JUDGMENT
Dinesh Maheshwari, J.
1. The Estate Officer, Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation Limited, Udyog Bhawan, New Power House Road, Jodhpur has issued a notice under the Rajasthan Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1964 (‘the Act of 1964’) on 12.04.2007 alleging the petitioner to be in unauthorised occupation of plot No. SR-62 situated at Industrial Area, Sangria Ist Phase, Jodhpur measuring 72 sq.m.; and has called upon the petitioner to show cause as to why order of eviction be not passed. The said notice dated 12.04.2007 (Annex.5) is sought to be questioned by the petitioner in this writ petition.
2. The petitioner has averred that the respondent-RIICO Ltd. had executed a lease deed (Annex.2) in favour of one Smt. Vimla Rathi in relation to the said plot No. SR-62 that was registered on 01.11.2004; and that the petitioner had purchased the rights in the said property under a registered sale deed dated 09.11.2004 (Annex.3). According to the petitioner, the sale deed was duly recognised by the respondent-RIICO Ltd. under its communication dated 11.03.2005 (Annex.4) and the plot in question was transferred in favour of the petitioner; and the petitioner has started its business on the plot in question and has fulfilled all the conditions of lease deed and transfer order. It is alleged that despite the petitioner having been recognised as lessee by the RIICO Ltd. and, thus, being not in unauthorised occupation, the Estate Officer has proceeded to issue the impugned notice on 12.04.2007 that remains wholly without jurisdiction. It is contended that lease deed exists in favour of the petitioner that has never been cancelled and, therefore, the Estate Officer has no jurisdiction to issue any notice to the petitioner. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied on the decisions of this Court in Ratan Lal v. State of Rajasthan and Ors.: 1998 WLC (Raj.) UC 747; Suzuki Processors v. The Commissioner, Central Excise Jaipur and Ors. 2000(4) WLC (Raj.) 286; and Man Mal Sharma and Ors. v. Bikaner Sahkari Upbhokta Bhandar: 1999 (2) WLC (Raj.) 195.
3. On the factual matrix as suggested, it remains inexplicable as to what has prevented the petitioner from responding to the notice Annex.5 and showing cause against the proposed order of eviction? By the impugned notice Annex.5, the petitioner was called upon to show cause on 04.05.2007; and the petitioner has filed this writ petition only on 08.05.2007 i.e., after the date fixed in the notice for showing cause had passed-by. The writ jurisdiction of this Court is ordinarily not exercised in relation to show cause notice where the final outcome of notice is available to be adjudicated by the authority concerned; and in the present case, looking to the nature of proceedings under the Act of 1964 and looking to the nature of claim made by the petitioner there appears no plausible reason for which the petitioner could not have replied to the show cause notice and pointed out an existing legal right, if any, to remain in possession of the disputed property. The present one does not appear fit a case to entertain the writ petition.
4. The submission that the impugned notice is wholly without jurisdiction and, therefore, can be challenged in writ petition is required to be rejected as fundamentally baseless and rather misplaced. It has not been shown if the Estate Officer issuing such notice Annex.5 is not at all entitled to deal with the property in question, or if there is any bar on his jurisdiction under any law. It has been suggested that since lease deed exists in favour of the petitioner and has never been cancelled, therefore, the notice is without jurisdiction. The submission is not well founded.
5. On the basis of the submissions sought to be made about existence of lease deed, only this much can be said that according to the petitioner, they cannot be evicted under the Act of 1964 for being lease holders. However, on this basis, it cannot be said that the authority concerned has no jurisdiction at all to issue notice. It is one thing to challenge the correctness of the facts stated in the notice or to meet out the grounds stated in the notice and thereby make out a case that addressee is not liable to be evicted; and it is entirely different an aspect to suggest that the notice is without jurisdiction. The contention urged on behalf of the petitioner does not make out a case of the notice being wholly without jurisdiction.
6. In Ratan Lal’s case (supra) an award was made under the Land Acquisition Act on 19.04.1996 and the reference at the instance of the petitioner was pending before the civil court. However, the Collector, in purported exercise of powers under Section 13A of the Land Acquisition Act, issued impugned notices after about one and half years; and in purported exercise of such powers, the award was attempted to be reviewed. This Court noticed that under Section 13A the Collector could issue such notices only if within the period of six months from the date of award or where reference under Section 18 has not been made; and it was also found such powers could be exercised only to correct clerical or arithmetical mistakes. Thus, the notices issued in the said case were held to be wholly without jurisdiction being beyond the scope of statutory provisions. Ratan Lal’s case is of no help to the petitioner.
7. In the case of Manmal Sharma (supra), this Court considered the validity of notice issued under Section 36 of the Rajasthan Cooperative Societies Act, 1965 and found that such provision empowers Registrar to issue direction only for the purpose of seeking proper implementation of cooperative production and other development programmes; and the notice issuing direction that a statue cannot be installed within the premises of the society did not fall within the ambit of the Section. It was also found that under Section 36 of the Act, the Registrar has been clothed with power to issue notice only if fault of the society was continuous; and a single act or omission was held not sufficient to warrant application of provisions of Section 36 (1) of the Act and the notice issued to show cause as to why committee be not superseded was also held to be without jurisdiction. This case, again, represents a materially different fact situation.
8. In the case of Suzuki Processors (supra), the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court has not interfered with the show cause notice for enquiry under Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944; and the Division Bench has observed,-
There cannot be any dispute about the settled principle that extraordinary jurisdiction is not ordinarily to be exercised to interfere with the show cause notices where the question as to the final outcome of the show cause notice can be adjudicated by the authority itself except where it is shown that the authority issuing show cause notice has no jurisdiction to invoke his authority either on account of non fulfillment of any condition precedent, existence of which is required before assuming jurisdiction as in the case of issuing notices under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act or for re- assessments under various other taxing statutes, or the authority inherently lacks jurisdiction on the subject matter which it intents to deal with under the guise of show cause notice. So also if a case is made out that on the undisputed and admitted facts the continuance of the enquiry in exercise of jurisdiction by the statutory authority would be futile exercise, the jurisdiction of this Court to examine the issue and entertain the petition under Article 226 is not totally prohibited. The ordinary rule of exercising judicial restrains at the pre-decisional stage by the Court cannot be raised to the height of denuding the Court of its jurisdiction to entertain the petition at all in any appropriate case, merely by showing that it is a show cause notice.
9. On facts, all the three cases have no co-relation with the fact situation of the present case; and on principles, as explained by the Division Bench in Suzuki Processors (supra), the present one is not a fit case to be entertained in writ jurisdiction. It cannot be said on the basis of the material placed on record that this is an admitted and undeniable position that the petitioners are lessees and that they are not liable to be proceeded under the Act of 1964 at all. Even the so-called letter permitting transfer (Annex.4) states that if the conditions were not complied with, proceedings could be undertaken as per the terms of the lease-deed. In the circumstances of this case, for what has been suggested in this writ petition, there was no impediment for the petitioners in responding to the notice and in making their position clear by filing reply.
10. It is true that in an appropriate case where it directly appears that proceedings before the authority would be totally futile an exercise, this Court may consider exercise of extra-ordinary writ jurisdiction even against show-cause notice; however in the fact situation of the present case where the lessor has retained certain rights under the lease deed; and where the petitioners are claiming themselves recognized transferees from the original lessee and yet have been issued notice under the Act of 1964, it does not appear appropriate to entertain the petition against such show-cause notice.
11. The petition fails and is, therefore, rejected.