ORDER
R.P. Sethi, J.
1. Arguments were heard regarding the maintainability of these petitions against the interim award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) in claim petition presented before it.
2. Section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) makes a provision that where the death or permanent disablement of any person results out of an accident, the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to pay compensation in respect of such death or disablement. According to Sub-Section (3) of Section 92-A of the Act, claimant is not required to plead or establish that the death or disablement in respect of which claim has been made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of owner or owners of the vehicle and such claim for compensation shall not be defeated by the reason of any wrongful act, neglect or default of person in respect of whose death the claim has been preferred nor shall the quantum of compensation recoverable in respect of such death or disablement be reduced on the basis of the share of such person in the responsibility of such death or permanent disablement. Section 92-B of the Act provides the right to claim such compensation in addition to any other right to claim compensation in respect thereof under any provision of the Act or of any other law for the time being in force. Section 93-E of the Act provides for overriding effect of the provision of Chapter VII-A notwithstanding anything in any other provision of the Act or for any law for the time being in force. Sections 92-A, 92-B, 92-C, 92-D & 92-E, were introduced in the Act by way of an amendment vide Act No. XLVII of 1982 which came into force on MO-1982. The legislature for the first time deemed it proper to make provision for directing the award of interim compensation to the claimants of the deceased or an injured.
3. A perusal of the aforesaid sections establishes that right to claim compensation under Section 92-A is in addition to other rights under the Act. It has been consistently held by various High Courts and this Court that the provisions of this Section have to be construed in such a manner so as to ensure that the object of the enactment meant for providing immediate assistance to the victims of the motor accidents or their legal heirs is efectively and expeditiously achieved. The appeals under the Act are maintainable against the final award passed in terms of Section 110-B of the Act and no provision has been made in the Act for filing an appeal against an interim award. There is no dispute to the legal proposition that an appeal is a statutory right which cannot be conferred upon a party unless special provision is made under law for filing such an appeal. A Division Bench of this Court while disposing of CIA No. 1 of 1987 titled Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. v. Maya Devi, refused to entertain the appeal holding the order passed under Section 92-A of the Act to be an interim order, not appealable. Similarly this Court dismissed CIMA No. 74 of 1986, holding:
“Section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, is a piece of beneficial legislation and while interpreting the same it is to be liberally construed. The object of the Section cannot be defeated on hyper technicalisation. In this case I find that since Sub-Section (1) of Section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for “joint and ‘several” liability, the appellant cannot be heard to make a grievance of the interim award made by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Jammu, particularly when it is not disputed that the claimant suffered a permanent disablement as a result of the accident in which the vehicle insured with the appellant was involved”.
In case of Oriental Fire & Genl. Insurance Co. v. N.D. Danial Stores, this Court held :
“The provisions of Section 92-A are meant on consideration of granting of an interim relief exgratia to the legal representatives of the deceased or to the claimant, as the case may be. This part of legislation being based on socio-economic conditions of the citizens is a beneficial’ part of the legislation, which is not made subject of appeal under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act. This Court in a Division Bench as well as in the single bench has held the view that an appeal is not entertainable against the interim relief granted under Section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act.”
Such a view was reiterated by this Court in case National Insurance Co. v. Gurmeet Singh and Janak Raj v. Union of India, CIMA No. 138/88.
4. The bar of filing an appeal against an interim award is equally applicable to the insurance company who, under the poicy of insurance is vicariously liable to compensate the insured, the owner of the vehicle. Mr. Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has referred to 1986 ACJ 202 : (1985 All U 1378), AIR 1985 Kant 171 and AIR 1986 Bom 280, to urge that an order passed under Section 92 of the Act was appealable. Such a plea already raised was considered and rejected by this Court while deciding CIMA No. 130/88, Janak Raj v. Union of India (supra) by holding:
“… In the aforesaid judgments no objection was taken regarding the maintainability of the appeal with respect to an interim order under Section 92-A of the Act. The Courts appear to have proceeded on the assumption that the orders under Section 92-A of the Act were appealable. The judgments cited by the learned counsel for the appellant are distinguishable and not applicable in the case. Otherwise also in view of the consistent view of this Court as referred hereinabove, it is held that an order passed under Section 92-A of the Act is not appealable…”
Faced with this position of law, Mr. Gupta has been fair enough to concede that even though the appeal against such an order is not maintainable, yet, this Court in exercise of the powers under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India read with Section 103 & 104 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, have ample power to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction for setting right the illegality committed by a tribunal while deciding a petition under Section 92-A of the Act.
