PETITIONER: OIL & NATURAL GAS COMMISSION Vs. RESPONDENT: UTPAL KUMAR BASU DATE OF JUDGMENT23/06/1994 BENCH: AHMADI, A.M. (J) BENCH: AHMADI, A.M. (J) VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N.(CJ) JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J) CITATION: 1994 SCC (4) 711 JT 1994 (5) 1 1994 SCALE (3)90 ACT: HEADNOTE: JUDGMENT:
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
A.M. AHMADI, J.- The short question to which we propose to
limit ourselves in this appeal directed against the decision
rendered by Shyamal Kumar Sen, J. of the Calcutta High Court
on 17-12-1993 in Writ Petition No. 487 of 1993, is whether
any part of the cause of action for filing the petition had
arisen within the jurisdiction of the said High Court to
entitle it to entertain, hear and decide the said petition?
The factual background in which the question of territorial
jurisdiction arises may be noticed briefly.
2.The Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC), a Government of
India Undertaking, has a Gas Processing Plant at Hazira in
the State of Gujarat. Engineers India Limited (EIL) acting
as consultants for ONGC issued an advertisement dated 27-6-
1991 in the leading newspapers of the country including
those in circulation in West Bengal calling for tenders for
setting up of a Kerosene Recovery Processing Unit at the
Hazira Complex in Gujarat. According to the said
advertisement the tenders containing offers were to be
communicated to EIL at New Delhi. NICCO, having its
registered office in Calcutta, read and became aware of the
tender notice printed in the
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Times of India circulated within the jurisdiction of the
Calcutta High Court. The tenders were to be scrutinised by
a Tender Committee and the final decision was to be taken by
a Steering Committee at New Delhi presided over by the
Chairman of ONGC. NICCO, along with others, submitted their
offer or bid in response to the tender notice. All the bids
were scrutinised by EIL at New Delhi. NICCO’s bid was
rejected on the ground that it did not fulfil the requisite
experience criteria stipulated in the tender. The
recommendations made by the EIL were considered by the
Tender Committee. The Tender Committee, however, expressed
the view that NICCO satisfied the experience criteria and
they too should be called for the clarificatory meeting
proposed to be held by EIL at New Delhi. The said meeting
was held by the EIL with various bidders including NICCO
some time in July-August 1992. After the said meeting EIL
once again reiterated its earlier view that NICCO lacked the
experience criteria. The Tender Committee re-examined the
view of EIL and agreed with the same some time in October
1992. In view of the said development NICCO was not
recommended for shortlisting by the Tender Committee. NICCO
represented and their representations were considered by the
EIL as well as the Tender Committee but they saw no reason
to depart from their earlier view. The final decision was
taken by the Steering Committee on 27-1-1993 at New Delhi,
pursuant whereto it was decided to award the contract to M/s
CIMMCO Ltd. Thereupon NICCO filed the aforesaid writ
petition in the High Court of Calcutta. In the said writ
petition CIMMCO was not made a party. On the application of
CIMMCO this Court directed that it be joined in the appeal
as a co-respondent. NICCO prayed that ONGC be restrained
from awarding the contract to any other party and if awarded
to cancel the same. The High Court by its impugned order
dated 17-12-1993 directed as under:
“There will be an order directing the
respondents to consider the offer of the
petitioner along with the others and in the
event the petitioner’s offer is otherwise
found to be valid and lowest and in the event
petitioner otherwise complies with the
formalities, petitioner’s offer should be
accepted by the respondent authorities.
The writ petition is accordingly disposed of.”
All the parties to the writ petition were directed to act in
accordance with the signed copy of the aforesaid operative
part of the order. A detailed judgment giving reasons for
the aforesaid operative part of the order was later rendered
on 4-2-1994.
3.Aggrieved by the judgment and order of the High Court
in the aforesaid writ petition, ONGC moved this Court under
Article 136 of the Constitution of India. This Court by its
order dated 31-1-1994 granted an ad interim order for
maintenance of status quo. Thereafter on 25-2-1994 leave to
appeal was granted and the status quo order was continued.
