Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs Smt. Laxmi Rani Biswas And Ors. on 3 October, 2007

ORDER

1. By making this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the present insurer, namely. Oriental Insurance Company Limited, puts to challenge the legality of the award, dated 20-12-1999, passed by the learned Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, West Tripura, Agartala, in TS (MAC) No. 249/1995, directing payment of, in all, a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/-, as compensation, with interest @ 12% per annum, with effect from 8-8-1995 (that is, the date of making of the claim application), with further direction to the present petitioner to pay, as insurer, the compensation awarded to the claimant-respondent No. 3.

2. We have heard Mr. B. Bhattacharjee, learned Counsel for the insurer-petitioner, and Mr. Somik Deb, learned Counsel for the claimants – respondents.

3. Claiming that Dinesh Chandra Biswas, husband of the claimant No. 1 and son of the claimant No. 2, had died in an ‘accident’, arising out of rash and negligent driving of the vehicle bearing registration No. TR 01 2561 (G), on 16 9-1994, at about 12.30 pm, at Boramura. the claimant made an application, under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (in short, ‘the MV Act, 1988’), seeking compensation, the case of the claimant being, in brief, thus: On 16-9-1996, at about 12.30 pm, while her husband, a police constable, was travelling through Assam Agartala road, towards No. 10 ONGC Drill site, in a jeep, bearing registration No. TR-01-2561, followed, for reasons of safety, by another jeep, the driver of the vehicle, wherein Dinesh Chandra Biswas was travelling, drove the vehicle at excessive speed, leaving thereby far behind the other vehicle, which was following the vehicle, wherein Dinesh Chandra Biswas was travelling. In these circumstances, contends the claimants, taking advantage of the lone vehicle on the road, extremists opened fire towards the jeep, where the claimant’s husband was travelling and as a result of the firing, her husband and the other occupants of the said vehicle sustained injuries and died, the said accident, according to the claimant, having taken place due to sheer negligence on the part of the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident, for, had the two vehicles been moving together, the accident could not have taken place.

4. The insurer resisted the claim by contending, inter alia, that the claimant’s husband’s death was not due to ‘accident’ arising out of use of the vehicle, but due to extremist attack and, hence, the insurer was not liable to indemnify the owner of the vehicle involved in the accident for any compensation, which the owner of the vehicle may be found liable to pay to the claimant. This apart, the insurer’s further case has been that in the case at hand, the insurance policy did not cover death arising out of the extremist attack. The learned Tribunal has held to the effect, inter alia, that Dinesh Chandra Biswas’s death was a result of an ‘accident’, arising out of the use of the vehicle, in question, and that the ‘accident’ occurred, because of rash and negligent driving of the vehicle by its driver and, hence, the insurer is liable to pay compensation if the owner of the vehicle can show that the vehicle stood insured with the present petitioner as insurer.

5. Aggrieved by the award, so granted, the insurer is, now, as already indicated above, before this Court challenging, with the help of the present application made under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the said award.

6. Before we answer the various questions raised in this writ petition, such as, the question as to whether the death of the claimant’s husband can be regarded as a death caused in an ‘accident’ arising out of ‘use’ of a vehicle and/or the question as to whether the insurance policy, in the present case, covers death arising out of extremists’ attack, we may point out that we are confronted with a larger issue and the issue is this: Whether a writ petition under Article 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India is, at all, maintainable at the instance of an insurer, who may feel aggrieved by an award delivered, under the scheme of the MV Act, 1988, by a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (in short, ‘the Claims Tribunal’)? If the answer to the question, so posed, lies in the negative, the writ petition needs to be dismissed outright without entering into the legality or justification of the grievances expressed by the insurer petitioner against the impugned award.

7. For the reasons that we record hereinbelow, we are of the view that the question with regard to the maintainability of a writ petition, at the instance of an insurer, against an award, delivered by a Claims Tribunal, needs to be looked into by a larger Bench, because of the serious ramifications, which the answer to the question, so posed, may entail.

8. In Milon Rani Saha v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. reported in 2000 (2) GLT 393 : AIR 2000 Gauhati 136, a Full Bench of this Court had the occasion to consider (as the Full Bench has itself noted) the question as to ‘whether a judicial review under Articles 226/227 is at all permissible at the instance of the insurer on the grounds other than those mentioned under Section 149 of the MV Act, 1988’. Responding to the question, so posed, the Full Bench held to the effect that notwithstanding the limited statutory right of appeal provided to the insurer, the High Court’s power, under Article 226 and/or 227, has not been taken away and can be invoked in an appropriate case. The Full Bench observed that an award or decision of a Claims Tribunal is not immune from judicial review. The relevant extracts of Paragraph 13 (Para 5 of AIR) read.” The letter and spirit of Articles 226/227 admit of no limitation on the power of the High Courts for exercise of the power of judicial review and as a matter of fact, no decision is required to state that the award or decision of a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is not immune from judicial review.

(Emphasis is supplied)

9. The Full Bench further observed at’ Paras 11 and 12 (Paras 4 and 5 of AIR) thus:

(11) Whether an application under Article 226 of the Constitution is to be entertained or not, is to be left to the discretion of the Court. The powers of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution can not be taken away or barred by any legislation, nor can it be barred by any Statute by providing that a decision of an inferior Court of Tribunal shall be final, , C. Singh and Ors. v. S. Singh and Ors. , State of Gujarat v. W. Vaghela. A duty and responsibility is cast on the High Court and is invested with the power of general superintendence to keep the Courts and Tribunals within its territorial jurisdiction, within the bounds of their authority and to see that the authorities discharge their duties in a legal manner. The High Court can interfere in cases of erroneous exercise of jurisdiction, refusal of exercise jurisdiction, error of law on the face of materials on records, violation of principles, of natural justice, arbitrary or capricious exercise of power/authority/discretion/perversity and so on and so forth. It is a discretionary and extraordinary power conferred on the High Courts that is to be used as and when called for. Alternative relief/remedy may be a ground for refusal to grant relief. But in a given case, to correct manifest injustice where basic principles of natural justice has been violated, alternative remedy/relief cannot and shall not stand as a bar for grant of relief. While exercising the jurisdiction/discretion, the Court will no doubt exercise judicial discretion keeping in mind the judicial norms.

