* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ CRL.M.C. 2103/2011
% Judgment reserved on :11th July, 2011
Judgment delivered on:26th July, 2011
O.P. GOGNE ..... Petitioner
Through: Petitioner in person.
versus
STATE (NCT OF DELHI) & ORS ..... Respondents
Through: NEMO.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESH KAIT
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the
judgment? Yes.
2. To be referred to Reporter or not? Yes.
3. Whether the judgment should be reported
in the Digest? Yes.
SURESH KAIT, J.
1. The instant case has been filed under Section 482 of the Cr.PC
for setting aside the impugned judgment dated 20.04.2011 passed by
Addl. Sessions Judge(North), Delhi dismissing the Revision Petition
and for setting aside the order dated 05.07.2010 passed in Criminal
Complaint No.97/J/10 by the Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate
dismissing the complaint under Section 200 of the Cr.PC.
Crl.M.C.2103/2011 Page 1 of 25
2. The facts of the case in brief are that, on 08.01.2008
Respondent No. 2, who is the elder son of the Petitioner, told the
petitioner and his wife that he wanted to marry his first cousin, namely,
Minakshi. The petitioner and his wife both opposed the alliance since
Respondent No.3 is the daughter of the brother of the wife of
petitioner, therefore, both fall within the “degree of prohibited
relationship” as defined in clause (g) (iv) of Section 3 of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955.
3. After about six months, Respondent No. 2 again repeated the
same proposal. The petitioner was shocked that his own son had
betrayed his parents by expressing his intention to commit void act.
When all the efforts failed to dissuade his son from the intended
marriage with his first cousin and no care for the law despite he
himself being a judicial officer in Delhi. Therefore, the petitioner
having no other option has taken the legal course.
4. Accordingly, on 07.08.2009 a Civil Suit was filed seeking
permanent injunction against the Respondent No. 2 and 3 and against
the father and the mother of the Respondent No. 3 for restraining the
Respondents from performing the marriage between Respondent No.2
Crl.M.C.2103/2011 Page 2 of 25
and 3.
5. Vide order dated 17.08.2009, the Commercial Civil Judge,
South District, Delhi rejected the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(a) of the
CPC.
6. The petitioner challenged the order dated 17.08.2009 the
Commercial Civil Judge, South District, Delhi before the Addl. District
Judge whereby vide order dated 16.02.2010 the appeal was allowed by
setting aside the order of the learned trial court.
7. Accordingly, the petitioner appeared before the learned the
Commercial Civil Judge, South District, Delhi on 26.02.2010. The ld.
Trial court issued summons of the suit and notice of the application
under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 read with Section 151 of the CPC to
Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 and their co-defendants who are the parents
of the Respondent No. 3.
8. Since none appeared for the Respondent No. 2 and 3 and for
their co-defendants, all the defendants were proceeded ex-parte. On
hearing the petitioner on the application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2
read with Section 151 of the CPC, the learned Commercial Civil
Crl.M.C.2103/2011 Page 3 of 25
Judge, South District, Delhi allowed the application and passed an
order on 31.03.2010 which reads as under:-
“The defendant No.1 is hereby restrained from
marrying defendant No.2 and defendant Nos.3 & 4
are hereby restrained from marrying defendant
No.2 with defendant No.1 till the final disposal of
the suit.”
9. The story of the case took a turn from this point when the
petitioner learnt on 04.05.2010 that Respondent Nos. 2 & 3 had
solemnised their marriage in a church after converting their religion to
Christianity on 17.11.2009. They secured the marriage certificate from
the same date under Section 9.
10. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a complaint under Section 200
of the Cr.P.C. against the Respondent Nos. 2 & 3 which was dismissed
by ACMM (North) vide order dated 05.07.2010 holding that no
offence was made out; on the observation that:-
“Section 66. False Oath, declaration notice or
certificate for procuring marriage- Whoever, for the
purpose of procuring a marriage or license of
marriage intentionally:-
Where an oath or declaration is required by this
Crl.M.C.2103/2011 Page 4 of 25
Act, or by any rule or custom of a Church
according to the rites and ceremonies of which a
marriage is intended to be solemnized, such Church
being the Church of England or of Scotland or of
Rome, makes a false oath or declaration or,
a) Where a notice or certificate is required by this
Act, signs a false notice or certificate.
b) where a notice or certificate is required by this
Act, signs a false notice or certificate,
shall be deemed to have committed the offence
punishable u/s 193 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of
1860) with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to three years and, at the
discretion of the Court, with fine.”
