JUDGMENT
Madan B. Lokur, J.
1. The Petitioner has filed a bunch of 21 writ petitions against an Award dated 6th November, 2003 passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court (the Tribunal). The issues involved in all the cases were said to be identical and so t his writ petition was taken up as the lead case. The only difference in facts in each case was said to be in respect of the post held by the Respondent/workmen.
2. The New Delhi Municipal Committee (NDMC) was constituted by the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911. It has been renamed and reconstituted as the New Delhi Municipal Council by virtue of the New Delhi Municipal Council Act, 1994.
3.NDMC is a compact unit providing civic services to the residents of New Delhi. These services include the supply of water and electricity. NDMC consists of three wings, namely, Electricity Wing, General Wing and Water Works Wing. Being a compact uni t, there is a common fund and budget for management of the affairs of NDMC.
4.NDMC employs technical staff and non-technical staff. Apart from the nature of duties which distinguish them from each other, there are certain other factors which are of relevance which is that the non-technical ministerial staff consists of a unifie d cadre with its employees liable to transfer from one department to another; there is a common channel of seniority and a common seniority list is maintained in respect of these employees.
5.Sometime in 1973, NDMC accepted the Report of the Third Pay Commission. Another local body, namely, the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) constituted under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 also accepted the Report of the Third Pay Commissi on. However, the technical staff of one of the constituents of MCD, that is, Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking (DESU) claimed higher scales of pay. To consider their grievance in this regard, MCD appointed the Shiv Shankar Committee (SSC), which gave i s Report in 1973 and that was then accepted. The SSC recommended better pay scales for the technical staff of DESU than was recommended by the Third Pay Commission. However, since the Report of the SSC pertained only to the technical staff of DESU, its ministerial staff agitated for implementation of the SSC Report in their favor. This demand was accepted by MCD with the result that the Report of the SSC governed the pay scales of all employees of DESU with effect from some time in 1973.
6.When the technical and non-technical ministerial staff in DESU were given the benefit of SSC pay scales, the Petitioner, on the assumption that the staff working in the electricity wing of NDMC were performing the same or similar functions and duties a s those performed by the staff of DESU, passed a Resolution on 19th October, 1973 extending the benefit of SSC pay scales to the technical and ministerial staff working in its electricity wing. By another Resolution dated 7th January, 1974, the benefit f SSC pay scales was given to the staff in the electricity wing of NDMC with effect from 1st April, 1972 to bring them on par with the employees of DESU.
7.Since the ministerial staff in all the three wings of NDMC consisted of a unified cadre, favorable treatment given to the ministerial staff in the electricity wing of NDMC and placing them on a better footing than the ministerial staff in the other wi ngs, gave rise to some dissatisfaction amongst the latter. This resulted in various debates and discussions and finally to some litigation in this Court.
8.Eventually, on 27th June, 1978 NDMC created a separate electricity wing with effect from 1st May, 1978 in an apparent attempt to resolve the problem. The electricity wing comprised of 28 Pump Drivers, 2 Welders, 3 Carpenters, one Pump Mechanic and 496 ministerial staff falling in 18 categories. All the posts were ex cadre posts and were given SSC pay scales. There were certain conditions imposed on the working of the 496 ministerial posts inasmuch as they were required to be filled up on deputation basis on rotation. This ”scheme” formulated by NDMC led to some dissatisfaction amongst the ministerial staff in the electricity wing of NDMC and this too generated litigation in this Court. Several other cases relating to various categories of employee of NDMC were also considered by this Court and amongst other things, this Court evolved a formula of its own in respect of the ministerial staff in the electricity wing.
9.The entire litigation, after its decision by this Court, was taken to the Supreme Court and decided in the case of R.D. Gupta and Ors. v. Lt. Governor and Ors., . The facts mentioned above have broadly been culled out from this decision.
10.In the Supreme Court, the ministerial staff of NDMC contended that the benefit of SSC pay scales should be given to the entire ministerial staff in all the three wings of NDMC. This was because (a) the electricity wing is not a distinct or independen t unit but is a part of a cohesive body called NDMC, (b) the ministerial staff belongs to a unified cadre, and (c) what was effectively done by NDMC was to create a cadre within a cadre which, it was contended, was impermissible.
11.In this regard, it was concluded by the Supreme Court that (a) the ministerial staff of NDMC forms a unified cadre, (b) the recruitment policy for the ministerial staff is common, (c) recruitment of the ministerial staff is by a common agency, (d) a c ommon seniority list is maintained for the ministerial staff, and (e) posts held by the ministerial staff are inter-changeable inasmuch as they could be transferred from one wing of NDMC to another. On these facts, the Supreme Court concluded that all m nisterial staff in NDMC should be treated alike which meant that they were entitled to the same scales of pay regardless of which wing they were working in.
12.The Supreme Court also considered the case of Junior Engineers (Civil) and Assistant Engineers (Civil) in R.D. Gupta. Their contention was that they should be treated on par with electrical engineers in the matter of fixation of pay scales. Accordin g to them, civil engineering works designed and executed by them constituted an integral part of the work of the electrical wing of NDMC. It was also contended that civil engineers in DESU were getting SSC pay scales like electrical engineers. Therefore civil engineers in NDMC should be given the same pay scales as electrical engineers.
13.The contention of the civil engineers in NDMC for parity in respect of pay scales with electrical engineers was rejected by the Supreme Court. It was held that the civil engineering department in NDMC is a self-contained unit; Junior Engineers (Civil ) in NDMC do not have a common seniority with electrical engineers, nor are their posts inter-transferable. On the other hand, NDMC is a separate and distinct unit and all engineers working therein constitute a single unit. On this basis, the Supreme C urt rejected the contention of civil engineers in NDMC for grant of SSC pay scales.
14.The common thread running through the decision of the Supreme Court in R.D. Gupta in respect of the contentions of various categories of employees of NDMC was that there cannot be different pay scales for staff belonging to a unified cadre, governed b y the same recruitment policy, a common seniority list and a common transfer policy, merely because they work in different wings of NDMC. The net result of this view of the Supreme Court was that all ministerial staff, regardless of which wing of NDMC t ey were working in, were entitled to a common pay scale because they belonged to a unified cadre and also satisfied the other laid down test of inter-transferability. On the other hand, since civil engineers and electrical engineers did not belong to a nified cadre nor did they satisfy the other test of inter-transferability, there could, therefore, be different pay scales for civil engineers vis-a-vis electrical engineers.
