ORDER
1. This revision petition and the miscellaneous first appeal arise from the judgment and award dated 2-6-1994 given in Motor Vehicles Case No. 579 of 1990 and in Motor Vehicles Case No. 747 of 1990 on the file of the District Judge acting as MACT at Karwar. The Tribunal after having held that the injuries to the claimants have been caused due to the negligence in driving of the vehicle in question by the driver of the vehicle. It further held that claimant in Motor Vehicles Case No. 579 of 1990 and in Motor Vehicles Case No. 747 of 1990 were entitled to the compensation to the tune of Rs. 7,750/- and Rs. 80,000/- respectively and awarded the same to the petitioners in two cases with costs and interest at the rate of 6% p.a. from the date of petition till the date of payment. The Tribunal fastened the liability jointly and severally on the owner of the vehicle as well as the Insurance Company, namely the owner of the vehicle who is respondent 2 in the revision petition and on the revision petitioner before this Court. Feeling aggrieved from the award of the Tribunal, the Insurance Company has come up before this Court for exercising of supervisory jurisdiction under Section 115 of the CPC.
2. The National Insurance Company had filed the revision and miscellaneous first appeal.
3. I have heard Sri Sowriraju, learned Counsel appearing for the revision petitioner in revision petition and for the appellant in miscellaneous first appeal. The only point that has been urged before me by the learned Counsel for the Insurance Company in the revision petition is that the vehicle in question has been the goods vehicle which was a public carriage and it was used under Public Carriage Permit. Learned Counsel contended that the Court below acted illegally as well as exceeded its jurisdiction when it fastened the liability for payment of compensation on the Insurance Company particularly in view of the law laid down in the case of National Insurance Company v Dundamma.
Learned Counsel contended that the goods vehicle are not meant for the use as passengers service vehicle. He further contended that the principle of law laid down in Dundamma’s case, supra, is that under Section 95 of the old Act which is analogous to Section 147, it is not obligatory that Insurance Policy in respect of goods vehicle must cover the liability in respect of death or bodily injury to the passengers travelling in the goods vehicle other than the driver and employees within the prescribed limited number. The carrying of passengers in a goods vehicle is quite contrary to the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, as such the Insurance Company has not been liable to reimburse compensation awarded against owner of the vehicle. Learned Counsel contended that as such the order making Insurance Company liable to pay along with the owner has been illegal and without jurisdiction or it has been in excess of jurisdiction. As such to the extent the award fastened the liability of the Insurance Company is illegal as well as it is in excess of jurisdiction vested under the Tribunal, therefore the appeal and the revision petition may be allowed. If revision is not maintainable in one case this Court has got supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. This Court in exercise thereof may set aside that part of the order by which the liability has been fastened on the Insurance Company.
4. Learned Counsel contended that in the present case no goods were being taken but marriage party was there consisting of about 38 persons being taken in this goods vehicle that is public carriage vehicle. Learned Counsel further contended it cannot be said that goods were being taken by the vehicle. Whatever the personal luggage of the travellers that has not been included within the definition of the ‘goods’ as per Section 2(13) of the Act. Therefore, learned Counsel contended that no liability could be fastened on the Insurance Company and Tribunal has committed the jurisdictional error in fastening the liability on the company.
5. I have applied my mind to the contentions raised by Sri Sowriraju, the learned Counsel for the revision petitioner as well as the appellant in appeal. No doubt the Tribunal by itself is not a Civil Court. It is a Tribunal and in view of provisions of Section 175 of the Act of 1988 and Section 173(2) and the decisions of this Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Company v Thibbegowda and Others, civil revision under Section 115 of the CPC is not maintainable in view of law laid and the reasons given in the above decision. The question which has been raised in the revision petition and the appeal no doubt are common and are whether the Tribunal could fasten the liability on the Insurance Company which law does not provide to be fastened. If it has fastened by erroneous view of law then it may be said that Court has acted illegally as well as in excess of jurisdiction because no Tribunal can fasten liability under any law which does not fasten. In my opinion if the answer is to be in favour of the Insurance Company and if it comes out that the Tribunal has exercised the jurisdiction by illegally i.e., in breach of law
in fastening the liability on the Insurance Company, then appeal may have to be allowed and this Court can exercise its supervisory powers under Article 227 of the Constitution in respect of matter involved in the revision petition and issue suitable directions with respect thereof in the interest of justice as well as to quash the order so far as it fastens a liability on Insurance Company if the same is unwarranted by law, as the said direction will be one without jurisdiction.
6. Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides that in order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which as per clause (b) of sub-section (1), insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person, including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place. Any person used in the above section has to be taken into consideration keeping in view the nature and category of vehicle in question which is the subject-matter of this appeal. If it is a goods vehicle then different consideration may apply but if it is a service vehicle or a passengers vehicle a different consideration may apply in the sense that any person can be carried in the goods vehicle if it is permissible under law and not otherwise. As regards the goods vehicle or goods carriage its definition is given in Section 2(14). It means the motor vehicle which is constructed or adapted solely for carrying of goods or any motor vehicle not so constructed or adapted, when used for carriage of goods. The idea is that in the goods vehicle ordinarily no passenger has to be carried. This comes out from the use of expression ‘solely’. No doubt in respect of the goods vehicle under Rule 100, it is provided that subject to the provisions of this rule, no person shall be carried in a goods vehicle. The proviso (i) to Rule 100 further provides that the owner or the hirer or a bona fide employee of the owner or the hirer of the vehicle can be carried free of charge or a Police Officer in uniform travelling on duty may be carried in a goods vehicle, but in case of light transport goods vehicle one person can be carried and in case of any other light transport goods vehicle not more than three persons can be carried and in any other goods vehicle persons not more than 7 can be carried i.e., upto 7 persons may be carried including the driver. There are other conditions prescribed under the rule which have to be fulfilled before a person is carried as contained under sub-rule (4) of Rule 100. This rule is almost similar to Rule 166 of the old rules. No person can be allowed to travel in a goods vehicle as a paid passenger. The Full Bench in Dundamma’s case, supra, have referred to Rule 166 of the rules under the old Act and observed that no person can be carried in goods vehicle except as provided under the rule. Under the first proviso to Rule 100, only persons who are permitted to be carried in the goods vehicle are the owner or hirer or a bona fide employee of the owner or the hirer of the vehicle may be earned free of charge. The total number of such persons who could be carried in light transport vehicle is not more than 3 persons and in case of heavy transport vehicle not more than seven persons including the Driver. The above rule indicates that the rule does not permit the carrying of any passengers for hire or reward in goods vehicle.
7. In this view of the matter, it appears that the persons who were being carried in the present case in the goods vehicle being only members of the marriage party they could not be said to be owners of goods or goods vehicle or employees of the hirer of goods vehicle but they were really passengers travelling in the vehicle on hire. In this view of the matter, so far as the injured persons are concerned they could not be said to be covered by the liability. Assuming of such persons to be included within the framework of expression ‘any person’ used in Section 95 of old Act or Section 147 of new Act then fastening of liability for payment of compensation in relation to such person with reference to goods vehicle on Insurance Company will run contrary to the provisions of Section 147(2) read with Section 2(14) of the Act which defines goods carriage and 2(13) which defines goods.
8. Thus in my opinion, in view of the position of law as above, no liability could be fastened under the law for compensation payable to the injured persons, on the Insurance Company and when the Tribunal fastened the liability against the provisions of law, in my opinion, it committed error of law as well as error of jurisdiction. The findings and direction given is in excess of jurisdiction. In view of this conclusion, it appears to me to be just and proper to allow the appeal as well as to set aside the same under Article 227 of the Constitution, the direction of the Tribunal fastening the liability of Insurance Company in respect of both the cases i.e., matters involved in the miscellaneous first appeal and revision petition which has been filed under Section 115 of the CPC.
9. Accordingly both the appeal as well as petition are allowed. The award is modified only to the extent that it is directed that the compensation awarded to the claimants shall be, payable by, and, realizable only from the owner of the vehicle involved and not from the Insurance Company as it has been found that Insurance Company is not liable to pay the same. As such, the appeal is allowed and the petition is also allowed exercising powers under Article 227 of the Constitution. It is open to claimant-respondents to recover and realise the amount of compensation from the owners of vehicle involved.
10. The learned Counsel for the petitioner urged that the Insurance Company may be allowed to withdraw the amount it has deposited. In the circumstance of the case it is so allowed but after the expiry of the period of six months from today.