11. As was alleged by the Petitioner/Complainant that both
the Respondent Nos. 2 & 3 had made false declarations and therefore,
they were deemed to have committed the offence punishable under
Section 193 IPC. The learned Trial Judge had put a query; As to how
cognizance of offence punishable under Section 193 IPC could be
taken without there being any complaint from the concerned
authorities? When the offence under Section 193 IPC is committed in a
Court, only then a complaint under Section 195 Cr.PC will be required
and not otherwise. There is no bar for taking cognizance if the said
Crl.M.C.2103/2011 Page 5 of 25
offence is committed at any other place. As the offence under Section
193 IPC is alleged to have been committed in a Church, bar of Section
195 Cr. P. C. is not applicable. The Trial Judge has perused the plaint
as a whole and assumed that all the allegations are correct, whether any
offence punishable under Section 193 IPC is disclosed or not on which,
cognizance can be taken?
12. The word „Christian‟ and the expression „Indian Christian‟
are defined under the said Act in Section 3 which is reproduced as:-
“the expression „Christian‟ means persons
professing the Christian religion;
and the expression „Indian Christian‟ includes the
Christian descendants of natives of Indian converted
to Christianity, as well as such converts.
S.6 and 9 on the said Act provide as under:
S.6 Grant and revocation of licenses to solemnize
marriage- The State Government, so far as regards
the territories under its administration, may, by
notification in the Official Gazette, grant licenses to
Ministers of Religion to solemnize marriages within
such territories and may, by a like notification,
revoke such licenses.
S.9 Licensing of persons to grant certificates of
Crl.M.C.2103/2011 Page 6 of 25
marriage between Indian Christians- The State
Government may grant a license to any Christian,
either by name or as holding any office for the time
being, authorising him to grant certificates or
marriage between Indian Christians. Any such
license may be revoked by the authority by which it
was granted, and every such grant or revocation
shall be notified in the Official Gazette.”
13. The Complainant argued before the Trial Judge that both
the Respondent Nos.2 & 3 had not come within the meaning of the
expression „Indian Christians‟ and therefore, declaration by both
respondents that their marriage would be solemnised under Section 6 &
9 of the said Act, was false.
14. Further submits that, the Complainant is a Hindu, his son
i.e. Respondent No.2 could not become Indian Christian, unless and
until Complainant himself converts to Christianity.
15. The Trial Judge has observed that no son can convert to
Christianity unless and until his father also converts so. Finding no
logic in this submission, in his considered view there was no such pre-
condition for converting into Christianity.
Crl.M.C.2103/2011 Page 7 of 25
16. Respondent Nos.2 & 3 were Baptised in Church and a
certificate was also issued to this effect. Thus, both the Respondent
Nos.2 & 3 are Christians after this Baptisation. The learned Trial
Judge was of the view that both were „Indian Christians‟ as well.
17. The learned Trial Judge as relied on their affidavits that
their marriage would be solemnised under Section 6 & 9 of the said
Act. Therefore, there was no falsity in declaring this fact. Even
Rev.Victor Thomas also did not consider the declaration as false and
he has not made any complaint in this respect.
18. The plea of the Complainant that both the Respondents
fall within the degree of prohibited relationship and thus, could not
marry with each other.
19. Keeping the aforesaid discussion into view the Trial Judge
came to the conclusion that no offence punishable under Section 193
IPC was disclosed from the complaint, even if all the allegations were
assumed to be correct.
20. The Complainant has relied upon the case of Harsh
Khurana Vs. Union of India & Anr : 121 (2005) DLT 301 (DB) and
Crl.M.C.2103/2011 Page 8 of 25
submits that his evidence would have been recorded under Section 200
Cr. P.C. However, learned Trial Judge was of the opinion that evidence
of the Complainant can be considered only if the cognizance was taken
and not otherwise. Since the Complainant had not disclosed any
offence, of which cognizance could be taken, there were no question of
examining the Complainant or his witnesses. Accordingly, the learned
Trial Judge has dismissed his complaint.
21. Being aggrieved by the order dated 05.07.2010 of Trial
Judge, Complainant preferred the revision before the Sessions Judge.
While considering the arguments of both the sides, learned Additional
Sessions Judge has observed that the Petitioner seeks to prosecute the
Respondents on the basis of their affidavits dated 17.11.2009, wherein
by Clause 7, they declared that their marriage will be solemnised in
accordance with under Section 6 & 9 of the Indian Christian Marriage
Act, 1872, by St.Thomas Baptist Church, Khyber Pass, Civil Lines,
Delhi-54.
