JUDGMENT
Samir Kumar Mookherjee, J.
1. The present Revisional application is directed against Order No. 60′ dated 3rd of July, 1992 passed by the learned Assistant District Judge, 9th Court, Alipore in Title Suit No. 84 of 1988. By the impugned order, the learned Assistant District Judge rejected an application, preferred on behalf of the Revisional petitioner, for stay of further proceedings in the connected suit.
2. The Title suit mentioned hereinabove is one for eviction of the Revisional petitioner, as a licensee, from the disputed property, though the defence of the Revisional petitioner, in the said suit, is based on claim of tenancy.
3. It appears that on several occasions this Hon’ble Court had to be moved in Revision, at different stages, of the said Title suit. The present Revisional application, as stated hereinabove, arises out of rejection of a prayer for stay made on behalf of the Revisional petitioner, the prayer for, stay is based, in its turn, on an order passed by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction in Case No. 293 of 1987 dated 10.2.1992. Admittedly, the petitioner has been declared as a sick industrial undertaking and there has been directions also in terms of Section 17(3) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 for enquiry into its working and for framing of a scheme for its rehabilitation. The Industrial Development Bank of India has been appointed to act as operating agency to prepare the said scheme.
4. The petitioner on or about 12th of August, 1991 made an application under Section 22(3) of the aforesaid Act, inter alia, praying for a declaration that any right, privilege, obligation, liability etc. should remain suspended and upon consideration of the said application, the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction by its above-mentioned order dated 10th of February, 1992 issued a declaration, which, it would be convenient for us, to quote here as follows :-
“……Since the BIFR is determining measures for revival of the sick company under Section 18 of the Act we are satisfied that the company needs protection under the Act so as to save considerable amount being incurred by the company on litigation, we are also satisfied about the reasonableness of the prayer of the company made in its. application dated 12.8.1991. (Therefore, in exercise of powers conferred on us by Section 22(3) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 we declare that the operation of all or any of the contracts, assurances of property agreements, settlements awards, standing orders or other instruments in force to which the sick Industrial Company is a party or which may be applicable to the Sick Industrial Company immediately before the date of this declaration shall remain suspended for a period of one year or till the finalisation of a rehabilitation scheme, whichever is earlier”.
We have not purposely quoted the entire order of the Board as we do not propose to express any view as to whether the manner in which the grounds made out by the petitioner had been dealt with by the Board, such order should have ended with a declaration, as prayed for by the petitioner and would have attracted the operation of Clause (a) of sub-section (4) of Section 22 of the said Act or not. In this context, before dealing with the contentions raised by the petitioner in course of hearing of he Revisional application regarding the propriety of the order passed by the trial Court, we would like to place it on record that the order of the trial Court discloses no effective ground or reason or which the prayer for refusal of stay can be sustained, but since as a Revisional Court we can test the propriety of the conclusion in the perspective of such grounds and reasons, after hearing the contesting parties, we have done so.
5. Section 22(3) of the aforesaid Act runs as follows :-
“During the period of consideration of any scheme under Section 18 or where any such scheme is sanctioned thereunder, for due implementation of the scheme, the Board may by order declare with respect to the sick industrial company concerned that the operation of all or any of the contracts assurances of property, agreements, settlements, awards, standing orders or other instruments in force, to which such sick industrial company immediately before the date of such order, shall remain suspended or that all or any of the rights, privileges, obligations and liabilities accruing or arising thereunder before the said date, shall remain suspended or shall be enforceable with such adaptations and in such manner as may be specified by the Board :
Provided that such declaration shall not be made for a period exceeding two years which may be extended by one year at a time so, however, that the total period shall not exceed seven years in the aggregate.”
6. A careful consideration and scrutiny of the aforesaid sub-section clearly indicate that the Board’s declaration may be two fold. In the first place it can declare that the operation of the transactions mentioned in the said first fold of sub-section (3) shall remain suspended. Such a declaration from its very language would be prospective and not retrospective. The second part of the said sub-section relates to rights, privileges, obligations and liabilities accruing or arising thereunder, remains by the term ‘thereunder’ transactions mentioned in the first fold of the said sub-section. In effect, the second fold of the declaration is retrospective. In other words, after declaration in terms of second fold, no proceeding or remedial measure can be initiated. It is to be noticed at this stage that the language of the second fold of the declaration under sub-section (3) has been so framed as to make it bear some nexus with the language mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (4) of Section 22 of the aforesaid Act, the relevant part of which may be quoted as hereunder :-
“Any remedy for the enforcement of any right, privilege, obligation and liability suspended or modified by such declaration, and all proceedings relating thereto pending before any court, tribunal, officer or other authority shall remain stayed or be continued subject to such declaration”.
7. On a reading of the second fold of sub-section (3) and clause (a) of sub-section (4) of Section 22 no doubt remains that the whole purpose of clause (a) is to impose an automatic stay of all existing proceedings for enforcement of the rights, privileges etc. mentioned in the second fold of sub-section (3). In other words, the suspension under second fold is intended to be comprehensive, covering both existing and contemplated proceedings.
8. It is also pertinent to note that clause (b) of sub-section (4) of the aforesaid Act provides for revival of such rights, privileges etc., as mentioned in the second fold of sub-section (3) after the declaration ceases to have effect as if the period of suspension was really a period of suspended animation.
9. In the instant case, considering the language to which declaration has been made in the context of the construction of the operation and the effect of sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 22 of the aforesaid Act, we have no hesitation in holding that the declaration by the Board did not result in automatic stay of any pending proceeding-the Title suit in the instant case, as the effect in terms of clause (a) of sub-section (4) of the Act is not attracted in view of the language of the declaration, as made by the Board.
10. In the result, we do not find any reason to interfere with the conclusion reached by the learned trial Judge in refusing the prayer for stay, though we have no hesitation in expressing that the reasonings and grounds have neither been clearly indicated nor have been happily expressed. The Revisional application, therefore, must fail and is dismissed, accordingly.
There will be no order as to costs.
Before parting with the case we feel it necessary to clarify that the instant order of ours would not prevent the petitioners from moving the Board, if they are so advised, and if so permissible in law for getting an appropriate declaration.
If any urgent certified copy of this order is applied for, the department is directed to deliver the same within ten days from the date of deposit of requisite stamps and folios.
A.K. Bhattacharji, J.
I agree.