ORDER
1. This revision is directed against the judgment delivered by the II Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge Hyderabad in Criminal R.P. No. 58 of 1993 dated 4-5-1993 reversing the judgment of the XVI Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad in M.C. No. 7 of 1983, dated 19-10-1984.
2. There is a chequered history for this case. The first petitioner is the wife and the 2nd petitioner is the son of the 1st respondent. The 1st petitioner and the 1st respondent were married on 13-1-1982 according to Muslim rites. The 2nd petitioner was born to them out of the said wedlock on 10-12-1982. After the marriage, the relations between them got strained as the 1st respondent was having illicit intimacy with one Parveen Jaffery. The 1st petitioner along with her child – 2nd petitioner was forced to live in her parents house. On 21-2-1983, she had instituted M.C. No. 7 of 1983 on the file of XVI Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, for maintenance. The 1st respondent filed counter on 26-4-1983 denying negligence of his wife. In the evidence adduced on 15-3-1984 also, he stated that the 1st petitioner is his wife. On consideration of material on record, by order dated 19-10-1984, the learned Magistrate allowed M.C. No. 7 of 1983 and awarded maintenance of Rs. 275/- to the 1st petitioner and Rs. 150/- to the son. The same was assailed in revision in Crl.R.P. No. 223 of 1984, but the same was dismissed on 28-2-1985 and the said order had become final. As a counter-blast, the 1st respondent had filed O.P. No. 159 of 1985 on the file of the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, for custody of minor child, i.e. 2nd petitioner herein and in those proceedings, the 1st respondent pleaded for the first time that he had divorced the 1st petitioner on 12-2-1983, but the said contention was repelled. When enforcement proceedings were filed by the petitioners under Section 125(3) Cr.P.C. in Cr. M.P. No. 2003 of 1986, again a plea was put-forth by the 1st respondent that he had divorced the 1st petitioner on 12-2-1983, but the said contention was negatived. Subsequently, Crl. R.C. No. 34 of 1987 of the file of the I Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad also ended in dismissal. Thereafter, the 1st petitioner moved this Court and the same was allowed to the limited extent of remitting the matter to the XVI Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad, for enquiry framing two questions :
1) Whether the 1st respondent divorced the 1st petitioner on 12-2-1983 in accordance with the principles of Shia Law ?; and
2) Whether the 1st respondent returned the Jahez articles and paid the Maher amount to the 1st petitioner ?
3. After remittance of the matter, the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate conducted enquiry for the determination of the above questions and after such enquiry, recorded a finding of fact to the effect that neither divorce was effected on 12-2-1983 nor were Jahez articles returned and it was also held that even Maher amount was not paid. Aggrieved by the same, the 1st respondent had filed a revision in Crl.R.P. No. 58 of 1993 before the Court of II Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad. The said Sessions Court rendered judgment on 4-5-1993 modifying the order of the Magistrate that the 1st petitioner wife was entitled to maintenance only up to 6-10-1986 plus three months Iddat period while confirming the order of maintenance in so far as the 2nd petitioner is concerned. For coming to the conclusion that the petitioner was entitled to maintenance up to 6-10-1986 and three months thereafter, the Sessions Court had made a strange approach which has to be condemned in severest terms as it had the effect of overruling the judgment of this Court, had it not been challenged and allowed to become final.
4. While confirming the finding of fact that the plea that divorce took-place on 12-2-1983 was false and incorrect, the Sessions Court had an audacity to cast aspersions on the judgment of this Court rendered earlier while remitting the matter, stating “Unfortunately, the High Court while remanding the matter formulated two points (1) Whether respondent divorced the petitioner on 12-2-1983 in accordance with principles of Shia Law ? and (2) Whether respondent returned the jahez articles and paid for consideration cannot at all be considered by the Court in a petition for pure maintenance. But, still being subordinate to the High Court, this Court and Lower Court are bound to decide on that point. Hence, a finding was given to the effect that there was no divorce on 12-2-1983.” The Sessions Court further held “Apart from that the factual evidence also disclosed that at no point of time when M.C. 7/1983 was pending, the plea was taken about the divorce on 12-2-1983, on the other hand the conduct of the petitioner goes to show that he treated the respondent always as the wife.” The said Sessions Court had conclusively held as a finding of fact “It has to be held that there was no divorce on 12-2-1983.” Having held so, the Court of Session ought to have concluded the matter by dismissing the Revision Petition. But, he exceeded his limits and jurisdiction by proceeding further stating “But to consider whether by what date there is any divorce, this Court can certainly look into the matter. Though a ruling of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court goes to show technical view of that Court is not followed by High Court of Andhra Pradesh when divorce is intimated or came to the knowledge of wife, it is deemed that there is a divorce binding the parties, that appears to be the view of the Andhra Pradesh High Court as per reported judgment of 1970 Crl. LJ 251 (Sic) in V. A. Mohinuddin v. Waheeda Bee. Hence, in this regard, the appreciation of law by the lower Court is not sound and obviously the lower Court was not taken through this decision of 1970 Cr LJ 251 (Sic). Hence the lower Court order is modified to the effect that the wife i.e. the 1st petitioner is entitled to maintenance at the granted rate up to 6-10-1986 plus for three months iddat period thereafter and not beyond that period.”