22. According to the Petitioner, this declaration was false, to the
knowledge of the Respondents as they were not Indian Christians and
they had intentionally made such false declarations in order to procure
Crl.M.C.2103/2011 Page 9 of 25
their marriage licence. However, on the perusal of the marriage
certificate, it is evident that marriage between the Respondent Nos.2 &
3 was solemnised under Section 6 & 9 of the said Act as it has been
specifically mentioned therein. Therefore, the declaration to this
effect in the affidavits of the Respondents cannot be termed as “wrong
or false”.
23. Learned Additional Sessions Judge has dealt with the
issue that – Whether the Respondents are Indian Christians or not?
24. The definition of the Indian Christians as provided under
Section 3 of the Act is not exhaustive definition. The language itself
makes it clear that it is only an inclusive definition. Otherwise also,
the expression „Indian Christian‟ includes Christian descendants of
natives of India converted to Christianity as well as such converts.
25. The learned Additional Sessions Judge came to the
conclusion that any person of Indian origin, if converts to Christianity
would be Indian Christian. It was not in dispute that the Respondents
have converted to Christianity by getting themselves Baptised in the
Church before their marriage. Finding no logical interpretation of
expression „Indian Christian‟ that only Christians descendants by
Crl.M.C.2103/2011 Page 10 of 25
converts can be Indian Christian.
26. As per Section 66 of the Indian Christian Marriage Act,
1872 and Section 193 IPC provides prosecution of the person who
gives false oath, declaration, notice or certificate for the purpose of
procuring the marriage. In the present case, learned Additional
Sessions Judge did not find that clause 7 of the affidavits of the
Respondents was false declaration and hence, no ground are existed to
proceed with the complaint.
27. Accordingly, learned Trial Judge has come to the conclusion
while relaying upon the case of Santokh Singh Vs. Ijhar Hussain &
Another : (1973) 2, SCC 406 wherein it was decided that, the
prosecution has to be ordered by the Court only in larger interest and
administration of justice and not to gratify the feelings of personal
revenge or vindictiveness or to serve the ends of a private party. Too
frequent prosecution for such offences tend to defeat its very object. It
is only in glaring cases of deliberate falsehood where conviction is
highly likely that Court should direct prosecution. Finding no merit in
the revision petition filed by the Petitioner, the learned Additional
Sessions Judge upholds the order of ACMM and dismissed the revision
Crl.M.C.2103/2011 Page 11 of 25
by the order dated 20.04.2011.
28. Being aggrieved from the said judgment passed by the
learned Additional Sessions Judge on 20.04.2011, the Petitioner has
challenged the order dated 05.07.2010 passed by learned ACMM
(North) Delhi and the judgment passed by the learned Additional
Sessions Judge on 20.04.2011, has filed the instant petition.
29. I note that in para 5 of the instant petition, the Petitioner
has averred that he has been disgraced and his reputation harmed as he
has suffered mental agony and social ignominy on account of the
disgraceful and shameful act of the Respondent Nos.2 & 3.
30. Though, the Petitioner who is appearing in person has
drawn the attention of this Court to the order dated 31.03.2010 passed
by the learned Commercial Civil Judge: South District at Patiala House
Courts, New Delhi whereby the learned Trial Judge has restrained the
Defendant No.1 from marrying with the Defendant No.2 (therein) and
the Defendant Nos.3 & 4 were also restrained from marrying
Respondent No.3 with Respondent No.2 (herein) till the disposal of
that suit.
Crl.M.C.2103/2011 Page 12 of 25
31. I note that the date of the marriage is 17.11.2009, much
before the restrain order passed by the learned Commercial Civil
Judge, therefore, this order has no relevance while deciding the present
petition.
32. Petitioner has relied upon the case of Shivjee Singh Vs.
Nagendra Tiwary & Ors : 2010 (3) JCC 2238. The Petitioner has
raised the issue that on filing the complaint case, the Trial Judge was
bound to examine the complainant and witnesses as to see whether
there exists sufficient ground for proceedings against the accused.
Non-examination of the witnesses would vitiate the proceedings. In
para No.6 of the case, Shivjee Singh (supra) has observed that:-
“6. We have considered the respective submissions.
