JUDGMENT
Markandeya Katju, C.J.
1. This writ appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 22.3.2004.
2. We have heard the counsel for the parties and have perused the record.
3. The facts in detail have been stated in the judgment of the learned Single Judge and hence we are not repeating the same except where necessary.
4. The respondent filed the writ petition out of which the present appeal arises.
5. The appellant, the National Housing Bank is a statutory corporation established under the National Housing Bank Act, 1987. It is fully owned by the Reserve Bank of India.
6. The respondent in this appeal (writ petitioner) was a General Manager of the Bank at its office in India Habitat Centre, Lodhi Road, New Delhi.
7. While serving at the bank the writ petitioner was issued two charge sheets dated 16.9.1998 and 7.1.1999 respectively. The first charge sheet dated 16.9.1998 contained only one charge which is as follows:-
(i) Charge sheet dated 16.9.1998
In connection with the meeting of the Board of Directors scheduled for 26th June 1998, you were required to submit to the Board Secretariat certain agenda items within the time limit stipulated. As you are aware the agenda items are to be circulated among the directors sufficiently in advance for which, the concerned officers of the Bank are to ensure that the agenda items are submitted to the Board Secretariat after final approval by the Chairman & Managing Director. You did not submit certain items of the agenda. The said act of yours constitutes grave misconduct in terms of the National Housing Bank Employees (Discipline & Appeals) Regulations, 1994 and therefore this charge sheet is issued to you in terms of Regulation 5 of the said Regulations and other regulations applicable thereto.
8. As regards the charge sheet dated 7.1.1999 there were six charges in the same which are as follows:-
(ii) Charge-sheet dated 07.01.1999
Article of Charge-I
You have been deliberately and willfully refusing to accept/deal with official communications/papers sent/marked to you and consequently failed to discharge your duties. You have refused to give acknowledgement of letter No. NHB (ND)/4229/98 dated November 6th, 1998 even after receiving the letter. You have also refused to give your recommendations on the leave application of one of the Officers, Sh.John Sunil Soren, even when it was specifically marked to you for the purpose. You have also refused to accept copy of a note sent to you by Sh. R.Nanjappa, Executive Director on 22nd December, 1998.
Article of Charge-II
You have deliberately and willfully failed to observe, comply and obey the reasonable orders and directions of your superiors. You were directed by Shri.R.Nanjappa, Executive Director vide note dated 4th December , 1998 to review the work done till date regarding registration of housing finance companies and you have not only refused to accept the said note but also did not review the work done and hence failed to carry out the reasonable orders of your superiors.
Article of Charge-III
You have willfully and deliberately made derogatory remarks about the bank officers in official notes/communications and thus have failed to show the courtesy and attention expected of you. In a note dated 3rd December, 1998 put up by you to the Executive Director, Shri. R.Nanjappa you have referred to the officers posted to the Department of Regulations and Supervision from other departments in a derogatory manner and referred them as NPAs.
Article of Charge-IV
You have, with a view to further your interest in the service of the Bank, tried to bring outside influence on your superiors. You have directly endorsed copies of your representation to the Directors of the Bank individually, thereby tried to bring influence upon your superiors in the matter of discharge of their duties.
Article of Charge-V
You have tried to tamper with the Bank record which was in your custody. In relation to a file, certain pages which were in continuation of previous note sheets, wherein you have called the other officers as NPA were deliberately kept by you instead of being filed. You handed over these only when you were called upon and told about the missing sheets. Your action in this regard amounts to your trying to tamper with the official records.
Article of Charge-VI.
You have remained absent without applying for leave and/or obtaining prior permission from the competent authority during the period 7th December, 1998 till 11th December, 1998.
(True copy of the charge sheets are annexures B & J to the writ petition).
9. On 22.12.1998 the writ petitioner was suspended. Thereafter two enquiries were conducted against him in accordance with the service regulations. He was given an opportunity of hearing in these enquiries and was found guilty of all the charges by the Inquiry Officer. The reports of the Inquiry Officer are annexures to the writ petition.