As stated earlier by the said order CIMMCO was impleaded as
a party-respondent.
4.At the hearing of this appeal we indicated to counsel
that we would like to confine ourselves to the preliminary
objection of ONGC that the High Court of Calcutta had no
jurisdiction to entertain, hear and dispose of the
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writ petition in the manner it did as the averments in the
writ petition, even if assumed to be correct, did not
disclose that even a part of the cause of action for
institution of the said writ petition had arisen within the
jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. The writ
petitioners averred in paragraph 43 of the writ petition
that a part of the cause of action had arisen within the
jurisdiction of the said High Court as pleaded in paragraphs
5, 7, 18, 22 and 26 of the writ petition. They further
averred in the said paragraph that they were likely to
suffer a loss at its registered office within the
jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court if the contract was
not awarded to them. The averments in paragraphs 5, 7, 18,
22 and 26 in a nutshell are as under:
Para 5. NICCO came to know of the tender from
the publication in the Times of India ‘issued
and obtained’ by NICCO within the said
jurisdiction;
Para 7. NICCO issued/submitted its tender on
19-8-1991 from its registered office within
the Jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court
which was received by EIL at New Delhi;
Para 18. NICCO submitted its revised price
bid by letter dated 3-12-1992 issued from its
registered office within the aforesaid
jurisdiction;
Para 22. By communication dated 4-12-1992
issued from its registered office, NICCO made
demands for justice to various authorities;
and
Para 26. By letters addressed to different
agencies including the Steering Committee of
ONGC in January/February 1993 from its
registered office, NICCO made demands for
justice.
These are the averments in the body of the writ petition on
the basis whereof NICCO contended that a part of the cause
of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta
High Court. It may also be mentioned that in the course of
submissions before this Court counsel for NICCO referred to
a fax message dated 15-1-1993 sent in answer to NICCO’s fax
message dated 11-1-1993 on the basis of which he contended
that a part of the cause of action arose within the
jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court where the message
was received. Although in the paragraphs disclosing the
cause of action for the institution of the writ petition
reference is not made to this fax message, we propose to
deal with it to avoid technicalities. The question which,
therefore, arises for consideration is whether the aforesaid
averments made in the body of the writ petition taken
individually or collectively, assuming them to be true,
constitute a cause of action for the maintenance of the writ
petition in the High Court of Calcutta?
5.Clause (1) of Article 226 begins with a non obstante
clause notwithstanding anything in Article 32 – and provides
that every High Court shall have power “throughout the
territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction”,
to issue to any person or authority, including in
appropriate cases, any Government, “within those
territories” directions, orders or writs, for the
enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or
for any other purpose. Under clause (2) of Article 226 the
High Court may
717
exercise its power conferred by clause (1) if the cause of
action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territory
over which it exercises Jurisdiction, notwithstanding that
the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of
such person is not within those territories. On a plain
reading of the aforesaid two clauses of Article 226 of the
Constitution it becomes clear that a High Court can exercise
the power to issue directions, orders or writs for the
enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by
Part III of the Constitution or for any other purpose if the
cause of action, wholly or impart, had arisen within the
territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction,
notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority
or the residence of the person against whom the direction,
order or writ ‘is issued is not within the said territories.
In order to confer jurisdiction on the High Court of
Calcutta, NICCO must show that at least a part of the cause
of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of
that Court, That is at best its case in the writ petition.
6. It is well settled that the expression “cause of action”
means that bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove,
if traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in his favour by
the Court. In Chand Kour v. Partab Singh’ Lord Watson said:
“… the cause of action has no relation
whatever to the defence which may be set up
by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the
character of the relief prayed for by the
plaintiff. It refers entirely to the ground
set forth in the plaint as the cause of
action, or, in other words, to the media upon
which the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive
at a conclusion in his favour.”
Therefore, in determining the objection of lack of
territorial jurisdiction the court must take all the facts
pleaded in support of the cause of action into consideration
albeit without embarking upon an enquiry as to the
correctness or otherwise of the said facts. In other words
the question whether a High Court has territorial
jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be answered
on the basis of the averments made in the petition, the
truth or otherwise whereof being immaterial. To put it
differently, the question of territorial jurisdiction
must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition.
