JUDGMENT
G.S. Singhvi, J.
1. This appeal involves a challenge to the order dated October 4, 1991, passed by the Judge, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Bundi, whereby he has directed the owner and the insurance company to jointly and severally pay a sum of Rs. 25,000 to the respondents under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short “the 1988 Act”).
2. The respondents have filed a claim petition before the Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal, Bundi (for short “MACT”) for compensation on account of death of Bhanwar Lal, husband of respondent No. 1 and father of respondents Nos. 2 to 5. In the claim petition it has been alleged that while Bhanwar Lal was travelling in Jeep No. RST 5325, the driver of the jeep Shri Rajendra Kumar drove the jeep rashly and negligently. On account of his rash and negligent driving the jeep suddenly overturned. Bhanwar Lal received serious injuries and ultimately died in Maharao Bhimsingh Hospital, at Kota. The jeep is insured with the appellant company.
3. The owner and the driver of the vehicle as well as the insurance company have filed their written statements and are contesting the claim on various grounds set out in the written statements. During the pendency of the proceedings the Tribunal has passed an interim award under Section 140 of the 1988 Act.
4. The only argument advanced by Mr. Alok Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant, is that while passing the interim award, the Tribunal has overlooked the proviso to Section 147(2) of the 1988 Act. The policy
of the jeep No. RST 5325 was valid for a period from October 30, 1988, to October 29, 1989, and, therefore, the said policy must be deemed to be effective for a period of four months after the commencement of the 1988 Act or till the date of expiry of the policy, whichever was earlier. In view of this, the Tribunal could have awarded interim compensation only to the tune of Rs. 15,000 under Section 92A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short “the 1939 Act”). Shri Sharma argued that since the provisions of the 1988 Act have come into force on July 1, 1989, the policy must be deemed to be valid up to October 29, 1989, and, therefore, in respect of the accident which took place on August 14, 1989, the provisions of Section 140 could not have been invoked.
5. Section 92A of the 1939 Act, Section 140, Section 144 and the proviso to Section 147(2) of the 1988 Act deserve to be quoted for the purpose of appreciation of the arguments of learned counsel for the appellant :
“92A. Liability to pay compensation in certain cases on the principle of no fault.–(1) Where the death or permanent disablement of any person has resulted from an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle or motor vehicles, the owner of the vehicle shall, or, as the case may be, the owners of the vehicles shall, jointly and severally, be liable to pay compensation in respect of such death or disablement in accordance with the provisions pf this section.
(2) The amount of compensation which shall be payable under Sub-section (1) in respect of the death of any person shall be a fixed sum of fifteen thousand rupees and the amount of compensation payable under that sub-section in respect of the permanent disablement of any person shall be a fixed sum of seven thousand five hundred rupees.
(3) In any claim for compensation under Sub-section (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead and establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person.
(4) A claim for compensation under Sub-section (1) shall not be defeated by reason of any wrongful act, neglect or default of the person in respect of whose death or permanent disablement the claim has been made nor shall the quantum of compensation recoverable in respect of such death or permanent disablement be reduced on the basis of the share of such person in the responsibility for such death or permanent disablement.”
“140. Liability to pay compensation in certain cases on the principle of no fault–(1) Where death or permanent disablement of any person has resulted from an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle or motor vehicles, the owner of the vehicle shall, or, as the case may be, the owners of the vehicles shall, jointly and severally, be liable to pay compensation in respect of such death or disablement in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(2) The amount of compensation which shall be payable under Sub-section (1) in respect of the death of any person shall be a fixed sum of twenty-five thousand rupees and the amount of compensation payable under that sub-section in respect of the permanent disablement of any person shall be a fixed sum of twelve thousand rupees.
(3) In any claim for compensation under Sub-section (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead and establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person.
(4) A claim for compensation under Sub-section (1) shall not be defeated by reason of any wrongful act, neglect or default of the person in respect of whose death or permanent disablement the claim has been made nor shall the quantum of compensation recoverable in respect of such death or permanent disablement be reduced on the basis of the share of such person in the responsibility for such death or permanent disablement.”
“144. Overriding effect.–The provisions of this Chapter shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act or of any other law for the time being in force.”
“147. Requirements of policies and limits of liability.– …
(2) Subject to the proviso to Sub-section (1), a policy of insurance referred to in Sub-section (1), shall cover any liability incurred in respect of any accident, up to the following limits, namely :–
(a) save as provided in Clause (b), the amount of liability incurred;
(b) in respect of damage to any property of a third party, a limit of rupees six thousand :
Provided that any policy of insurance issued with any limited liability and in force, immediately before the commencement of this Act shall continue to be effective for a period of four months after such commencement or till the date of expiry of such policy whichever is earlier.”
6. Section 92A of the 1939 Act was brought into force with effect from October 1, 1982, and as already noted above, the provisions of the 1988 Act have come into force with effect from July 1, 1989.
