JUDGMENT
A.P. Ravani, J.
1. The expression ‘an appeal’ occurring in Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (and now in Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988) has given rise to these matters before the Full Bench. Does the expression ‘an appeal’ connote number of appeals available to an aggrieved person or is it used as requirement of grammar of English language to write the correct language? This, in short, is the question to be examined and decided by the Full Bench in both these appeals. The special appeals arise out of the judgment rendered by the learned single Judge in appeals under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short ‘the Act’). In both these special appeals, the Division Bench of this court by order dated 10.8.1993 referred the following question to a larger Bench:
Whether a special appeal lies under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, against a judgment of the learned single Judge under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988?
It is the aforesaid question which is required to be examined and answered.
2. In an unfortunate automobile accident which took place in Jodhpur on 21.5.1979, a truck bearing No. RJT 4061 was involved. In the aforesaid accident, two persons died. The heirs and legal representatives of the deceased filed two claim petitions before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (for short ‘the Tribunal’). The Tribunal allowed the claim petitions to certain extent. The owners and driver of the vehicle preferred appeals before the High Court as provided under Section 110-D of the Act. In both the appeals, the learned single Judge held that the insurance company was liable to satisfy the award passed by the Tribunal. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned single Judge, these two special appeals bearing No. 604 of 1989 and 605 of 1989 have been filed under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949.
3. Before the Division Bench (coram M. C. Jain and R.S. Verma, JJ.), a preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the respondents, i.e., original claimants that the special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, was not maintainable in view of the Division Bench decision of this court in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Lad Kanwar 1994 ACJ 105 (Rajasthan). The other side relied upon a Division Bench decision of this court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kastoori Devi 1988 ACJ 8 (Rajasthan) and contended that the special appeal was maintainable. The Division Bench felt that there was conflict between two decisions of the Division Bench of this court. Hence, the Division Bench raised the question as indicated hereinabove and passed the order to place the matter before the Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench to answer the question raised in the order. Thereafter, the matter has been referred to the Full Bench. This is how the matter has come up before this Full Bench which is required to answer the aforesaid question.
4. Our attention has been drawn to the following two decisions of the Division Bench of this court wherein the view taken is that the special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, is not maintainable against the judgment and order passed by the learned single Judge in an appeal under Section 110-D of the Act:
(1) New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Lad Kanwar 1994 ACJ 105 (Rajasthan).
(2) Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sadhu Singh 1994 ACJ 157 (Rajasthan).
The first decision in point of time is in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. decided on 30.3.1993, while the other decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. is decided on 13.8.1993. Incidentally, both the decisions have been rendered by the same Division Bench (coram K.C. Agrawal, C.J. and V.K. Singhal, J.).
5. Both the aforesaid decisions proceed on the footing that under Section 110-D of the Act the expression used is ‘an appeal’. The section provides that any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within ninety days from the date of award, prefer an appeal to the High Court. The basis of both these decisions rendered by the Division Bench of this court is that the expression ‘an appeal’ means only one appeal. Having interpreted the phrase ‘an appeal’ in this manner, the Division Bench proceeded further and held that against the judgment and award passed by the Claims Tribunal constituted under the appropriate provisions of the Act, only one appeal could be filed. It is further held that the provisions with regard to the internal appeal in the High Court Ordinance (or in the Letters Patent) will be of no consequence as far as the right of further appeal is concerned. This conclusion is buttressed on the premise that the provisions of the Act are contained in the special law, while the provisions of the High Court Ordinance, i.e., Rajasthan High Court Ordinance 1949, is general law. Relying upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of J.K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. AIR 1961 SC 1170, the Division Bench held that the provisions in special law will prevail over the provisions in the general law. In other words, the Division Bench relied upon the principles of interpretation contained in the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant.
(Emphasis supplied)
6. In the latter decision in Oriental Insurance Company’s case, 1994 ACJ 157 (Rajasthan), decided on 13.8.1993, a request was made by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant insurance company that the earlier decision rendered in New India Assurance Company’s case, 1994 ACJ 105 (Rajasthan), was required to be reconsidered. The Division Bench considered the request elaborately and rejected the same reiterating the reasons given in the earlier decision in New India Assurance Company’s case (supra).
