JUDGMENT
Bhaskar Bhattacharya , J.
1. This Mandamus-Appeal is at the instance of a writ-petitioner and is directed against order dated 15th September, 2006, passed by a learned single Judge of this Court in the Writ Petition No. 1589 (W) of 2006, thereby vacating the interim order earlier granted by His Lordship.
2. The appellant before us filed the aforesaid writ-application thereby praying for quashing the demand of the respondent contained in a letter dated 28th April, 2006 for relinquishing possession of the acquired land, being Annexure P-12 to the writ-application and for restraining the respondents from erecting or installing any Toll-Plaza within the area of Matidhar Tea Estate belonging to the writ petitioner and from interfering with the possession of the writ-petitioner in the said tea-estate. The writ-petitioner further prayed for cancellation of the notifications dated 27th May, 2005 and 22nd November, 2005 issued under the National Highways Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) so far as the serial No. 5 thereof, relating to the tea-estate of the writ petitioner and for a direction upon the respondents not to take any step or further action on the basis of those notifications. The writ petitioner further prayed for an injunction restraining the respondent from interfering with its possession in the property mentioned in those notifications.
3. The case made out by the appellant in the writ-application was that from the beginning of the year 2005, the officers of the National Highways Authority were surveying the area where the tea-estate of the appellant is situated and the appellant got a vague information that the tea-estate of the appellant might be acquired for the purpose of extension of the National Highway No. 31. The appellant has admitted in the writ-application that its officers made representations to the National Highways Authority for not acquiring the tea-estate concerned and even suggested some alternative accommodation but the respondent paid deaf ear to those representations and ultimately, by a letter dated 28th April, 2006 demanded possession of the land in question on the allegation that the notices in terms of the provisions contained in the Act have already been published and other necessary formalities have been complied with. According to the appellant, there was no notification in terms of Section 3-A of the Act and at the same time, the essential formalities prescribed in the said section for publication of such notification in two local newspapers including one in vernacular had not been complied with, as a result, the appellant has been deprived of the opportunity of raising objection against the proposed acquisition. It is further alleged that even the officers of the State Government requested the National Highways Authority to revoke the acquisition-notice as would appear from the document annexed to the writ-application and as such, at this stage, the appellant contended, there was no question of handing over possession of the land in question in favour of the National Highways Authority.
4. After filing of the said writ application, the appellant before us, prayed for interim order in terms of prayer (f) and (g) of the writ-application after giving a notice to the respondent. None-appeared on behalf of the respondent in spite of notice and a learned single Judge of this Court granted such prayer till 15th September, 2006 with liberty to the writ petitioner to apply for extension of the said interim order upon fresh notice to the respondents. By the aforesaid prayer (e) and (f) of the writ-application, the appellant prayed for injunction restraining the respondent from taking possession of the property in question or from acting in furtherance of the purported notification dated 27th May, 2005 and also for stay of operation of such notification,
5. The National Highways Authority, the respondent herein, however, filed an application for variation of the said interim order alleging that all the requirements of the provisions contained in the Act had been complied with for the purpose of acquisition of the land and that the representation of the appellant opposing the acquisition of its land had been considered and found to be “not tenable”. The respondent, thus prayed for vacating the interim order which was standing in the way of implementing the scheme of widening of the National Highway No. 31.
6. Ultimately, His Lordship by the order impugned herein allowed such application thereby vacating the interim order earlier granted.
7. Being dissatisfied, the writ-petitioner has come up with the present mandamus-appeal.
8. Mr. Mitra, the learned senior advocate, appearing on behalf of the appellant has laboriously contended before us that the learned single Judge erred in law in vacating the interim order by totally overlooking the fact that the appellant had made a strong prima facie case to have an interim order till the disposal of the writ-application. According to Mr. Mitra, the National Highways Authority sought to take possession of the property of his client by not following the provisions contained in Sections 3-A, 3-D and 3-G of the Act.
9. According to Mr. Mitra, the notification issued under Section 3-A of the Act was utterly a vague one as it did not disclose the exact description of the land sought to be acquired. In addition to that deficiency of description, Mr. Mitra continues, the respondent authority did not publish the said notification in the two local newspapers including the one in vernacular as required under Section 3-A(3) of the Act. Mr. Mitra contends that for non-publication of the notification in the local newspapers, his client was deprived of the opportunity of raising objection against the proposed acquisition for want of knowledge of such notification. According to Mr. Mitra, if the notification in terms of Section 3-A of the Act is defective, the subsequent notification in terms of Section 3-D of the Act declaring vesting of the estate in the respondent is bound to fail for non-compliance of pre-requisite of issue of the latter notification. In support of such contention, Mr. Mitra refers to a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Competent Authority v, Barangore Jute Factory, .
