JUDGMENT
N.B. Patel, J.
1. The original opponent Nos. 3 and 2 (insurer and insured) of Motor Accident Claim Application No. 73 of 1978 on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal No. 4, Ahmedabad, have preferred this appeal against the award passed by the Tribunal in favour of the respondent Nos. 1 to 6 (original applicants), whereby the said respondents are awarded a sum of Rs. 50,000/-together with running interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition till realisation and the entire costs of the petition. It may be noted that the award is passed against respondent No. 7 (original opponent No. 1, driver) also, but as she has not joined in filing the appeal, she is put up as formal respondent.
2. The accident in question occurred on 25.1.1975 in broad daylight at about 3.45 or 4.00 p.m. on a big road in the city of Ahmedabad, namely, the road on which Navrangpura Stadium abuts. As a result of this accident, the husband of the claimant No. 1 and father of the claimant Nos. 2 to 6 died some 12 hours after the event. The vehicle involved in the accident was a Fiat car, bearing No. GJC 7252 and it is stated that, at the relevant time, it was being driven by original opponent No. 1 and belonged to original opponent No. 2 and was insured, to cover third party risk, by original opponent No. 3. In the claim petition, the claimants averred that at the relevant time, deceased Panabhai Zavrabhai was aged about 45 years and he was earning Rs. 250/- p.m. and the claimants were deriving dependency benefit from his said income. It was also alleged in the claim petition that the accident, which proved fatal for Panabhai, had occurred as a direct result of negligent and rash driving of the aforesaid car by the original opponent No. 1. On this basis, the claimants claimed a total amount of Rs. 50,000/- as compensation from the opponent No. 1, as the tortfeasor, from the opponent No. 2 on the basis of his vicarious liability and from the opponent No. 3, as the insurer of the vehicle in question.
3. In the reply filed by the opponents, their liability to pay any compensation to the claimants was repudiated altogether on the basis that the accident had not occurred as a result of any rashness or negligence on the part of the opponent No. 1 in driving the car. In the alternative, it was pleaded that in any event, the claimants were not entitled to claim as much as Rs. 50,000/- as compensation.
4. On the evidence before it, the Tribunal has found that the accident in question had occurred as a result of negligent, if not rash, driving of the car by the opponent No. 1. So far as the quantum of compensation is concerned, the Tribunal estimated the income of the deceased Panabhai at Rs. 385/- p.m. and, after deducting his pocket expenses and the expenses for his maintenance and upkeep, arrived at the figure of Rs. 250/- p.m. as the figure of dependency benefit derived by the claimants from the income of Panabhai. Thus, the Tribunal has worked out the annual datum figure at Rs. 3,000/- and, applying the multiplier of 15 years, it has held that the claimants were entitled to claim Rs. 45,000/-as compensation for loss of dependency benefit plus another amount of Rs. 2,000/- as compensation for the pain, shock and agony suffered by the victim (till his death) for about 12 hours after the accident. The Tribunal has awarded a further amount of Rs. 3,000/- as compensation for loss of expectation of life and in this way, the Tribunal has awarded a total amount of Rs. 50,000/- as reasonable and just compensation to the claimants.
5. On behalf of the appellants, i.e., the insurer and insured of the vehicle, it was vehemently contended by the learned Advocate Mr. Soparkar that the Tribunal had erred in recording a finding that the accident had occurred as a result of rash and negligent driving of the car by original opponent No. 1. In this connection, Mr. Soparkar submitted that there was a clear fallacy committed by the Tribunal in admitting in evidence a copy purporting to be the copy of the panchnama and in exhibiting it at Exh. 38 and thereafter in relying on it. It is true that the Tribunal has made a reference to this document, but it is at the same time clear from the judgment of the Tribunal that the finding on the issue of negligence is not based entirely on the contents of this document. The Tribunal has first referred to the eye-witness account of the accident, as rendered by witnesses Bhikhabhai Atabhai (Exh. 29) and Gandabhai Bababhai (Exh. 30) and, even before referring to the panchnama, it has clearly stated that their evidence was more than sufficient to record a finding in the affirmative on the question whether the accident had occurred as a result of rash and negligent driving of the car by the original opponent No. 1. We will now proceed to consider whether this finding of the Tribunal on the issue of negligent driving of the vehicle by the opponent No. 1 is substantiated even if the document (Exh. 38) is kept totally out of consideration. Both the witnesses Bhikhabhai Atabhai and Gandabhai Bababhai have consistently stated that, at the relevant time, Panabhai, who was employed as a sweeper in Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, was sweeping the aforesaid road near its southern edge close to the footpath and the original opponent No. 1 had arrived at the junction of that road with another road and had taken a sudden turn without blowing horn of the car and without reducing its speed. The evidence of these two witnesses that Panabhai was sweeping the road at its extreme edge just near the footpath stands clearly corroborated by the admitted position that one of the wheels of the car had mounted the footpath on that side. It is also there in the evidence that both the legs of Panabhai were run over by the car and he had profuse bleeding. The Tribunal has very rightly pointed out that the fact that the car had mounted the footpath eloquently spoke about high degree of negligence, if not rashness, on the part of the opponent No. 1 in driving the car. There is also now no dispute about the fact that the death of Panabhai which occurred at about 3.30 a.m. on the next day, i.e., 26.1.1975, was in consequence of the serious injuries which he had sustained as a result of the accident. We have, therefore, no hesitation in upholding the finding of the Tribunal that the accident had occurred as a result of negligent, if not rash, driving of the car by the opponent No. 1 and, consequent upon the accident, Panabhai had passed away in the morning of the next day.