5. So far as the applicability of Article 227 of the Federal Constitution is concerned, this Court has already held in Ghulam Rasool Wani v. Ghulan Mohd’ Wani, 1990 KLJ 73, that an authority or a tribunal under a particular enactment is not a civil Court and as such not amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. Similarly this Court in Executive Engineer v. Commissioner, Workmen’s Compensation, Civil Revision No. 104/88 decided on 3-11-1988, after referring to the provisions of Section 104 of the State Constitution and Article 227 of the Federal Constitution, as applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, came to the conclusion :
“Comparing the aforesaid two provisions it would be clear that the word “Tribunal” appearing in Article 227 of the Central Constitution is absent from Section 104 of the State Constitution which implies that the power of superintendent and the control of the High Court under Section 104 of the State Constitution are limited only to the Courts and not the Tribunals. The exclusion of the word, “TribunaF’is intentional and distinguishable from the provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution of India which are not invoked in the instant case…”
It was further held :
“The constitutional framers of the State even though aware of the existence of the word ‘tribunal’ in Article 227 of the Central Constitution omitted the same to be incorporated in Section 104 of the State Constitution with the object of providing protection to such tribunals and depriving this Court of having jurisdiction over them presumably keeping in view the object of the enactment which were sought to be achieved by such exclusion. The respondent No. 1 cannot be equated with a Court for the purposes of Section 104 of the Constitution of the State as has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In AIR 1950 Nag 14, a Division Bench of that Court after referring to and discussing a number of authorities cited came to the conclusion that the authority appointed under the Payment of Wages Act was not a civil Court. Similarly it was held in AIR 1979 MP 21 that the main distinction between the ‘Court’ and Tribunal’ was that a Court was a Tribunal constituted by the State as a part of the ordinary heirarchy of Courts, whereas a Tribunal was constituted under a special Act to exercise some special jurisdiction. It was further held that the Commissioner appointed under the Workmen’s Compensation Act was a Tribunal and not a civil Court. The provisions of Section 104 of the State Constitution have to be sparingly exercised and no party can be permitted to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under this Section as an appeal in disguise.”
In Smt. Gian Devi v. Sub Judge (CJM), Jammu, 1986 KLJ 307, this Court held :
“The jurisdiction under Section 104 of the State Constitution is not to be used as an appeal in disguise. It cannot be exercised to bring up an order of decision of the subordinate Court for re-hearing of an issue raised in the proceedings, when the statutory remedy available against the order of decision has neither been exhausted or allowed to lapse because of bar of limitation. Errors of fact or law which are committed by the subordinate Court, while acting within the bounds and limits of their jurisdiction and authority, can be scrutinized by the appellate or the revisional Court and the High Court cannot in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 104 of the State Constitution, convert itself into a Court of appeal or revision to correct such errors of law or fact allegedly committed by the subordinate Courts. The powers under Section 104 of the Constitution are not meant to come to the aid of a party who has chosen not to avail of the statutory remedy of appeal or revision within the period prescribed by the law of limitation. If the bar of limitation does not stare the petitioner, the High Court may even, in appropriate cases, direct that the petition may be treated as an appeal or revision subject to the payment of Court-fee etc., but it cannot show that indulgence after the period or revision has expired. A petition under Section 104 of the Constitution cannot be permitted to hood-wink law.”
In this view of the matter, the provisions of Article 227 of the Federal Constitution and Section 104 of the State Constitution, cannot be pressed into service for the grant of relief as prayed for by the petitioners in these petitions.
6. Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the remedy being discretionary the High Court can refuse to grant relief where there exists an alternate remedy equally efficaious and adequate. The remedy under Article 226 cannot be permitted to be availed of for the purposes of frustrating a welfare legislation or allowed to be an appeal in disguise. This Article is not intended to circumvent the statutory procedure. The petitioners have the remedy of challenging the quantum of compensation awarded as an interim relief when ultimately final award is passed against them and they decide to file an appeal against such an award under the Act. While dealing with he scope of Article 226 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court in Asst. Collector, Central Ex. v. Dunlop India Ltd., AIR 1985 SC 330, held (at page 332):
“……Article 226 is not meant to short circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. It is only where statutory remedies are entirely ill-suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations, as for instance, where the very vires of the statute is in question or where private or public wrongs are so inextricably mixed up and the prevention of public injury and the vindication of public justice require it that recourse may be had to Article 226 of the Constitution. But then the Court must have gpod and sufficient reason to by-pass the alternative remedy provided by statute. Surely matters involving the revenue where statutory remedies are available are not such matters. We can also take judicial notice of the fact that the vast majority of the petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution are filed solely for the purpose of obtaining interim orders and thereafter prolong the proceedings by one device or the other The practice certainly needs to be strongly discouraged”.
The High Court can refuse to entertain a petition under this Article where it is found that the peitioner had an alternate remedy, his conduct was such which did not deserve discretionary remedy to be provided, has misrepresented or suppressed material facts thus misleading the Court, disputed facts are required to be investigated, petition is premature, the writ even if issued would be futile or ineffective or of a mere academic interest or where the order of the Court cannot be carried out without prejudicing the rights of others, shall not interfere in the absence of special circumstances and would not enter into political as distinguished from a legal issue.
7. Testing these cases on the touchstone of the conditions referred to hereinabove, I am of the opinion that the petitioner-company could not be permitted to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for the purposes of depriving the claimants of motor accidents.
8. Upholding the preliminary objection, these petitions are directed to be dismissed. Interim relief granted shall stand vacated. The registry shall disburse the claim amount, if deposited, to the claimants as per directions given in the award by means of payee’s account cheques.
9. All the connected Civil Misc. Petitions shall stand dismissed.