By its very nomenclature, Cr.P.C. is a compendium of
law relating to criminal procedure. The provisions
contained therein are required to be interpreted
keeping in view the well recognized rule of
construction that procedural prescriptions are meant
for doing substantial justice. If violation of the
procedural provision does not result in denial of fair
hearing or causes prejudice to the parties, the same
has to be treated as directory notwithstanding the use
of word `shall’. Chapter XIV of Cr.P.C. enumerates
Crl.M.C.2103/2011 Page 13 of 25
conditions for initiation of proceedings. Under Section
190, which forms part of the scheme of that chapter, a
Magistrate can take cognizance of any offence either
on receiving a complaint of facts which constitute an
offence or a police report of such facts or upon receipt
of information from any person other than a police
officer or upon his own knowledge, that such an
offence has been committed. Chapters XV and XVI
contain various procedural provisions which are
required to be followed by the Magistrate for taking
cognizance, issuing of process/summons, dismissal of
the complaint, supply of copies of documents and
statements to the accused and commitment of case to
the Court of Sessions when the offence is triable
exclusively by that Court. Sections 200, 202, 203,
204, 207, 208 and 209 Cr.P.C. which form part of
these chapters and which have bearing on the question
raised in this appeal read as under:
200. Examination of complainant.- A Magistrate
taking cognizance of an offence on complaint shall
examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses
present, if any, and the substance of such examination
shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by the
complainant and the witnesses, and also by the
Magistrate:
Provided that, when the complaint is made in writing,
the Magistrate need not examine the complainant and
the witnesses-
Crl.M.C.2103/2011 Page 14 of 25
(a) if a public servant acting or purporting to act in the
discharge of his official duties or a Court has made
the complaint; or
(b) if the Magistrate makes over the case for inquiry
or trial to another Magistrate under Section 192:
Provided further that if the Magistrate makes over the
case to another Magistrate under Section 192 after
examining the complainant and the witnesses, the
latter Magistrate need not re-examine them.
202. Postponement of issue of process.-(1) Any
Magistrate, on receipt of a complaint of an offence of
which he is authorised to take cognizance or which
has been made over to him under Section 192, may, if
he thinks fit, and shall, in a case where the accused is
residing at a place beyond the area in which he
exercises his jurisdiction postpone the issue of process
against the accused, and either inquire into the case
himself or direct an investigation to be made by a
police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit,
for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is
sufficient ground for proceeding:
Provided that no such direction for investigation shall
be made-
(a) where it appears to the Magistrate that the offence
complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of
Sessions; or
(b) where the complaint has not been made by a
Court, unless the complainant and the witnesses
present (if any) have been examined on oath under
Section 200.
(2) In an inquiry under Sub-section (1), the Magistrate
may, if he thinks fit, take evidence of witness on oath:
Crl.M.C.2103/2011 Page 15 of 25
Provided that if it appears to the Magistrate that the
offence complained of is triable exclusively by the
Court of Session, he shall call upon the complainant
to produce all his witnesses and examine them on
oath.
(3) If an investigation under Sub-section (1) is made
by a person not being a police officer, he shall have
for that investigation all the powers conferred by this
Code on an officer in charge of a police station except
the power to arrest without warrant.
203. Dismissal of complaint.- If, after considering
the statements on oath (if any) of the complainant and
of the witnesses and the result of the inquiry or
investigation (if any) under Section 202, the
Magistrate is of opinion that there is no sufficient
ground for proceeding, he shall dismiss the complaint,
and in every such case he shall record his reasons for
so doing.
204. Issue of process.- (1) If in the opinion of a
Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence there is
sufficient ground for proceeding, and the case appears
to be-
(a) a summons-case, he shall issue his summons for
the attendance of the accused, or
(b) a warrant-case, he may issue a warrant, or, if he
thinks fit, a summons, for causing the accused to be
brought or to appear at a certain time before such
Magistrate or (if he has no jurisdiction himself) some
other Magistrates having jurisdiction.
(2) No summons or warrant shall be issued against the
accused under Sub-section (1) until a list of the
prosecution witnesses has been filed.
Crl.M.C.2103/2011 Page 16 of 25
(3) In a proceeding instituted upon a complaint made
in writing, every summons or warrant issued under
Sub-section (1) shall be accompanied by a copy of
such complaint.
(4) When by any law for the time being in force any
process- fees or other fees are payable, no process
shall be issued until the fees are paid and, if such fees
are not paid within a reasonable time, the Magistrate
may dismiss the complaint.
(5) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect
the provisions of Section 87.
