ORDER
S.V. Maruthi, J.
1. The Special Appeals arise out of the order of the Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, dated 11-4-1990. The facts in brief are as follows:
The appellant in both the appeals viz., M/s. Nava Bharat Agricultural and Commercial Corporation, Vijayawada is a dealer in Tractors Spares which are purchased by ryots for the purpose of utilising in repairs of tractors used in agriculture operations. Tractors are liable to tax at the rate 3 paise under Section 3(1) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939 (for short the ‘MGST Act’) at every point of sale and also liable to additional tax at the rate of 6 paise on first sale under Section 3(2) of the MGST Act. For the assessment years 1974-75 and 1975-76 the appellant collected tax from the buyers at the above rates and paid to the Department which assessed at the same rate by the assessment orders dated 21-7-1975 and 26-1-1977. The appellant came to know that the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal held in TA No,337/77 that tractors’ spares used for agricultural purposes are not liable to tax by virtue of G.O.Ms.No. 10 Revenue dated 2-1-1951 issued by the then Composite Madras State under the MGST Act read with Section 41 of the A.P. General Sales Tax Act (for short the ‘APGST Act’) and the exemption continues to be in force till 16th June 1976 when the Andhra Pradesh Government rescinded the said G.O. Since the appellant had paid tax and could not file an appeal in time, it had filed revisions for 1974-75 and 1975-76 under Section 20 of the APGST Act before the Deputy Commissioner (CT) Vijayawada. The Deputy Commissioner allowed the revisions by a common order dated 5-7-1979 and consequently the appellant had refunded to the buyers the tax collected from them.
2. The appellant received the order dated 5-7-1979 on 6-7-1979. While so, the Commissioner (CT) issued show cause notice dated 18-10-1982 which was served on the appellant on 25-10-1982, proposing to revise the order of the Deputy Commissioner (CT) dated 5-7-1979 invoking the revisional jurisdiction under Section 20 of the APGST Act on the ground that under G.O.Ms.No.10 tractors and its spares are exempt only from additional Sales Tax and relied on the
subsequent decisions of the Tribunal. Challenging the show cause notice, the appellant filed Writ Petition No.8463/82. The Writ Petition was admitted and stay was granted on 29-11-1982. However, at the time of final hearing of the Writ Petition, by judgment dated 26-6-1987 this Court dismissed the same on the ground that the appellant has an alternative remedy and gave one month time for the appellant to file objections. The appellant filed the objections on 7-4-1990 before the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes in response to the notice of the Commissioner dated 16-3-1990 and raised various contentions. However, the Commissioner passed the impugned order dated 11-4-1990 rejecting contentions. Aggrieved by the same, the present special appeals are filed.
3. The main argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant in both the appeals is that the order passed by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes on 11-4-1990 is beyond the period of limitation and, therefore, is liable to be set aside. In support of his contention he relied on the language used in Section 24A of the APGST Act while the learned Government Pleader for Revenue contended that Section 24A itself provides for extended period of limitation in the circumstances mentioned therein. The Counsel submitted that the High Court while dismissing the Writ Petition filed by the appellant directed the petitioner to file objections and on filing such objections, the authorities were directed to consider the same on merits and pass appropriate orders. Therefore, the extended period of limitation provided under Section 24A will come to the rescue of the revenue and the order passed by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes is within the period of limitation.
4. The question, therefore, is whether the impugned order is covered by Section 24A of the APGST Act and that the impugned order is not barred by limitation. To consider the question that arises for consideration, it is necessary to extract Section 24A of the APGST Act which reads as under:
“24-A. Limitation in respect of certain assessments or re-assessments ordered :–Notwithstanding anything in Sections 14 and 20 where an assessment, reassessment, rectification in or revision of assessment, is made in respect of an assessee or any person, in pursuance or in consequence of or to give effect to any finding or direction contained in an order under Section 19, Section 20, Section 21, Section 22 or Section 23 or in an order of any Court in a proceeding, otherwise than by way of appeal or revision under this Act, such assessment, re-assessment, rectification in or revision of an assessment shall be made within three years from the date of receipt to such order by the assessing or revising authority as the case may be.
