JUDGMENT
T.K. Chandrashekhara Das, J.
1. The petitioner has approached this Court by way of this writ petition inter alia with the following prayers:
(i) That this Hon’ble Court be pleased to call for the record pertaining to the complaint lodged by J.B. Holdings Ltd. from the Office of the Special Superintendent of Police, C.I.D. Shilong and Malawani Police Station and after perusing and perusing the same be pleased to issue a writ of Prohibition or a writ in the nature of Prohibition or any other writ, order or direction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India restraining the Special Superintendent of Police, C.I.D. Shilong and other offices subordinate to him and all other investigating agencies of the Meghalaya Police, State of Meghalaya from taking any further steps in respect of the complaint lodged by M/s. J.B. Holding Ltd. with the police authorities in Shilong, State of Meghalaya.
(ii) That this Hon’ble Court, upon perusal of the record of the said complaint be pleased to quash the said complaint or in the alternative, this Hon’ble Court, be pleased to issue a writ of Mandamus or a writ in the nature of Mandamus or any other writ, order or direction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India directing the State of Meghalaya, Respondent No. 2 hearing to transfer the investigation in respect of the complaint lodged by M/s. J.B. Holdings Ltd. with C.I.D. Shilong to Economic Offences Wing General Branch, C.I.D. Mumbai or any other investigating agency of the Mumbai Police, Mumbai.
(iii) That pending the hearing and final disposal of the above petition, this Hon’ble Court be pleased to grant an order restraining the Special Superintendent of Police C.I.D. Shilong and other Officers subordinate to him and all other investigating agencies of the Meghalaya Police. State of Meghalaya from taking any further steps in respect of the complaint lodged by M/s. J.B. Holdings Ltd. with the Police authorities in Shilong, State of Meghalaya.
2. This writ petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure. The petition arises out of a complaint filed by respondent No. 4 before the respondent No. 3 alleging that the petitioner who is the Managing Director of the India Fanners Pvt. Ltd. claiming to be in possession of certain lands in Aksa, Marve and Malavani village in Mumbai, had entered into an agreement with a company known as M/s. J.B. Holding Ltd. which is represented by the 4th respondent to transfer some equity shares of the petitioner company. Certain amount has been paid by the respondent pursuant to the agreement and certain shares have been transferred also in favour of M/s. J.B. Holdings Ltd. In the meantime, it is alleged, that at the time of entering into the agreement with the 4th respondent the petitioner company had suppressed certain material facts from 4th respondent company thereby petitioner committed the offence like cheating etc. and on these allegations, a complaint has been filed before the Special Superintendent of Police, Special Branch, Shilong on 1 lth June, 1997. It has come out from the affidavits filed by the Special Superintendent of Police, C.I.D. Shilong that when a permission was sought by Shilong Police to come to Bombay to investigate the offence from the Meghalaya Government, the same was refused on the ground of Financial constraints. In that context, J.B. Holding Ltd. has preferred a writ petition before the High Court at Guahati and an order was passed on 17-11-1997 by a single Judge of that Court directing the investigation to continue at the cost of J.B. Holding Company Ltd. Against this order of the learned single Judge of Guahati High Court, the State Government has filed appeal before the Division Bench and the Division Bench by an order dated 13th July, 1998 confirmed the order of the learned single Judge. Accordingly the investigation on the basis of the complaint dated 11-6-1997 was initiated by the Meghalaya Police and proceeded to Bombay and with help of Bombay Police, the petitioner and others were sought to be questioned. In or about that time the petitioner had to file an application before this Court in Cri. Application No. 3775 of 1998 for anticipatory bail and the same was disposed of by a learned single Judge of this Court on 30-1-1999 granting an interim anticipatory bail facilitating the petitioner to move appropriate Court in the State of Meghalaya for bail. In that application, jurisdiction of this Court was raised though incidentally, but not decided.
3. When the matter came up for admission before us, the learned counsel for petitioner Mr. Sakhardande was called upon to answer the preliminary objection with regard to the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain this petition. We heard him in detail on that point.