10. Thereafter a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner and subsequently he was dismissed from service. In appeal the punishment was reduced from dismissal to compulsory retirement and that order was confirmed in review.
11. Subsequently, a writ petition was filed in this Court which was allowed and hence this appeal is filed.
12. It may be mentioned that there is no finding of mala fides against the appellant in the judgment of the learned Single Judge. Also, the learned Single Judge has not held that there is any defect in the inquiry proceedings or violation of the principles of natural justice. The petitioner participated in the inquiry, and admittedly the evidence of each and every witness was recorded in his presence and he was given an opportunity of cross-examination.
13. The findings of the inquiry officer are findings of fact which cannot be interfered with in writ jurisdiction. However, a perusal of the judgment of the learned Single Judge shows that while the learned Single Judge in paragraph 20 of his judgment stated that in writ jurisdiction the Court has a limited role and cannot re-appreciate the evidence nor could it go into the adequacy of the evidence, he has subsequently gone on in his judgment to re-appreciate the evidence and practically sit as a Court of first appeal over the findings of the inquiry officer.
14. It is well settled that in writ jurisdiction the Court cannot sit as a Court of first appeal over the findings of the fact of the enquiry officer.
15. In paragraphs 23 to 59 of his judgment, the learned Single Judge has gone deep into the evidence and has really acted as an appellate Court for reassessing and re-appreciating the evidence, and he has interfered with findings of fact. In our opinion, this he could not do in writ jurisdiction.
16. It is well settled that a writ of certiorari is issued only when there is error of law apparent on the face of the record, and the writ court should not quash the findings of fact of the judicial or quasi judicial body even if they are erroneous or based on insufficient evidence vide Raja Ram Chandra Reddy & Anr. v. Rani Shankaramma & Ors. , Smt. Ujjain Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. AIR 1962 SC 1621. The court issues a writ of certiorari in its supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction vide Province of Bombay v. Khushal Das S.Advani & Ors. , Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque and Ors. , Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra & Ors. etc.
17. An error of fact is not a ground for interference by means of a writ of certiorari, however, gross the error may be, unless the finding of fact is not based on any evidence at all vide Provincial Transport Services v. State Industrial Court, Nagpur & Ors. . An error in appreciation of evidence or drawing the wrong inferences is not a ground on which the High Court in writ jurisdiction can interfere with a finding of fact vide Board of Muslim Wakfs v. Hadi Begum & Ors. .
18. In the light of the above legal position we are of the opinion, with great respect to the learned Single Judge that he has totally misdirected himself and acted as a first appellate officer over the findings of the inquiry officer. In the present case, there was ample evidence, both documentary and oral, before the inquiry officer, and it cannot be said to be a case of no evidence. Hence, in our opinion the learned Single Judge committed an error in interfering with the findings of fact of the inquiry officer.
19. Before going into the findings of the learned Single Judge on the merits of the case, it may be mentioned that the past record of the petitioner has been very bad. This has been referred to in paragraph 67 of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. The petitioner had been issued a charge sheet on 16.12.1992. After an inquiry he was imposed a punishment on 21.10.1997 by which four increments were stopped. On 6.9.1994 the petitioner was issued a caution letter not to use intemperate language. On 26.8.1996 the Legal Adviser of the bank had reported that the petitioner had quarrelled with him. On 22.9.1997 a caution letter had been issued to him as he left his place of work without intimation.
20. Thus, it is evident that the past record of the respondent (writ petitioner) was extremely bad. He had been issued warnings and cautions and even been awarded punishments in the past. Even during the inquiry he used highly intemperate and abusive language against his seniors and supervisors.
21. The disciplinary authority in an order dated 5.7.1999 observed as:-
In view of the continued attitude of CSO during the entire proceedings and even otherwise when he was present in the office, I consider that his continuance in office is detrimental to the interests of the Bank.
