ORDER
Shethna, J.
(1). The deceased Devilal was working as a driver with Babu-Lal. He was paid monthly salary of Rs. 3,000/-. On 27.4.98 at about 5:00 P.M., he was driving the jeep no. RJ19C 6488 belonging to Babulal. All of sudden one camel cart came from the opposite side, therefore, Devilal immediately applied the breaks but due to failure of breaks, he met with the accident and received serious injuries, therefore, he was immediately taken to the hospital at Phalodi and from there, he was referred to Jodhpur where he died. His widow Bidami Devi and his father Shankar Lal filed the claim petition under Sections 166 and 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short “the Act”) before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Phalodi (for short “the Tribunal”). On behalf of claimants Shankar Lal, Raj Kumar and Raja Ram – three witnesses were examined before the Tribunal in support of their claim petition. However, though opportunity was given to the respondents, they have not preferred to examine any witness. After considering the oral as well as the documentary evidence led before it, the learned Tribunal found that the claimants were entitled for total claim of Rs. 4,10,000/- instead of Rs. 20,66,500/- claimed by them. Thus, by its award dated 27.1.99, the learned Tribunal awarded total sum of Rs. 4,10,000/- to the claimants. This has been challenged by the petitioner- Insurance Company before this Court by way of this petition which is filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitu-
tion. Though, this petition is labelled as a petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution but strictly speaking it is a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. The scope of which is narrow and limited. As held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Yunus vs. Mohd. Mustaqim (1), even errors of law committed by the subordinate Courts cannot be corrected by the High Court in its supervisory jurisdiction under Art. 227 of the Constitution.
(2). It is an admitted that against the award passed by the learned Tribunal, statutory appeal lies under Section 173 of the Act within 90 days before this court from the date of award. It is surprising that instead of filing a regular appeal under Section 173 of the act within the period of limitation i.e. 90 days, the Insurance Company has preferred to file writ petition before this Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution as stated earlier. Therefore, only on this ground alone, this petition was required to be dismissed because, in my opinion, the petitioner Insurance company cannot be allowed to frustrate the intention of legislature by circumventing the provisions of law by filing this petition instead of filing the statutory appeal before this Court.
(3). However, learned counsel Mr. Mehta’s argument was that the Insurance Company has got limited defences and it cannot raise the objection about the adequacy of the compensation amount awarded by the Tribunal to the claimants in appeal under Section 173 of the Act, therefore, he has filed this petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution before this Court. If this Court entertains such a petition, then it would be opening a Pendora’s Box and it will be flooded with all such types of writ petitions, which will not be in the interest of justice. To submit before this Court that the amount awarded by the Tribunal is highly excessive is not permissible in a petition filed under Article 226/227 of the Constitution.
(4). Learned counsel Mr. Mehta vehemently submitted that the claimants were entitled for only Rs.2 lacs by way of compensation if they had moved the Workmen Compensation Commissioner under the provisions of the Workmen Compensation Act because the income of the deceased would be only Rs. 2,000/- under the provisions of Workmen Compensation Act, therefore, instead of approaching the Workmen Compensation Commissioner, the claimants preferred to file a claim petition before the learned Tribunal who accepted the version of the claimants that the salary of the deceased Devi Lal was Rs. 3,000/- per month as a driver. Thereby, the learned Tribunal committed a grave error on law. He also submitted that the learned Tribunal was wholly wrong in applying seventeen years multiplier which is against the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as this Court. According to his submission, at the most the learned Tribunal could have applied fifteen years multiplier but not more than that.
(5). In view of the above submission made by the learned counsel Mr. Mehta for the Insurance Company, I thought it fit to take the assistance of learned counsel Mr. H.R. Panwar, who has immediately assisted the Court by citing a judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Suresh Chandra vs. State of U.P. (2). In Suresh Chandra’s case (supra), the claimant Suresh Chandra himself being an injured person filed claim petition before the learned Tribunal when he received an injury while working as Beldar and because of that accident, his right leg was amputated. He moved a claim petition before the learned Tribunal for a sum of Rs. 5,30,000/- as compensation. The learned Tribunal, however, awarded total compensation of Rs. 1,45,000/- with interest @ 12%. Against that award, the State of U.P. preferred an appeal to the Allahabad High Court and in appeal, the High Court reduced compensation of Rs. 1,45,000/- to Rs. 85,000/- with interest @ 12% by accepting the condition that the claimant would have secured Rs. 85,000/- only by way of compensation, if he has moved the Workman Compensation Commissioner. This was challenged by the original claimant before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that “We do not think that the High Court was right in accepting that reasoning on the facts of this case when the finding is that the accident had occasioned while the roadroller was on the move
and the negligence was on the part of the person who drove the roadroller belonging to the respondents.”.
