JUDGMENT
Imtiyaz Murtaza, J.
1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 5.10.2005 passed by Add). Sessions Judge, F.T.C. 1 Muzaffarnagar, in S.T. No. 377 of 2004 whereby the appellant is convicted under Section 376 I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs. 10,000/- and in case of default in payment of fine, further imprisonment for one year.
2. The brief facts of the case mentioned in the report lodged by Muzaffar Ali at p.s. Kotwali Nagar Muzaffarnagar are that informant’s daughter Shabana who was aged about 16 years and she was a minor and was under his guardianship. She was of a low intelligence and Irshad was his maternal uncle. Naushad is son of Irshad and Shehnaz is wife of Irshad, being relative they used to visit each other house. Naushad was very clever. He has enticed his daughter Shabana and cheated her on the pretext that he will marry her and committed sexual intercourse with her. His daughter became pregnant and about 10 days back Shabana had narrated to her mother as to how she was raped by Naushad. He and his wife had talked with Irshad and his wife and told them that his son has committed rape against her will by giving false promise of marriage and she has become pregnant. Irshad and Sehnaz had accepted their fault and requested for excuse and promised to punish Naushad and thereby postponed the dispute. A day before lodging the report a Panchayat was held in the village, which was attended by Furkan, son of Ejaj, Anwar son of Farooq, Seetu son of Mustakeem and others. Irshad and Sehnaz had told them to accept 10 -20 thousand rupees but they will not marry his son with Shenaz and in case any action is taken he will be killed. He was confident that on the instigation of Irshad and Sehnaz, Naushad had committed rape with her daughter. On the basis ‘of above information case crime No. 115 of 203 was registered at P.S. Kotwali Nagar, Muzaffarnagar. After the registration of the case S.I. Kiran Pal Singh commenced investigation. He has proved the chik F.I.R. and G.D. entry. On 14.3.2003 he recorded the statement of the informant. He reached at the house of the informant and recorded the statement of informant’s wife and victim Km. Shabana. He prepared the site plan on the pointing out of Shaban, which is Ext. Ka-5. On 15.5.2003 Irshad was arrested. On 17.9.2003 Naushad was arrested. On 18.9.2003 he recorded the statements of Furkan and Anwar and on 20.9.2003 submitted charge sheet, which is Ext. Ka-8.
3. Dr. Abha had medically examined Km. Shabana on 14.9.2003 at 3 p.m. She found that Shabana was fully conscious and was oriented to time and place, her height was 145 cm. Weight was 42 kg. and teeth were 14/14. In the external examination Doctor had found no mark of injury on her body. Axillary hair present were small, (shaved four days back.) Breast were developed, on palpation-fundal, height about 24 weeks, quickening present according to her. P/V- (pervergivium). No mark of injury on her private parts. Pubic hair present (small) (…shaving four days back) Hymen torned old. No bleeding P/V OS close uterus soft. Two vagina smear slides prepared and sent to pathology for District Hospital for the evidence of any spermatozoa or gonococci. She was referred to the CMO for the age.
4. After the submission of the charge sheet the case was committed to the court of Sessions. The Sessions Judge had framed charge under Section 376 I.P.C. against the appellant and Section 376 read with Section 109 I.P.C. against Irshad, both were further charged under Section 506 I.P.C. The Sessions Judge after considering the evidence on record convicted the appellant, as aforesaid, hence this appeal.
5. In order to prove its case the prosecution has examined five witnesses in all. The case of the defence was of denial and they did not produce any witness in their defence.
6. P.W. 1 Shabana deposed that Irshad was his grand father in relation, he was maternal uncle of his father and Naushad was his son. About quarter and two years back, Naushad used to visit her house and sometimes used to sleep with her, at that time her age was 15 years. Naushad used to tell her that he will marry her and used to commit rape. He had committed rape 15- 20 times in a year and on account of rape she became pregnant. She asked him to marry her but he had refused. She had told her mother about rape. Her mother and father Muzaffar Ali talked with Irshad, Naushad and Sehnaz. Irshad and Sehnaz had accepted their fault but Naushad refused to marry her. Thereafter a Panchayat was held in the village and Naushad refused to marry her. He asked her to accept 10-20 thousand rupees and refused to marry. The report of the occurrence was lodged by her father. She was medically examined. A girl was also born due to rape committed by Naushad.
