JUDGMENT
Inder Dev Dua, J.
(1) The second appeal from order under section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act 59 of 1958 (hereafter called the Act) raises the usual question of the scope of the present appeal and also the question of the construction of clause (e) of the proviso to section 14(1) of the Act.
(2) An application for ejectment of the tenant was filed before the Rent Controller by 0m Parkash Singal (appellant in this Court). The premises in dispute are admittedly residential and the rent payable by the tenant is also indisputably Rs. 130.00 p. m. No question in regard to them has been raised before me. The tenant occupied the premises in question on 15-10-1961 and on 15-12-1964, the proceedings, out of which this appeal arises, were initiated under section 14 of the Act, the ground for eviction being personal bona fide requirement of the landlord-owner for occupation as residence for himself and members of his family dependent on him.
(3) This prayer was opposed on the ground that the landlord was already in possession of sufficient and suitable accommodation and the present proceedings merely meant to harass the tenant. An earlier proceeding for eviction on the ground of subletting, according to the tenant, was also pending before the Controller.
(4) After trial, the Rent Controller, in a very well-reasoned order, granted the landlord-owner’s application on 4-11-1965. In the order, reliance was placed in support of the order in favor of the landlord-owner on Smt. Vidya Vati v. Shri Hanuman Parshad (1) Mahabir Parshad v. Mohinder Kumar(2), an unreported judgment of G. D. Khosla C. J. of the Punjab High Court in Ram Piara v. Baboo Ram, C. R. 35-D of 1959 and Jiwan Dass v. Smt. Devi Bin, (3). On the evidence, the Rent Controller concluded that the accommodation already in possession of the landlord was nto reasonably suitable for his requirements and that he was in need of more accommodation in this very building for living comfortably. He had a large family and he was held to be justified in claiming more accommodation for his family. The landlord’s claim was considered to be genuine and bona fide.
(5) The tenant took the matter on appeal to the Rent Control Tribunal. On appeal, the learned Tribunal took into consideration the extent of accommodation in the possession of the landlord and took ntoe of the fact that some portion on the first floor in occupation of some tenants had fallen vacant and been let out again about half a dozen times during the last two or three years. The last letting was about a year prior to the filing of the present ejectment application. The fact that the portion now in dispute was let out in 1961 only three years before the institution of the present application for ejectment, was also taken into account. The attention of the learned Tribunal was also drawn to some civil litigation between the parties with regard to the use of the common staircase in which the landlord’s plea for permanent injunction was disallowed by the trial Court and the appeal though preferred, was later withdrawn. It appears that reference was also made to some evidence in regard to some negtoiations for letting out a barsati on the second floor of the house in question and the learned Tribunal felt that under the circumstances of the case, it could nto be said that the tenant’s allegation about the negtoiations for the lease of the barsati was without any basis. After considering the number of members of the landlord’s family and ntoing the absence of medical evidence in support of the landlord’s plea that his daughter studying at Pilani was keeping indifferent health and was for this reason to be brought to Delhi and also keeping in view that one of the landlord’s daughter had since the lease of the portion in question been married off, the learned Tribunal felt doubt about the landlord’s bona fides in filing the present ejectment application. It seems that before the learned Tribunal, the tenant made an offer to exchange his portion of the house in question with the back portion along with the kitchen, but this offer was declined by the landlord. This denial was also considered by the learned Tribunal to be a circumstance which went against the genuineness of the landlord’s requirement. It was in addition observed with reference to this offer that the portion claimed by the tenant was nto so unfit or unsuitable that the landlord could nto utilise it for relieving the pressure on his accommodation if there was any. On this view of the matter, the appeal was allowed and setting aside the order of the learned Rent Controller, the application for eviction was dismissed with costs throughout.
(6) On second appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the order of the learned Rent Control Tribunal is tainted with a serious legal infirmity and deserves to be reversed. According to him, the following observations in the order of the learned Tribunal prominently bring out the legal error in his approach in construing section 14(1) proviso (e) of the Act. “the premises in dispute were leased out to the appellant only three years ago. A man of ordinary prudence having such a big family could easily anticipate the needs and requirements of his family during the coming three or four years. The fact that he leased out the premises in dispute may seem to suggest that the landlord found his accommodation already in his occupation as sufficient and suitable for his family in 1961-62. The Rent Controller or the Tribunal would have no business to enforce on the landlord or his family more liberal or comfortable standards of living than the landlord has been crying to provide for himself and his family.”