Therefore, the question whether in the instant case the
Calcutta High Court had jurisdiction to entertain and decide
the writ petition in question even on the facts alleged must
depend upon whether the averments made in paragraphs 5, 7,
18, 22, 26 and 43 are sufficient in law to establish that a
part of the cause of action had arisen within the
jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court.
7. The learned counsel for ONGC contended that on these
averments no part of the cause of action had arisen within
the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court and hence the
writ petition filed by NICCO and another was not
entertainable by that High Court. He submitted that ONGC
had decided to set up a Kerosene Recovery Processing Unit at
Hazira in Gujarat. EIL was appointed by ONGC as its
consultant. In that capacity, EIL issued the advertisement
from New Delhi calling for tenders and this advertisement
was
1 ILR (1889) 16 Cal 98,102: 15 IA 156
718
printed and published in all the leading newspapers of the
country including the Times of India in circulation in West
Bengal. The tenders or bids were to be forwarded to EIL at
New Delhi. EIL was expected to scrutinise the tenders and
make its recommendations to the Tender Committee constituted
by ONGC. The final decision was, however, to be taken by
the Steering Committee at New Delhi presided over by the
Chairman, ONGC. Accordingly, the tender of NICCO was
examined by EIL at New Delhi and it recommended its
rejection on the ground that NICCO did not satisfy the
experience criteria requisite for the grant of contract. On
the first occasion, the Tender Committee did not agree with
the said recommendation and directed the EIL to call NICCO
at the clarificatory meeting proposed to be held in New
Delhi. In obedience to the said direction, EIL invited
NICCO along with the other bidders, but once again
recommended its rejection on the ground that it did not
satisfy the experience criteria. The Tender Committee which
met in New Delhi reviewed its earlier decision and accepted
the recommendation of EIL which was also accepted by the
Steering Committee at New Delhi on 27-1-1993. It was at
this point of time that the decision to award the contract
to CIMMCO was taken at New Delhi. Counsel for ONGC,
therefore, contended that all these events took place
outside the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court and
merely because NICCO had read the advertisement in the Times
of India in circulation in West Bengal and had forwarded its
tender from its registered office in Calcutta and followed
it up by a revised offer, it cannot be said that any part of
the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of
the Calcutta High Court for the simple reason that if these
facts were to give a cause of action, every tenderer would
sue ONGC in the local court from where he forwarded the
tender and that would make ONGC run about from court to
court all over the country. Counsel further submitted that
nor can the fact that NLCCO sent representations including
fax messages from its registered office to ONGC at Calcutta
to which ONGC showed the courtesy of replying confer
jurisdiction. In support of this contention, he placed
strong reliance on the decision in State of Rajasthan v.
Swaika Properties2. Learned counsel for CIMMCO buttressed
these submissions by inviting our attention to certain other
decisions of this Court, namely, Election Commission v. Saka
Venkata Subba Rao3, R. Bejal v. Triveni Structurals Ltd .4,
Subodh Kumar Gupta v. Shrikant Gupta’ and certain decisions
of different High Courts. On the other hand, counsel for
NICCO, while reiterating that the averments made in
paragraphs 5, 7, 18, 22 and 26 constituted an integral part
of the cause of action, submitted that by the introduction
of clause (2) in Article 226 of the Constitution, the
Legislature intended,to widen the High Court’s Jurisdiction
and thereby extend its beneficent reach even to cases where
a part of the cause of action arose within its territorial
Jurisdiction. In the alternative, he submitted that even if
this Court comes to the conclusion that the High Court
2 (1985) 3 SCC 217
3 1953 SCR 1144: AIR 1953 SC 210
4 1987 Supp SCC 279
5 (1993) 4 SCC 1
719
of Calcutta lacked jurisdiction, this Court sitting in
appeal should not interfere with the verdict of the High
Court as ONGC had neither alleged nor showed that there had
been a failure of justice. In this connection, he placed
reliance on the spirit of Section 21 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. He, therefore, contended that this Court should
examine the appeal on merits and not confine itself to the
question of territorial jurisdiction. Lastly, he submitted
that on merits NICCO had made out a good case for the grant
of relief sought by it.