4. The learned counsel mainly submits that though the investigation is initiated in the territory of State of Meghalaya, the police machinery was set in motion and the Bombay police was also made to involve in the investigation and the petitioner was sought to be interrogated by the Bombay Police which is within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, this Court has jurisdiction. The learned counsel for the petitioner argues that a part of cause of action has arisen in Bombay, within the jurisdiction of this Court, particularly when the petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. By virtue of Clause (2) of Article 226, this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this petition for granting relief’s quoted earlier when part of the cause of action arises in Bombay. He cited several decisions in support of his contention i.e., , Umasankar Chatterjee v. Union of India, (1982) 86 Cal WN 348, etc. None of these cases relates to a investigation of a criminal offence. All these decisions, dealt with regard to the “effect” of the impugned actions which can be treated as arising of a part of the cause of action to bring it in the ambit of Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India. We are concerned here about the questioning of the complaints filed by the 4th respondent before the Special District Superintendent, Meghalaya. He also cited, , True it is that these decisions are the authority for the proposition that the High Court can exercise its power under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the criminal proceedings where the F.I.R. does not disclose any triable offence. But such power can be exercised by a High Court only when the F.I.R. is filed within territorial limits of the High Court. Petitioner cannot content a part of the cause of action arose within the limits of this Court as Bombay Police sought to interrogate him. The investigation is not the cause of action. The investigation is only the consequence of the F.I.R. filed by the 4th respondent before the Police authorities in Meghalaya. The petitioner challenges in this writ petition, the said F.I.R. where an investigation is extending to Bombay or any other state on the basis of the F.I.R. filed in a different state one cannot say that the part of cause of action has arisen wherever police goes for the purpose of investigation. In this context, it is profitable to refer to definition of High Court in Sub-Clause (e) of Section. 2 of Cr.P.C. which reads as follows :
“High Court” means-
(i) in relation to any State, the High Court for that State.
(ii) in relation to a Union territory to which the jurisdiction of the High Court for a State has been extended by law, that High Court.
5. By this definition, the Cr.P.C. has clearly lays down that every High Court has to exercise the jurisdiction under the provisions of Criminal Procedure Code only within the territory of the State unless it is extended by any law. Evidently, the police machinery set in motion in this case by complaint filed by 4th respondent on 1 lth June, 1997 before the 3rd respondent and the entire cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of Gauhati High Court No. part of cause of action has arisen as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner to any other State much less the State of Maharashtra, Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is conferring the inherent power to be exercised by every High Court within the territory as defined in Section 2 of Code of Criminal Procedure and not outside. Merely for the reason that the High Court can exercise the power under Article 226, also to quash an F.I.R. where no offence is disclosed, cannot be construed to have jurisdiction to be exercised outside territory where no F.I.R. is lodged. To hold so would be farfetched. The instance that has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner is being questioned by Bombay Police is only as a part of investigation. Police of a particular State can very well seek the assistance of police of another State in the course of the investigation of a crime. It is permissible under Section 48 of Code of Criminal Procedure that any police officer may, for the purpose of arresting without warrant any person whom he is authorized to arrest, pursue such person into any place in India. Exercising this power, the Assam Police might have come to Bombay also and sought aid of Bombay Police. Thus that by itself cannot be said that the part of cause of action has arisen in Maharashtra. If that be so, then no investigation by any police in India can be successfully carried out because any absconding accused can go to any corner of India and challenge the prosecution where he was staying. This concept is quite contrary to the scheme envisaged by the Code of Criminal Procedure with regard to the investigation of offence. The Criminal Procedure Code itself lays down certain principles with regard to the place of prosecution and trial as envisaged under Section 177 to 189 in Chapter XIII. The Courts cannot transgress the limits laid down by the Statute. Therefore, we fail to appreciate the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the part of cause of action arises in State of Maharashtra where this Court can exercise its jurisdiction.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioner then contended that the petitioner cannot approach High Court at Gauhati because of the serious threats posed by the 4th respondent to his life. He submits that the petitioner has every reason to believe that his and relative’s life will be in danger if they go to Gauhati to prosecute his remedy. Needless to say that this apprehension in the mind of the petitioner is not a justification for this Court to grant any relief which suffers from total lack of jurisdiction in this matter.
7. Counsel for the petitioner also tooku us to the averments contained in the complaint filed by the 4th respondent before the Police and argued that none of the incidents stated therein took place in Meghalaya, and all the incidents were happened in Bombay. Therefore, he argues only this Court has got jurisdiction to entertain this writ petition. We fail to appreciate this argument. This contention relates to the merits of the case. May be this argument be valid before a Court having jurisdiction where F.I.R. was filed. We cannot simply conceive of a position of quashing an F.I.R. filed in Meghalaya sitting in Bombay. This tends to shake our basic rudimentary concept of criminal jurisprudence.
8. Therefore, we hold that this Court has absolutely no jurisdiction to entertain this petition. In the light of the averments contained in the writ petition, only the High Court of Gauhati has jurisdiction to entertain writ petition in this nature. In view of this, no case, even prima facie, is made out to entertain this writ petition. Hence, writ petition is rejected in limine.
9. At this stage, the counsel for the petitioner requests for stay of arrest of the petitioner for two weeks for enabling the petitioner to approach the Supreme Court of India. The learned A.P.P. for State of Maharashtra Ms. Kamath makes a statement that the petitioner will not be arrested for a period of two weeks from today. This statement is recorded.