15.After examining the above decision of the Supreme Court, the Petitioner passed a Resolution on 9th February, 1988 concerning its implementation. A letter had earlier been sent to the Delhi Administration on 8th September, 1987 seeking its sanction fo r payment of dues in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court. The Delhi Administration was also requested to clarify whether the relief granted by the Supreme Court is to be limited to the ministerial staff only or if it is to be extended and ayments made to the holders of other common transferable posts borne on a unified cadre.
16.The Delhi Administration by its letter dated 3rd February 1988 communicated its formal sanction for disbursement of funds and payment of arrears as directed by the Supreme Court. But, there was no response to the clarification sought by the Petitioner with regard to extending the benefit of the decision of the Supreme Court to other holders of common transferable posts borne on a unified cadre. To my mind, the judgment of the Supreme Court in R.D. Gupta was absolutely clear and no such clarification was required. R.D. Gupta was intended to apply to all ministerial posts and also to other posts provided they were borne on a unified cadre and were inter-transferable. Be that as it may, by a Resolution dated 9th February, 1988, the benefit of R.D. Gup a was extended to 8 categories of ministerial staff falling within the 496 posts and the case regarding other categories was held back to await a clarification from the Delhi Administration and the directions of the Supreme Court in another petition said to have been filed by one Karyalaya Chaturth Shreni Karamchari Association.
17. The 8 categories of ministerial posts to which the benefit of R.D. Gupta was extended, are as follows:- (i) Office Superintendent (ii) HA/Accountant (iii) Personal Assistant (iv) Senior Clerk (v) Stenographer (vi) Junior Clerk (vii) Store Keeper (viii) Adrema Operator
18.On 26th February, 1988, the question of implementing SSC pay scales and its extension to other categories of employees came up for consideration before the Petitioner. What had happened was that the Action Committee of NDMC Workers Federation consist ing of various categories of employees demanded that SSC pay scales should be extended to them since they formed an integral part of NDMC. Since this was not accepted, they decided to take the path of non-cooperation and struck work from 25th February, 988. To resolve the dispute amicably, discussions were held with the Administrator of NDMC and it was decided that to maintain harmonious and cordial relations with the labour and appreciating the genuineness of their demand, NDMC decided to adopt this s Resolution No.1 and act accordingly.
18.In the sheaf of papers handed over by learned counsel for the Respondents during the course of hearing, a note appears at the bottom of Resolution No.1 dated 26th February, 1988. The contents of this note were not denied by learned counsel for the Pe titioner and are, therefore, assumed to be a part of the official record. As per this note, it was made clear that NDMC desired to adopt SSC pay scales in respect of all its employees irrespective of any category and that the as follows:- effect of R.D. Gupta would e considered favorably. The note reads
”With reference to your demand, it is certified that N.D.M.C. wants to make payment in accordance with S.S. Committee’s report to all its employees irrespective of its any category. Further it is resolved that after taking clarifications from Labour Com issioner / Delhi Administration, Hon’ble Supreme Court’s judgment i.e. equal pay for equal work will be considered favorably.”
19.The implications of the decision of the Supreme Court in R.D. Gupta were again considered by NDMC on 9th June, 1988 when it was noted that on the basis of legal advice received by it, NDMC had decided on 26th February, 1988 to extend the benefit of R. D. Gupta to all employees who constituted the 496 posts, that is, to all 18 categories of posts. On this basis, a formal resolution was passed on 9th June, 1988 for processing the case for payment to these 18 categories of employees. Eight categories ha already been given the benefit of SSC pay scales as mentioned above after the Resolution dated 3rd February, 1988. The remaining 10 categories are as follows:- (i) Assistant Adrema Operator (ii) Assistant Record Keeper (iii) Daftari (iv) Peon (v) Bill Collector (vi) Sorter (vii) Ferro Printer (viii) Chowkidar (ix) Sewerman (x) Sweeper
It may be noted here that apart from Assistant Adrema Operator, Assistant Record Keeper and Daftari, none of the other posts are ministerial posts.
20.Thereafter, on 27th July, 1988 an order was passed by the Assistant Secretary (Health) of NDMC extending the benefit of SSC pay scales to another 8 categories of municipal workers since they formed a common cadre of sweepers. These categories of empl oyees are as follows:- (i) Lorry Beldars (ii) Dumping Ground Beldars (iii) Bhisties (iv) Rat Catchers (v) Veranda Beldars (vi) Hawker Raid Van Beldars (vii) Sweepers-cum-Chowkidars (viii) Dog Catchers
Here again, it may be noted that none of the above posts are ministerial posts.
21. It has been mentioned in Babu Lal, Convenor and Ors. v. NDMC and Anr., 1994 Supp (2) SCC 633 that around the same time, the benefit of SSC pay scales was also extended to the following: (i) SWD Lorry Beldar (ii) Gilt Lorry Beldar (iii) Filth Cartman (iv) Rubbish Cartman (v) Dumping Ground Mate (vi) Sewerman-cum-Beldar
None of the above posts, it may once again be noted, are ministerial posts.
22.On 2nd August, 1988 NDMC considered extending the benefits of R.D. Gupta to drivers (again, not a ministerial post). It seems that it was earlier agreed in principle by the Administrator to extend the benefit of SSC pay scales to drivers subject to t he approval of the Lt. Governor, Delhi. The approval was applied for on 30th June, 1988 but had still not been received. It was then noted that even though drivers have not been classified as ministerial staff, they satisfy the important test of inter- ransferability. In view of this, it was decided by NDMC to extend the benefit of R.D. Gupta to all drivers in anticipation of approval by the Lt. Governor.
23. During the rest of 1988 and 1989, there does not seem to have been any activity with regard to the implementation of SSC pay scales – at least, nothing has been brought on record either way.
24.In the beginning of 1990, writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution were filed in the Supreme Court by several categories of employees of NDMC. They all claimed the benefit of R.D. Gupta and, therefore, SSC pay scales. The controversy befo re the Supreme Court was whether those writ petitioners fell within the cadre of ministerial staff or fell in similar cadres which had already been granted SSC pay scales. On 17th March, 1993 the Supreme Court rendered its decision and this is reported s Narendra Kumar and Anr. v. Dharam Dutt and Anr., 1993 Supp (3) SCC 205. More about this decision a little later.