5. By the above order, the then II Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad virtually refused to carry out the directions of this Court. Such refusal is in effect, a denial of Justice and is further more destructive of one of the basic principles of administration of Justice based as it is in this country on a hierarchy of Courts. In our Constitutional Scheme, the High Court is responsible for the entire administration of Justice in the State. Article 227 of the Constitution of India, makes it crystal clear. That apart, under Criminal Procedure Code, the ultimate revisional jurisdiction, be it under Section 397 read with Section 401 or exercise of inherent power under Section 482 is vested in the High Court and the judgment of this Court rendered by a learned single Judge framing two points in clear, certain and definite terms and without ambiguity in any manner, had become final and after remittance, the Court of Magistrate had properly enquired into the matter and answered that the divorce did not take place on 12-2-1983 as pleaded by the 1st respondent herein and said finding of fact having been confirmed by the II Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, as an inevitable corollary, the revision had to be dismissed and there was no option or discretion to the Sessions Judge to adjudicate any further. Reference to Jammu & Kashmir judgment is too vague and there is no discussion on it. That itself shows the callousness and reckless manner in which the II Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge had dealt with the matter. Further, as I see from the judgment of the Magistrate, the reference of the above judgment is to in Dilshada Masood v. Gh. Mustaffa stating the principles and guidelines for a valid divorce under Shia Law. I fail to understand as to how the said judgment supports the order of the II Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge. Reference to the case in K. A. Mohiuddin v. Waheeda mentioned as 1970 Crl. LJ. 251 (Sic) by the above Sessions Judge is equally irresponsible. As I found, it is a case pertaining to Mohambaram v. Jayavelu 1970 Cri LJ 241 (Mad) that too, it is a case arising out of Writ of Quo Warranto decided by the Madras High Court and the judgment commences at Page 241 and ends at page 254. Any judgment or order rendered by this Court shall bind all the subordinate Courts tribunals and authorities within the territory of State of Andhra Pradesh and if only there is a direct judgment of the Supreme Court contra to the proposition laid down by this Court, there will be a scope of interpretation by the subordinate Court, tribunal or authority. But, the subordinate Courts, tribunals or authorities within the State of Andhra Pradesh cannot ignore the decision of this Court even if there is a decision of another High Court on that point. Further, if this Court dealt with a matter, be it under writ/civil/criminal jurisdiction, either as original authority or as appellate or revisional authority and remanded the matter back to any subordinate Court, tribunal or authority to decide the matter in a particular fashion by framing the points, the said subordinate Court, tribunal or authority shall deal with the same, only in the fashion and manner directed by this Court and not otherwise. If the subordinate Courts, tribunals and authorities within the territory of a particular High Court refuse to carry out the directions given to them by the High Court, the result will be chaos in the administration of Justice and the very democracy founded on rule of law crumbles.
6. For the reasons mentioned supra, the order dated 4-5-1993 passed in Crl.R.P. No. 58 of 1993 by the Court of II Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad is set aside and the order of the Court of XVI Metropolitan Magistrate dated 7-1-1993 passed in Crl.M.P. No. 2003/1986 in M.C. No. 7 of 1983 is restored. Time for payment of arrears of maintenance including that of next month is granted till 30-9-1995. Future maintenance shall be regularly paid within 10th day of each English Calendar month commencing from the month of September, 1995, failing which, the petitioners shall be entitled to continue the enforcement proceedings under Section 125(3) Cr.P.C.
7. The then Presiding Officer of the Court of II Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, namely, Sri C. Sambasiva Rao, who had committed grave acts of judicial indiscipline, impropriety and insubordination need to be disciplined and for taking suitable action, the Registrar is directed to communicate a copy of this order to Mylord, the Chief Justice.
8. The Criminal Revision Case is allowed.
9. Revision allowed.