(6). In Supreme Court, an attempt was made to support the view taken by the Hon’ble High Court but the Supreme Court negatived that contention and held that the High Court was wrong in reducing the amount on the basis that if the claimant had moved the Commissioner of Workmen’s Compensation by way of compensation, then he would have been entitled to only Rs. 85,000/- and not Rs. 1,45,000/-. Accordingly the Hon’ble Supreme Court set aside the judgment and order passed by the High Court and restored the order passed by the Tribunal. This judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Suresh Chandra (supra) is a clear answer to the aforesaid submission made by the learned counsel Mr. Mehta that the Tribunal should have awarded compensation of Rs. 2 lacs only on the basis of the salary of the driver at Rs. 2,000/- per month.
(7). There is also no substance in the submission of learned counsel Mr. Mehta for the petitioner about the multiplier of seventeen years applied by the learned Tribunal because the new Chapter is amended in the Act of 1988 itself and as per the Second Schedule to Section 163A of the Act, if the age of the victim was not exceeding 25 years, then he would be entitled for seventeen years multiplier. Not only that learned counsel Mr. H.R. Panwar also pointed out a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of U.P. State Road Transport Corporation & Ors. vs. Trilok Chandra & Ors. (3) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the multiplier cannot exceed 18 in a case where the victim was only 20 years in view of the provisions of Section 163A read with Second Schedule. Thus, there is a clear answer to this submission of Mr. Mehta. Hence, this submission of Mr. Mehta is also rejected.
(8). As stated earlier, strictly speaking this is a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution wherein this Court is called upon to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction against the impugned award at Annex. 1 passed by the learned Tribunal. Giving through the reasons assigned by the learned Tribunal for awarding in all Rs. 4,10,000/- to the claimants, I do not find any reason to interfere with the same in my supervisory jurisdiction. Neither error on facts nor error of law is committed by the learned Tribunal while passing the award. It was conceded by learned counsel Mr. Mehta for the Insurance Company that the Tribunal had jurisdiction but his only submission was that the claimant should have approached the Commissioner under Workmen’s Compensation Act. In my opinion, when two parallel remedies are available to the claimants, then it is upto them to choose the forum and if they had approached the Tribunal, then it cannot be said that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction or it should not have exercised the jurisdiction. Hence, this submission of learned counsel Mr. Mehta is also rejected.
(9). Before parting, I must state that in case of Harivadan Manek Lal Modi & Anr. vs. Chandrasinh Chhatrasinh Parmar & Ors. (4), the Division Bench of Gujarat High Court held that “Under Sec. 110-AA of the Motor Vehicles Act the person entitled to compensation “may claim” such compensation under either the Workmen’s Compensation Act or the Motor Vehicles Act but not both. The words “may claim” clearly indicate that the person entitled to compensation must take a conscious decision and opt for compensation under one or the other statutes. Deposit of compensation money by a third party in discharge of his obligation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act can never tantamount to the option being exercised by the person entitled to compensation. Hence, receipt of compensation money deposited by the employer in discharge of his obligation under Sec. 4 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act without the appellants having made any claim for compensation under that statute cannot debar the appellants from claiming compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act by virtue of Sec. 110-AA thereof. Such deposit of compensation money and receipt thereof by the dependents of the deceased will not amount to making a claim by the dependents of the deceased under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.”
(10). In view of the above discussion, I do not see any substance or merits in this petition and this petition is required to be dismissed on all counts which I have stated hereinabove.
(11). Stay petition is also dismissed.
(12). Interim relief, if any, granted earlier stands vacated forthwith.
(13). I must appreciate the assistance rendered by learned counsel Mr. H.R. Panwar in helping this court for properly adjudicating this case.