22. Similarly, the Appellate Authority in his order dated 30.9.1999 observed as:-
a that Shri Baliga has been displaying a tendency of gross insubordination, gross indiscipline and carrying personal vendetta against several senior and subordinate level officers, unbecoming of an officer of the rank of General Manager and if these would have not been checked, it would have led to a widespread indiscipline among the officers working in the organization.
23. Similarly, the Board and its review order dated 11.4.2000 observed:-
After perusing records, the Board noted with displeasure and anguish the attitude of Shri Baliga almost from the beginning of his career in the National Housing Bank and his recalcitrant attitude towards his superiors and colleagues
The Board concluded that the attitude and behavior shown by Shri Baliga was unbecoming of a person holding the rank of a General Manager
Shri Baliga had committed grave acts of misconduct namely dereliction of duty, insubordination, and indiscipline of the highest order, among several other acts. The Board noted that such a person can not continue in the service of the National Housing Bank in any capacity.
25. Learned Single Judge too in paragraph 71 of his judgment has noted that the petitioner appears to have become somewhat individualistic and is unable to pull- along as a team in the Organization. A person who cannot pull-along in an Organization has no place in such an organization. Every organization functions on discipline amongst its members. It appears that the learned Single Judge had showed some sympathy to the petitioner as noted in paragraph 71 of his Judgment. However, in our opinion, a decision has to be given by a Court on the basis of legal principles and not on misplaced sympathies. The petitioner was involved in the financial scam of 1992 involving Harshad Mehta for which major punishment of stoppage of 4 increments was imposed on him. This was in connection with the charge related to Charge sheet dated 16.12.1992 for showing gross negligence and acting in a manner detrimental to the interests of the Bank while signing a cheque for 76 crore.
The Board in its order observed:-
The Board noted that such a person cannot continue in the service of the National Housing Bank in any capacity
26. The Board consists of 12 members, out of which 11 are outsiders, and are highly placed respectful citizens.
27. Although, it is not strictly speaking necessary to go into detail into each and every observation of the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment (since we are of the view that the learned Single Judge has practically acted as a Court of appeal sitting over the findings of fact of the Inquiry Officer which he could not do in writ jurisdiction) yet we may examine some of his findings.
28. As regards the first charge sheet the bank had examined the Executive Director Sh. R. Nanjappa, the Assistant General Manager, Sh. V.Raghu and Sh.S.D.Sharma from the section of Sh.R.Nanjappa. The learned Single Judge has made his observations on the charge contained in the first Charge-sheet in paragraphs 25 to 48 of the impugned judgment. A perusal of the remarks made in these paragraphs shows that the learned Single Judge has acted as a Court of first appeal over the findings of the Inquiry Officer on this charge.
29. In paragraph 48 of his judgment, the learned Single Judge has observed that there is no evidence on record to establish the charge contained in Charge-Sheet dated 16.9.1998. However, in the very next sentence in the said paragraph he says in any case, from the evidence on record, there is only one possible conclusion, namely that the petitioner had completed the work assigned to him on 19.6.1998 and there was no pending work to be performed by him on 20.6.1998.
30. In our opinion, the above observation itself reveals that the learned Single Judge has sat as a court of appeal over the findings of the Inquiry Officer on the charge relating to Charge-sheet dated 16.9.1998. (Annexure G to the writ petition).
31. It may be noted from the Inquiry report dated 17.5.1999 which related to the Charge-sheet dated 16.9.1998 that the Inquiry Officer has gone into great detail in as many as 8 pages in his Inquiry report which states:
In the light of the above, it is therefore concluded that the Charge against the CSO as contained in the Statement of Imputation of Misconduct that he did not turn up at the office on 20.6.1998 despite instructions of his superior as a result of which the agenda papers were finalized by the Executive Director and others is proved.