25.In the meanwhile, consequent to the agitation for implementation of Resolution No.1 dated 26th February, 1988 the Petitioner entered into a Memorandum of Settlement on 29th December, 1990 with its Federation of employees. One of the terms of the Sett lement was that all categories of employees up to Group B will be given a relief of Rs.100/- with effect from 1st March, 1990 and this amount will not be recovered. The second term of the Settlement was that a Sub-committee would be constituted to consid r and examine the Resolution dated 26th February, 1988 and other demands of the Federation of employees and this Sub-committee would submit its report to the Administrator and NDMC would then consider the issue and take a final decision. This term of the Settlement is of some importance and it reads as follows:-
”That Administrator NDMC will constitute a Sub-committee under the chairmanship of Secretary NDMC. This Sub-committee will include Financial Adviser, NDMC, Director (Personnel), Director (Horticulture), Medical Officer of Health, Director of Estate, Di ector (Social Education and Labour Welfare), Chief Engineer (Civil-I) and Chief Accounts Officer. This Sub-committee will also include three representatives of the Federation namely Shri C.P. Tomer, Shri O.P. Kaushik and Shri G.S. Kohli. The Sub-committe will consider and examine Resolution No.1 dated 26.2.1988 of the NDMC and other demands of the Federation. The Sub-committee will submit its report to the Administrator NDMC preferably within three months. On receipt of the same, NDMC will consider th issue and take a final decision after due consultations.”
26.The extension of SSC pay scales was again considered by NDMC in a meeting held on 9th January, 1991. Interestingly, it was noted that the post of sweeper is a feeder cadre of Assistant Sanitary Inspector and with the grant of SSC pay scales to sweepe rs (and allied categories), the pay scale of Assistant Sanitary Inspector has become lower than the pay scale of sweepers. In other words, a person belonging to the supervisory staff was getting a lower pay scale than his subordinate. In view of this a omaly, it was decided that SSC pay scales be extended to Assistant Sanitary Inspectors, Sanitary Inspectors, Chief Sanitary Inspectors and Deputy Sanitary Officers. Later, SSC pay scales appear to have been extended to the post of Sewer Mate and Sewer P mp Operator.
27.The Sub-committee, in accordance with the terms of the Settlement dated 29th December, 1990, eventually gave its report on 19th April, 1991. The opening paragraph of the report mentions that the workers in NDMC had gone on a strike in December, 1990 pressing for implementation of Resolution No.1 dated 26th February, 1988 ”wherein the Committee had conceded grant of S.S. Scales to all its employees.” In other words, the Sub-committee proceeded on the basis that the Resolution dated 26th February, 198 meant that SSC pay scales would be applicable to all employees of the Petitioner. This was clarified in the report to mean all employees other than teachers and doctors who are covered by the Chattopadhyay Commission and pay packages announced in vario s settlements by the Government of India and the Delhi Administration.
28.During its various deliberations with the Sub-committee, the Federation of employees withdrew all their demands except with regard to implementation of SSC pay scales. The stand of the Federation was that Resolution No.1 dated 26th February, 1988 was unequivocal in character and NDMC had conceded that SSC pay scales would be given to all its employees irrespective of their category.
29.It was also noted in the report that apart from 496 persons belonging to 18 categories of posts, the benefit of R.D. Gupta was extended to other categories such as Assistant Sanitary Inspectors, Sanitary Inspectors, Chief Sanitary Inspectors, Deputy S anitary Officer, Sewer Mate and Sewer Pump Operator vide Resolution dated 9th January, 1991. In other words, the benefit of R.D. Gupta was now extended to several other categories other than those covered by the 496 posts, going well beyond the scope of the decision of the Supreme Court, but in partial implementation of Resolution No.1 dated 26th February, 1988.
30. Keeping all these factors in mind, the Sub-committee concluded as follows:- ”1) the N.D.M.C. vide Reso. No.1 dt. 26.2.88 had already agreed to extend inter-alia the S.S. Scales to all its employees.
2)that the present operation of Reso. no. 1 is working to the advantage of some, while other categories are not getting these benefits. Such unequal operation is without any reasonable cause or basis. Such discrimination was legally unjustified. As su ch, the benefits may be extended to all the categories of employees working in N.D.M.C. except those covered by different pay packages announced by Delhi Administration or Govt. of India. Alternatively, none should get beyond what was prescribed by the upreme Court of India and the S.S. Scales given since then over and above the judgment of the Supreme Court be withdrawn and the payments made recovered.”
31.The decision of the Sub-committee clearly indicates that not only were SSC pay scales intended to apply to all categories of employees of NDMC, in terms of the Resolution dated 26th February, 1988 but that it was made absolutely clear that this is so except that the applicability of SSC pay scales would not be extended to those persons who were entitled to different pay packages announced by the Delhi Administration and the Government of India.
32.Alternatively, it was further decided by the Sub-committee that if the above decision cannot be accepted then no one, other than those who were covered by the decision of R.D. Gupta (that is the 496 posts) should be given the benefit of SSC pay scales – on the contrary, the benefit given to them should be withdrawn and payments recovered. The rationale for this decision of the Sub-committee was that some categories of employees were getting benefits denied to others and that this was discriminatory.
33.As mentioned above, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Narendra Kumar on 17th March, 1993 that is on the writ petitions filed by some categories of employees seeking the benefit of R.D. Gupta. The Settlement dated 29th December, 1990 and the report dated 19th April, 1991 given by the Sub-committee were either not brought to the notice of the Supreme Court or if they were brought to its notice, they were not considered by the Supreme Court because there is no mention of these documents in Nar ndra Kumar (or even later in Babu Lal).
34.But, be that as it may, the Supreme Court held that Auto Workshop employees, Duplicating Machine Operators, Gunmen/Dog Shooters, Junior Technical Assistants (Hindi) or Translator (Hindi), Assistant Store Keepers and Pump Drivers are all entitled to th e benefit of SSC pay scales since their posts are inter-changeable and transferable between the three wings of NDMC.
On the other hand, the benefit of R.D. Gupta was denied to the employees of Junior Navyug School run by NDMC and to Telephone Operators because these classes or categories of employees fall in a separate cadre and their posts are not inter-changeable or transferable from any other post under NDMC. Additionally, it was noted in the case of Telephone Operators that they did not fall within the category of ministerial staff.
