IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
MACA.No. 87 of 2004()
1. NEW INDIA ASSURANCE COMPANY LTD.,
... Petitioner
Vs
1. P.K. PADMAVATHI, AGED 70 YEARS,
... Respondent
2. GOVINDA SHETTI, S/O. NARASIMHAN CHETTI,
3. H.P. GIRISH, S/O. H.T. PALLASWAMI,
4. UNITED INDIA INSURANCE COMPANY,
5. S.V. JAAPRAKSH, S/O. S.V.VAYYAPURI,
6. S. SAKTHIVEL, S/O. SARAVANAN,
7. E.S. JAMES, S/O. STEPHEN,
For Petitioner :SRI.RAJAN P.KALIYATH
For Respondent :SRI.JOHN JOSEPH VETTIKAD
The Hon'ble MR. Justice C.N.RAMACHANDRAN NAIR
The Hon'ble MR. Justice C.K.ABDUL REHIM
Dated :21/08/2009
O R D E R
C .N. RAMACHANDRAN NAIR &
C. K. ABDUL REHIM, JJ.
--------------------------------------------
M.A.C.A. No. 87 OF 2004
--------------------------------------------
Dated this the 21st day of August, 2009
JUDGMENT
Ramachandran Nair, J.
Heard standing counsel appearing for the appellant and counsel
appearing for the claimant-respondent, and also standing counsel
appearing for the fourth respondent. The claimant is 70 year old lady
who lost her son aged 27 years, in the accident. Though the Claim
Petition was filed under Section 166, it was later converted into a claim
under Section 163A of the Act. The MACT awarded compensation
going by the formula stated in the Second Schedule. The total
compensation granted is Rs. 2,04,500/-. The MACT held that since it
is a claim awarded under Section 163A, liability has to be shared
between the insurance companies. However, there is a specific
direction to the appellant to deposit the entire amount and recover 50%
from the fourth respondent.
2. We have heard Sri. Rajan P Kalliyath, counsel appearing for
the appellant, who cited before us the decision of the Supreme Court in
2
RAMESH SINGH V. SBBIR SINGH, (2008) ACC 765 (SC) wherein
the Supreme Court held that Second Schedule prescribed under Section
163A does not contain static principle and if the claimants are fairly
old, the Tribunal should not grant compensation going by the age of the
victim. Counsel for the appellant heavily relied on the age of the
claimant, who was 70 years of age as on the date making Claim
Petition, and according to him, the multiplier applicable going by her
age is only 5 as against 10 taken in this case, under the Second
Schedule. He further pointed out that even in a Section 166 claim,
eligible compensation would have been lesser because the multiplier
would have been only 5 and reduction in dependency should also be
taken after the normal age of marriage of the victim who was 27 years
at the time of his death. Counsel for the claimant on the other hand
contended that whatever be the contentions raised, the total
compensation granted for the death of 27 year old son of the claimant
on whom she was depending for her livelihood is only Rs. 2,04,500/-.
He further pointed out that if the claim was proceeded under Section
166, compensation would have been claimed under other heads, which
3
is not the case herein, where the claim is considered and awarded under
Section 163A. Eventhough we find force in the various contentions
raised by counsel for the appellant, we do not think any interference is
called for in this case because the total compensation awarded is Rs.
2,04,500/- only. Even in the case of death of a very tender child, we
have noticed that courts have been granting compensation around Rs. 2
lakhs. Further, even going by the decision of the Supreme Court cited
by the appellant, wherein the Supreme Court says that life expectancy
of the claimant should also be reckoned while fixing the multiplier.
We find that the claimant who was 70 years of age at the time of filing
of the Claim Petition in the year 1998 is still alive which means that she
is 81 years of age now. Therefore going by the expectancy of life of
the claimant, which factually stands proved, we do not find any ground
to interfere with the multiplier applied on the facts of this case. We
therefore leave open the contentions raised by the appellant to be raised
in appropriate case for exhorbitant awards which may not be tenable
under Section 163A.
3. We do not find any logic in the MACT directing the appellant
4
to deposit the entire amount after noticing that the liability is to be
shared between the two insurance companies. We therefore modify
the award directing both the insurance companies to deposit 50% of the
amount awarded with proportionate interest.
The Appeal is dismissed, but with the above observations.
(C.N.RAMACHANDRAN NAIR)
Judge.
(C. K. ABDUL REHIM)
Judge.
kk
5