ORDER
P. Sathasivam, J.
1. This is a revision filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by the National Insurance Company against the order dated 16.4.1991 made in I.A. No. 137 of 1990 on the file of Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (Principal District Judge), Ramanathapuram at Madurai. The only grievance of the petitioner is lhat as per the provisions stood on the date of the petition filed by the first respondent/claimant, the Tribunal has no power to condone the delay of 658 days in filing claim petition.
2. The accident took place on 20.4.1988. The first respondent herein said to have been sustained injuries filed the claim petition before the court below only on 1.10.1990. Mr. K.S. Narasimhan, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the amended provision came into force on 1.7.1989. As per the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Vinod Gurudas Rajkar v. National Insurance Co. Limited , the person would be covered by the new Act and the delay for a longer period than six months cannot be condoned. The argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner may be right, hut for the subsequent latest decision of the Supreme Court reported in Dhannalal v. D.P. Vijayavargiva . In the latest judgment referred above, the Apex Court has observed thus;
Before the scope of Sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Act is examined, it may be pointed out that the aforesaid Sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Act has been omitted by Section 53 of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1994 which came in force w.e.f. 14.11. 1994. The effect of the Amending Act is that w.e.f. 14.11.1994 there is no limitation for filing claims before the Tribunal in respect of any accident. It can be said that Parliament realised the grave injustice and injury which was being caused to the heirs and legal representatives of the victims who died in accidents by rejecting their claim petitions only on ground of limitation. If it is a matter of common knowledge that majority of the claimants for such compensation are ignorant about the period during which such claims should be preferred. After the death due to the accident, of the bread cancer of the family, in many cases such claimants are virtually on the streets. Even in cases where the victims escapes death some of such victims are hospitalised for months if not for years. In the present case itself the applicant claims that he met with the accident on 4. 12.1990 and he was being treated as an indoor patient till 27.9.1991. According to us, in its wisdom the Parliament, rightly thought that prescribing a period of limitation and restricting the power of Tribunal to entertain any claim petition beyond the period of twelve months from the date of the accident was harsh, inequitable and in many cases was likely to cause injustice to the claimants. The present case is a glaring example where the appellant has been deprived by the order of the High Court from claiming the compensation because of delay of only four days in preferring the claim petition.
In this background, now it has to be examined as to what is the effect of omission of Sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Act. From the Amending Act it does not appear that the said Sub-section (3) has been deleted retrospectively. But t the same time, there is nothing in the Amending Act to show that benefit of deletion of Sub-section (3) of Section 166 is not to be extended to pending claim petitions where a plea of limitation has been raised. The effect of deletion of Sub-section (3) from Section 166 of the Act can be tested by an illustration. Suppose an accident had taken place two years before 14.11.1994 when Sub-section (3) was omitted from Section 166. For one reason of the other no claim petition had been filed by the victim or the heirs of the victim till 14.11.1994. Can a claim petition be not filed after 14.11.1994 in respect of such accident whether a claim petition filed after 14.11.1994 can be rejected by the tribunal on the ground of limitation saying that the period of twelve months which had been prescribed when Sub-section (3) of Section 166 was in force having expired the right to prefer the claim petition had been extinguished and shall not be revived after deletion of Sub-section (3) of Section 166 w.e.f. 14.11. 1994? According to us, the answer should be in negative. When Sub-section (3) of Section 166 has been omitted, then the tribunal has to entertain a claim petition without taking note of the date of which such accident had taken place. The claim petitions cannot be thrown out on the ground that such claim petitions were barred by time when Sub-section (3) of Section 166 was in force. It need not be impressed that Parliament from time to time has introduced amendments in the old Act as well as in the new Act in order to protect the interest of victims of the accidents and their heirs if the victims die. One such amendment has been introduced in the Act by the aforesaid Amendment Act 54 of 1994 by substituting Sub-section (6) of Section 158 which provides:
As soon as any information regarding any accident involving death or bodily injury to any person is recorded or report under this section is completed by a police officer, the officer in charge of the police station shall forward a copy of the same within thirty days from the date of recording of information or, as the case may be, on completion of such report to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction and a copy thereof to the concerned insurer, and where a copy is made available to the owner, he shall also within thirty days of receipt of such report, forward the same to such claims tribunals and insurer.
In view of Sub-section (6) of Section 158 of the Act the Officer incharge of the police station is enjoined to forward a copy of information report regarding the accident to the Tribunal having jurisdiction. A copy thereof has also to be forwarded to the concerned insurer. It also requires that where a copy is made available to the owner of the vehicle, he shall within thirty days of receipt of such copy forward the same to the Claims Tribunal and insurer. In this background, the deletion of Sub-section (3) from Section 166 should be given full effect so that the object of said section by the Parliament is not defeated. If a victim of the accident or heirs of the deceased victim can prefer claim for compensation although not being preferred earlier because of the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed, how the victim or the heirs of the deceased shall be in a worse position if the question of condonation of delay in filing the claim petition is pending either before the tribunal, High Court or the Supreme Court. The present appeal is one such case.
The appellant has been pursuing from tribunal to this Court. His right to get compensation in connection with the accident in question is being resisted by the respondents on the ground of delay in filing the same. If he had not filed any petition for claim till 14.11.1994 in respect of the accident which took place on 4.12.1990, in view of the Amending Act he became entitled to file such claim petition, the period of limitation having been deleted, the claim petition which has been filed and is being pursued upto this Court cannot be thrown out on the ground of limitation.
The matter will be different if any claimant having filed a petition for claim beyond time which has been rejected by the Tribunal or the High Court, the claimant does not challenge the same and allows said judicial order to become final. The aforesaid Amending Act shall be of no help to such claimant. The reason being that a judicial order saying that such petition of claim was barred by limitation has attained finality. But that principle will not govern cases where the dispute as to whether petition for claim having been filed beyond the period of 12 months from the date of the accident is pending consideration either before the tribunal, High Court of this Court in such cases. The benefit of amendment of Sub-section (3) of Section 166 should be extended.
3. At this juncture it is also relevant to mention the other judgment of the Apex Court reported in Ramesh Singh v. Chaya Devi , while construing (Motor Vehicles Act, 1988) Section 173, Proviso, 214(4) (Motor Vehicles Act, 1939) Section 110-D, General Clauses Act, Section 6 and in the light of various earlier decisions the Supreme Court held thus,
Unless the New Act expressly or by necessary implication makes the provision applicable retrospectively, the right to appeal4will crystallise in the appellant on the institution of the application in the Tribunal of first instance and that vested right of appeal would not be dislodged by the enactment of the new Act. In other words, the appellant would be entitled to file the appeal without being required to make the deposit under the proviso to Section 173 of the New Act. The law, therefore, seems to be fairly well settled by the said three decisions of this Court.
4. Hence the decision reported in Dhannalal v. D.P. Vijayavargiya may be confined to the condonation of delay application pending consideration either before tribunal. High Court or Supreme Court and not for any other cases. Following the said decision i.e. , the civil revision petition fails and the same is dismissed. No costs.