JUDGMENT
Satish Kumar Mittal, J.
1. The petitioners, who are sons of Asa Nand Dhingra, the defendant (respondent No. 2 herein) in the suit for specific performance filed by respondent No. 1 Rajni Gupta, have filed this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, for setting aside the order dated 18.10.2006, passed by Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Faridabad, whereby their application for impleading them as defendants in the above suit, has been dismissed.
2.Respondent No. 1-plaintiff filed a suit for possession by way of specific performance of agreement to sell dated 15.10.2004 in respect of a portion of plot No. 5-R-1/B N.I.T. Faridabad. When the said suit was fixed for evidence of the plaintiff, the petitioner filed application under Order 1 Rule 10 C.P.C. for impleading them as defendants, In the application, it has been averred that the suit property is the Joint Hindu Family property, in which the petitioners and defendant Asa Nand Dhingra are the coparceners. It is alleged that Asa Nand Dhirigra is having only 1/7th share in the suit property. Therefore, he was not competent to enter into the alleged agreement of sale in respect of the suit property more than his share. It is further alleged that Asa Nand Dhingra being Karta of the Joint Hindu Family has no right to alienate the suit property to the plaintiff without their being any legal necessity. With these averments, a prayer has been made that the petitioners may be impleaded as defendants as they are the necessary parties.
The said application has been dismissed by the trial Court while holding that in a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell in respect of the joint property, a co-owner is not necessary party. It has been further observed that strangers to the contract making a claim adverse to the title of the vendor-defendant contending that they are co-owners of the contracted property, are neither necessary nor proper party. Therefore, they are not entitled to be joined as party to the suit. The trial court, while dismissing the application of the petitioner on the aforesaid grounds, has relied upon a Full Bench decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Panne Khushali and Anr. v. Jeewanlal Mathoo Khatik and Anr. , a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Krishan Lal and Ors. v. Tek Chand and Ors. A.I.R. 1987 Punjab and Haryana 1987 and judgment of the Supreme Court in Kasturi v. Jyyamperumal and Ors. .
3. Learned Counsel for the petitioners, while relying upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Mohamed Asgar Mohamed Mazhar and Anr. v. Arvind Raghunath Satwant and Anr. J.T. 2001 (5) S.C. 563, submits that in a suit for specific performance of sale agreement entered into by Karta of HUF, other coparceners are the necessary party. In the instant case, it is the contention of the petitioners that the suit property is Joint Hindu Family property, in which they are also coparceners, and Asa Nand Dhingra, who has entered into agreement to sell has no right to sell the Joint Hindu Family property being Karta of the HUF without there being any legal necessity. Therefore, the impugned order, passed by the trial court, is illegal and liable to be set aside.
4. After hearing counsel for the petitioners as well as counsel for the caveator-respondent No. 1, I do not find any merit in the instant petition. It is well settled law, as has been held by the Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Panne Khushali’s case (supra) that in a suit for specific performance of agreement to sell, strangers to the agreement making a claim adverse to the title of vendor-defendant contending that they are the co-owners of the contracted property are neither necessary nor proper party. The decision of the Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court has been approved by the Supreme Court in Kasiuri’s case (supra), wherein it has been held that in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale, a person claiming adverse to the claim of a vendor is not a necessary party. In the said judgment, the question of impleading such person has also been examined in view of Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act, which provides relief against the parties and persons claiming under them by subsequent title. In this regard, the Supreme Court has observed as under:
8. We have carefully considered Sub-sections (a) to (e) of Section 19 of the Act. From a careful examination of the aforesaid provisions of Sub-sections (a) to (e) of the Specific Relief Act we are of the view that the persons seeking addition in the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale who were not claiming under the vendor but they were claiming adverse to the title of the vendor do not fall in any of the categories enumerated in Sub-sections (a) to (e) of Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act.
It has been further held that a stranger to the contract even is not a proper party. In this regard, it has been observed that the question that is to decided in a suit for specific performance of the contract for sale is to the enforceability of the contract entered into between the parties to the contract. If the person seeking addition is added in such a suit, the scope of the suit for specific performance would be enlarged and it would be practically converted into a suit for title. Therefore, for effective adjudication of the controversies involved in the suit, presence of such parties cannot be said to be necessary at all. Even in Krishan Lai’s case (supra), a Division Bench of this Court has held that in a suit for specific performance of a contract of sale, a person, who is not party to agreement to sell and is claiming to be joint owner of the suit property, is not entitled to be impleaded as defendant, as he is neither necessary nor proper party. The judgment cited by learned Counsel for the petitioners is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. In the said judgment, the relief of specific performance was declined in a suit for specific performance filed against the Karta of the HUF, who entered into agreement without making the other coparcener as party to the suit. In that judgment, it was not the controversy that a stranger to the contract was making a claim adverse to the title of the vendor-defendant contending that he is co-owner of the contracted property. It is also well settled, as has been held by a Division Bench of this Court in Jujhar Singh v. Giani Talok Singh 1986 P.L.J. 346, that no injunction can be granted to a coparcener for restraining the Karta of the Joint Hindu Family property from alienating the coparcenary property. The coparcener has right only to challenge the alienation after execution of the sale deed by the Karta, on the ground that alienation was not for legal necessity or for the benefit of the estate.
5. In view of the aforesaid legal position, I do not find any illegality or perversity in the impugned order passed by the trial Court.
6. Dismissed.