32. The above quoted conclusion was read by the Inquiry Officer after considering the evidence in great detail. We have perused the said Inquiry report and we find that the Inquiry Officer has taken great pains to go into factual details and has found the charge proved. We fail to understand, therefore, how the learned Single Judge could have interfered with this finding of fact.
33. As regards the second Charge-sheet this contains as many as six charges against the petitioner. These were inquired into in the Inquiry report dated 28.5.1999 relating to these charges vide annexure P to the writ petition.
34. We have carefully perused this Inquiry report also. The findings therein are findings of fact which could not interfered with in writ jurisdiction.
35. The learned Single Judge has dealt with these findings in paragraphs 50 to 65 of the impugned Judgment. We have carefully perused these paragraphs and we find again that the learned Single Judge has acted practically sat as a court of first appeal and has interfered with the findings of fact of the Inquiry Officer.
36. In paragraphs 29, 30 & 50 of the impugned Judgment, the learned Single Judge has held that the banks counsel had conceded a certain position with regard to the Article of Charge in the first charge-sheet, and charge 5 in the second charge-sheet. It is contended by Sh.Raj Birbal, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that no such concession had ever been made before the learned Single Judge. However, it is not necessary to go into this controversy as we are of the opinion that even otherwise the judgment of the learned Single Judge cannot be sustained.
37. As regards the charge No.I, the learned Single Judge has himself recorded a finding that there is evidence to sustain this charge.
38. Charge No. III in the Charge-sheet dated 7.1.1999 (quoted earlier) is with regard to deliberately making remarks about the Bank officers and failing to show the courtesy and attention expected of the petitioner. He has called the officers posted in the Department of regulations and supervision from other departments as non-performing assets in his note dated 3.12.1998 put up by the Executive Director Sh.R.Nanjappa.
39. In this connection, the learned Single Judge in paragraph 55 of his Judgment has observed that:-
Article of charge No. III was of using derogatory language in the note dated 3.12.1998. Derogatory words used were that some of the staff at petitioners office was Non-performing Assets. Non-performing asset means an asset which yields no income. It means useless. Derogatory means involving disparagement, insulting or depreciatory remark. However, every trade develop its own colloquial literature and one starts understanding these phrases in said context. What did the petitioner write? A good chunk of officers are fresh recruits without any such experience background, some have no knowledge of basics of accounting, some were NPAs in other departments. It may be an injudicious and unofficious way to communicate. However, it does not cross the Laxman Rekha of derogatory remarks. Article of charge No. III also fails.
40. We are afraid we cannot agree with the view taken by the learned Single Judge. The expression non-performing assets is a term used for properties and not for human beings. It was certainly highly improper for the petitioner to call his brother officers as non-performing assets, that too in a written note dated 3.12.1998 addressed to the Executive Director. In this connection, it may be mentioned that the petitioner has used intemperate, objectionable and derogatory language on several occasions. Thus the Appellate Authority in its order dated 30.9.1999 has observed:
20. On page 14 of Shri Baliga appeal, Shri Baliga states that he has a track record of excellent performance. The fact of the matter is that his performance is unsatisfactory. He has been charge-sheeted once in the Securities Scam and was awarded a major penalty of reduction of pay by 4 increments. He has been several times cautioned for his rude language and intemperate behavior and all these are in his confidential file. On the same page, he says that there were delays (in the disposal of work) at levels senior to him. This shows a tendency on the part of Shri Baliga to blame every body for his shortcomings. On the same page, he has used words about the Executive Director, Shri Handa, which I reproduce are indications of his mental decay arising out of senility. It does not behoove well of a person designated as executive director and of senior age like 59 years to stoop to such low levels. Instead of accepting his mistakes and apologizing for the same, he keeps on using highly objectionable language against his superiors. On pages 14 & 15, Shri Baliga tries to pass on the buck to the Executive Directors.