35.While Narendra Kumar was pending decision by the Supreme Court, some other employees of NDMC filed Article 32 writ petitions in the Supreme Court in 1992 claiming the benefit of R.D. Gupta. In fact, three groups of such petitions were filed. One suc h group was a writ petition being Rajinder Prasad and Ors. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and Anr. (WP (C) No.647 of 1992). The Supreme Court disposed this of on 24th February, 1995. The Supreme Court did not entertain the writ petition and the operati e portion of the order passed by the Supreme Court reads as follows:-
”Since the Petitioners have not given detailed facts in this petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, it would not be in the interest of justice to go into the matter on merits. We direct that Central Industrial Tribunal, New Delhi shall decide the question after hearing the parties. The Tribunal shall also permit the parties to lead evidence and place additional documents on the record. The Tribunal shall decide the matter expeditiously and preferably within six months of the receipt f this paper book. The writ paper book be sent to the Tribunal which shall be treated as a reference before that Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act. The papers be sent to the Tribunal by the Registry. We are passing this order to do complete j stice between the parties. The Writ petition is disposed of.”
36.The significance of this order is that the Supreme Court directed the paper book in the writ petition be treated as a reference and the ”Central Industrial Tribunal” shall decide the question after hearing parties. According to learned counsel for th e Petitioner, this meant the Industrial Tribunal and not the Central Government Industrial Tribunal. I do not think learned counsel for the Petitioner is correct in this submission because in compliance with the order dated 24th February, 1995 passed by the Supreme Court, the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, took up the reference and passed an Award in ID No.60/95 on 27th February, 1997. This was brought to the notice of the Supreme Court, which passed an order on 28th April, 1997 directing that he Award passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal be published in accordance with law and consequential steps in that direction be taken. At that time, it was nobody’s case before the Supreme Court that the reference should have been consider d by the Industrial Tribunal and not by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal.
37.The second group of writ petitions filed in 1992 included Laxmi and Ors. v. Lt. Governor, Delhi Administration and Anr. (WP (C) No.761 of 1992). This writ petition got tagged along with a very large number of writ petitions that were filed in 1 993 and 1994 by various employees of NDMC. These writ petitions were, however, not tagged along with Narendra Kumar. When they came up for hearing on 8th May, 1997, the Supreme Court declined to entertain these writ petitions but gave liberty to the wr t petitioners therein to institute original proceedings before the appropriate forum and leave was granted to them to avail of such remedy as is available to each one of them under law for claiming the relief they want.
38.The third group comprised of a solitary writ petition (Babu Lal) decided by the Supreme Court on 13th July, 1994. In this case, the Supreme Court directed grant of SSC pay scales to Storm Water Drain Beldars and Storm Water Drain Mates with effect fr om 1st April, 1994.
39.Consequent upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Laxmi, several employees approached this Court in Digpal Singh and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., CW No.5002 of 1997. On 2nd December, 1997, this Court referred to the orders passed in Laxmi and Rajinder Prasad and directed that it would be in the interest of justice if the Petitioners approach the ”Central Industrial Tribunal” which was directed to decide the questions raised in the writ petition within a period of six months from receipt of t e paper book.
40.A batch of writ petitions being CW No.47-59/1998 and 65/1998 (Jamaluddin and Ors. v. Lt. Governor and Ors.) filed by similarly aggrieved employees of NDMC raising the same issue was taken up by a learned Single Judge of this Court on 22nd January , 1998. Following the orders passed by the Supreme Court as well as this Court, the learned Single Judge thought it appropriate to take the same view and, accordingly, directed the Petitioners to approach the ”Industrial Tribunal (Labour)” and the Indus rial Tribunal was directed to adjudicate upon all the points raised in the writ petitions. One significant direction given by the learned Single Judge reads as follows:-
”Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners submit that the Petitioners are apprehensive that the Respondents may take the plea that the points that may urged by the Petitioners would not come precluded from taking such points in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court of India.”
within the purview of the Industrial Tribunal. The Respondents are
41. In view of the above orders passed by the Supreme Court and this Court, the writ petitions were taken up by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal as references. Some other references were directly instituted before the Central Government Industr ial Tribunal and they were also taken up for consideration. The impugned Award dated 6th November, 2003 answered all the references in favor of the Respondent/workmen. While doing so, the learned Central Government Industrial Tribunal held as follows:
”Hence, all the petitions / claims of the Petitioners deserve to be allowed with costs. The Petitioners are entitled to get the pay scales and other benefits as being given to other categories of similarly placed employees of the N.D.M.C. at least w.e.f 1.7.91 i.e. subsequent to 19.4.91 i.e. the date of final conclusion arrived at by the committee of the management of N.D.M.C. and worker’s federation of N.D.M.C. if not earlier. It is further found that the pay scale of each Petitioners should be conc uded and refixed by N.D.M.C. within three months from the date of the publication of the award in the government gazette.
The award is given accordingly.”
42. It is this Award dated 6th November, 2003 that is under challenge in this batch of writ petitions. In view of the fact that the questions involved would affect a large number of employees of NDMC, it was decided to take up this batch of cases out of t urn for an early hearing. Learned counsels for the parties were heard on 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 9th and 10th August, 2004 when judgment was reserved.
43.At the outset, I think it is vital to understand what the Supreme Court decided in R.D. Gupta. If this decision is properly appreciated, there is hardly any scope for further litigation. The basic question in R.D. Gupta was of the applicability of SS C pay scales to ministerial staff of the general wing of NDMC. This has been so stated in the judgment by the Supreme Court on more than occasion. In fact, among other things, the Supreme Court was concerned with CA No.2969 of 1983, which was filed by t e ministerial staff of the general wing of NDMC objecting to special treatment being given to 496 ministerial posts in the electricity wing of NDMC (para 16 of the Report).
44.The Supreme Court broadly noted that there are two categories of staff in NDMC – technical and non-technical. It said that non-technical staff includes municipal staff, clerks, etc. In other words, non-technical staff consists of non-ministerial emp loyees and ministerial employees. This is also clear from the fact that when the electricity wing was created in NDMC with effect from 1st May, 1978, it comprised of pump drivers, welders, carpenters, one pump mechanic and 496 posts of ministerial staff making it plain that there is a distinction between pump drivers, welders, carpenters and pump mechanics on the one hand and ministerial staff on the other. To drive home this point, one may also usefully refer to the definition of ”ministerial servant” in Fundamental Rule 9(17). This reads as follows:-
9(17). Ministerial servant means a Government servant of a subordinate service whose duties are entirely clerical, and any other class of servant specially defined as such by general or special order of the Government.
45.One has to proceed, therefore, on the premise that there is a recognised difference between non-ministerial staff (consisting of carpenters, pump drivers, welders etc.) and ministerial staff (such as clerks etc.) both of whom form sub-sets of the larg er category known as non-technical staff. It is (obviously) assumed in this context that pump drivers, welders etc. are not technical staff.