207. Supply to the accused of copy of police report
and other documents. – In any case where the
proceeding has been instituted on a police report, the
Magistrate shall without delay furnish to the accused,
free of cost, a copy of each of the following:
(i) the police report;
(ii) the first information report recorded under Section
154;
(iii) the statements recorded under Sub-section (3) of
Section 161 of all persons whom the prosecution
proposes to examine as its witnesses, excluding there
from any part in regard to which a request for such
exclusion has been made by the police officer under
Sub-section (6) of Section 173;
(iv) the confessions and statements, if any, recorded
under Section 164;
(v) any other document or relevant extract thereof
forwarded to the Magistrate with the police report
under Sub-section (5) of Section 173:
Crl.M.C.2103/2011 Page 17 of 25
Provided that the Magistrate may, after perusing any
such part of a statement as is referred to in Clause (iii)
and considering the reasons given by the police
officer for the request, direct that a copy of that part of
the statement or of such portion thereof as the
Magistrate thinks proper, shall be furnished to the
accused:
Provided further that if the Magistrate is satisfied that
any document referred to in Clause (v) is voluminous,
he shall, instead of furnishing the accused with a copy
thereof, direct that he will only be allowed to inspect
it either personally or through pleader in Court.
208. Supply of copies of statements and documents
to accused in other cases triable by Court of
Session.- Where, in a case instituted otherwise than
on a police report, it appears to the Magistrate issuing
process under Section 204 that the offence is triable
exclusively by the Court of Session, the Magistrate
shall without delay furnish to the accused, free of cost,
a copy of each of the following:
(i) the statements recorded under Section 200 or
Section 202, or all persons examined by the
Magistrate;
(ii) the statements and confessions, if any, recorded
under Section 161 or Section 164; (iii) any documents
produced before the Magistrate on which the
prosecution proposes to rely:
Provided that if the Magistrate is satisfied that any
such document is voluminous, he shall, instead of
furnishing the accused with a copy thereof, direct that
he will only be allowed to inspect it either personally
or through pleader in Court.
209. Commitment of case to Court of Session when
offence is triable exclusively by it.- When in a case
Crl.M.C.2103/2011 Page 18 of 25
instituted on a police report or otherwise, the accused
appears or is brought before the Magistrate and it
appears to the Magistrate that the offence is triable
exclusively by the Court of Session, he shall-
(a) commit, after complying with the provisions of
Section 207 or Section 208, as the case may be, the
case to the Court of Session, and subject to the
provisions of this Code relating to bail, remand the
accused to custody until such commitment has been
made;
(b) subject to the provisions of this Code relating to
bail, remand the accused to custody during, and until
the conclusion of, the trial;
(c) send to that Court the record of the case and the
documents and articles, if any, which are to be
produced in evidence;
(d) notify the Public Prosecutor of the commitment of
the case to the Court of Session.”
Section 202 (3) of Cr. P. C. is qualified by the word „his‟. This
implies that the Complainant is not bound to examine all the witnesses
named in the complaint or whose name is disclosed in response to the
order passed by the Magistrate. Vice-a-versa the Magistrate is also
required to inquire into the detailed discussions on the merits or de-
merits of the case. He has to see only whether there exists sufficient
ground for proceeding against the accused or not.
33. The Petitioner has referred another case of M/s.Morgan
Crl.M.C.2103/2011 Page 19 of 25
Tectronics (P) Ltd & Ors Vs. State & Anr: 2007 (1) JCC (NI) 69;
wherein in para No. 5, it has been observed that mandate of Section
200 Cr. P. C. was to be followed by the learned MM, which provides
compulsory examination of the complainant and the witnesses present,
if any, on oath and on the basis of the pre-summoning evidence, the
Magistrate has to be decide as to whether the cognizance of the offence
is to be taken and summons are to be issued to the accused persons or
not. Further observed that this is an unambiguous mandatory
procedure prescribed under Section 200 Cr. P.C. and has been so held
as well by catena of judgments, such as M/s.Gopi Nath & Sons Vs.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors : 1981 Crl. L J 175; Mohd. Abdul
Kadir Choudhury Vs. State of Assam & Anr. : 1989 Crl. L J 1888.
Same view was taken by this Court in a case of Ranbir Singh Kharab
Vs. Smt.Santosh: 2007 (1)JCC (NI) 65.
34. No doubt, under Section 202(3) of Criminal Procedure
Code, the magistrate is bound to examine the complainant and witness
before issuing summons. Simultaneously, the magistrate is also duty
bound to go through the complaint. If after going through the
complaint, the magistrate is of the opinion that no case is made-out
Crl.M.C.2103/2011 Page 20 of 25
from the complaint, then the magistrate, need not resort to the further
procedures, prescribed in the Code.