10. Mr. Mitra further contends that there are huge amount of alternative vacant unproductive lands adjoining the land of the appellant mentioned in the purported notification and as such, it was the duty of the respondent authority to act fairly and to acquire those infertile lands’ instead of the land of the writ petitioner which is a precious one. Mr. Mitra submits that for the above reason, the officials of the State Government requested the respondent to withdraw the notification dated 27th May, 2005. Mr. Mitra, therefore, prays for setting aside the order impugned and extending the interim order earlier granted by the learned single Judge.
11. Mr. Bhattacharya, the learned senior advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent has vehemently opposed the aforesaid contentions advanced by Mr. Mitra and has contended that the learned single Judge in the facts of the present case rightly came to the conclusion that the appellant was not entitled to have extension of the earlier ex parte interim order having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case.
12. According to Mr. Bhattacharya, the notification under Section 3-A of the Act was given in three different newspapers including one in vernacular and pursuant to such publication, within the period fixed by the act for raising objection, the appellant approached the authority for recalling the decision of acquisition. Mr. Bhattacharya contends that one of the newspapers, namely, Hindustan Times, was published from Kolkata and at the same time, the other newspaper published in Bengali was also published from the said place. Mr. Bhattacharya submits that the term “local newspapers” mentioned in Section 3-A of the Act means newspapers which have circulations in the locality where the land sought to be acquired is situated. Mr. Bhattacharya, therefore, contends that there has been substantial compliance of the provisions contained in Section 3-A of the Act.
13. As regards the allegation that the notice was vague, Mr. Bhattacharya contends that the relevant statute does not require that the detailed description of the land sought to be acquired should be given in the notification but a brief description thereof would be sufficient. Mr, Bhattacharya further submits that in the notification, the plot numbers of the land of the writ petitioner proposed to be acquired were mentioned and it was further disclosed that the map showing actual position of the land would be available in the office of the respondent and that the persons interested were free to visit the office of the respondent for inspection. At any rate, according to Mr. Bhattacharya, the appellant having approached respondent authority for reconsideration of the acquisition within three weeks of the publication of the notification as required under the law, it is clear that the appellant was not at all misguided by the alleged insufficient description of the land proposed to be acquired. Mr. Bhattacharya further contends that for the interim order granted by this Court, the project of widening of the National Highway No. 31 has been seriously disrupted and as such, the interim order granted in this appeal should be immediately vacated after dismissing the appeal.
14. Therefore, the first question that arises for determination in this appeal is whether the notification dated 27th May, 2005 can be said to be insufficient for not giving detailed description of the land proposed to be acquired.
15. After going through the said notification, we find that the plot numbers of the land sought to be acquired have been mentioned therein but the exact location of the land has not been indicated. In our view, Mr. Bhattacharya was quite justified in contending that the notice having further disclosed that the exact location of the land proposed to be acquired would be available from the office of the respondent and that it was open for the inspection by all the interested persons, there was no just ground for branding the notification as invalid for want of sufficient description. It appears that in the section itself, all that has been mentioned is that there must be a “brief description” of the land and not the detailed description. The notification having described the plot numbers of the land and having invited the interested persons to visit the office for inspection of the map, we are of the view that there was sufficient compliance of the formalities mentioned in the said section. In the case of Competent Authority v. Barangore Jute Factory (supra), relied upon by Mr. Mitra, there was even no reference of any map for inspection by the interested persons for the purpose of locating the land acquired and for the above reason, the Supreme Court declared that the notification was bad for its vagueness. In paragraph 7 of the Judgment, the Supreme Court however, made the following observations:
The availability of a plan would have made all the differences. If there is a plan, the area under acquisition becomes identifiable immediately
16. In the case before us, in the notification itself, there being a reference of the plan which was open to inspection in the office of the respondent, the aforesaid decision cited by Mitra cannot have any application to the facts of the present case and it rather supports the contention of Mr. Bhattacharya. It is not the case of the appellant that no such plan was available for inspection in the office in spite of demand although referred to in the notification.
17. We, thus, find no substance in the first contention of Mr. Mitra.
18. The next question is whether there has been due publication of such notification in two local newspapers including one published in vernacular.