This view, so argues the learned counsel for the appellant, runs counter to the legal position enunciated in some of the decisions relied upon by the learned Rent Controller and it is emphasised that the learned Tribunal did nto even care to refer to the ratio of those decisions. It is next emphasised that merely because some portion of the house was let out by the landlord which presumably was nto convenient or comfortable enough for his requirements, could nto by itself be construed to suggest either mala fide or want of bona fide on the part of the landlord in seeking the present portion of his own property for his residence. Again, to insist that the landlord should file a medical certificate establishing the indifferent health of his daughter, if he wanted her to come back to Delhi from Pilani where she was studying, and if he desired for this reason to have more accommodation at his disposal in his own house, has been described by the learned counsel to be a legally erroneous approach to the question of the landlord-owner’s bona fide requirement for his residence and for residence of the members of his family. After all, if the father thinks that his daughter had better come and stay in Delhi because her stay in Pilani is nto as healthy as it is desired by the parents to be, the tenant cannto insist on strict meticulous proof of the indifferent health of the daughter as. a condition precedent to the acceptance of the plea of indifferent health, if the father wants to have her daughter come and live with him, then unless it is a mere pretext and is nto genuine it deserves to be accepted and ordinarily, it would nto be open to the Rent Control Authorities to substitute their opinion for that of the father on a question like this. The landlord-owner is certainly entitled to make himself and his children comfortable in his own house and unless there is clearly discernible some collateral purpose or ulterior object in get ting the premises vacated, the tenant cannto successfully resist the landlord’s claim for possession of the premises on the plea that, in his opinion, or in the opinion of the Rent Control Authorities, the landlord-owner should nto be desirous of having his children live with him. This is how the learned counsel has developed his challenge to the order of the learned Tribunal. He has, in support of the appeal, cited C. L. Davar v. Shri Amar Nath Kapur, (4) Ram Saran v. Shri Harbhajan Singh, (5) Smt. Subhadran Devi v. Sunder Das, (6) and two unreported decisions in Vishnu Doss Garg v. Mange Ram, S. A. 0. No. 26-D of 1962 decided on 22-5-1964 and Mst. Shahzadi v. Kaka Ram, C. Rev. No. 363-D of 1961 decided on 27-5-1968.
(7) The main plank on which the respondent’s learned counsel has sought to support the learned Tribunal’s order is that the impugned conclusion is one of fact and, therefore, nto open to challenge on second appeal under section 39 of the Act. Reliance for this submission has been placed on Parkash Chander Gupta v. Tara Chand Malik, (7) , Manohar Singh v. M/s Kanshi Ram & Sons, (8) Shri V. N. Sarin v. Major Ajit Kumar Poplai, (9) Roop Lal Mehra v. Smt. Kamla Soni, (10) and Hari Shankar v. Girdhari Lal, (11).
SECTION 14(1) proviso (e) of the Act may now be reproduced :- “14.Prtoection of Tenant against eviction. (1) Ntowithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any toher law or contract no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court or Controller in favor of the landlord against a tenant:
(8) Provided that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely:- (1)that the premises let for residential purposes are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no toher reasonable suitable residential accommodation." (9) In Roop Lal Mehra's case, cited on behalf of the respondent, the Court observed as follows:-
“THEattention of the courts will have, therefore, to be directed to find out: (a) whether or nto the requirement of possession is bonafide, and (b) whether or nto the premises already in possession of the landlord afford a reasonably suitable alternative accommodation. It would also nto be correct to suggest that the question of accommodation, actually in possession of the landlord, being ‘reasonably suitable’ is to be judged only in the context of physical sufficiency of the accommodation. In terms of physical sufficiency three rooms in possession of a landlord with family of three, may be sufficient, yet court may hold that accommodation is sufficient having regard to various circumstances, such as, the social status of the family or traditions and customs observed by it. In that view the decision of the landlord would be btoh subjective and objective. Subjective in the sense that the matter has nto to be decided from the standpoint of the Rent Controller or the tenant but from that of the landlord. In deciding this from the point of view of the landlord, various considerations, mentioned above, would be relevant. So long as the landlord is able to establish that he in good faith and genuinely wishes to occupy the premises in possession of the tenant and that good faith or genuineness is of a reasonable man, it would nto be open to the Controller to weigh the claim of the landlord in a fine scale. Similarly, the suitability of the toher accommodation will also have to be decided from the standpoint of a reasonable landlord.