7. It appears that the attention of the Division Bench was not drawn to the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kastoori Devi 1988 ACJ 8 (Rajasthan). In that case, the facts were like this. An automobile accident took place on 10.10.1977. Some persons had died and several other persons were injured. Three different claim petitions were filed before the concerned Tribunal. The Tribunal dismissed all the three claim petitions on the ground that no such accident had occurred with the truck in question. On appeal before this court, the learned single Judge reversed and set aside the award passed by the Tribunal and allowed the appeal. The insurance company filed special appeals under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949. Before the Division Bench, it was contended for and on behalf of the claimants that the special appeals were not maintainable as the award given by the Tribunal cannot be said to be a decree or judgment under the Code of Civil Procedure. The Division Bench negatived the contention stating that the claimants themselves had filed appeals which were allowed in their favour. Moreover, cross-objections were also filed by the claimants in the special appeals. Therefore, the Division Bench held that the special appeals filed under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, were maintainable.
8. It is true that in National Insurance Company’s case, 1988 ACJ 8 (Rajasthan), elaborate reasons have not been given for the proposition that the special appeals under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance were maintainable. However, the fact remains that the Division Bench of this court did take the view that the special appeal against the judgment and order passed by the learned single Judge in an appeal under Section 110-D of the Act was maintainable. This decision of the Division Bench consisting of N.M. Kasliwal, J. (as he then was) and Farooq Hasan, J. was not brought to the notice of the Division Bench which decided the cases of New India Assurance Co. Ltd., 1994 ACJ 105 (Rajasthan) and Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., 1994 ACJ 157 (Rajasthan).
9. With utmost respect, it is difficult to agree with the interpretation placed on the provisions of Section 110-D of the Act by the Division Bench which decided the cases of New India Assurance Co. Ltd., 1994 ACJ 105 (Rajasthan) and Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. 1994 ACJ 157 (Rajasthan). The provisions of Section 110-D of the Act read as follows:
110-D. Appeals.-(1) Subject to the provisions of Sub-section (2), any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within ninety days from the date of award, prefer an appeal to the High Court:
Provided that the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time.
(2) No appeal shall lie against any award of a Claims Tribunal, if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than two thousand rupees.
10. The Act of 1939 has now been repealed. The corresponding provision is in Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, with minor valuation with the insertion of proviso which requires the appellant to deposit certain amount in terms of the award at the time of filing the appeal before the High Court. So far as the provision which requires to be interpreted in both these special appeals is concerned, it is pan materia and there is no difference in the language which is required to be interpreted.
11. As per the scheme of the Act, the State Government is empowered to constitute one or more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals for such area as may be specified in the notification for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages to any property of a third party or both. (Section 110 of the Act). As provided under Section 110-A of the Act, the application for compensation with the particulars mentioned therein and in the Rules framed under the Act is required to be filed before the Tribunal. The Tribunal is required to pass award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just, as provided under Section 110-B of the Act. Section 110-C of the Act provides for procedure and powers of the Claims Tribunals. Section 110-CC of the Act which was inserted by Act 55 of 1969 and which came into force on 2.3.1970 provided for awarding of interest. Section 110-CCC of the Act, which has also been introduced later on, provided for award of compensatory costs in certain cases. Section 110-D of the Act provides for an appeal to the High Court and the same has been reproduced hereinabove. Section 110-E of the Act provided for recovery of money due from any person under an award as arrear of land revenue. Section 110-F of the Act provided for bar of jurisdiction of civil courts in respect of claims which could be preferred before the Claims Tribunal. Rest of the provisions of the Act are not necessary to be referred to for our purposes.