7. Before Section 92A of the 1939 Act came to be inserted, compensation could be claimed in motor accidents if the driver was negligent or rash in driving the vehicle. But by virtue of Section 92A, a clear departure from the aforesaid common law principle has been made. The right to compensation has been created irrespective of the fault of the opposite party. The mere factum of accident and sustaining of injuries in a motor accident has been made the basis of compensation in the case of death or permanent disablement. The result of introduction of Section 92A was that even if the accident had taken place without total or partial negligence of the injured, still compensation under the no-fault liability clause was to be granted. What was required to be established by the claimant was that the accident has in fact taken place, which has resulted in death or permanent disablement and that the vehicle of the respondent was involved in the accident. Further, if the claim was against the insurance company, then it was required to be proved that the vehicle was insured with the insurance company. Thus, in the case of tortious liability, negligence or rashness of the driver had to be established but it need not be established in the case of no-fault liability. The consequence of the introduction of Chapter VIIA in the 1939 Act was to have the compensation paid irrespective of the fault of the opposite party. The Legislature fixed the amount of compensation at Rs. 15,000 under Section 92A.
8. In Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai [1987] ACJ 561 ; [1987] 62 Comp Cas 609, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed (at page 619) :
“From the point of view of the pedestrian, the roads of this country have been rendered by the use of the motor vehicles highly dangerous. ‘Hit and run’ cases where the drivers of the motor vehicles who have caused the accidents are not known are increasing in number. Where a pedestrian without negligence on his part is injured or killed by a motorist whether negligently or not, he or his legal representatives, as the case may
be should be entitled to recover damages if the principle of social justice should have any meaning at all. In order to meet, to some extent, the responsibility of the society for the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents, there has been a continuous agitation throughout the world to make the liability for damages arising out of motor vehicle accidents a liability without fault. In order to meet the above social demand, Chapter VIIA was introduced in the Act. … This part of the Act is clearly a departure from the usual common law principle that a claimant should establish negligence on the part of the owner or driver of the motor vehicle before claiming any compensation for the death or permanent disablement caused on account of a motor vehicle accident. To that extent, the substantive law of the country stands modified.”
9. Section 92A of the 1939 Act has been held to be applicable in regard to accidents which occurred prior to October 1, 1982, even though that section came into force only with effect from October 1, 1982. This question has been examined at length in T. Srinivasulu Reddy v. C. Goverdhana Naidu [1990] ACJ 66 (AP) and also in Dorakonda Venkatarama Seshachalapathi v. Vijayawada Co-operative Central Bank [1990] 2 ACJ 746 (AP).
10. When the Motor Vehicles Bill, 1987, which ultimately became the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, was introduced in Parliament, their Lordships of the Supreme Court took notice of some provisions of the Bill in M.K. Kunhimohammed v. P.A. Ahmedkutty [1987] ACJ 872 ; [1988] 64 Comp Cas 7 (SC). Their Lordships of the Supreme Court felt that some of the clauses contained in the Bill were not in tune with the falling value of currency and the inflationary trends. While expressing their concern, the Supreme Court observed (at page 17) :
“Having regard to the inflationary pressures and the consequent loss of purchasing power of the rupee, we feel that the amount of Rs. 15,000 and the amount of Rs. 7,500 in the above provisions appear to have become unrealistic. We, therefore, suggest that the limits of compensation in respect of death and in respect of permanent disablement, payable in the event of there being no proof of fault, should be raised adequately to meet the current situation.”
11. Apparently, Parliament gave due regard to these observations of the Supreme Court and, therefore, it has retained the provisions of section 92A in the form of Section 140, and has enhanced the amount of compensation from Rs. 15,000 to Rs. 25,000 in the cases of no-fault liability. The increase in the quantum of compensation has been brought about in order
to make it realistic. When the Bill was ultimately introduced in para 5 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons, it was specifically incorporated that the Bill seeks to provide for payment of enhanced compensation in cases of no fault and under “hit and run motor accidents”.
12. When Section 92A of the 1939 Act has been held to be retrospective, there is every reason to hold that Section 140 will also operate retrospectively and will apply to accidents which took place prior to the commencement of the 1988 Act. When Parliament has itself considered it appropriate to enhance the compensation from Rs. 15,000 to 25,000, there is absolutely no reason to deny the benefit of enhanced compensation to a claimant on the ground that the insurance policy which was in force at the time of commencement of this Act has been deemed to be continued for a period of four months or till the date of insurance, whichever is earlier. The object of Section 147(2) is only to continue the limited liability insurance policies for a certain period so that the insurance company may not escape from its liability to pay compensation. This provision was not intended to restrict the right of the claimant which has otherwise been conferred upon him by Parliament. The argument of learned counsel for the appellant completely overlooks Section 144 of the 1988 Act. Section 144 says that the provisions of this Chapter shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in any other provisions of this Act or of any other law for the time being in force. Parliament, therefore, clearly gave an overriding effect to the provisions of Chapter X including Section 140 of the 1988 Act. Therefore, Section 140 will prevail over any other provisions under the 1988 Act or under any other law. There is absolutely no reason or justification to curb or curtail the scope of the non obstante clause contained in Section 144. I am, therefore, clearly of the opinion that irrespective of the fact that the limited liability policy may remain in force for a period specified in the proviso to Section 147(2), so far as no-fault liability is concerned, the same will be governed by the provisions of Section 140 and the claimant will be entitled to compensation of Rs. 25,000 in case of death or permanent disablement of the victim.
13. The learned Tribunal has not committed any error in passing the impugned award warranting interference by this court. Hence the appeal fails and it is hereby dismissed.