6. The next and more controversial issue in the case was about the quantum of compensation awardable to the claimants. So far as this issue is concerned, there was almost uncontroverted evidence of the claimant No. 1 (widow of Panabhai) that she and her husband were both employed as sweepers in the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and that her salary was almost equal to the salary received by her husband. The evidence of this lady that, at the time when she tendered evidence, the total emoluments which she was receiving came to Rs. 386.91 was fully corroborated by the salary slip produced by her. It is on the basis of this evidence that the Tribunal has held that, if Panabhai had not met with untimely death as a result of the accident, he too would have been earning about Rs. 385/- at the time of the trial of the case. The Tribunal has held that, out of this amount, Panabhai must be spending for himself and after making deduction of that amount from the estimated income of Panabhai, namely, Rs. 385/-, the Tribunal has found that the claimants must be held to be entitled to claim compensation at the rate of Rs. 250/- p.m. for the loss of dependency benefit suffered by them. Thus, the Tribunal has worked out the annual datum figure at Rs. 3,000/- and it has then held that Panabhai would have retired from service at the age of 60 years and his age being 45 years at the time of his death, the Tribunal has applied 15 years’ multiplier to the aforesaid annual datum figure of Rs. 3,000/-. This line of reasoning adopted by the Tribunal was severely criticised before us by Mr. Soparkar on the ground that the Tribunal could not have applied 15 years’ multiplier in the case of a victim aged 45 years. He pointed out that the Tribunal itself has held that Panabhai would have retired at the age of 60 years and he rightly submitted that that being so, the Tribunal ought to have adopted a multiplier lower than the multiplier of 15 years. The Tribunal, with great respect, has totally overlooked the factor that claimants were to be awarded compensation in a lump sum. We, therefore, accept the submission of Mr. Soparkar that the Tribunal should have applied only 12 years’ multiplier to the annual datum figure arrived at by it. However, even though we accept the submission of Mr. Soparkar that the Tribunal should have applied 12 years’ multiplier to the annual datum figure, we find that the award in this case is not liable to be disturbed. We are clearly of the opinion that the Tribunal should not have proceeded on the basis that the income of Panabhai would have stagnated at Rs. 385/- if he had survived and had had the full tenure of his service. It appears from the evidence of the claimant No. 1 (widow) that she was aged about 42 to 43 years and, at the time of recording of her evidence, she was getting about Rs. 385/- p.m. There cannot be the slightest of doubt that, by the time she retired, her emoluments would have gone up considerably. One cannot also keep out of consideration the steep rise in the emoluments earned by employees of Municipal Corporations 1/ Corporations and the Government. In our view, the Tribunal committed a clear fallacy in not considering and giving due weight to this aspect of the matter while assessing the income of the victim, on the basis of which the dependency benefit of the claimants should have been worked out. In our view, it would not be unreasonable and unrealistic to estimate the income of the victim at Rs. 450/- p.m. The evidence of the claimantNo. 1 shows that she herself is also an earning member of the family and, therefore, the total income of the family would be Rs. 900/- p.m. The family should be taken to represent 11 units to work out the expenses incurred by Panabhai for his own maintenance and upkeep, because there were four adult persons in the family and three minor children. On this basis, the two units assigned to the deceased would be equivalent to Rs. 165/- p.m. and the remaining amount of Rs. 285/- p.m. out of his estimated income of Rs. 450/- p.m. should be taken to be the dependency benefit derived by the claimants from the income of the deceased. The annual datum figure would then work out to Rs. 3,420/- and applying 12 years’ multiplier thereto, the resultant figure would come to Rs. 41,040/-. This, in our view, should be held to be the just compensation awardable to the claimants for the loss of dependency benefit suffered by them. There was no dispute raised about the award of Rs. 2,000/- to the claimants on the basis that the victim had suffered pain and agony for a period of about 12 hours till his death. The Tribunal has awarded an amount of Rs. 3,000/- only as the conventional amount of compensation for loss of expectation of life. Mr. Soparkar submitted that the award of Rs. 3,000/- under this head is quite appropriate. However, in view of the Division Bench decision of this court in First Appeal No. 524 of 1976; decided on 21.8.1978, we hold that the compensation under this head should be Rs. 5,000/-. We may mention that in that case, the accident had occurred on 16.12.1974 and this court’s judgment was delivered on 21.8.1978. In the case before us, the accident had occurred on 25.1.1975 and we are deciding this appeal in 1990. The total of the aforesaid three items would thus come to Rs. 48,040/-. The Tribunal has awarded Rs. 50,000/- and, in view of the small difference between the amount awarded by the Tribunal and the amount which, in our view, should have been awarded, we find that the award does not call for any interference at our hands. In not interfering with the award, we also take into consideration the fact that the Tribunal has awarded interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum only whereas at present interest is being awarded at the rate of 12 per cent per annum.
7. In the result of the above discussion, we find that the appeal has no merit and the same is accordingly dismissed with costs.