“TRUE,that the necessity for such legislation has arisen with a view to prtoecting the tenants from unscrupulous landlords, who may adopt devices to extract exorbitant rent, but at the same time the statute is nto intended to deprive a landlord of his bona fide desire, so long as that desire is confined within reasonable limits, judged from a practical and nto fanciful point of view, to be more comfortable by occupying his own house. It is objective in the sense that the authorities under the Act have nto been rendered powerless to pronounce dissatisfaction with the bona fides of the landlord’s claim, provided they judge it from the point of view of the landlord. The law does nto require a landlord to sacrifice his own comforts and requirements merely on the ground that the premises are with a tenant. Whether or nto the alternate accommodation available to the landlord is suitable or nto, must, therefore, be decided after taking into account all relevant circumstances, but in deciding that the authorities must step into the position of the landlord and decide in what I venture to call a broad commonsense way as a man of the world. In so deciding, the social customs, conventions and habits, usages and practices of the society also cannto be completely ruled out as irrelevant. The problem will in all cases have to be approached from a practical point of view and from the point of view of a reasonable man and nto from that of a whimsical landlord, who may be wanting a premises for satisfaction of his mere whims. Whatever may be the scope of the expression : ‘required bona fide by the landlord’ it appears to be fairly clear that read as a whole, clause(e) of proviso to sub-section(l) of section 14 does nto make the landlords sole arbiters of subjectively deciding the question of their requirements. It is possible that the later part of the clause has been added to avoid an argument that once a landlord is able to show that he in fact desires possession and genuinely intends to occupy it, his claim becomes unanswerable. I think, the clause does confer a power of scrutiny, though of limited nature on the authorities charged. with the function of deciding disputes under the said Act.”
After taking into account a finding of fact, which was nto questioned in the High Court, the second appeal presented by the tenant was allowed in the reported case. The ratio of, and, the trend of discussion in, this decision do nto seem to help the respondent. The word “bonafide” as used in proviso(e)has been considered judicially in a number of decisions and this interpretation is no longer in controversy. It means, genuinely or in good faith, and it conveys an idea of absence of intent to deceive. If the owner-landlord is nto considered to be seeking eviction on false pretext of acquiring additional accommodation with some collateral purpose or oblique mtoive and his requirement cannto be considered to be inspired by a pure fanciful whim, the plea of bond fide requirement put forth by the landlord-owner, deserves ordinarily to be upheld. As a broad workable rule, the landlord, must be left to assess his requirements in the background of his position, circumstances, status in life and social and toher responsibilities and toher relevant, factors. The order of the learned Tribunal below seems to suggest that unless the landlord can satisfy the Controller or the Tribunal the absolute necessity for additional accommodation, the requirement cannto be considered to be bona fide. This line of approach is, in my view, erroneous and the error involves a substantial question of law. While considering the question of ejectment on the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord-owner, it is eminently desirable to strike a proper and just balance between the rights of the owner on the one hand and those of the tenant as prtoected by the law on the toher. The owner is entitled to make himself comfortable and is, normally speaking, the best judge of his own requirements. Unless he can be considered to be abusing or misusing this right to acquire possession of his property in eviction proceedings, which means that he is seeking to get possession under the veil of bona fide requirement, but for some toher purpose, his claim demands acceptance. Of course, in some rare cases, when his claim prima fade appears to be wholly unreasonable, when considered in the background of his status, position and toher family circumstances, the Controller or the Tribunal may be persuaded judicially to negative his bona fides. Such, however, is by no means the case before me.
(10) Before the Tribunal, no distinct and separate point was raised about the landlord having toher reasonably suitable residential accommodation and apparently, this aspect was mixed up with the question of the bona fide requirement of the landlord. Even before me, the respondent has nto cared to urge anything on this aspect as distinct from the plea that the landlord’s requirement is nto bona fide. I need, therefore, say ntohing on this point. Once the conclusion of the Tribunal as to the bonafide requirement of the landlord is reversed and that of the Controller restored, the ejectment order must, on the facts of this case, follow.
(11) At this stage, it would nto be out of place to prefer to section 19 of the Act which provides for recovery of possession for occupation and re-entry. Sub-section(2) of this section provides that where a landlord recovers possession of any premises from the tenant in pursuance of an order made under clause(e) of the proviso to sub-section(l) of section 14 and the premises are nto occupied by the landlord or by the person for whose benefit the premises are held, within two months of obtaining such possession or the premises having been so occupied are, at any time within three years from the date of obtaining possession, relet to any person toher than the evicted tenant without obtaining the permission of the Controller under section 14(1) or the possession of such premises in transfer to antoher person for reasons which do nto appear to the Controller to be bona fide, the Controller is empowered, on application made to him in this behalf by the evicted tenant within the prescribed time, to direct the landlord to put the tenant back in possession of the premises or to pay him such compensation as the Controller thinks fit. This indicates the scheme of the statute and provides for cases where the landlord secures possession for some collateral purpose under the veil of his bonafide requirement.
(12) In view of the foregoing discussion, I am constrained to allow the appeal and reversing the order of the Rent Control Tribunal, grant the appellant’s prayer for ejectment. There would be no order as to costs. The appellant would be entitled to eject the respondent after the expiry of three months, though execution proceedings can be initiated before that period.