(12) The High Courts powers under Article 227 of the Constitution though initially shown to be restricted only to the cases of grave dereliction of duties and gross violation, to be used/exercised most sparingly in cases of grave injustice, but there is a shift of the paradigm. The trend is now liberalised. It, however, cannot be used as an appellate or revisional power. The High Court in exercise of its power will not substitute its own judgment to that of an inferior Court on a question of fact or interfere with the legitimate exercise of powers/jurisdiction by the inferior Court, unless it is arbitrary, capricious or there is error of finding of jurisdictional fact Ref. Atchutnanda Baidya v. Prafulla Kumar Gayan and Ors. . The power under Article 227 of the Constitution is wider than that of Section 115 CPC and may be used even when Section 115 CPC is not applicable. The powers of judicial superintendence under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution is not limited to technical rules. The power under Article 227 of the constitution may even be exercised suo motu by the Court.

(13) The letter and spirit of Article 226/227 admit of no limitation on the power of the High Courts for exercise of the power of judicial review and as a matter of fact, no decision is required to state that the award or decision of a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is not immune from judicial review.

10. The Full Bench, in Milan Rani Saha, AIR 2000 Gauhati 136 (supra), eventually, reached the conclusion, at para 19. thus : “In view of the above facts and circumstances as well as the discussions, we answer the reference in the affirmative and hold that an application for judicial review under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India is maintainable against an award of the tribunal under the MV Act at the instance of the insurer on the grounds other than those mentioned under Section 149 of the MV Act, 1988.

11. From the observations made in Milan Rani Saha (supra), what transpires is that according to the Full Bench, an award or the decision of a Claims Tribunal is not immune from judicial review, but whether the High Court would entertain an application under Article 226 and/or 227 would be a question of fact. What, however, the Full Bench, in Milan Rani Saha (supra), eventually, concluded was that an application for judicial review under Article 226/227 is maintainable against an award of a Claims Tribunal, at the instance of an insurer, ‘on the grounds other than those mentioned in Section 149 of the MV Act, 1988.

12. However, in Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and Anr. , which arose, in the form of a writ petition made under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, out of the insurer’s grievance, based, primarily, against the quantum of compensation awarded to a claimant, the Apex Court held to the effect that the right of appeal is a statutory’ right and when the law provides remedy by filing an appeal on limited grounds, the grounds of challenge cannot be enlarged by filing a petition under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India on the premises that the insurer has, under Section 149 (2) of the Act of 1988, limited grounds available for challenging an award given by a Claims Tribunal.”

13. Following the decision rendered in Sadhana Lodh. (supra), a learned Single Judge held, in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sukla Dev Nath and Ors. reported in 2004 (1) GLT 497 (which arose at Agartala Bench of this High Court), that an insurer cannot invoke revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (in short, the Code’), for, entertaining such a revision would amount to expanding the limited right of appeal, which the legislature has chosen to provide to the insurer under Section 149 (2) of the M.V. Act, 1988. The relevant observations, made in Sukla Dev Nath (supra), run as under:

(9) It is time to turn to two recent decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court, In National Insurance Co. Ltd. Chandigarh, appellant v. Nicolletta Rohtagi and Ors respondents , the question which fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court was where an insurer does not prefer an appeal under Section 173 of the Act, is it open for the insurer to prefer an appeal against the award questioning the quantum of compensation as well as the findings as regards the negligence of the offending vehicle. The Hon’ble Apex Court while referring to the scheme of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and the Act of 1988, more particularly Section 149 of the latter Act answered the question in the negative and held that if an insurer is permitted to contest the claim on grounds other than those mentioned under Section 149 (2) of the Act. it would mean adding more grounds of contest to the insurer than what the statvite has specifically provided for. Referring to Sub-section (7) of Section 149 of the Act, it held that an insurer cannot avoid its liability on any other ground except those mentioned in Sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act. It, therefore, ruled that if an insurer is aggrieved by an award, it can, therefore, file an appeal only on the grounds specified under Section 149 (2) of the Act and it would be permissible for it to file an appeal challenging the quantum of compensation or negligence or contributory negligence if the conditions of Section 170 of the act are satisfied and the award is adverse to the interest of the insurer. It further held that if a permission is sought by the insurer in the circumstances contemplated under Section 170 of the Act and is granted the insurer can contest the claim on merits and it would then be open for it to file an appeal against the award on merits as well. If such a permission is rejected, the insurer can challenge that order while filing an appeal on the grounds available to it under Section 149 (2) of the Act. The insurer can also approach the Tribunal for rectification of the award in case a fraud is perpetrated in obtaining the award. In Sadhana Lodh, (supra), the insurer had assailed the award of the learned Tribunal before this Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. The learned Single bench dismissed the application but a Division Bench in appeal entertained the same and interfered with the compensation. It was contended before the Hon’ble Apex Court that when a remedy of appeal was available to the insurer an application under Article 227 of the Constitution was misconceived. It was countered by contending that as the insurer has limited grounds available for appeal, it was open for it to file an application under Article 226/227 of the Constitution. The Hon’ble Apex Court ruled that a right of appeal is a statutory right and where the law provides remedy by filing an appeal on limited grounds, the grounds of challenge cannot be enlarged by filing an application under Article 226/227 of the Constitution on the premises that the insurer has limited grounds available for challenging the award given by the learned Tribunal. It was thus held that the application under Article 227 of the Constitution filed by the insurer was wholly misconceived. It was observed thereafter that where a remedy by way of appeal is not provided for against an order, the remedy available to the aggrieved person is to file revision before the High Court under Section 115 C.P.C. but if such a remedy of revision under Section 115 C.P.C. is expressly barred then an application under Article 227 of the Constitution would lie. The Hon’ble Apex Court thereafter dealt with the scope and ambit of the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. The judgment and order of the Division Bench of this Court was set aside granting liberty to the insurer to file an appeal if it is permissible under the law. What transpires from the above decisions of the’ Hon’ble Apex Court is that an insurer can resist the claim in a proceeding involving its policy or challenge an award passed therein by preferring an appeal only on grounds limited by Section 149 (2) of the Act. It is only if an insurer is impleaded under Section 170 of the Act that it is permissible for it to resist the claim or challenge the award on other grounds as well. The scope of the grounds enumerated under Section 149 (2) of the Act cannot be enlarged in any manner other than the one prescribed under Section 170 of the Act. The application filed by the insurer in Sadhana Lodh (supra) was held to be not maintainable on the said considerations. According to Mr. Biswas, the Hon’ble Apex Court had ruled therein that in view of the limited grounds available to the insurer to prefer appeal, it is permissible for it to file a revision petition under Section 115 C.P.C. challenging the award on grounds other than those under Section 149 (2) of the Act. Reading between the lines of the said decision I am unable to locate any such observation. The discussion which finds place in the decision Sadhana Lodh relating to Section 115 C.P.C, in my view, was generated to underline the circumstances under which an application under Article 227 of the Constitution is contemplated in general. There is no specific reference to the provisions of the Act in this connection. This is amply clear also from the concluding lines of the decision by which the insurer’ was directed to prefer an appeal, if permissible under the law. Apparently, in Sadhana Lodh (supra), the insurer sought to challenge the award on grounds beyond those available under Section 149 (2) of the Act. Had the Hon’ble Apex Court ruled that under those circumstances, an application under Section 115 C.P.C. is contemplated, in my considered view, it would have clearly indicated the same in the decision and further would have allowed the insurer to file such a revision petition. This has not been done. As a matter of fact, such a question seemingly was not agitated in the said case. If the grounds of challenge as laid down in Section 149 (2) of the Act cannot be allowed to be enlarged by filing an application under Article 227 of the Constitution, the same cannot be permitted to be done by invoking Section 115 C.P.C. as well. In view of the preponderant judicial opinion as above, I am unable to concur with the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the revision petitions under Section 115 C.P.C. in the present setting of facts are maintainable. The scheme of the act above does not permit any remedy other than those prescribed by it. If an application under Section 115 C.P.C. is allowed to be filed invoking the revisional jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the challenge of an insurer to an award beyond the grounds specified under Section 149 (2) of the Act, it would amount to doing violence to the scheme which has been adumbrated by the legislature. This, in my view, is not permissible. The insurer, if aggrieved, will have to seek remedy within the four corners of the Act. As it is, the insurer is not without any remedy and Section 170 is a tailor made provision to remedy situations embracing eventualities beyond the scope of the permissible ground of defence under Section 149(2).

(Emphasis is supplied).

14. Close on the heels of the decision in Sukla Dev Nath (supra), a number of civil revision petitions and writ petitions made under Article 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India, which were pending at the Principal Seat, came up for consideration before a Single Bench, which was considered by one of us (IA Ansari, J.) and the orders passed therein stand reported, in The (Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Must. Rejina Begum and Ors. 2005 (1) GLT 1.

15. In Rejina Begum (supra), broadly speaking, two important questions were raised, namely, (i) Whether revision would lie at the instance of an insurer against an appealable award? and (ii) Whether, in the face of the decision in Sadhana Lodh (supra), a writ petition, under Article 226 and/or 227, is at all maintainable at the instance of an insurer or whether the constitutional remedy of judicial review under Article 226 and of superintendence under Article 227 is, in the light of the decision in Sadhana Lodh, (supra), not at all available to an insurer against an award delivered by a Claims Tribunal?

16-17. For better appreciation of the issues, which were raised in Rejina Begum (supra), we reproduce hereinbelow the observations made by the Court in this regard:

5. Challenging, at the very threshold, the maintainability of the present writ petitions, it has been submitted, on behalf of the respondents, that in the light of the law laid down in Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and Anr. , it is no longer open to the High Court to entertain against an award, which is appealable under Section 173 of the M.V. Act, any writ petition under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India, for, the Apex Court has laid down in Sadhana Lodh (supra) that since a limited right of appeal has been provided under Section 173 of the M.V. Act to the insurer, the limited grounds of appeal cannot be enlarged by making any application under Article 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution. In other words, the resistance to the maintainability of the present set of writ petitions are on the ground that the insurer cannot invoke High Court’s jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution inasmuch as a statutory right of appeal is available to the insurer against the award passed by the Tribunal on limited grounds as provided under Section 149 (2) of the M.V. Act, 1988 and if the grievance of the insurer does not fall within the grounds enumerated in Section 149 (2), the insurer cannot enlarge the grounds, as provided under Section 149 (2), by taking recourse to a writ petition under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution and invite thereby the High Court to exercise the powers of an appellate Court in the garb of exercising the powers of judicial review under Article 226 and/or superintendence under Article 227. It is further submitted, on behalf of the respondents, that the Full Bench decision of this Court in Milan Rani Saha v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. reported in 2000 (2) GLT 293; AIR 2000 Gauhati 136, wherein it has been held to the effect that notwithstanding the limited statutory right of appeal provided to the insurer, the High Court’s power under Article 226 and/or 227 has not been taken away and can be invoked, in an appropriate case, no longer remains a good law and must be deemed to have been overruled by the decision in Sadhna Lodh (supra) so far as the insurers are concerned.