12. It may be noted that substantially similar provisions are made in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Since the provision of Section 110-D of the Act which has come up for interpretation is part materia with the provisions of Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the interpretation of the phrase ‘an appeal’ occurring in both the provisions (i.e., Section 110-D of the Act and Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988) will be identical, we do not think it necessary to refer and reproduce the relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
13. A bare reading of Section 110-D of the Act makes it clear that the expression ‘an appeal’ has been used by the legislature as a requirement of grammar of the English language. It is not used to indicate that no further appeal will be maintainable. In other words, the expression ‘an appeal’ is not used to indicate the number of appeals which could be preferred by an aggrieved party. One of the basic rules of interpretation of statutes is that any word, phrase or sentence occurring in the provision of a statute is required to be interpreted and understood in the context in which it is used. Looking at the provisions of Section 110-D of the Act from this angle, it becomes evident that the legislature intended to provide for an appeal against the award passed by the Claims Tribunal. While making this provision, the legislature is supposed to write correct language. The expression ‘an appeal’ is required to be used because the term ‘appeal’ starts with vowel ‘a’. The rules of grammar of English language provide that an indefinite article be used as prefix whenever it is followed by common noun. There are two indefinite articles in the English language. One is ‘a’ and another is ‘an’. Article ‘a’ could be used when common noun does not start with any vowel. Whenever the common noun starts with vowel, it is to be prefixed by article ‘an’. In the context in which the provisions of Section 110-D of the Act have been enacted and in the context in which the expression ‘an appeal’ has been used, this is the only interpretation which could be given. The intention of the legislature was to provide a remedy of appeal to any person who may feel aggrieved by an award that may be passed by the Tribunal. It would not be proper to read this section to mean that it was intended to provide for certain number of appeals to an aggrieved person.
14. In our opinion, the expression ‘an appeal’ used in Section 110-D of the Act has nothing to do with the number of appeals which may be available to an aggrieved person. Had it been so, the legislature could have and would have used a simpler way and stated ‘and decision thereon will be final’ after the word ‘High Court’. Similar phraseology has been used by the legislature whenever it desired to attach finality to a particular decision. Reference may be made to the provisions of Ajmer Abolition of Intermediaries and Land Reforms Act (No. III of 1955) (in short ‘the Act of 1955’). Section 66(3) of the Act of 1955 provided for an appeal to the Judicial Commissioner, Ajmer. Later on, the office of the Judicial Commissioner was required to be considered as ‘High Court’ in view of the integration of the State of Rajasthan under States Reorganisation Act, 1956. The provisions of Section 66(3) came up for consideration before the Division Bench of this court in the case of Temple of Shri Bankteshwar Balaji v. The Collector, Ajmer ILR (1964) 14 Raj 1. In that case, the order of compensation passed by the Compensation Commissioner was challenged before this court. The learned single Judge upheld the order of the Compensation Commissioner. The special appeal was filed by the Temple of Shri Bankteshwar Balaji, invoking the provisions of Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949. The Division Bench of this court interpreted the provisions of Section 66(3) of the Act of 1955, which read as follows:
66 (3). The State Government or any person aggrieved by an order of the Compensation Commissioner under this Act may, within ninety days from the date of communication of such order, appeal to the Judicial Commissioner, Ajmer, whose decision thereon shall be final.
Emphasising the expression ‘whose decision thereon shall be final’ occurring in the aforesaid provisions of Section 66(3) of the Act of 1955, the Division Bench of this court held that the meaning of the aforesaid expression was no more and no less than to say that no further appeal shall lie against it.
15. If the legislature intended to make the decision of the High Court in appeal under Section 110-D of the Act as final, nothing prevented it to use the simple language as indicated hereinabove. To the legislature cannot be attributed the inaptness of drafting of the provisions of the statute, much more so when the language and the provisions of the Act are expressly clear and leave no room for ambiguity whatsoever.
16. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents-claimants has relied upon the decision of this court in the case of Temple of Shri Bankteshwar Balaji, ILR (1964) 14 Rajasthan 1, in support of his contention that no special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, is maintainable. However, in that case, the provision which came up for consideration was Section 66(3) of the Act of 1955. Therein the legislature made it clear by using the expression ‘whose decision thereon shall be final’. In view of the aforesaid express language used by the legislature, the Division Bench of this court followed the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company AIR 1962 SC 256. Before the Supreme Court, the question was with regard to the provisions of Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Since the provisions of Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act expressly provided that no second appeal shall lie against an order passed in appeal in that section, the Supreme Court held that further appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent was not maintainable. Such is not the situation as far as the provisions of the Act in general and specifically the provisions of Section 110-D of the Act are concerned. Similar is the position with regard to the provisions of Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. In view of this position, reliance placed by the learned counsel for the respondents on the Division Bench decision of this court in the case of Temple of Shri Bankteshwar Balaji, ILR (1964) 14 Raj 1, is of no help to the respondents-claimants.