8.From the facts pleaded in the writ petition, it is
clear that NICCO invoked the jurisdiction of the Calcutta
High Court on the plea that a part of the cause of action
had arisen within its territorial jurisdiction. According
to NICCO, it became aware of the contract proposed to be
given by ONGC on reading the advertisement which appeared in
the Times of India at Calcutta. In response thereto, it
submitted its bid or tender from its Calcutta office and
revised the rates subsequently. When it learnt that it was
considered ineligible it sent representations, including fax
messages, to EIL, ONGC, etc., at New Delhi, demanding
justice. As stated earlier, the Steering Committee finally
rejected the offer of NICCO and awarded the contract to
CIMMCO at New Delhi on 27-1-1993. Therefore, broadly
speaking, NICCO claims that a part of the cause of action
arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court
because it became aware of the advertisement in Calcutta, it
submitted its bid or tender from Calcutta and made
representations demanding justice from Calcutta on learning
about the rejection of its offer. The advertisement itself
mentioned that the tenders should be submitted to EIL at New
Delhi; that those would be scrutinised at New Delhi and that
a final decision whether or not to award the contract to the
tenderer would be taken at New Delhi. Of course, the
execution of the contract work was to be carried out at
Hazira in Gujarat. Therefore, merely because it read the
advertisement at Calcutta and submitted the offer from
Calcutta and made representations from Calcutta would not,
in our opinion, constitute facts forming an integral part of
the cause of action. So also the mere fact that it sent fax
messages from Calcutta and received a reply thereto at
Calcutta would not constitute an integral part of the cause
of action. Besides the fax message of 15-1-1993, cannot be
construed as conveying rejection of the offer as that fact
occurred on 27-1-1993. We are, therefore, of the opinion
that even if the averments in the writ petition are taken as
true, it cannot be said that a part of the cause of action
arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court.
9.In Subodh Kumar Gupta case5, the facts revealed that he
had instituted a suit in the Court of Senior Judge,
Chandigarh, for dissolution of the firm in which he as
partner had 20% share along with his father, brothers and
one another. The head office of the firm was situate in
Bombay where the firm was registered with the Registrar of
Firms. Its factory was situate at Mandsaur where the father
Rajaram Gupta lived with his sons and attended to the
partnership business. The plaintiff-petitioner was also
residing in Mandsaur till 1974 when he shifted to
Chandigarh. He, however, visited Mandsaur often in
connection with the business of the firm. The case
720
pleaded by him was that after he shifted to Chandigarh, he
used to call for and received the statements of accounts of
the business carried on at Mandsaur. He had got letterheads
printed indicating that the branch office of the firm was at
Chandigarh and he claimed that he also booked orders for the
firm at Chandigarh. It was also pleaded that certain
disputes had arisen regarding the management of the
partnership firm and in regard to the correctness of the
accounts which were discussed at the meeting in Bhilai at
the end whereof an agreement was drawn up for the
dissolution of the partnership and for distribution of
assets amongst the partners to which the plaintiff was a
signatory. The suit filed in the Chandigarh court was
resisted on the preliminary contention that no part of the
cause of action had arisen at Chandigarh and therefore that
court had no jurisdiction. The Chandigarh court upheld the
contention and this Court affirmed the said view. While
dealing with the averment that the plaintiff was carrying on
business of the firm from Chandigarh where the branch office
of the firm was situate, this Court held that there is no
averment that the branch at Chandigarh was started with the
consent of the other partners and intimation thereof was
given to the Registrar of Firms as required by Section 61 of
the Partnership Act; the mere printing of stationery was
neither here nor there and therefore no part of the cause of
action could be said to have arisen within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Chandigarh court.