7. P.W. 2 Muzaffar Ali deposed that Irsad was his maternal uncle and Nausad was his son. About one and a half year back he lodged the report and at that time victim was 15 years of age. Naushad used to visit and stay in his house in the night. Several times he stayed in his house. 10 days prior to lodging of the report Shabana had told that Naushad had committed rape and on that account she became pregnant. He had talked about this matter with his uncle Irshad and he told him to wait for some time and he will marry. After two four days Irshad told him that he will not marry and threatened him and also offered 10 -20 thousand rupees. He lodged the report, which is ext.ka-1. A daughter was born after lodging of the report
8. P.W. 3 Dr. Abha had conducted the medical examination.
9. P.W. 4 Kirsan Pal Singh investigated the case and submitted the charge sheet.
10. We have heard learned Counsel for the appellant and the learned A.G.A. for the state.
11. The Sessions Judge has convicted the appellant on the ground that the consent given by P.W. 1 Shabana was not a consent for sexual intercourse in the eye of law. She had given consent on the ground that the appellant had promised her to marry and on that account the consent was obtained by misconception of fact and the case is covered under Section 376 I.P.C.
12. We have perused the evidence of P.W. 1 Shabana and P.W. 2 Dilshad. The Sessions Judge has recorded categorical findings that P.W.1 Shabana was mentally fit and she was about 16 years of age and she was also not a girl of low intelligence and she was mentally fit. The Sessions Judge has also held that the sexual intercourse was committed because consent which she had given was under misconception of fact that appellant had promised to marry. The testimony of P.W.1 Shabana shows that appellant Naushad used to stay in her house and he had also promised to marry. We have carefully examined evidence on record. The prosecutrix has stated that appellant had promised her to marry and he used to stay in her house and commits sexual intercourse with her and he had committed sexual intercourse about 15 20 times in a year and he was doing this about quarter to two years prior to lodging of the report. In the first information report she has alleged that appellant used to forcible sexual intercourse. In her deposition also she had stated that Naushad used to do forcible sexual intercourse but we do not find any material on record to show that appellant had committed forcible sexual intercourse. She never resisted sexual intercourse she has admitted presence of grant mother and her younger sister in the room where Naushad used to commit sexual intercourse she never raised alarm at that time or thereafter. It is also very surprising that she was subjected to sexual intercourse repeatedly for a long period without any resistance, she never objected to sleeping of Naushad in her room. The circumstances clearly show that she was a consenting party and the allegation of forcible sexual intercourse cannot be accepted. The Sessions Judge has held that the consent given by her was on account of misconception of fact that appellant had promised her to marry. Even if it is accepted that she consented for sexual intercourse on account of his promise to marry her this will not give rise to an inference beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had no intention to marry her at all from the inception and that the promise he made was false to his knowledge. At the most it could be a case of breach of promise to marry rather than a case of false promise to marry. In the case of Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar reported in AIR 2205 SC 203 the Apex Court has held as under:
No doubt the accused did hold out the promise to marry her and that was the predominant reason for the victim girl to agree to the sexual intimacy with him. But there is no evidence which gives rise to an inference beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had no intention to marry her at all from the inception and that the promise he made was false to his knowledge. It seems to be a case of breach of promise to marry rather than a case of false promise to marry.
13. The facts and circumstances of the case clearly show that it was a case of consent. There is nothing to indicate that she was incapable of understanding the nature and implication of the act which she consented to. The Apex Court in the case of Udai v. State of Karnataka has held that “there is no strait jacket formulae for determining whether consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse is voluntary or whether it is given under a misconception of tact. The court must, in each case, consider the evidence before it and the surrounding circumstances, before reaching a conclusion, because each case has its own peculiar facts which may have a bearing on the question whether the consent was voluntary, or was given under a misconception of fact. It was further observed that “it must also weigh the evidence keeping in view the fact that the burden is on the prosecution to prove each and every ingredient of the offence, absence of consent being one of them.
14. In the facts and circumstances of the present case the allegation is that she was subjected to forcible sexual intercourse 15-20 times, in a year. We find that it is a case of consent and the prosecutrix kept it a secret as long as she could, despite this she did not resist and infact succumb to it. She thus freely exercised a choice between resistance and assent. She had sufficient intelligence to understand the significance and moral quality of the act she was consenting to. She must have known to the consequences of the act. All these circumstances led to the conclusion that she freely, voluntarily, and consciously consented to having sexual intercourse with the appellant, and her consent was not in consequence of any misconception of fact.
15. In our opinion, the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and the Sessions Judge has erroneously convicted the appellant.
16. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed. The order dated 5.10.2005 convicting and sentencing the appellant, as aforesaid, is set aside. The appellant is in jail. He shall be released forthwith unless wanted in any other case.
17. Office is directed to communicate this order within two weeks the concerned trial court for necessary compliance.