ORDER
1. Heard counsel for the petitioner and the learned Advocate General for the respondents.
2. The contempt application was filed on 14.11.2000 complaining that a direction issued by the Court on 15.7.1993 in CWJC No. 12007 of 1992 had not been complied with and this amounted to a willful disobedience of the order of the Court. The learned Advocate General pointed out that no action under the Contempt of Courts Act could be taken in view of the bar contained in Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, the Contempt of Court petition not having been filed within one year of the disobedience. Learned counsel for the petitioner sought to meet this plea by pointing out that the petitioner had earlier filed another writ petition in the Patna High Court which was disposed of on 15.9.2000 by Annexure-6 judgment giving liberty to the petitioner to move the Court under the Contempt of Courts Act and the present Contempt of Court case has been filed within two months of that order.
3. Obviously, the Court cannot extend the period of limitation or the period provided under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act. Therefore, merely because the Court observed in the subsequent writ petition in CWJC No. 7893 of 2000 that the remedy of the petitioner lay in moving a petition under the Contempt of Courts Act, it would not mean that the time for filing a contempt, case fixed under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act gets extended. Therefore, there is substance in the contention that this Contempt of Court application is barred under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act. All the same, this Court as a Court of record could take note of a wilful disobedience of its order even apart from what is contained in the Contempt of Courts Act and the bar created under that Act would not apply. In that context, we think it appropriate to examine whether there has been a wilful disobedience of the direction of the Patna High Court as alleged.
4. By Annexure-2 judgment, it was directed that regular appointment should be made to the post of Accountant in the office of the District Rural Development Authority and that the petitioner applied and was found entitled to be selected, the question of relaxing the age qualification may be considered.
5. The grievance of the petitioner is (that no advertisement has been made subsequent to the direction and no selection has been made. It appears that the contractual appointment of the petitioner was continued and he is continuing In the contractual appointment. In the show cause, it is submitted that pursuant to the direction in the judgment, the Government was moved for permission to initiate the process for regular appointment, but the Government declined to grant permission, on the basis that there was a ban on fresh recruitments and the District Rural Development Authority was not guilty of wilful violation of any direction of this Court. It is submitted that the District Rural Development Authority cannot advertise for the post and make a regular appointment unless so permitted by the Government. If the Government has imposed a ban on fresh recruitments or it finds that a particular department is to be wound up, it cannot be said that the Government cannot take a decision on that ban. There was also no specific direction to the Government to make an appointment. The direction was issued to the Deputy Development Commissioner-cum-Managing Director of the District Rural Development Authority to fill up the post by regular selection.
6. A proceeding under the Contempt of Courts Act is quasi-criminal in nature. Therefore, unless a clear case of contempt or violation of a direction is made out, action cannot be taken. The benefit of doubt will be available to the alleged contemnor. In this context, we have to note that there was no direction to the Government to make an appointment by regular selection. Since the selection was not made only because of the ban and the circumstances surrounding the organization in question, we are not satisfied that it is expedient in the interest of justice to take any action against the contemnor under the contempt of Courts Act.
7. The further complaint was that two persons similarly situated are being treated differently. The case of two other persons working in the same organization is highlighted. The case of the petitioner is that the other two persons who were appointed along with the petitioner have been confirmed whereas the appointment of the petitioner still continued on contractual basis. In the show cause, it is pleaded that the engagement of those persons was on daily wages and the High Court of Patna had ordered that the daily wages workers must also be given the same pay as those who were regular appointees and on that basis, they were being given wages in the same scale as those who were regularly working. It is submitted that the case of the petitioner stands on the different footing. The petitioner was appointed only on a contractual basis. We cannot say that this defence taken is unsustainable. It is not possible to say on the basis of the facts pointed out that there has been any discriminatory treatment meted out to the petitioner. Of course, this is the aspect outside the purview of a petitioner under the Contempt of Courts Act.
8. In this situation we are satisfied that the Contempt of Court case deserves to be dropped. It is dropped.