10. The submission of the learned counsel for NICCO was
that clause (2) was introduced in Article 226 of the
Constitution to enlarge the scope of the writ jurisdiction
of the High Court. The Supreme Court in Saka Venkata Subba
Rao case3 while interpreting Article 226 as it then stood
observed as under:
“The rule that cause of action attracts
Jurisdiction in suits is based on statutory
enactment and cannot apply to writs issuable
under Article 226 which makes no reference to
any cause of action or where it arises but
insists on the presence of the person or
authority ‘within the territories’ in relation
to which the High Court exercises
jurisdiction.”
Thus, this Court ruled that in the absence of a specific
provision in Article 226 on the lines of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the High Court cannot exercise jurisdiction on
the plea that the whole or part of the cause of action had
arisen within its jurisdiction. This view was followed in
subsequent cases. The consequence was that only the High
Court of Punjab could exercise jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution against the Union of India and other
bodies located in Delhi. To remedy this situation, clause
(1-A) was inserted by the 15th Amendment Act, 1963, to
confer on the High Courts jurisdiction to entertain a
petition under Article 226 against the Union of India or any
other body or authority located in Delhi if the cause of
action has arisen, wholly or in part, within its
Jurisdiction. Clause (1-A) was later renumbered as clause
(2) of Article 226. Therefore, the learned counsel for
NICCO is right that this amendment was introduced to
supersede the view taken by this Court in the aforesaid
case. But as stated earlier, on a plain reading of clause
(2) of Article 226, it is clear that the power conferred by
721
clause (1) can be exercised by the High Court provided the
cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within its
territorial limits.
11.Strong reliance was placed on the decision of this
Court in the State of Rajasthan case2 by the learned counsel
for ONGC. The facts of that case reveal that the
respondent-company having its registered office at Calcutta
owned a large chunk of land on the outskirts of Jaipur. The
Special Officer, Town Planning Department, Jaipur, at the
instance of the Improvement Trust, Jaipur issued a notice
intimating that the State Government proposed to acquire a
large part of the said parcel of land for a public purpose,
namely, implementation of a development scheme. The said
notice was duly served on the respondents at their Calcutta
office. The respondents thereafter participated in the
inquiry and contended that they proposed to use the land for
constructing a three star hotel. The Special Officer,
however, felt that the alleged need of the respondents was
just a pretence and the land was not needed bona fide by
them, but the real object was to get the land released from
acquisition. Consequently, the requisite final notification
for the acquisition of the land was issued. Thereafter an
attempt was made to seek exemption in regard to the notified
land under Section 20 of the Urban Lands (Ceiling and
Regulation) Act, 1976, but in vain. Having failed to get
the 1-and released from acquisition, the respondents filed a
writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the
High Court of Calcutta challenging the acquisition wherein
rule nisi was issued and an ad interim ex parte prohibitory
order was granted restraining taking of possession of the
acquired land, etc. The question which arose for
consideration in the backdrop of the said facts was whether
the High Court of Calcutta had jurisdiction to entertain the
petition and grant ex parte ad interim relief. This Court
observed that upon the said facts, the cause of action
neither wholly nor in part arose within the territorial
limits of the Calcutta High Court and therefore the learned
Judge had no jurisdiction to issue rule nisi or to grant the
ad interim ex parte prohibitory order. After extracting the
definition of the expression “cause of action” from Mulla’s
Code of Civil Procedure, this Court observed as under: (SCC
p. 223, para 8)
“The mere service of notice under Section
52(2) of the Act on the respondents at their
registered office at 18-B, Brabourne Road,
Calcutta i.e. within the territorial limits of
the State of West Bengal, could not give rise
to a cause of action within that territory
unless the service of such notice was an
integral part of the cause of action. The
entire cause of action culminating in the
acquisition of the land under Section 52(1) of
the Act arose within the State of Rajasthan
i.e. within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Rajasthan High Court at the Jaipur Bench.”
12.Pointing out that after the issuance of the
notification by the State Government under Section 52(1) of
the Act, the notified land became vested in the State
Government free from all encumbrances and hence it was not
necessary for the respondents to plead the service of notice
under Section 52(2) for the grant of an appropriate
direction or order under Article 226 for quashing the
notification acquiring the land. This Court, therefore,
held that
722
no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction
of the Calcutta High Court. This Court deeply regretted and
deprecated the practice prevalent in the High Court of
exercising jurisdiction and passing interlocutory orders in
matters where it lacked territorial jurisdiction.