24. On pages 19, 20 & 21 on his appeal, Shri Baliga has been using highly objectionable and intemperate language about his superiors, which is borne out in the appeal itself and therefore, I do not propose to deal with this. His comment regarding using defamatory words to call officers as Non Performing Assets, is a further proof.
29. On pages 32 and 33 of his appeal, Shri Baliga has used the following language about the Executive Director:
Shri Handa has turned senile and is on the verge of lunacy having failed to prove his bogus allegations. Shri Handa is hallucinating advise Shri Handa to make another attempt at telling cock-and-bull stories. Shri Handa has failed to prove his bogus allegations and his conspiracy lies exposed.
Shri Baliga language is highly objectionable and defamatory, for which separate action is warranted against him. In his observation, Shri Baliga has mentioned as under:
The enquiry report prepared by the Legal Adviser, who took it to CMD in the evening today (17th May, 1999) and got it vetted by the CMD and was delivered to me at 21 hours.
This is an absolute falsehood which is highly objectionable and separate action against Shri Baliga is required for leveling baseless allegations involving highest functionary of the bank as also the Legal Adviser. In the personal hearing given to him when he was confronted with this statement, Shri Baliga stated that this was told to him by some officer of the NHB. He however refused to disclose the identity of the officer, which shows that Shri Baliga is in the habit of leveling baseless allegations.
30. Shri Baliga in the personal hearing on 28th Sept, 1999 informed the undersigned that in case his appeal is not disposed of before 6th October 1999, he would commit suicide. He was advised that life is very precious and he should never think of any such thing. Despite this, when it was found that Shri Baliga has the tendency of being in a somewhat unsound mind, the matter was also report by NHB to the police for taking appropriate action in the matter.
31.1. During the personal hearing as also in any of the communications, Shri Baliga has not expressed regret or remorse about his gross indiscipline, rude behavior and using intemperate language against several officers of the Bank. Regarding the quantum of punishment, since Shri Baliga was totally unrepentant, he observed that no punishment be awarded to him, because, according to him, he was innocent. Considering each individual charge and guilt proved in respect of each individual charge, seemingly the punishment may appear to be somewhat harsh. However, here is an officer who has a tendency to flout all established norms of discipline, indulges in gross insubordination, does not carry out reasonable orders of his superiors and is in the habit of leveling baseless allegations against the General Manager, Executive Director, Legal Advisor and Chairman and Managing Director. He is in the habit of using highly intemperate and objectionable language in his communications.
31.2 All considered, including the enquire reports, the other relevant details and reasons given in the order of the Competent Authority and after considering the appeal of Shri Baliga and the relevant records, including his past track record, I am left with no other option but to agree that the order of dismissal from the service of National Housing Bank is just and equitable in the circumstances. I am aware of the fact that dismissal from service would mean a livelihood of the officer but if an institution has to have a discipline, the punishment is not considered too harsh. I having nothing further to add.
32. This order may be served on Shri Baliga.
True copy of the Appellate Order dated 30.9.1999 is annexure V to the appeal.
41. Thereafter also the Board of the Director in its review order observed:
7. After perusing records, the Board noted with displeasure and anguish the attitude of Shri Baliga almost from the beginning of his career in the National Housing Bank and his recalcitrant attitude towards his superiors and colleagues. The Board noted with regret the attitude of Shri Baliga in not attending to the important work allotted to him in the matter of registration of housing finance companies, which is a mandatory duty on the National Housing Bank under the Housing Finance Companies (NHB) Directions, 1989. The Board noted his attitude in this respect and use of intemperate language in replying to the Executive Director, who in the hierarchy of the Bank, is next to the Chairman & Managing Director. The Board concluded that the attitude and behavior shown by Shri Baliga was unbecoming of a person holding the rank of a General Manager. The Board, after thorough discussions, taking into consideration of all aspects, came to the conclusion that Shri Baliga had committed grave acts of misconduct namely dereliction of duty, insubordination, and indiscipline of the highest order, among several other acts. The Board noted that such a person cannot continue in the service of the National Housing Bank in any capacity. Regarding the quantum of punishment, the Board felt that the order of dismissal was indeed called for and a major penalty imposing dismissal from service was correctly imposed. However, the Board, taking into consideration the age of Shri Baliga and on humanitarian grounds, decided that the major punishment of dismissal imposed on Shri Baliga vide Disciplinary Authority order dated 15th July, 1999, be substituted for compulsory retirement under clause (f) of Regulation 4 of the National Housing Bank Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1994, which shall have the effect from the same date as the order of the Disciplinary Authority, dismissing Shri Baliga from service as mentioned in the aforesaid order. The Board directed that the decision of the Board be communicated to Shri Baliga.