17. Here reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of N.S. Thread Co. v. James Chadwick & Bros AIR 1953 SC 357. It was a case under the Trade Marks Act, 1940. In that case, the appellants made an application to the Registrar of Trade Marks for the registration of their trade mark ‘Vulture Brand’. The rival businessman, namely, James Chadwick & Bros. was using the trade mark ‘Eagle Brand’. The owner of ‘Eagle Brand’ objected to the registration of trade mark ‘Vulture Brand’. Registrar of Trade Marks refused to register the trade mark ‘Vulture Brand’. An appeal under Section 76 of the Trade Marks Act was preferred before the High Court of Bombay. The learned single Judge of the Bombay High Court interfered with the discretion exercised by the Registrar of Trade Marks and set aside the order passed by him. An appeal was preferred before the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court allowed the appeal and restored the order passed by the Registrar of Trade Marks. The matter was carried before the Supreme Court. Two questions arose before the Supreme Court: (i) whether the judgment of the learned single Judge was subject to appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court and (ii) whether the learned single Judge was right in interfering with the discretion exercised by the Registrar in refusing registration of the appellants’ trade mark.
18. The Supreme Court considered the case-law on the point. It also examined the relevant provisions of law and came to the conclusion that once an appeal reaches the High Court, it has to be determined according to the rules of practice and procedure of that High Court. In para 7 of the reported decision, the Supreme Court observed as follows:
Obviously after the appeal had reached the High Court it has to be determined according to the rules of practice and procedure of that court and in accordance with the provisions of the charter under which the court is constituted and which confers on it power in respect to the method and manner of exercising that jurisdiction. The rule is well settled that when a statute directs that an appeal shall lie to a court already established, then that appeal must be regulated by the practice and procedure of that court.
While laying down the aforesaid proposition, the Supreme Court approvingly referred to the following observations made by the Privy Council in the case of Adaikappa Chettiar v. Chandresekhara Thevar AIR 1948 PC 12:
Where a legal right is in dispute and the ordinary courts of the country are seized of such dispute the courts are governed by the ordinary rules of procedure applicable thereto and an appeal lies if authorised by such rules notwithstanding that the legal right claimed arises under a special statute which does not in terms confer a right of appeal.
(Emphasis supplied)
In the same para, after referring to the other decisions of the Privy Council, the Supreme Court further observed as follows:
Though the facts of the cases laying down the above rule were not exactly similar to the facts of the present case, the principle enunciated therein is one of general application and has an apposite application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Section 76, Trade Marks Act, confers a right of appeal to the High Court and says nothing more about it. That being so, the High Court being seized as such of the appellate jurisdiction conferred by Section 76 it has to exercise that jurisdiction in the same manner as it exercises its other appellate jurisdiction and when such jurisdiction is exercised by a single Judge, his judgment also becomes subject to appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent there being nothing to the contrary in the Trade Marks Act
19. The aforesaid principle has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of South Asia Industries (P) Ltd. v. Sarup Singh AIR 1965 SC 1442. After examining the provisions of law and case-law, in para 11 of the reported decision, the Supreme Court has observed as follows:
The following legal position emerges from the said discussions: A statute may give a right of appeal from an order of a Tribunal or a court to the High Court without any limitation thereon. The appeal to the High Court will be regulated by the practice and procedure obtaining in the High Court. Under the Rules made by the High Court in exercise of the powers conferred on it under Section 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915, an appeal under Section 39 of the Act will be heard by the single Judge. Any judgment made by the single Judge in the said appeal will, under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, be subject to an appeal to that court. If the order made by a single Judge is a judgment and if the appropriate legislature has, expressly or by necessary implication, not taken away the right of appeal, the conclusion is inevitable that an appeal shall lie from the judgment of a single Judge under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent to the High Court. It follows that, if the Act had not taken away the Letters Patent Appeal, an appeal shall certainly lie from the judgment of the single Judge to the High Court.
20. In view of the aforesaid settled legal position, the simple question which needs to be examined and answered is- Can it be said that by virtue of Section 110-D of the Act or any other provisions of the Act, the right of special appeal as provided under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, is taken away?
