JUDGMENT
Prakash Tatia, J.
1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. The plaintiff’s suit for eviction from the suit premises filed against the tenant-appellant was decreed by the Trial Court’s judgment and decree dated 6th Dec, 1995 on the ground of default in payment of rent. It will be worthwhile to mention here that plaintiff was given opportunity to deposit the arrears of rent by determining the rent under Section 13(4) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 but he did not deposit the rent before the Trial Court. Therefore, his defence against the eviction was struck off by the order of the court dated 16.2.1995. The Trial Court also held that defendant committed material alteration in the premises in dispute. Further, the Trial Court also held that defendant parted with the possession of the property and decreed the suit on the basis of the above grounds.
3. The defendant-tenant preferred appeal against the Trial Court’s decree dated 6th Dec, 1995, which was dismissed by the first appellate court vide judgment and decree dated 24th March, 2001.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently submitted that though the suit was originally filed in the competent court, but after the change in pecuniary jurisdictions of the courts by amendment in law, the plaintiff’s suit was wrongly transferred to the court of Addl. Civil Judge (Jr. Div.) as it could have been transferred to the court of the Civil Judge (Sr. Div.) only. According to learned counsel for the appellant when the suit was transferred to the court of Civil Judge (Jr. Div.), the issues were already framed and evidence of the plaintiff was already completed, therefore, appellant could not have raised objection before the Trial Court at that stage. The appellant after the decision of the Trial Court raised objection about the lack of jurisdiction of the Trial Court in hearing the suit of the plaintiff. The objection of the appellant-tenant was not accepted by the first appellate court and the first, appellate court after rejecting the said objection dismissed the appeal of the appellant on merit also. Therefore, appellant is aggrieved against the judgment and decree of the first appellate court.
5. According to learned counsel for the appellant, the decree is nullity as the Trial Court had no jurisdiction to hear the suit of the plaintiff and further submits that since the appellant had no opportunity to raise objection before the Trial Court as the stage of framing the issue has already gone before the order of transferring the case to the court of Civil Judge (Jr. Div.) and as per Sub-section (2) of Section 21 of the CPC, objection on the ground of lack of pecuniary jurisdiction can be raised upto the stage of framing issues only. Learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court delivered in the case of Kiran Singh and Ors. v. Paswan and Ors., AIR 1954 SC 340.
6. I considered the submissions of learned counsel for the appellant. As per Sub-section (2) of Section 21 itself it is clear that the objection about the pecuniary jurisdiction is required to be raised at the earliest possible opportunity and further the objector is required to prove that because of the trial of the suit by a court who had no pecuniary jurisdiction to hear the suit, caused the consequential failure of justice to the objector. In this case, the plaintiff did not submit any application under Sub-section (2) of Section 21 before the Trial Court when he appeared there in pursuance to the order of the transfer of the case to the Trial Court. 1 do not find any force in the submission of learned counsel for the appellant that appellant had no opportunity to raise objection as appellant already submitted written statement before the court of higher pecuniary jurisdiction. The appellant could have amended the written statement or could have submitted an objection by moving an application under Sub-section (2) of Section 21. Instead of doing so, the appellant participated in the proceedings and after getting the decree against him in a matter of eviction and where he was found guilty of not even paying the rent despite opportunity given by the court, raised the objection first-time before the appellate court, which would not have been entertained by the appellate court, which could not have been entertained by the appellate court in view of the bar under Sub-section (2) of Section 21 CPC itself. It is worthwhile to mention here that the first appellate court considered the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court delivered in the case of Koopilan Une’s daughter v. Koopilan Unee’s son Kuntalan Kutty dead by LRs and Ors., AIR 1981 (SC) 1683, and which is also followed in the judgment of this court delivered in the case of Smt. Mani v. Kishan Lal and Ors., AIR 1997 (Raj) 19, RLW 1996(2) Raj. 487. It is true that the decree, which is nullity and is sought to be executed against the party then objection about the nullity of the decree can be set up even at execution stage, but it has no application to the cases where there is an objection of lack of territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction only and not an objection of inherent lack of jurisdiction. In view of the decision given by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of The Koopilan Unee’s daughter (supra), I do not find any merit in this appeal on this count.
7. I do not find any force in the submission of learned counsel for the appellant that the question of showing prejudice or consequential failure of justice to the appellant is not required because trial of a suit by a court of lower pecuniary jurisdiction itself is a sufficient failure of justice to the appellant. I am unable to subscribe the view as advanced by learned counsel for the appellant in view of the language used in Sub-section (1) and Sub-section (2) of Section 21 of the CPC. All sort of the objections about the pecuniary jurisdiction in deciding the suit can be the ground to set aside the judgment and decree only upon showing the consequential failure of justice. Mere trial of a suit by a court of lower pecuniary jurisdiction (but otherwise competent to hear and decide the suit) itself is not a fact foundation for holding that it has caused prejudice or it caused failure of justice to any party.
8. Hence, I do not find any merit in this appeal and the same is hereby dismissed.