35. In the instant case, the magistrate, after going through the
complaint, was of the opinion that no offence is made-out. Therefore,
he has rejected the complaint.
36. Admittedly, marriage has taken place between the
Respondent Nos.2 & 3 in a Church on 17.11.2009 under Section 6 & 9
of the Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872. This marriage has not
been challenged either of the parties or the Bishop of the Church on the
ground that the declaration made in the affidavits before Church was
false.
37. The two Courts below have come to the conclusion that in
the complaint, no case is made out by the Petitioner and the Petitioner
has no locus in the present case.
38. On the issue of Locus, the Petitioner has referred to the
case of Manohar Lal Vs. Vinesh Anand : AIR 2001 SC 1820 and has
relied upon the para No.5 as has been observed by the Supreme Court
that to pursue an offender in the event of commission of an offence, is
Crl.M.C.2103/2011 Page 21 of 25
to sub-serve a social need. Society cannot afford to have a criminal
escape his liability since that would bring about a State of social
pollution, which is neither desired nor warranted and this is
irrespective of the concept of locus. Further observed that doctrine of
locus-standi is totally foreign to criminal jurisprudence.
39. No doubt, if any offence is committed in society, then the
doctrine of locus standi comes into existence, not in vice-versa.
40. Admittedly, Respondent No.2 is the son of the Petitioner
who is a Judicial Officer in Delhi Judicial Service. Both the
Respondent Nos.2 & 3 married on 17.11.2009 after converting to
Christianity. Since then, the Respondent Nos.2 & 3 are happily living
their married life.
41. The Petitioner herein felt great dishonour out of this
marriage and therefore, he is continuously dragging the aforesaid
couple and fighting with tooth and nail.
42. In my view, if the honour and reputation of the Petitioner
has been spoiled by this marriage, then his honour and reputation
would not come back by separating the couple. This type of thinking is
Crl.M.C.2103/2011 Page 22 of 25
spoiling the broad thinking of new generation and at times it leads to
honour-killing. If the Courts start supporting this type of Issues, it
would amount to support the „KHAP‟ dictat. The Courts are not meant
to gratify the feelings of personal revenge or vindictiveness or to serve
the ends of a private party.
43. According to Section 3 of the Christian Marriage Act,
1872;
“…… the expression „Christian‟ means
persons professing the Christian religion;
and the expression „Indian Christians‟ includes
the Christian descendants of native of India converted
to Christianity, as well as such converts ……”
Had this marriage being within the Hindus than this marriage would
have come under the sapindas relations which is prohibited under the
Hindu Marriage Act, which is not the position in this case.
Presumingly, this comes under the sapinda relations even then this
marriage would have been void and if any issue thereto which affects
any person, like the Petitioner, the position would have been different.
44. In my view, „Indian Christians‟ are those who being
Indian nationals converted to the religion of Christianity. The
Crl.M.C.2103/2011 Page 23 of 25
Respondents have rightly converted as per the Section 3 of the Act.
Therefore, after conversion into Christianity the marriage does not fall
under the „sapinda’ relationship. As such, the respondent No.2 has not
committed any offence, being Government servant.
45. There is no dispute as regards to the law in the cases
referred to by the Petitioners, but the crucial point involved in the
instant petition is that whether the Petitioner has any locus standi or
not, hence the judgments referred to by the Petitioner are of no help to
him.
46. Keeping the aforesaid discussion into view, I do not find
any locus standi of the Petitioner and any merit in the petition.
Further, there is no infirmity in the order dated 05.07.2010 passed by
the ACMM (North) Delhi and the judgment dated 20.04.2011 passed
by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, therefore, I am not inclined
to interfere with the aforesaid two verdicts given by two Courts below.
47. The petitioner has been judicial officer in Delhi, now legal
practitioner. He should have been more careful while indulging in such
type of frivolous case. Thus, he has unnecessarily wasted the time of
the Courts.
Crl.M.C.2103/2011 Page 24 of 25
48. Therefore, while dismissing the present Criminal M.C.
No.2103/2011, I impose a costs of ì.10,000/- to be paid by the
Petitioner in favour of the Advocates Welfare Fund, Bar Council of
Delhi.
49. The Registrar General of this Court shall ensure the
realisation of the above costs from the Petitioner.
SURESH KAIT, J
JULY 26, 2011
RS/Mk
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