(emphasis supplied).
42. Thus, it is evident that the petitioner had become a nuisance and misbehaved with the superior officers using derogatory, offensive and intemperate language. Surely such a person does not deserve any sympathy. We fail to understand how the learned Single Judge could have extended sympathy to him by showing that describing officers as non-performing assets does not cross the Laxman Rekha about derogatory remarks.
43. The learned Single Judge has held that charges I & VI of the second Charge-sheet stand established. In our opinion, the learned Single Judge has acted as an appellate court sitting in appeal over the findings of the Inquiry Officer.
44. In our opinion, it cannot be said that there was no evidence before the Inquiry Officer on the basis of which he gave his finding of fact. It can also not be said that no man acting reasonably and objectively could have arrived at such conclusions or that they were perverse. In Union of India v. Upendra Singh it was held:
The truth or otherwise of the charges is a matter for the disciplinary authority to go into. Indeed, even after the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings, if the matter comes to Court or Tribunal, they have no jurisdiction to look into the correctness of the findings of the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority, as the case may be.
45. The past conduct of an employee can certainly be looked into as observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Directorate General RPF v. Ch.Sai Babu, where the Honble Court was held:-
Normally punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority not to be disturbed by High Court or Tribunal except in appropriate cases that to only after reaching a conclusion that punishment imposed is grossly or shockingly disappropriate. For reaching such a conclusion, the Court has to examine all the relevant facts including nature of charge proved against, the past conduct of the employee, penalty imposed earlier, discipline required to be maintained and the department in which the delinquent person works etc.
46. In Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana the Supreme Court observed:
The Court exercising the jurisdiction of judicial review would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings excepting in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e., where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at that finding. The Court cannot embark upon re-appreciating the evidence or weighing the same like an appellate authority. So long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained.
47. Similarly, in Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K.Chopra held that:
17. The High Court appears to have over-looked the settled position that in departmental proceedings, the Disciplinary Authority is the sole Judge of facts and in case an appeal is presented to the Appellate Authority, the Appellate Authority has also the power/and jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion, on facts, being the sole fact finding authorities. Once findings of fact, based on appreciation of evidence are recorded, the High Court in writ jurisdiction may not normally interfere with those factual findings were based either on no evidence or that the findings were wholly perverse and/or legally untenable. The adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the High Court. Since, the High Court does not sit as an Appellate Authority, over the factual findings recorded during departmental proceedings, while exercising the power of judicial review, the High Court cannot normally speaking substitute its own conclusion, with regard to the guilt of the delinquent, for that of the departmental authorities. Even in so far as imposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed by the Disciplinary or the Departmental Appellate Authority, is either impermissible or such that it shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should not normally substitute its own opinion and impose some other punishment or penalty. Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court, it appears, ignored the well-settled principle that even though Judicial Review of administrative action must remain flexible and its dimension not closed, yet the Court in exercise of the power of judicial review is not concerned with the correctness of the findings of fact on the basis of which the orders are made so long as those findings are reasonably supported by evidence and have been arrived at through proceedings which cannot be faulted with for procedural illegalities or irregularities which vitiate the process by which the decision was arrived at. Judicial Review, it must be remembered, is directed not against the decision, but is confined to the examination of the decision-making process. Lord Haltom in Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans (1982) 3 All ER 141, observed:
The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment, and not to ensure that the authority, after according fair treatment, reaches, on a matter which it is authorized by law to decide for itself, a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the Court.
