JUDGMENT
Ashutosh Mohunta, J.
1. The petitioners have filed this petition for quashment of the notification under sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 date 15th November, 1984 and 6th November, 1985, respectively, vide which
the property measuring 8.09 standard acres, known as ‘Jubilee Hotel’, situated at Jaland-har Cantt., had been acquired for the purpose of construction of accommodation for troops to accommodate the married officers at Jalandar Cantt.
2. Briefly, the facts of the case are that the aforesaid property was requisitioned by the District Magistrate, Jalandhar, who was the competent authority under the Defence of India Act, 1962 for the accommodation of married Military Officers, vide order dated 9th May, 1963 (Annexure P.I). Vide order dated 29th June, 1964 it was held by the District Magistrate that the maintenance and the ordinary repairs would be carried out by the concerned authority, for which a sum of Rs. 3318/- per annum was fixed as maintenance and repair charges. The said amount was to be deducted out of the annual compensation payable to the petitioners. The concerned authorities allegedly failed to carry out the repairs and maintenance and, thus, a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- accumulated for the said purpose. The Requisitioning and Acquisitioning of Immovable Property Act, 1952 (for short ‘the RAIP’) was amended in August, 1968 and section 25 was inserted therein, whereby the earlier requisitioned properties under the Defence of India Act, 1962 was to be deemed to have been requisitioned under the RAIP. On 12th November, 1976 respondent No. 1 (Competent Authority) issued notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for acquisition of the property in question. After that notification under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was also issued. The said notifications were challenged in CWP No.2503 of 1977 and were quashed by this Court vide judgment dated 20th July, 1983. Petitioner No. 1 then filed an application before the Competent Authority (District Magistrate) for the release of the property from requisition. It was pleaded that in case the building (property in dispute) was to be acquired, it should first be derequisition by making payment of compensation and damages for the period of occupation. The Competent Authority derequisitioned the property and directed respondent No.3 to make the payment of compensation and damages for the entire property. Thereafter, the building was directed to be handed over to petitioner No. 1 by 6th May, 1985. Respondent No.2, i.e., the Military Estate Officer Chandigarh challenged the order of the District Magistrate-cum-Competent Authority by filing CWP No.2695 of 1985 in the Court. The said writ petition was admitted on 12th October, 1985 and the derequisition and dispossession of the property was stayed. Thereafter the notification under sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Annexure P.4 and P.6) were again issued for the acquisition of the property in dispute. The petitioners have challenged the issuance of the said notification on the ground that the State Government cannot issue the notifications in view of the specific order dated 12th April, 1985 (Annexure P.3) passed by the District Magistrate-cum-Competent Authority, vide which the property in question was derequisitioned.
3. Shri Raman Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners, has contended that the acquisition by the Military Authorities was challenged in C.W.P. No.2503 of 1977 and the acquisition was quashed on technical grounds by this Court. Thereafter the Military Authorities filed CWP No.2595 of 1985 wherein the order dated 12th April, 1985 (Annexure P.3) was challenged. The said writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn in the year 1998. According to the learned counsel, with the withdrawal of the writ petition, the order dated 12th April, 1985 (Annexure P.3) became final and the Military Authorities cannot continue with the acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. His further contention is that no acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act can be made during the pendency of the requisition under the RAIP Act. Further he submits that the objections raised by the petitioners under section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 had not been properly dealt with. Still further, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners under section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 had not been properly dealt with. Still further, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that compensation for the entire area has not been paid. In support of his contention that the acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act during the pendency of the
requisition under the RAID was illegal, the counsel relies upon Union of India v. Hari Krishan Khosla (dead) by L.Rs., 1993 Supp.(2) S.C.C. 149.
4. On the other hand, Shri Kamal Sehgal, learned counsel appearing for the Union of India, contends that the initiation of proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, during the pendency of the RAIP Act is not bad nor does it amount to abuse of power under RAIP. In support of his contention, the learned counsel places reliance on The Collector, Akola and others v. Ramchandra and others A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 244.
5. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that there is no limitation to the power of the State to acquire the property for any public purpose. There is no difference between a property requisitioned under the RAIP and the property free from requisition for the purpose of acquisition under the land Acquisition Act, 1894. In the case reported as The Collector, Akola and others v. Ramchandra and others (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court were pleased to hold as under :-
“The only limitation to the power which section 5(1) confers is the temporary life of the Act. But the words” any land for any public purpose” are sufficiently wide enough t’o include any public purpose whether temporary or otherwise. It is for the requisitioned authority to judge and not for a court of law to decide how best the land is to be used. If the requisitioning authority uses the land for a purpose which is not temporary such as settling a new village site and for construction of nouses it is for the Government and those who put up such structures to contemplate the possibility of having to return in future the land to the owner in its original state. But that does not mean that the power is restricted to temporary purpose only.
There is no antithesis between the power to requisition and the power of compulsory acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act. Neither of the two Acts contains any provision under which it can be said that if one is acted upon, the other cannot. The exercise of power under the Requisitioning Act does not exhaust or make incompatible the exercise of power under the Land Acquisition Act. The initiation of proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act after requisitioning the land under section 5(1) of the Act does not and cannot mean the abuse of the power under the provisions of the Act.”
6. In view of the above aforesaid dictum of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, we are of the considered opinion that the authorities were well within their right to acquire the property in dispute under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, though the same had been earlier requisitioned under the RAIP Act.
7. In the light of the above, we find no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly,
dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.
Sd/- H.S. Bedi, J.