46.The significance of R.D. Gupta lies in the conclusions arrived at by the Supreme Court in paragraphs 20 and 21 of the Report. It has clearly been held, and that was also the admitted position, that the ministerial staff in NDMC constitutes a unified cadre; the recruitment policy for ministerial staff is common; recruitment is done by a common agency and they are all governed by a common seniority list. Secondly, and significantly, all posts of ministerial staff in the three wings of NDMC are transfe able and interchangeable and postings are made from a common pool according to administrative convenience and exigencies of service. The Supreme Court noted that the set up of NDMC is that of an integrated unit comprising of three wings. The revenue of DMC is income derived from all three wings and the expenses are governed by a common budget. Keeping this in mind, the Supreme Court concluded that the first principle to be applied is that all ministerial staff working in NDMC, regardless of the wing o department they are working in, are entitled to the benefit of SSC pay scales. It was held in paragraph 32 of the Report, that:-
”……all the ministerial staff working in the NDMC are entitled to get pay scales as per SS Committee Report and likewise all of them are entitled to be given ex gratia payment. The grant of SS Committee pay scales to only the staff working in the ele tricity wing or the grant of ex gratia payment to only the staff working in the electricity wing and the waterworks wing cannot be legally sustained as it suffers from the vice of discrimination. As a consequence of these findings it follows that there hould be uniformity not only in the payment of the SS Committee pay scales and the ex gratia amount to the staff working in all the wings or departments of the NDMC but the payment should also be made from a date common to all.”
47.R.D. Gupta also concerned itself with Junior Engineers (Civil) and Assistant Engineers (Civil) who claimed that they are on par with electrical engineers in the electricity wing and, therefore, should be given the same pay scales. Obviously, Junior E ngineers (Civil) and Assistant Engineers (Civil) are technical staff and not ministerial staff, and if the decision in R.D. Gupta were intended to be limited only to ministerial staff, the case of Junior Engineers (Civil) and Assistant Engineers (Civil) ould have been rejected by the Supreme Court with much ado.
48.But that was not to be, because in their case the Supreme Court applied the second test arrived at by it, namely, that these engineers were not entitled to the benefit of SSC pay scales because they did not belong to a unified cadre and the posts of c ivil engineers were not inter-transferable with posts of electrical engineers, nor did they have a common seniority list with electrical engineers. Applying this principle, the Supreme Court concluded that civil engineers could not be treated on par with electrical engineers. What follows from this is that if civil engineers and electrical engineers belonged to a unified cadre (as in DESU) and had inter-transferable posts, they may have been granted the benefit of SSC pay scales, even though they were n t ministerial staff. I say this because the Supreme Court noted and observed that both civil and electrical engineers in DESU (who also do not belong to a ministerial cadre) held inter-transferable posts, which is not the case in NDMC and, therefore, civ l engineers in NDMC could not legitimately compare themselves with electrical engineers in NDMC.
49. R.D. Gupta, therefore, laid down two significant principles or tests that are required to be adhered to, and these are:-
(i)All ministerial employees in NDMC are entitled to the benefit of SSC pay scales regardless of which wing or department they belong to. In other words, all ministerial employees of all the three wings of NDMC are entitled to the benefit of SSC pay sca les.
(ii)Those employees of NDMC who are not ministerial employees, but nevertheless belong to a unified cadre with inter-transferable posts and a common seniority list and are recruited through a common recruitment agency would also be entitled to the benefi t of SSC pay scales. This is so because if the benefit of SSC pay scales is given only to employees in the electricity wing, while denying the same benefit to similarly placed persons in other wings of NDMC, it would put them in an advantageous position vis-a-vis their colleagues in other wings only due to force of fortuitous circumstances. Such an artificial distinction would suffer from the vice of discrimination.
50.It is on the above reading and understanding of R.D. Gupta that NDMC rightly addressed a letter to the Delhi Administration on 8th September, 1987 seeking a clarification as to whether relief granted by the Supreme Court is to be limited to ministeria l staff only or it is to be extended and disbursed to holders of other common transferable posts borne on a unified cadre. Unfortunately, the Delhi Administration did not respond to this letter and that is what has complicated matters. I am of the vie that on a reading of R.D. Gupta, the Delhi Administration ought to have answered the query raised by NDMC in the affirmative with the result that SSC pay scales must be extended to all ministerial staff in NDMC and all other holders of inter-transferabl posts borne on a unified cadre.
51.The uncertainty caused by the absence of any response from the Delhi Administration led NDMC to take its own decisions with regard to the interpretation of R.D. Gupta. That is why in its Resolution dated 9th February, 1988 it limited the benefit of R .D. Gupta to only 8 categories of ministerial staff out of the 496 posts in the electricity wing, postponing a decision on the other categories while awaiting a response from the Delhi Administration.
52.Thereafter, NDMC decided to formally extend the benefit of R.D. Gupta to 10 other categories of its employees by a Resolution dated 9th June, 1988 (although a decision in this regard was taken on 26th collector, sorter, ferro printer, chowkidar, sewerman and sweeper, none of whom (except daftari) can be said to be ministerial staff. This extension was but natural because the benefit of SSC pay scales to these employees was directly i February, 1988). This included categories like da ftari, peon, bill issue in R.D. Gupta.
53.But what is of importance is that the second principle laid down by the Supreme Court was unilaterally applied by NDMC from time to time to various other categories of employees such as beldar, bhistie, rat catcher and dog catcher (27th July, 1988); f ilth cartman, rubbish cartman and mate; driver (2nd August, 1988); assistant sanitary inspector and other sanitary staff (9th January, 1991) and sewer pump operator etc. etc.
54.It is in this setting of contemporaneous events that Resolution No.1 dated 26th February, 1988 has now to be appreciated, the contemporaneous events being the decision of the Supreme Court in R.D. Gupta, its applicability and interpretation as underst ood by NDMC and its employees, implementation of the decision of the Supreme Court before 26th February, 1988, on 26th February, 1988 and for few months thereafter.
55.It does appear that when the employees of NDMC represented by its Action Committee of Workers Federation comprising of various categories of municipal employees struck work and decided to take the path of non-cooperation on 25th February, 1988, the fl ash point was the failure of NDMC to implement R.D. Gupta in letter and spirit, that is to say, to extend the benefit of R.D. Gupta to all ministerial employees and to all other employees, who form a uniform cadre with inter transferable posts. It is tru that in so far as NDMC was concerned, it had understood and interpreted R.D. Gupta in such a manner that the benefit of the decision was intended to be given to all such employees. However, NDMC was unable to take any positive action in that direction ecause of the lack of an appropriate response from the Delhi Administration. But now that NDMC was compelled to place its cards on the table, it passed Resolution No.1 on 26th February, 1988 along with the note appended thereto, and agreed to make payme ts in accordance with SSC pay scales to all its employees irrespective of any category and to favorably consider this after obtaining clarifications from the Labour Commissioner and the Delhi Administration.