6. Referring also to National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sukla Dev reported in 2004 (1) GLT 497, it is submitted, on behalf of the respondents, that the decision in Sukla Dev Nath (supra) has clearly laid down that an insurer cannot invoke revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 1 15 of the Code, for, entertaining such revision would be tantamount to expanding the limited right of appeals, which the legislature has chosen to provide to the insurers under Section 149(2) of the Act. In the light of the decision in Sukla Dev Nath (supra), the present set of Civil Revision Petition may be held to be not maintainable. So contend the respondents.

7. Controverting the submissions made on behalf of the respondents challenging the very maintainability of the present set of Writ Petitions and Civil Revision Petitions, it has been submitted, on behalf of the petitioners, that the decision in Sadhana Lodh. (supra) does not lay down a law of general proposition that an award given by a Tribunal cannot, in any event, be challenged by an insurer except by way of appeal on the grounds as provided in Section 149(2) of the M.V. Act and that such an interpretation, if resorted to, with regard to the powers of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227, the same would go contrary to the consistent views expressed by the Apex Court that the powers under Articles 226 and 227 cannot be abridged or taken away or curtailed by a statute and in an appropriate case, there is no limitation on the powers of the High Court to invoke its jurisdiction under Article 226 and/or 227. The decision in Sadhana Lodh (supra), it is reiterated on behalf of the petitioners, does not lay down a law of general proposition and must be read to have been kept confined within the context of the facts of that case and the decision in Milan Rani Saha (supra) still holds the field, for, the law laid down therein has not been overruled, directly or by implication, either by the decision in Sadhana Lodh (supra) or by any other judicial pronouncement.

8. As regards the revisional jurisdiction of the High Courts under Section 115 of the Code, it is submitted, on behalf of the petitioners, that the revisional jurisdiction is nothing, but a source of power of superintendence of the High Court over all the Courts subordinate to it and, hence, in an appropriate case, when a Tribunal, constituted under the M.V. Act, which is nothing but a Court subordinate to the High Court, acts without jurisdiction and/or arbitrarily and/or in total disregard of the law contained in that behalf and/or in violation of the principles of natural justice, the revisional jurisdiction can and must be exercised by the High Court to undo the wrong and/or keep the Court within the bounds of law.

9. Let me, now, consider the correctness or otherwise of the preliminary objections raised by the respondents with regard to the maintainability of the present sot of Writ Petitions and Civil Revision Petitions, for, if the preliminary objections are sustained, this Court need not enter into the merit of the Writ Petitions and/or the Civil Revision Petitions.

18. Having pointed out the questions raised in Rejina Begum (supra), the Court proceeded to determine the parameters of exercise of civil revisional jurisdiction. From the observations made, in this regard, in Rajina Begum (supra), what emerges is that unlike the power of judicial review and of superintendence, which Articles 226 and 227 confer on the High Courts, the appeal or revision is a creature of legislature and it is up to the legislature to provide or not to provide a right of appeal against a judicial decision or order and, similarly, it is for the legislature to decide whether the High Courts should be given revisional jurisdiction or not in any adjudicatory process. It was also pointed out. in Rajina Begum (supra), that when a statute provides for an appeal against a judicial order, revision against such an order will not lie irrespective of the fact whether the right of appeal is absolute or conditional, restricted or otherwise. In other words, however truncated the right of appeal may be, so long as the provisions for appeal remain, revisional jurisdiction cannot be exercised, for, it is for the legislature to decide whether to give or not to give against a judicial order the remedy of absolute right of appeal or restricted right of appeal. When the legislature has chosen to give to the insurer, under Section 149(2) of the M.V. Act, a right of appeal, though limited, it will bar exercise of revisional jurisdiction.

19. The Court also pointed out that it agrees with the views expressed, in Sukla Dev Nath (supra), that the grounds of appeal given to an insurer, under Section 149(2), cannot be expanded by taking recourse to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. In other words, when a remedy, by way of appeal, has been provided for by the statute, however, restricted such right of appeal may be. (he making of the provision’; for appeal in themselves create complete bar for the High Court to exorcise revisional jurisdiction.

20. The Court further pointed out, in Rejina Begum (supra), that it sees no reason to lake a conclusion different from what the Court had readied in Sukla Dev Nath (supra), though the reasons assigned for coming to the same conclusion, namely, that the revisional jurisdiction cannot be invoked against an appealable order are, somewhat. different. Thus, while, in Sukla Dev Nath (supra), what was held is that the limited right of appeal provided to an insurer, under Section 149(2). cannot be expanded by taking recourse to Section 115. the views expressed by the Court, in Rejina Begum (supra), with regard to revisional jurisdiction, was that since the legislature has provided to the insurer a right of appeal, however truncated such right may be, no revisional jurisdiction can be invoked by the High Court, for, Section 115 of the Code makes it abundantly clear that where an appeal lies, revision will not be entertainable, however restricted the right of appeal may be.

21. The relevant observations made by the Court, in Rejina Begum (supra), with regard to the parameters of High Courts revisional jurisdiction against an award read as under:

10. While dealing with the present set of revision petitions, it is imperative to note that unlike the power of judicial review and of superintendence, which Articles 226 and 227 confer on the High Courts, the appeal or revision is a creature of legislature and it is up to the legislature to provide or not to provide the right of appeal against a judicial decision or order and, similarly, it is for the legislature to decide whether the High Courts should be given revisional jurisdiction or not in any adjudicator}’ process.

