JUDGMENT
A.K. Patnaik, J.
1. In this application under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner, who is a practising Advocate of the Gauhati High Court, has challenged the notification dated 19.8.1992 insofar as it inserts a proviso after second paragraph in Rule 1 of Chapter V-A of the Rules of the Gauhati High Court that more than one Individual can jointly file a single writ petition if each such individual says separate court fees payable on such application.
2. The case made out in the writ petition is that under Schedule II of the Court Fees Act, 1870, as amended by the Court Fees (Assam Amendment) Act. 1972, a fixed court fee of Rs. 50 is payable on an application or petition presented to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Hence any rule requiring payment of court fees of more than Rs. 50 on a petition presented to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution would be ultravires the said provisions of the Court Fees Act. The aforesaid proviso to Rule 1 of Chapter V-A of the Rules of the Gauhati High Court sought to be inserted by the impugned notification dated 19.8.1992 requiring payment of court fees of Rs. 50 on a single petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and hence ultravires the aforesaid provision in Schedule II to the Court Fees Act, 1870 as amended by the Court Fees (Assam Amendment) Act, 1972.
3. At the hearing of this petition, Mr. N. Dhar, the petitioner argued that the power of the High Court under Article 225 of the Constitution to make rules has been made expressly subject to the provisions of not only the Constitution but also of any law of the appropriate legislature made by virtue of powers conferred on it by the Constitution. According to Mr. Dhar, since under the Constitution the State Legislature of Assam has the power to prescribe court fee that Is payable on a writ petition to be presented in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and since in exercise of the said power conferred on by the Constitution, the State Legislature has prescribed a court fee of Rs. 50 on a petition to be presented under. Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, in exercise of its rule making power under Article 225 of the Constitution, cannot make a rule which is contrary to the provisions of such a law made by the State Legislature. Mr. Dhar also argued that under Order 1 Rule 1 CPC several persons can be joined in one suit as plaintiffs where any right to relief in respect of, or arising out of, the same act or transaction or series of acts or transactions is alleged to exist in such persons, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative; and if such persons brought separate suits, any common question of law or fact would arises in such suit. Since the principles of CPC are also applicable to proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution, though not in letter but atleast in spirit, a writ petition field by several persons in certain circumstances cannot be thrown out by the High Court on the ground that court fee of Rs. 50 has not been paid in respect of each of several persons filing the writ petition. The impugned proviso in so far as it stipulates that separate court fee of Rs. 50 is to be paid in respect of each petitioner joining in a single writ petition is inconsistent with the principles of Order 1 Rule 1 CPC. Mr. Dhar also vehemently argued that In a writ petition field before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution a common grievance may be made by several petitioners that their fundamental rights have been violated and in such cases, the High Court which is obliged under the Constitution to enforce the fundamental rights, cannot insist on payment of separate court fees for each person on a joint petition filed by several persons complaining of such violation of their fundamental rights guaranteed under Part-Ill of the Constitution. Mr. Dhar argued that the Apex Court has ruled in several cases that the Court should not be technical and pedantic in its approach and in certain circumstances entertain also a letter by way of writ petition although no court fee is paid on such letters treated as writ petitions.
4. Mr. S.N. Bhuyan, learned Advocate General, Assam, however, argued that the proviso does not create any such hardship as is conceived by Mr. Dhar, rather it provides a relief to the litigant public in some cases. He explained that under the second paragraph of Rule 1 of Chapter V-A of the Rules of the Gauhati High Court, separate applications are to be filed for each individual where interests are not identical. Thus, where Interests are identical, no separate application is required to be filed and a single writ application will do in which case one set of court fee of Rs. 50 is payable on such a joint application, but where grievances of the individual in the writ petition are not identical separate applications are required to be filed even if there is a common order covering several cases. The proviso inserted by the impugned amendment to the rules carves out an exception and provides that even in cases where separate applications are required to be filed by several individuals whose interests are not identical a common application can also be filed if separate set of court fee of Rs. 50 for every individual Joining in the writ petition as petitioner is paid.
5. Mr. N.M. Lahiri, learned Advocate General for the State of Meghalaya, argued that though this Interpretation suggested by Mr. Bhuyan is the proper interpretation of the second paragraph of Rule 1 of Chapter V-A of the Rules of the Gauhati High Court and the proviso inserted by the Impugned amendment, there has been a lot of confusion in the Registry of the High Court, as a result of which, separate court fee has been Insisted upon in almost every case of writ petition in which several individuals have been joined as writ petitioner because of the proviso inserted by the impugned amendment. Mr. Lahiri stated that the purport of the proviso inserted by the impugned amendment was a beneficial one and aimed at permitting filing of a common writ application by several individuals where interest are not identical, provided separate court fees were payable for each individual. In such cases, the only additional burden was that additional court fees of Rs. 50 was payable for each individual joining in the writ petition but all other expenses of filing a separate writ petition and engaging separate set of counsel were saved for such an individuals. Mr. Lahiri further argued that court fees being a subject on which the legislature has the power to make law, the High Court in exercise of its rule making power under Article 225 of the Constitution cannot make a rule prescribing a court fee and this important constitutional limitation on the rule making power has to be kept in mind while construing the proviso introduced by the impugned amendment to the Rules of the Gauhati High Court,
6. We have no doubt in our mind that the power to make law with regard to court fee is that of the legislature and that the power of the High Court is only to make rules regulating its procedure and while exercising the rule making power, the High Court cannot encroach into the legislative field and prescribe a court fee that is payable on a petition presented to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Since under Schedule II to the Court Fees Act, 1870, as amended by the Court Fees (Assam Amendment) Act, 1972, the court fee that is payable on an application or petition presented to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is Rs. 50, the high court in exercise of its rule making power cannot make a rule so as to increase the said court fee payable on an application or petition presented to the High Court. It is settled principle of statutory interpretation that whenever a provisos of a statute is challenged as ultravires, an effort shall first be made by the Court to read down the impugned provision so as to make it intravires if it is so permissible. Where, however, the language of the impugned provision is such that it cannot be read so as to make it intravires and the only result of the interpretation of the language of the impugned provision is that it is ultravires, then of course the court will not be shy to declare the provision as ultravires.