56.For some inexplicable reason, Resolution No.1 dated 26th February, 1988 was not implemented and this led to another agitation by the employees of NDMC some time in December, 1990. It may be recalled that between February, 1988 and December, 1990, ND MC had been implementing the decision in R.D. Gupta by extending the benefits to other employees who constituted a uniform cadre with inter-transferable posts. Unfortunately, this was obviously not being done to the fullest extent, which is what led to everal categories of employees filing writ petitions in the Supreme Court in early 1990 (Narendra Kumar) and the subsequent agitation of employees in December, 1990.
57.The December, 1990 agitation led to a Settlement dated 29th December, 1990 between the parties, who agreed to set up a Sub-committee to examine Resolution No.1 dated 26th February, 1988. It was clearly understood by all the parties to the Settlement that NDMC had conceded the grant of SSC pay scales to all its employees. Indeed, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in R.D. Gupta there was no option with NDMC but to concede to this demand because (as I have already pointed out above) the Sup eme Court laid down two principles or tests, which were binding on NDMC and to this extent, the reference made by NDMC to Delhi Administration for a clarification was really a superfluous exercise.
58.The Sub-committee set up pursuant to the Memorandum of Settlement dated 29th December, 1990 submitted its report on 19th April, 1991 taking note of the fact that some other employees belonging to the sanitary staff, amongst others, were given the bene fit of R.D. Gupta. It was also noted that SSC pay scales were being extended to various categories from time to time without any rational or cogent policy leading to discrimination between various categories of employees. With this in mind the report g ven by the Sub-committee unequivocally recommended, as was to be expected and rightly so, that the benefits of SSC pay scales should be extended to all categories of employees working in NDMC, except those covered by different pay packages announced by t e Delhi Administration and the Government of India. Alternatively, it was suggested that if this recommendation cannot be given effect to, then the benefits of SSC pay scales should be withdrawn in respect of all categories of employees except those dire tly connected with the decision of the Supreme Court.
59. The alternative suggestion given by the Sub-committee could not have been accepted by NDMC because it would have meant ignoring the law laid down by the Supreme Court in R.D. Gupta.
60.Notwithstanding this, since R.D. Gupta was not fully implemented by NDMC, the Supreme Court had no option but to consider on merits in Narendra Kumar whether various categories of employees who had approached the Supreme Court by way of writ petitions were entitled to the benefit of R.D. Gupta.
61.The Supreme Court noted in Narendra Kumar that the question that arose for its consideration was whether those writ petitioners fall within the cadre of ministerial staff or fall in similar cadres, which have already been granted the benefit of SSC pa y scales. The Supreme Court noted that it was not in controversy that the ministerial staff working in all the wings of NDMC are entitled to the same benefit of SSC pay scales as has been given to the ministerial staff working in its electricity wing. he writ petitioners in Narendra Kumar were not all ministerial staff. For example, in Writ Petition No.1/1990, the writ petitioners were employees of an auto workshop; in Writ Petition No.5/1990, the writ petitioners were Class IV employees holding post of duplicating machine operator and gunman/dog shooter and in Writ Petition No.292/1990 the writ petitioners were pump drivers.
62.The Supreme Court considered the various resolutions passed by NDMC as also the fact that the posts held by the writ petitioners, even though they were Class IV category posts, were transferable and interchangeable with other Class IV employees of NDM C, some of whom had been granted the benefit of SSC pay scales. On this basis, the Supreme Court applied the second principle or test laid down in R.D. Gupta and gave the benefit of its decision in that case to employees of the auto workshop, duplicatin machine operators, gunman/dog shooters and pump drivers. As regards some of the other categories concerned in Narendra Kumar, that is, Junior Technical Assistants (Hindi) or Translator (Hindi) (Writ Petition No.3/1990) and Assistant fell within the ministerial cadre, the Supreme Court naturally granted them the benefit of R.D. Gupta. Store Keepers (Writ Petition No.13/1990), since these posts clearly
63.With regard to the employees of Junior Navyug School (Writ Petition No.1109/1990, the Supreme Court did not go into the question whether they fell within the ministerial cadre or not. The Supreme Court based its decision of denying them the benefit o f R.D. Gupta only on the ground that the posts held by them were not transferable or interchangeable with any other post under NDMC. Similarly, in Writ Petition No.409/1990, since Telephone Operators fell in a separate cadre and their posts were not tra sferable or interchangeable, the second principle or test laid down in R.D. Gupta did not apply to them and that is why they were denied the benefit of SSC pay scales. Additionally and incidentally, in the case of Telephone Operators, they did not fall in the category of ministerial staff.
64.The second principle or test was again put to use by the Supreme Court in Babu Lal. In this case, the Supreme Court noted that the precise question for its consideration was whether the petitioners therein belonged to the same class of employees to w hich SSC pay scales have been granted by NDMC. The employees in Babu Lal were all Class IV employees and, therefore, non-ministerial employees belonging to the posts of SWD Beldars and SWD Mates. On an application of the second principle or test, the Su reme Court gave them the benefit of SSC pay scales.
65.The upshot of the above discussion is that even in Narendra Kumar and Babu Lal, the Supreme Court reiterated both the principles or tests laid down in R.D. Gupta, namely, that all ministerial employees in NDMC are entitled to the benefit of SSC pay sc ales and secondly, other employees are also entitled to the benefit of SSC pay scales provided they form a unified cadre and their posts are interchangeable or transferable with other posts in NDMC. Therefore, it is only these two principles that have to be applied for deciding the present batch of writ petitions.