21. With utmost respect, it is difficult to agree with the Division Bench decisions of this court in the cases of New India Assurance Co. Ltd., 1994 ACJ 105 (Rajasthan) and Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd,, 1994 ACJ 157 (Rajasthan), wherein the expression ‘an appeal’ has been interpreted to mean one appeal and, thereafter, it is concluded that the Act provides only one appeal and by necessary implication, the right of appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, is taken away. The right of appeal conferred under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, cannot be taken away unless specific provision is made to that effect. It would not be permissible to the court to read the language of Section 110-D of the Act in such a way that the right conferred on the litigants under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, is taken away. This is so in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court which is referred to here-inabove.
22. The Division Bench of this court in the cases of New India Assurance Co. Ltd., 1994 ACJ 105 (Rajasthan) and Oriental Insurance Co., 1994 ACJ 157 (Rajasthan), has observed that the Motor Vehicles Act is a special Act and High Court Ordinance is a general Act. Relying upon the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant and the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of J. K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. AIR 1961 SC 1170, the Division Bench has held that the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act would prevail over the provisions made in the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949. In our opinion, the question as to whether the Motor Vehicles Act is a special law and the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance is a general law is not required to be gone into. But we would like to make it clear that we do not agree with the proposition that the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Motor Vehicles Act, 1988) is a special law and the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, is a general law. The Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, also can be said to be special law, by which the High Court is established and the powers conferred on the High Court have been defined and the procedure as well as manner in which the business of the High Court is conducted is indicated. This cannot be said to be a general law. However, we do not wish to go into this controversy. Without expressing a firm opinion on this question, we leave the question as it is. We do so for the reason that we have come to the conclusion that the expression ‘an appeal’ used in Section 110-D of the Act does not mean ‘one appeal’. Therefore, it is not necessary to decide this issue for answering the question referred to the Full Bench.
23. Here reference may be made to a Full Bench decision of the Madhya Pra-desh High Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Saraswati Bai 1995 ACJ 273 (MP). In that case, identical question arose as to whether appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent (Nagpur) against the judgment and order passed by the learned single Judge in an appeal under Section 110-D of the Act is maintainable or not? In that case, the Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court following the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of South Asia Industries (P) Ltd. v. Sarup Singh AIR 1965 SC 1442 and in the case of N.S. Thread Co. v. James Chadwick & Bros. AIR 1953 SC 357, has taken the same view which we have taken herein-above. Of course, before the Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, the question arose in a different context. The question had not come up before the Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court on account of the interpretation of the expression ‘an appeal’ occurring in Section 110-D of the Act. However, that is not material. The fact remains that the Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court has taken the view that internal appeal under the appropriate provisions of the Letters Patent was maintainable against the judgment and order passed by the learned single Judge in appeal under Section 110-D of the Act. Similar view is taken by the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Kuldip Lal Bhandari 1969 ACJ 276 (Delhi). We are in respectful agreement with the view taken by the Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court and the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in the aforesaid decisions.
24. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents relied upon a decision of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Dhondubai Murlidhar Reddi v. Proprietor, Jankidas Khandsari Sugar Factory 1991 ACJ 954 (Bombay), it was a case arising out of the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923. In that case, the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has taken the view that the Commissioner exercising power under Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, is not a civil court. The award passed by him is subject to appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, only on the substantial question of law. In the context of the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that further appeal under clauses 15 and 16 of the Letters Patent of High Court of Bombay will not be maintainable against the judgment and order passed by the learned single Judge in an appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923. This decision is not required to be considered in further details. This is so because in these matters we are not concerned with the provisions of Section 30 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act and the question as to whether further internal appeal in the High Court would be maintainable or not. It is an undisputed position that the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, are not analogous to the provisions of the Act or that of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Therefore, the reliance placed on the said decision is of no help to the respondents-claimants.
25. In the result, we answer the question in affirmative, that is to say, that a special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949, is maintainable against the judgment and order of the learned single Judge rendered in an appeal under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (now Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988).
26. The question is answered accordingly. Both the special appeals shall be placed before the appropriate Division Bench for proceeding further in accordance with law.