11. That the revisional jurisdiction is a creation of statute and cannot be assumed or exercised by the High Court in the name of having the power of superintendents over the subordinate Courts unless the statute. in a given case, either expressly or by implication, so provides, cannot be disputed and has, in fact, not. been disputed before me. With this limitation in mind, the question as to whether the revision power under Section 115 of the Code can be invoked against an award passed by a Tribunal has to be considered.

12. A careful reading of Section 115 of the Code reveals that the revisional power can be exercised only when there is no appeal provided for. Hence, when a statute provides for an appeal against a judicial order, revision against such an order will not lie irrespective of the fact whether the right of appeal is absolute or conditional, restricted or otherwise. In other words, howsoever truncated the right of appeal may be, so long as the provisions for appeal remain, revisional jurisdiction cannot be exercised, for. it is for the legislature to decide whether to give or not to give against a judicial order the remedy of absolute right of appeal or restricted right of appeal. When the legislature has chosen to give to the insurer, under Section 149(2) of the M.V. Act, a right of appeal, though limited, it will bar exercise of revisional jurisdiction.

13. Coupled with the above, as has been correctly laid down in Sukha Dev Nath (supra), the grounds of appeal given to an insurer under Section 149(2) cannot be expanded by taking recourse to the revisional, jurisdiction of the High Court. In other words, when a remedy, by way of appeal, has been provided for by the statute, however restricted such right of appeal may be, the making of the provisions for appeal in themselves create complete bar for the High Court to exercise revisional jurisdiction. Considered thus, I see no reason to take a view different from what this Court has taken in Sukla Dev Nath (supra), though reasoning for coming to the same conclusion, namely, that the revisional jurisdiction cannot be invoked against an appealable award is, somewhat, different. In Sukla Dev Nath (supra), what has been held is that the limited right of appeal provided to an insurer under Section 149(2) of the M.V. Act cannot be expanded by taking recourse to Section 115 of the Code; whereas I am of the view that the legislature, having provided to the insurer a right of appeal, howsoever runcated such right may be, no revisional jurisdiction can be invoked by the High Court, for. Section 115 of the Code makes it abundantly clear that where an appeal lies, revision will not be entertained, howsoever restricted the right of appeal may be.

22. As regards the awards, which are non appealable, the question, which arose in Rejina Begum (supra), was as to whether revision would lie against non-appealable awards i.e., the awards, which did not fall under Section 173 of the M.V. Act, 1988. This took the Court to a broader issue and the issue was as to whether a Claims Tribunal is a Court within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code, for, there were two contradictory decisions, on this subject, rendered by two Single Benches. While, in the State of Assam v. Pranesh Dev Nath reported in (1991) 2 GLR 389, it has been held that a Claims Tribunal is a ‘Court’ within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code, the decision, in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Dilip Chakraborty reported in (1995) 2 GLJ 107, was that a Claims Tribunal is not a ‘Court’ within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code.

23. Hence, in Rejina Begum (supra), while dismissing those revision petitions, which had arisen out of appealable awards, the Court referred to a larger Bench the question as to whether a Claims Tribunal is or is not a Court ‘subordinate to the High Court under Section 115 of the Code’. This reference was answered by a Division Bench in the affirmative in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mustt. Abeda Begum, which stands reported in, 2005 (2) GLT 571. The correctness of this conclusion has been doubted by the Division Bench in Rekha Paul v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in 2006 (Suppl) 1 GLT 231. The question, therefore, which has been referred, now, to a Full Bench is an to whether a Claims Tribunal is a ‘Court’, ‘subordinate to the High Court’, within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code.

24. In Abeda Begum (supra), the Division Bench, (B. K. Roy, C. J., and P. G. Agarwalla, J.), taking into account the facts that a Claims Tribunal has been held to have all the trapping of a Civil Court, an appeal lies to the High Court from an award of a Claims Tribunal and that the Claims Tribunal is presided over by a judicial officer of the grade of a District Judge, concluded in that the Claims Tribunal is a ‘Court’ within the meaning of Section 115. As against this, it has been pointed out, in Rekha Paul (supra), that though a Claims Tribunal may be a ‘Court’, the important question remains as to whether it is a ‘Court’ within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code. It has been pointed out, in Rekha Paul (supra), that an appeal lies to the High Court not by virtue of Section 96 of the Code, but because of the fact that specific provisions have been made, under Section 173 of the M.V. Act, 1988, for an appeal to the High Court in respect of awards granting compensation of more than Rs. 10,000/. This shows, according to what has been held in Rekha Paul (supra), that a Claims Tribunal is not a Court within the meaning of Section 96 of the Code, for, had no specific provisions for appeal, in the form of Section 173 of the M.V. Act, 1988, been made by the legislature, no appeal would have lied to the High Court under Section 96 of the Code. Logically, therefore, when no specific provision for revision has been made in the M.V. Act. 1988. the Claims Tribunal cannot be treated as ‘Court’ for the purpose of exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code and thereby create a forum for revision, which the legislature never intended to provide.

25. As regards the Court’s observations, in Abeda Begum (supra), that a Claims Tribunal is presided over by a Judicial Officer of the grade of District Judge, it has been pointed out, in Rekha Paul (supra), that Section 173 makes provisions enabling even a High Court Judge to preside over a Claims Tribunal; hence, the mere fact that ordinarily, a Judicial Officer, and not a High Court Judge, presides over a Claims Tribunal, cannot make a Claims Tribunal a Court ‘subordinate to the High Court’ within the meaning of Section 115. It has been further pointed out, in Rekha Paul (supra), that in order to be a Court under Section 115, a Court must, first, be a Court within the meaning of Sections 3 and 15 of the Code, which relate to subordination of the Court, for, ‘subordination’ of the Courts can be administrative, financial and judicial and that judicial subordinate is distinct from administrative subordination.