66.There was some discussion, on a question raised by me during the hearing of the writ petitions, whether Resolution No.1 dated 26th February, 1988 as well as the Memorandum of Settlement dated 29th December, 1990 and the report dated 19th April, 1991 o f the Sub-committee were brought to the notice of the Supreme Court while it was hearing Narendra Kumar and Babu Lal. It was submitted by learned counsel for the Petitioner, relying upon various decisions of the Supreme Court, that the Supreme Court mus be deemed to be aware of all aspects of the case. There can be no quarrel with this proposition, especially in so far as the law is concerned but I have my reservations whether it can be assumed that the Supreme Court was aware of all factual matters, ncluding those that were not pleaded or placed before it. There is nothing to suggest that the documents mentioned above were brought to the notice of the Supreme Court but this is being mentioned only in passing because it was debated and discussed. To my mind, this will really have no material bearing on the issues raised in this case because even if it is assumed that the Supreme Court was aware of the contents of Resolution No.1 dated 26th February, 1988, the Settlement dated 29th December, 1990 and the report of the Sub-committee dated 19th April, 1991, the decision arrived at by the Supreme Court both in Narendra Kumar and Babu Lal would have been no different. This is because all that the Supreme Court has done is to arrive at the same conclusio that it did in R.D. Gupta de hors the contents of these three documents. On the contrary, if these documents had been placed before the Supreme Court, it would have only fortified and strengthened, on a factual plain, what the Supreme Court had already decided. In this view of the matter, I do not think it necessary to discuss the various decisions cited by learned counsel for the Petitioner in this regard, but must acknowledge the effort put in by him.
67.Learned counsel for the Petitioner also contended that the Central Government Industrial Tribunal could not have entertained the references because the appropriate Government in this case is not the Central Government but the State Government and, the refore, the matter should have been heard by the Industrial Tribunal and not by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal.
68.I am afraid it is not possible to accept the contention of learned counsel for the Petitioner for several reasons, some of which I have already adverted to above. In Rajinder Prasad, the Supreme Court had specifically directed the ”Central Industrial Tribunal” to decide the questions raised in the writ petition filed before it. In fact, the Supreme Court directed that writ paper book be sent to the said Tribunal, which was directed to treat that as a reference before it under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is true that there is no Tribunal called the Central Industrial Tribunal but I think what the Supreme Court meant was the Central Government Industrial Tribunal. I say this because the reference made in the case of Raji der Prasad was in fact heard by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, which passed an Award being ID No.60/1995 dated 27th February, 1997 and this Award was then placed before the Supreme Court. No one before the Supreme Court at that stage, inclu ing the Petitioner herein, took any objection to the reference having been decided by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal and not by the Industrial Tribunal.
69.When a learned Single Judge of this Court dealt with similar matters in Jamaluddin, he directed the petitioners therein, on the basis of the order passed in Rajinder Prasad and Laxmi, to approach the ”Industrial Tribunal (Labour)”. The Industrial Tri bunal was directed to dispose of the references made to it pursuant to the orders of this Court. Learned counsel for the Petitioner relied upon this fact to contend that in view of the order passed in Jamaluddin, the matter could have been considered on y by the Industrial Tribunal. The contention of learned counsel was that the direction given by this Court was that the employees should approach the appropriate industrial adjudicator which in this case would be the Industrial Tribunal constituted by t e Delhi Government, which alone was competent to try the disputes. . 70.The fact of the matter is that the references were made to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal and not to the Industrial Tribunal. It appears that references were made to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal on the basis of the order pas sed by the Supreme Court in Rajinder Prasad. In Jamaluddin, learned counsel for the petitioners therein voiced an apprehension that NDMC may take a plea that the points urged by the employees would not come within learned Single Judge passed an order precluding NDMC from taking such a point in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court. In other words, when the learned Single Judge referred the disputes to the Industrial Tribunal (La the purview of the Industrial Tribunal. o dispel this doubt, the our), what he had in mind was what the Supreme Court had intended, namely, the Central Government Industrial Tribunal. Perhaps, since the Central Government Industrial Tribunal may not have had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the disputes between the par ies, the learned Single Judge depended upon the order of the Supreme Court and precluded NDMC from raising such an issue of jurisdiction. No appeal was preferred by NDMC against the order of the learned Single Judge precluding it from raising the issue f jurisdiction and that being so, it must be held that the Petitioner had submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal for deciding the references at the instance of this Court, which merely followed the order of the Supreme Court.
71.Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the Central Government Industrial Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to entertain the dispute, it was conferred that jurisdiction by the Supreme Court in order to do substantial justice. Learned coun sel for the Petitioner has not been able to point out any prejudice, material or otherwise, that may have been caused to the Petitioner in the matter being taken up by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal and not by the Industrial Tribunal. The pr cedures adopted by both the Tribunals are the same and if the Petitioner has any grievance against an Award passed by either of these Tribunals, the remedy is to approach this Court by way of a writ petition under Articles 226 and 277 of the Constitution which the Petitioner has done. In a sense, therefore, the Petitioner has had its say in an appropriate forum, though not necessarily at the appropriate time. Notwithstanding this, one can understand some prejudice being caused to the Petitioner because of the violation of any substantive or procedural right that it may have in an Industrial Tribunal as against a Central Government Industrial Tribunal. But, learned counsel for the Petitioner has not shown any such right and no prejudice has been pleade or argued in this regard. An additional fact that needs to be noticed in this context is that the Petitioner declined to lead any evidence when called upon to do so. It chose to rely upon the material on record and nothing more. Before me, the Petitione did not complain that any material that it wanted to produce or any evidence that it wanted to lead was shut out. In fact, since the relevant material is mainly documentary, the batch of writ petitions was virtually argued as an original writ petition, n the basis of affidavits on record. Consequently, whichever way one approaches the problem, I think there is no substance in the contention raised by learned counsel for the Petitioner, my opinion being fortified by the orders passed by the Supreme Cour in Rajinder Prasad.
72. It was also contended by learned counsel for the Petitioner, relying upon Grih Kalyan Kendra Workers’ Union v. Union of India and Ors., and State of U.P. and others v. J.P. Chaurasia and others, that the principle of equal pay for equal work cannot really be applied to the facts of the present case because there are qualitative differences in the nature of work being performed by various categories of ministerial employees or even between employees. I am afraid it i too late in the day for learned counsel for the Petitioner to raise this contention inasmuch as the principles in this regard have been explicitly laid down by the Supreme Court in R.D. Gupta, Narendra Kumar and Babu Lal. All that these principles and apply them to the facts of the case. Moreover, the issue is not one of equal pay for equal work – the issue really is whether two employees of the same unified cadre holding inter-changea is to be done by this Court or by the learned Tribunal is to follow le and transferable posts can be treated differently. The Supreme Court has unequivocally answered this question in the negative.