The relevant portion of the Section reads ‘where an assessment, re-assessment, rectification in or revision of assessment, is made in respect of an assessee or any person, in pursuance or in consequence of or to give effect to any finding or direction contained in an order ….. of any Court in a proceeding’. Therefore, it says where an assessment, reassessment or rectification or revision of assessment is made in pursuance or in consequence of or to give effect to any finding or order of any Court in a proceeding, such assessment, re-assessment, rectification in or revision of assessment shall be made within three years from the date of receipt of such order by the assessing or revising authority. In other words, the assessment or re-asssessment or revision of assessment should have been made pursuant to or as a consequence of or to give effect to any finding of an order of any Court in a proceeding, then such assessment, reassessment, rectification in or revision of assessment should be made within three years from the date of receipt of the order by the assessing or revising authority. Otherwise, under Section 20 of the APGST Act, the assessment or reassessment should have been completed within four years from the date on which the order was served on the dealer. The question, therefore, is whether the impugned
order passed is an order of assessment, reassessment, rectification in or revision of assessment in pursuance or in consequence of or to give effect to any finding or direction contained in an order of any Court in a proceeding. If it is so, the period of limitation is three years. Otherwise, the period of limitation is four years from the date of the order under Section 20. Section 24A enlarges the period of limitation by three more years in a case where the assessment, reassessment or revision of assessment is made-pursuant to an order of the Court. At this stage, it is necessary to refer to the order of this Court in the Writ Petition filed by the appellant on an earlier occasion viz., W.P.No.8463/82 and W.P.No. 8546/82. The order reads as follows :
“These two writ petitions are directed against a show cause notice. The petitioners therefore, are directed to submit their objections within 4 weeks from to day. Objections if filed, may be considered on merits and appropriate orders be passed.
The Writ Petitions, subject to the above, arc dismissed. Advocate’s fee Rs.150/- in each.”
5. The facts narrated above disclose that the show-cause notice dated 18-10-82 proposing to revise the order was received by the appellant on 25-10-1982. The proceedings to revise the assessment have already been commenced. The appellant obtained stay of those proceedings in the Writ Petition. The Writ Petition was dismissed on 2-6-1987. As seen from the order of this Court extracted above, this Court only directed the appellant to file objections to the show cause notice. Therefore, it is difficult to hold that the impugned order is passed in pursuance of or as a consequence of or to give effect to any finding of the Court. The High Court merely directed the appellant to file objections as the proceedings have already commenced. Therefore, the extended period of limitation provided under Section 24A of the APGST Act is not applicable as the period of three years
starts running from the date of receipt of the order by the revising or the assessing authority in cases where revision of assessment is in pursuance of or as a consequence of of to give effect to the order of the Court. If the extended period of limitation provided under Section 24A of the APGST Act is not applicable, then the next question is whether the impugned order is passed within the period of 4 years mentioned in Section 20 of the APGST Act. The assessment years are 1974-75 and 1975-76. The assessment orders are passed on 21-7-1975 and 264-1977 respectively for the assessment years 1974-75 and 1975-76 respectively. The dealer filed the revisions in 1978 and on 5-7-1979 the revisions were allowed by the Deputy Commissioner. In the normal circumstances, the Commissioner can revise the order dated 5-7-1979 on or before 5-7-1983. However, the order in revision was passed on 11-4-1990. In view of the pendency of the matter in the High Court from 29-11-1982 to 26-6-1987, the said period viz., 4 years 7 months 7 days is to be excluded for the purpose of calculating the period of four years under Section 20 of the A.P.G.S.T. Act. If so calculated, the order should have been passed on or before 12-4-1988, but the order was passed on 11-4-1990. Therefore, it is beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 20 of the A.P.G.S.T. Act.
6. The argument of the learned Government Pleader for Revenue that fresh notice was issued on 16-3-1990 and, therefore, the period commences from 16-3-1990 cannot be countenanced as in our view the extended period of limitation under Section 24A of the APGST Act has no application as the impugned order is not passed in pursuance of or in consequence of or to give effect to the order of the High Court in W.P.Nos.8463/82 and 8546/82 as the proceedings were already initiated and have been concluded.
7. In view of the above, it follows that the Special Appeals are to be allowed and they are accordingly allowed. No costs.