26. The Division Bench, in Rekha Paul (supra), pointed out that there may be subordination of a Court for the purpose of a particular statute and such subordination may be judicial subordination or administrative subordination. For instance, while Article 227 speaks of judicial subordination, Article 235 denotes administrative subordination. That the judicial subordination, (as envisaged under Article 227), is different from administrative subordination, as envisaged by Article 235, becomes clear, when one carefully reads the Apex Court’s observations, in Thakur Jugal Prasad Kishore Sinha v. Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. , which run thus, “It may not be out of place to note that “subordinate Courts have been dealt with in Chapter VI of the Constitution and Article 235 of the Constitution gives the High Court “the control over District Courts and Courts subordinating thereto” by providing for powers like the posting and promotion, and the grant of leave to person belonging to the judicial service of a State. Such control is not judicial control and a Court may be subordinate to High Court for purposes other than judicial control.

(Emphasis is supplied)

27. Deriving support from various authorities including Canara Bank v. Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. reported in 1995 (Supp) 3 SCC 81, the Division Bench, in Rekha Paul (supra), held that in order to be subordinate to the High Court under Article 227, a Court need not necessarily be a Court of Civil Judicature in the ordinary hierarchy of Courts meaning thereby that though a Tribunal or an authority, acting under a given statute, may be regarded as a Court, yet it may not still be a Court in the ordinary hierarchy of Courts and though a Tribunal may not be a Court in the ordinary hierarchy of Courts, such a Tribunal would nevertheless be subordinate to the High Court under Article 227.

28. The Division Bench has further pointed out, in Rekha Paul (supra), that all the Courts and Tribunals, which come under the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court, are, in the light of the provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution of India, under the power of superintendence of the High Court concerned. This power of superintendence, however, excludes the Courts or Tribunals, constituted by or under any law, relating to the Armed Forces. Thus, every Court and Tribunal, except those Courts and Tribunals relating to Armed Forces, functioning under the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court, is under the High Court’s power of superintendence and can be, loosely speaking, regarded as subordinate to the High Court. While considering, however, the question as to whether a Court or a Tribunal is subordinate to the High Court under a particular statute, it is the statute, which has to be examined to ascertain and trace the source of revisional power of the High Court vis-a-vis the Court, or the Tribunal, which is sought to be treated as a subordinate Court to the High Court for the purposes of the statute concerned.

29. The Division Bench, in Rekha Paul (supra), finally, concluded, in para 28, thus, “28. It is, thus, clear that subordination of Courts may have different shades and different facets. A Court may not be subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, even though such a subordinate Court may be exercising powers, which are, ordinarily, exercisable by a Court of civil judicature. One such instance can be subordination of Courts in the context of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.”

30. We may, now, pause here to point out that the reference, which has been made on the question as to whether the Claims Tribunal is or is not a ‘Court’ within the meaning of Section 115, has not yet been, (as we are informed by the Bar), decided by any Full Bench.

31. Now, turning to the second question, which was raised in Rejina Begum (supra), namely as to whether a writ petition under Article 226 and or 227 lies at all at the instance of an insurer against an award of the Claims Tribunal, the Court, having considered a number of decisions, particularly, in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India , held, in Rejina Begum (supra), that curtailment of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court cannot take away High Court’s constitutional jurisdiction to issue writ of certiorari, though, while exercising the writ jurisdiction of certiorari, the High Court should proceed on the assumption that the Court, which has the jurisdiction over a given subject-matter, has also the jurisdiction to decide wrongly as well as rightly and that the High Court would not assign to itself the role of an appellate Court and step into appreciating or evaluating the evidence and/or substitute its own findings in the place of those arrived at by the inferior Court. In short, while acting on the certiorari jurisdiction, though the High Court cannot convert itself into an appellate Court, it remains free to exercise the powers of issuing writ of certiorari if the well-established and acceptable conditions precedent for exercise of such powers exists.

32. As regards the scope of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the Court, in Rejina Begum (supra), pointed out that the remedy of certiorari jurisdiction is available not against the decision, but against the decision-making process. In the decision-making process, if the Court or the Tribunal or. for that matter, any other authority, while deciding a case, ignores the. vital pieces of evidence and thereby arrives at an irrational conclusion or misconstrues the provisions of an enactment, there is no impediment in taking resort to constitutional powers under Articles 226 and/or 227. This position of law can be clearly gathered, points out the Court in Rejina Begum (supra), from the observations made in State of A.P. v. Hanumanta Rao through LRs. , which run as follows (paras 30 to 32 of AIR):

True it is that remedy of the writ petition available in the High Court is not against the “decision-making process”. In the “decision-making process”, if the Court, tribunal or authority, deciding the case, has ignored vital evidence and thereby arrived at erroneous conclusion or has misconstrued the provisions of the relevant Act or misunderstood the scope of its jurisdiction, the constitutional power of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 can be invoked to set right such errors and prevent gross injustice to the party complaining.

7. In the case of Surya Dev Rai. (supra), while examining the nature and ambit of power of the High Court to issue writs under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution, the above-stated legal position has been recognized by observing thus:

39. Though we have tried to lay down broad principles and working rules, the fact remains that the parameters for exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution cannot be tied down in a strait-jacket formula or rigid rules…. At the end, we may sum up by saying that the power is there but the exercise is discretionary which will be governed solely by the dictates of judicial conscience enriched by judicial experience and practical wisdom of the Judge.

This Court has recognized the right of the High Court to interfere with orders of subordinate Courts and tribunals where (1) there is an error manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear misreading or utter disregard of the provisions of law. and (2) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.