73.It was also contended by learned counsel for the Petitioner that the learned Central Government Industrial Tribunal has not given any cogent reasons for arriving at its conclusions. The criticism of learned counsel is that all what the learned Centra l Government Industrial Tribunal has done is to indicate the facts of the case and on the basis of these facts merely conclude that the Respondents are entitled to the benefit of SSC pay scales. It was submitted that there is no discussion about the dec sions rendered by the Supreme Court in R.D. Gupta and Narendra Kumar. While this may be partially correct, I do not think it would detract from the conclusions arrived at by the learned Central Government Industrial Tribunal. Really speaking, the fact speak for themselves, particularly in this case, and much has happened since the decision rendered in R.D. Gupta which only needs to be recounted, so that hopefully NDMC can put a quietus to this controversy that has been raging for a little over 30 yea s, ever since a decision was taken to extend the benefit of SSC pay scales to some employees of NDMC. It must be realised by NDMC that what has been laid down by the Supreme Court in R.D. Gupta is the law of the land and it has to be applied, whether th Delhi Administration gives it any clarification or not, and whether the Central Government Industrial Tribunal gives adequate reasons or not. Decisions of the Supreme Court have to be implemented and their implementation is not dependent upon any clarif cation being given by any authority. What can only be debated is the interpretation of a judgment of the Supreme Court but when the decision is as clear as it is in R.D. Gupta and without any room for ambiguity, the judgment has to be acted upon, which in fact was initially intended by NDMC. The learned Central Government Industrial Tribunal has merely reiterated, perhaps not felicitously enough, what the Supreme Court has said on more than one occasion. Consequently, I do not think there is sufficien reason to set aside the Award on this ground agitated by learned counsel.
74.The final contention of learned counsel for the Petitioner was with regard to the date from which relief has been given to the Respondents. The learned Central Government Industrial Tribunal has awarded the benefit of SSC pay scales to the employees with effect from 1st July, 1991 which it says is subsequent to 19th April, 1991, that is, the date of the report of the Sub-committee. How this date of 1st July, 1991 has been arrived at is not at all clear from the impugned Award, nor is it clear what exus it has with the date of the Sub-committee’s report.
75.In R.D. Gupta, the Supreme Court took into regard the long lapse of time and the financial implications involved in the matter, and after making pro rata adjustments for the period up to 31st May, 1982 NDMC was directed to give effect to its decision f rom 1st June, 1982. In Narendra Kumar, the Supreme Court granted to the employees the benefit of SSC pay scales in the same manner as granted to other employees vide Resolutions dated 9th February, 1988 and 9th June, 1988. In other words, the directions iven by the Supreme Court in R.D. Gupta were reiterated. However, the Supreme Court made a departure in Babu Lal and declined to grant the benefit of SSC pay scales to the employees in that case from a back date and instead granted them the benefit with ffect from 1st April, 1994. This date appears to have been chosen being the start of the financial year.
76. In view of the above, it is quite clear that the learned Central Government Industrial Tribunal had given much more relief to the Respondents than what was given even by the Supreme Court in Babu Lal. This is clearly unacceptable.
77.Many of the Respondents in the present batch of cases have been agitating their claims for a pretty long time now, at least for over a decade. (This is good enough reason, en passant, to reject the contention of learned counsel for the Petitioner that the claims are belated). Some approached the Supreme Court as far back as in 1992 (Laxmi) while this Court was approached for the first time in 1997 (Digpal Singh) and then in 1998 (Jamaluddin). Most references were made to the Central Government Indust ial Tribunal in 1998, while some were made as recently as between 2000 and 2003. If the benefit of SSC pay scales is given to the Respondents from the day they sought relief, they will get the benefits from different dates, although they are all entitled to the benefits from a common date, the law being equally applicable to all from the same date. Therefore, I am of the view that all the employees should be benefited from the same date rather than from diverse dates, because this will again lead to some differentiation and discrimination. But, what should that common date be is the question? As mentioned above, since most references were made in 1998, it will have to be a date in 1998 and I think the date of 1st April would be appropriate being the star of the financial year and the date chosen by the Supreme Court in Babu Lal. I would, therefore, hold that the benefits of SSC pay scales be given to such of the Respondents as are entitled to it from 1st April, 1998.
78.During the course of hearing, I gathered an impression (supported by averments made in the writ petition) that an inarticulate premise running through the submissions made on behalf of the Petitioner was that the decisions of the Supreme Court were in tended to benefit only those who had inter-changeable or transferable posts with those in the Electricity Wing. I am afraid that is not how I read the judgments of the Supreme Court in R.D Gupta, Narendra Kumar or Babu Lal. The resolutions and decisions aken by the Petitioner also belie this viewpoint. It has never been anybody’s case that all the posts dealt with by the Supreme Court or in the resolutions of NDMC, existing in the General Wing or the Water Works Wing, must necessarily exist in the Elect icity Wing also before the concept of inter-changeability or transferability can be applied to them. Far from it. There are posts that are, by their description itself, suggestive of being exclusively found in one Wing and not in any other, such as dog c tcher, rat catcher, filth cartman and rubbish cartman. Surely, these posts cannot be said to exist also in the Electricity Wing of NDMC – at least no such contention seems to have been advanced before the Supreme Court and was certainly not advanced befo e me. The inarticulate premise of the Petitioner keeping the inter-changeable and transferable posts in a watertight compartment relative to a particular Wing to which they belong, is not only totally incorrect but goes completely against the grain of th decisions of the Supreme Court. This suggestion is, therefore, rejected.
79.Since there are a large number of writ petitions, it may be advisable if they are taken up individually for disposal and to determine whether the category of employees in each writ petition is covered by the principles laid down by the Supreme Court o r is otherwise excluded being covered by the Chattopadhyay Commission or other pay packages of the Delhi Administration or the Central Government. I am, therefore, passing appropriate orders in each case separately.
80. In so far as the present writ petition is concerned, it relates to masons. This category of employees is substantially and essentially no different from carpenters or welders or auto workshop employees who have already been given the benefit of SSC p ay scales. The services of masons, and their equivalents, are not exclusive to any Wing of NDMC. Consequently, I find no merit in the challenge urged by learned counsel for the Petitioner in so far as masons are concerned, to whichever Wing they belong; hey are all held entitled to the benefit of SSC pay scales.
81.Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. However, the Respondents will be entitled to SSC pay scales only from 1st April, 1998 onwards. The Petitioner should pay the arrears to them within 3 months from today and in any case before 31st December, 2004 after obtaining financial sanctions, if necessary.
82.Litigation is time consuming and costly. I would have expected the Petitioner to sort out the issues raised in this writ petition after mutual discussions with the Respondents, particularly since all the issues are fully settled by decisions of the Su preme Court. Unfortunately, that was not to be. Therefore, for having constrained the Respondents to litigate, the Petitioner will pay to each of them costs of Rs.1000/-. It is true that the Petitioner has partially succeeded in the writ petition, but su missions were not limited to that aspect.