19. We have already pointed out that the newspaper, namely, Hindustan Times, was published from Kolkata and the other newspaper in vernacular, namely, Ganashakti, is also published from Kolkata. In our view, the term “local newspaper” used in Section 3-A does not mean that the newspaper concerned must be published from the same district where the land is situated. All that is necessary is that there must be circulation of the said newspaper in that locality. There are districts in India wherefrom no newspaper is published. If we accept the contention of the appellant that the local newspapers, mentioned in the Section 3-A of the Act, must be published from that very district where the land is situated, it will be impossible to acquire any land under the Act in those remote-districts and even if there is any newspaper published from a district, the same may not have sufficient circulation and even the people of the said district may not purchase those insignificant newspapers. Once it is established that the newspapers where the notification under the Act is published are circulated in the area where the land is situated, it should be presumed that there has been due compliance of Section 3-A by publishing the notification in the local newspaper. In the case before us, at least two of the newspapers are published from the capital of the State where the land is situated. In such circumstances, the onus was upon the appellant to show that there is no circulation of those newspapers in the said district. Moreover, it has been well established from the materials on record that on 13th June, 2005, i.e. well within the time fixed for raising objection against proposed acquisition, the appellant, in fact, approached the member (technical) of the respondent for reconsideration of the proposal of acquisition in writing. Therefore, the appellant cannot have any legitimate grievance before us that for non-publication of the notification in the two local newspapers, it has been prejudiced in any way, We, thus, find that the second point raised by Mr, Mitra, is equally devoid of any substance,
20. The next question is whether the objection raised by the appellant was considered by the respondent.
21. It appears from the materials placed before us that the experts of the respondent in the field found that the alternative proposal given by the appellant was not at all suitable. Although before us, in the supplementary affidavit affirmed by the appellant, some new proposals are given, we are of the view that in this type of a matter of public-interest, the project should not be unnecessarily interrupted simply because the appellant has come up with new proposal of alternative land which even does not belong to it long after the publication of the notification under Section 3-A of the Act. Moreover, in the matter of selection of the location for establishing a Toll-Plaza and for widening of the national highway, the sites selected by the experts should not be interfered by a writ-Court unless glaring absurdity or patent mala fide intention of the respondent is apparent from the face of the record. The appellant before us has failed to establish such a case in this matter. It appears that the decision of the Special Land Acquisition Officer dated 3rd February, 2006 for cancelling the earlier notifications under Sections 3-A and 3-D of the Act has not been approved by the National Highways Authority and there has been no publication of any notification withdrawing the earlier ones. Therefore, the order dated 3rd February, 2006 mentioned above is insignificant as the same has not been passed by the competent authority authorised to recall the notification under Section 3-A of the Act.
22. We, however, find substance in the contention of Mr. Mitra that even if there is a notice of acquisition in terms of Section 3-A and the consequential declaration of acquisition in accordance with Section 3-D of the Act. the possession of the land acquired can be taken only after complying with the provisions contained in Section 3-E of the Act which authorises the respondent to take possession only after determination of compensation in terms of Section 3-G and deposit of the same. Mr. Bhattacharya, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent fairly conceded before us that the amount of compensation has not yet been deposited in terms of the said section and the amount has also not been determined in view of the interim order granted by the writ court and subsequently, by this Court, In view of the aforesaid admitted fact, we find that the respondent authority illegally demanded possession of the land from the appellant by its letter 28th April. 2006. Annexure P-12 of the writ application, although the amount of compensation had not been determined and the amount had, accordingly, not been deposited at that time.
23. On consideration of the entire materials on record, we are of the opinion that this is a fit case where there should not be any interim order stalling the project of widening of the national highway by staying the operation of the notifications issued under Sections 3-A and 3-D of the Act on the basis of the writ application filed by the petitioner which failed to disclose strong prima facie case as regards the alleged deficiency of the notifications under Sections 3-A and 3-D of the Act nor could it prove any evil intention or irrationality in the decision of the proposed acquisition. However, we make it clear that, possession of the land should be taken only alter complying with the requirement of Section 3-E of the Act. We further make it clear that we have not gone into the question of determination of the amount of compensation for the land sought to be acquired and this order will nor stand in the way of the appellant In taking appropriate step in accordance with law if it is dissatisfied with the amount of compensation and alleges non-compliance of the provision contained in Section 3-E of the Act.
24. We, therefore, find no reason to interfere with the discretion exercised by the learned single Judge by vacating the interim order earlier granted by us subject to our clarifications mentioned above.
25. It is needless to mention that our observations made herein are all tentative for the purpose of disposal of this appeal and will not be binding upon the learned single Judge at the time of disposal of the writ application.
26. We, thus, affirm the order passed by the learned single Judge subject to the observation made herein and dispose of the appeal accordingly. In the facts and circumstances, there will be, however, no order as to costs. The Interim order granted earlier stands vacated.