7. Bearing in mind this important principle of interpretation we may now have a look at the provisions of Rule 1 of Chapter V-A of the Rules of the Gauhati High Court as it stood prior to the impugned amendment and as it now stands after the impugned amendment. Rule 1 of Chapter V-5 of the Rules of the Gauhati High Court as It existed prior to the impugned amendment Is extracted herein below:
“An application for direction or order or writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, other than writ of habeas corpus, shall be drawn us in the form contained in the schedule to this chapter and shall be accompanied by an affidavit verifying the facts relied upon.
Separate application should be filed for each individual where interests are not identical even if there is one common order covering several cases and the facts of each case should be separately supported by affidavit.”
By the impugned notification dated 19.8.1992, the following proviso was inserted after the second paragraph in Rule 1 of Chapter V-A quoted above.
“Provided that more than one such individual can jointly file a single writ petition on each of them paying court fee payable on such application”.
Prior to the impugned notification dated 19.8.1992 the second paragraph of Rule 1 of Chapter V-A of the Rules of the Gauhati High Court required that separate applications are to be filed for each individual where interests are not identical. Where interests were Identical, the said paragraph of the Rules did not require separate application to be filed and in such a case where interest are identical the principles of Order 1 Rule 1 CPC providing for joinder of plaintiffs in one suit applied in spirit if not in letter to writ petitions also. In such cases, therefore, where interests of the individuals filing the application are identical and the principles of Order 1 Rule 1 CPC applied, a common writ petition could be filed but no such common writ petition could be filed where the interests of the several individuals filing the writ petition were not identical.
8. It is settled principle of law that ordinarily the function of a proviso is to curve out an exception from the main provision and not to enact a general rules so as to enlarge the main provision itself. In Craies of Statutory Law, 7th Edition it has been stated that –
The effect of an excepting or qualifying proviso, according to the ordinary rules of construction, is to except out of the preceding portion of the enactment, or to qualify something enacted therein, which but for the proviso would be within it, and such a proviso cannot be construed as enlarging the scope of an enactment when it can be fairly and properly construed without attributing to it that effect.”
To similar effect are the observations of Hidyatullah, J. in Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills v. Subhash Chander Yograj, AIR 1961 SC 1596 that as a general rule, a proviso is added to an enactment to qualify or create an exception to what Is in the enactment, and ordinarily a proviso is not interpreted as stating a general rule. Similarly, in Commissioner of Income Tax, Mysore etc, v. The Indo Merential Bank Ltd. AIR 1959 SC 713, Kapur, J. held that the proper function of a proviso is that it qualifies the generality of the main enactment by providing an exception and taking out as it were, from the main enactment, a portion of which, but for the proviso would fall within the main enactment.
9. Thus, the proviso to second paragraph of Rule 1 of the Chapter V-A. of the Rules of the Gauhati High Court inserted by the impugned amendment cannot be interested to mean as making general rule that in every case when a single writ petition is filed by several individuals court fee will have to be paid by each such individual separately on the writ application. The said proviso has to be read only as an exception to the main enactment to which it is appended i.e. the second paragraph of Rule 1 of Chapter V-A. of the Rules of Gauhati High Court. Since the second paragraph does not provide for separate application to be filed by several individuals where interests are identical, the impugned proviso cannot enlarge the scope of the second paragraph of the said Rule 1 and provide that a single petition cannot be filed by several individuals even where interests are identical unless separate court fee is paid for each of the several individuals joining in the single writ petition. In our opinion, the impugned proviso only provides an exception from the general rule stated in the second paragraph of Rule 1 of Chapter V-A. of the Rules of the Gauhati High Court that separate applications five to be filed where interests are not identical and the exception is that a single application may also be filed by several individuals where interests are not identical provided separate court fee is paid for each such individual Joining in the single application. But we may hasten to add that even in such a case where a single application is sought to be filed by several individuals not having identical interests by paying separate set of court fees for each individual, the High Court can, consistent with the principles of Order 1 Rule 2 CPC, always insist on filing of the separate writ petition by each such individual where it deems fit.
10. On the view we have taken above there is no conflict at all between the proviso sought to be Inserted by the impugned notification dated 19.8.1992 and Schedule II to the Court Fees Act, 1890, as amended by the Court Fees (Assam Amendment) Act, 1972 and the principles of Order 1 Rule 1 CPC. It is only in those cases where the interests of the individuals joining in the writ petition are not identical and where the principles of Order 1 Rule 1 CPC are not applicable, i.e. where a single petition by several individuals is really not permissible under law, that separate set of court fee will be payable for each such individual joining in the single writ petition. On this interpretation given by us to the impugned proviso, it is not necessary for us to strike down the proviso inserted below the second paragraph of Rule 1 of Chapter V-A of the Rules of the Gauhati High Court under the impugned notification dated 19.8.1992 and the Registry of the High Court would keep in mind the observations made herein while requiring the petitioner to pay court fee on a writ application or petition presented to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
11. With the aforesaid observations, this writ petition is disposed of.
No costs.