Notwithstanding the strong observations made by this Court
in the aforesaid decision and in the earlier decisions
referred to therein, we are distressed that the High Court
of Calcutta persists in exercising jurisdiction even in
cases where no part of the cause of action arose within its
territorial jurisdiction. It is indeed a great pity that
one of the premier High Courts of the country should appear
to have developed a tendency to assume jurisdiction on the
sole ground that the petitioner before it resides in or
carries on business from a registered office in the State of
West Bengal. We feel all the more pained that
notwithstanding the observations of Court made time and
again, some of the learned Judges continue to betray that
tendency. Only recently while disposing of appeals arising
out of SLP Nos. 10065-66 of 1993, Aligarh Muslim University
v, Vina.v Engineering Enterprises (P) Ltd.6, this Court
observed:
“We are surprised, not a little, that the High
Court of Calcutta should have exercised
jurisdiction in a case where it had absolutely
no jurisdiction.”
In that case, the contract in question was executed at
Aligarh, the construction work was to be carried out at
Aligarh, the contracts provided that in the event of dispute
the Aligarh court alone will have jurisdiction, the
arbitrator was appointed at Aligarh and was to function at
Aligarh and yet merely because the respondent was a
Calcutta-based firm, it instituted proceedings in the
Calcutta High Court and the High Court exercised
jurisdiction where it had none whatsoever. It must be
remembered that the image and prestige of a court depends on
how the members of that institution conduct themselves. If
an impression gains ground that even in cases which fall
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court, certain
members of the court would be willing to exercise
jurisdiction on the plea that some event, however trivial
and unconnected with the cause of action had occurred within
the jurisdiction of the said court, litigants would seek to
abuse the process by carrying the cause before such members
giving rise to avoidable suspicion. That would lower the
dignity of the institution and put the entire system to
ridicule. We are greatly pained to say so but if we do not
strongly deprecate the growing tendency we will, we are
afraid, be failing in our duty to the institution and the
system of administration of Justice. We do hope that we
will not have another occasion to deal with such a
situation.
13.The submission of the learned counsel for NICCO based
on Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure that even if
this Court comes to the conclusion that the High Court of
Calcutta had no jurisdiction, this Court should, in the
absence of proof of prejudice, refuse to interfere with the
decision of the High Court unless it is otherwise found to
be erroneous.
6 (1994)4SCC 710
723
While the spirit of Section 21 of the Code of Civil
Procedure may support such a submission, we are afraid, the
discretion cannot be used in favour of a party which
deliberately invokes the jurisdiction of a court which has
no jurisdiction whatsoever for ulterior motives. That would
only encourage such type of litigation. The object
underlying the provision in Section 21 is not to encourage
such litigants but to avoid harassment to litigants who had
bona fide and in good faith commenced proceedings in a court
which is later found to be wanting in jurisdiction. In the
instant case, we are convinced, beyond doubt, that NICCO did
not act bona fide in moving the Calcutta High Court and,
therefore, the submission based on Section 21 must fail.
14.Before we part we must clarify that we have confined
ourselves to deciding whether on the averments made in the
petition any part of the cause of action is shown to have
arisen within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court.
Even if we had come to the conclusion that the averments
disclosed that a part of the cause of action had arisen
within the jurisdiction of the said Court and therefore the
petition could be entertained by that Court, it would still
have been open for the opposite party to dispute the said
averments and if the opposite party were to succeed in
showing that the averments were not true and correct, the
petition, though entertained, would fail for want of
jurisdiction.
15.In the result, we allow this appeal, set aside the
order of the High Court and direct that the writ petition
will stand disposed of for want of jurisdiction. Since we
are satisfied that NICCO had not invoked the jurisdiction of
the Calcutta High Court bona fide, we think that this is a
fit case for granting exemplary costs to ensure that such
abuse of the Court’s jurisdiction does not take place in
future. We, therefore, direct NICCO to pay Rs 50,000 by way
of costs.
724