33. Rejina Begum (supra), then, concludes that notwithstanding the relief pro vided. within the scheme of an enactment, against an order passed by a Court or Tribunal, the High Court can still exercise jurisdiction of issuing writ of certiorari under Articles 226 and/or 227 when the Tribunal or the Court, subordinate to the High Court, is found to have acted without jurisdiction i.e. by assuming jurisdiction, where no such jurisdiction exists, or refuses to exercise jurisdiction, where the jurisdiction exists, or acts beyond its jurisdiction or acts in flagrant disregard of law or rule governing its function or in violation of the principles of natural justice occasioning thereby failure of justice or when its order is based on clear misreading or utter disregard of the provisions of law or when it acts under a statute, which is ultra vires. The Court, in Rejina Begum (supra), further pointed out that while a mere erroneous decision is not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 and/or 227, yet when an error is apparent on the face of the proceedings, such as, when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby, the power to issue writ of certiorari under supervisory jurisdiction may be resorted to, though this power should be resorted to sparingly and only in appropriate cases, where the judicial consciousness of the High Court dictates it to act, lest a gross violation of justice or grave injustice should occasion.

34. Having referred to the question of facts and the law involved in Sadhana Lodh (supra), the Court, in Rejina Begum (supra), observed out that if the objections raised on behalf of the respondents that Sadhana Lodh (supra) bars jurisdiction of the High Court completely under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution is accepted, the same would not only be contrary to the established law of the land, but also prove disastrous, for, such an approach would set at naught the whole object with which Articles 226 and 227 stand embodied in the Constitution. The Court, in Rejina Begum (supra), then, cited some illustrations indicating that there may be orders passed by a Claims Tribunal, which the High Court may find to be wholly contrary to the scheme of the M.V. Act, 1988, but there would be no remedy provided for breach of such a remedy under the M.V. Act, 1988, and in such cases, the High Court may have to step in by invoking in extraordinary circumstances, its extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227. The relevant observations made by the Court, in Rejina Begum (supra), read thus:

54. One can, thus, multiply the examples, when the High Court may, notwithstanding the limited of right of appeal provided to the insurer under Section 149(2), have to interfere in certiorari jurisdiction in order to keep the Tribunal within the bounds of law. What the High Court cannot do is to convert itself into a Court of appeal, but it will be too much to say that under no circumstances, the High Court under Articles 226/227 can interfere with an award passed by a Tribunal even if the award be a nullity in the eyes of law or is completely perverse or even when the award passed is one, which cannot stand most reluctant judicial scrutiny.

35. Having reached the conclusions as indicated hereinabove, the Court, finally, observed and directed, in Rejina Begum (supra), as under:

56. It is also worth noticing, if I may hasten to emphasize, that merely because of the fact that the High Court, as I have held above, docs not enjoy the revisional jurisdiction in respect of appealable awards passed by the Tribunals under the M.V. Act, it does not mean that by curtailing the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, its constitutional jurisdiction to issue writ of certiorari has been taken away.

57. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, 1 hold that all the Civil Revision Petitions enlisted above are not maintainable, the same having arisen out of the impugned awards, which are appealable, and shall, therefore, stand dismissed accordingly. This will, however, not debar, in an appropriate case, the revision petitioners from challenging the award by way of writ application. No costs.

58. I further clarify that the writ petitions, which have been enlisted above, though maintainable, are being disposed of, on merit, by independent orders.

36. The question as to whether against an award of the Claims Tribunal, an insurer ran. under any circumstances, challenge an award under Articles 226 and/or 227 or whether this constitutional remedy is completely barred so far as the insurers are concerned, was. again, considered in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Gauri Roy (Deb) reported in 2005 (1) GLT 569, by single Bench.

37. The questions, raised in Gauri Roy (Deb) (supra), were noted by one of us, at paragraph No. 7, as under:

1. Against an award rendered by a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, which is appealable under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 1988 (hereinafter as “the M.V. Act”, whether an insurer can invoke revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter as “the Code”) on the grounds beyond those, which are available to an insurer under Section 149(2) of the M.V. Act? 2. Against an award rendered by a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, which is appealable under Section 173 of the M.V. Act, whether an insurer can, under any circumstance, impugn an award in an application under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India or whether this constitutional remedy is completely barred so far as an insurer is concerned? 3. Whether the power of judicial review vested in the High Courts under Articles 226 of the Constitution of India and power of superintendence conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution form part of the basic structure of the Constitution and whether the powers, so given to the High Courts, can be taken away by amendment of the Constitution or by any piece of legislation?

38. The Court, in Gauri Roy (Deb) (supra), answered the questions, posed above, in tune with the decision in Rejina Begum (supra).

39. In the backdrop of the decisions in Rejina Begum (supra) and Gauri Roy (Deb) (supra), the question, as to whether writ jurisdiction, under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India can, at all, be exercised, in a writ petition filed by an insurer against an award, fell, once again, for determination in W.P. (C) No. 3614 of 2005 (New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Member, MACT, Guwahati), decided on 3-6-2005. Though the learned single Judge, while disposing of the W. P. (C) No. 3614 of 2005, did not clearly hold that the constitutional remedies under Articles 226 and 227 do not exist for an insurer, the decision indicated that according to the learned single Judge, in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (supra), recourse to Articles 226 and/or 227 cannot be taken by an insurer to expand the limited right of appeal given to it under Section 149(2). In substance, thus, the decision in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (supra) is in tune with Rejina Begum (supra) and Gauri Roy (Deb) (supra).

