain an appropriate interim order from it. The learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 as well as the Inlervener has opposed the said request. According to the Intervener its sum of Rs. 21,00,000/- paid to the respondent No. 1 is locked and therefore, no indulgence should be shown to the petitioner. We do not think that there is any reason to continue the interim status quo. Hence the request to maintain the status quo for a further period of two months is rejected.
Petition dismissed.