18. Judicial Review, not being an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was arrived at, the Court while exercising the power of Judicial Review must remain conscious of the fact that if the decision has been arrived at by the Administrative Authority after following the principles established by law and the rules of natural justice and the individual has received a fair treatment to meet the case against him, the Court cannot substitute, its judgment for that of the Administrative Authority on a matter which fell squarely within the sphere of jurisdiction of that authority.
19. It is useful to note the following observations of this Court in Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur :
Where there are some relevant materials which the authority has accepted and which materials may reasonably support the conclusion that the officer is guilty, it is not the function of the High Court exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 to review the materials and to arrive at an independent finding on the materials.
If the enquiry has been properly held the question of adequacy or reliability of the evidence cannot be canvassed before the High Court.
20. After a detailed review of the law on the subject, this Court while dealing with the jurisdiction of the High Court or Tribunal to interfere with the disciplinary matters and punishment in Union of India v. Parma Nand opined (at P. 1192 of AIR):
We must unequivocally State that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to interfere with the disciplinary matters or punishment cannot be equated with an appellate jurisdiction. The Tribunal cannot interfere with the findings of the Enquiry Officer or Competent Authority where they are not arbitrary or utterly perverse. It is appropriate to remember that the power to impose penalty on a delinquent officer is conferred on the competent authority either by an Act of Legislature or Rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. If there has been an enquiry consistent with the rules and in accordance with principles of natural justice what punishment would meet the ends of justice is a matter of exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. If the penalty can lawfully be imposed and is imposed on the proved misconduct, the Tribunal has no power to substitute its own discretion for that of the authority.
21. In B.C.Chaturvedi v. Union of India , this Court opined (at P.4379 of AIR SCW):
The disciplinary authority is the sole Judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a Disciplinary Enquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal.
Further it was held (at P. 4380 of AIR SCW):
A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.
(Emphasis supplied)
22. Again in Government of Tamil Nadu v. A.Rajapandian this Court opined (at P.4834 of AIR):
It has been authoritatively settled by string of authorities of this Court that the Administrative Tribunal cannot sit as a Court of appeal over a decision based on the findings of the inquiring authority in disciplinary proceedings. Where there is some relevant material which the disciplinary authority has accepted and which material reasonably supports the conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority, it is not the function of the Administrative Tribunal to review the same and reach different finding than that of the disciplinary authority. The Administrative Tribunal, in this case, has found no fault with the proceedings held by the inquiring authority. It has quashed the dismissal order by re-appreciating the evidence and reaching a finding different than that of the inquiring authority.
(Emphasis ours)
48. In Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. v.N.B,Narawade etc. the Supreme Court observed that the High Court cannot interfere with the punishment imposed by the management. There is a workman has used abusive language. In our opinion, even if the writ petitioner did not use abusive language in the present case the principle of that decision will apply because the petitioner has used derogatory, offensive and intemperate language with senior officers not once but repeatedly as his past records also shows.
49. It is well settled that in a bank the employees have to maintain high standards of discipline, integrity and devotion to duty which has to be higher than that of other employees. This is because a bank runs on public confidence and unless such high standards are maintained, the public confidence in the same will be shaken and the bank may collapse as the public may withdraw their deposits.
50. From a perusal of the record, it shows that the writ petitioner (respondent in this appeal) is highly indisciplined and cantankerous person who was not prepared to accept the discipline required in an organization. Such a person surely does not deserve any sympathy. Writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction vide Chandra Singh & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Anr. AIR 2003 (6) SCC 545.
51. We are not inclined to exercise our discretion under Article 226 in favor of such person. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside.
52. Hence, the writ appeal is allowed.