40. The learned single Judge, it may be, once again, pointed out made no clear observations, in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (supra), (i.e. W. P. (C) No. 3614/2005), that Article 226/227 cannot be invoked by an insurer; rather, the learned single Judge, in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (supra), held, (on the basis of the fact of the given case) that merely on the ground that the award is exorbitant and unjust, no writ petition can be filed for adjudication, for, such a writ petition, if entertained, would amount to expansion of limited right of appeal given, under Section 149(2), to the insurer, It is, thus, clear that the learned single Judge, in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (supra) (i.e. WP(C) No. 3614/2005), declined to exercise jurisdiction on the well established grounds, as indicated in Sadhana Lodh (supra). Since it has not been clearly held, in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (supra) (i.e. WP(C) No. 3614/2005), that writ jurisdiction under Article 226/227 can never be exercised, at the instance of insurer against an award passed by the Tribunal, this decision cannot be said to run contrary to the decision in Rejina Begum (supra) and Gauri Roy (Deb) (supra).

41. What is, now, of utmost important to note is that on the very day, a decision in Gauri Roy (Deb) (supra), was rendered, i.e., on 18-3-2005, a writ petition was also disposed of by a decision rendered in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Bina Bhattacharjee reported in (2005) 3 GLR 380 : 2006 AIHC 64. It may be pointed out that Bina Bhattacharjee’s case was one of the cases, which was disposed of following the decision in Gauri Roy (Deb) (supra). In Bina Bhattacharjee (supra), since the award was challenged by the insurer only on the quantum of compensation, as being high or excessive, the Court, which had delivered the decisions in Rejina Begum (supra) and Gauri Roy (Deb) (supra), dismissed the writ petition. The relevant observations made, in Bina Bhattacharjee (supra), read as under:

8. It has also been agitated, at the time of hearing of the present writ petition, that the compensation awarded for the injuries sustained by the claimant is unreasonable and not sustainable under the law. While considering this aspect of the matter, it is pertinent to note that though the petitioner has challenged in its writ petition that the quantum of compensation is too high, what need to be noted, in this regard, is that an insurer cannot, as held in Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. . challenge, by way of a writ petition, an award given by a Tribunal on the mere ground that the compensation awarded is high or excessive, for, an erroneous decision, in the absence of any other ground, is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India. That the insurer, such as, the present petitioner, cannot challenge an award made by a Tribunal on the ground of quantum of compensation only cannot be disputed and has not in fact, been disputed before me.

42. The question as to whether a writ petition lies at the instances of an insurer, again, fell for consideration in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krishna Kakati reported in 2005 (4) GLT 712, decided on 25-11-2005, by the learned single Judge, who had rendered the decision in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (supra). In Krishna Kakati (supra), the learned single Judge, having referred to Sadhana Lodh (supra), Rejina Begum (supra) and Gauri Roy (Deb) (supra), did not clearly hold that the learned single Judge was taking a view contrary to Rejina Begum (supra) and Gauri Roy (Deb) (supra). At the same time, however, taking note of the decision, in Bina Bhattacharjee (2006 AIHC 64) (supra), the learned single Judge observed as follows:

10. Yet, we come across another decision rendered by the same learned single Judge deciding Rejina Begum (supra), decided on 18-3-2005 reported in (2005) 3 GLR 380 : 2006 AIHC 64, (Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Bina Bhattacharjee) wherein at paragraph 8, it is held as follows:

8. It has also been agitated, at the time of hearing of the present writ petition that the compensation awarded for the injuries sustained by the claimant is unreasonable and not sustainable under the law. While considering this aspect of the matter, it is pertinent to note that though the petitioner has challenged in its writ petition that the quantum of compensation is too high, what need to be noted, in this regard, is that an insurer cannot, as held in Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. , challenge, by way of a writ petition, an award given by a tribunal on the mere ground that the compensation awarded is high or excessive, for, an erroneous decision, in the absence of any other ground, is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India. That the insurer, such as, the present petition, cannot challenge an award by the Tribunal on the ground of quantum of compensation only cannot be disputed and has not, in fact, been disputed before me.

11. The aforesaid case (Bina Bhattacharjee) being a decision rendered in later point of time, it will have forceful effect than the earlier case decided by the same single Judge in Rejina Begum (supra), which was decided on 20-1 -2005.

12. In view of the aforesaid discussions, I am constrained to hold that in view of the dictum of law laid down by Full Bench of this Court and the Apex Court, more particularly in Sadhana Lodh (supra), this present application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India against the award is not maintainable.

43. From a bare reading of what has been quoted above, it is clear that the learned single Judge, in Krishna Kakati (supra), held as if the decision, in Bina Bhattacharjee (supra), was a correction of the views, which had been expressed in Rejina Begum (supra) and Gauri Roy (Deb) (supra). It, perhaps, escaped the notice of the learned single Judge, in Krishna Kakati (supra), that Bina Bhattacharjee (supra) was a decision rendered on 18-3 2005, i.e., on the very day, the decision was given in Gauri Roy (Deb) (supra).

44. What also clearly surfaces from the above discussion is that it was wrongly assumed, in Krishna Kakati (supra), that the Court, which had decided Rejina Begum (supra) and Gauri Roy (Deb) (supra), had corrected the views, which it had taken in Rajina Begum (supra) and Gauri Roy (Deb) (supra); whereas the factual position is that Rejina Begum (supra) and Gauri Roy (Deb) (supra) did not decide any case. The issue, which the Court had decided, in Rejina Begum (supra) and Gauri Roy (Deb) (supra), was as to whether the constitutional remedy, guaranteed under Article 226 and/or 227, stood completely barred for an insurer against an award made by a Claims Tribunal. So far as the case of Bina Bhattacharjee (supra) is concerned, it was a case, where the Court, upon examining the nature of grievances and the issue involved, took the view that the writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked in a case, where the grievance is only as regards the quantum of compensation, particularly, when there was no accusation or material that the Claims Tribunal had acted arbitrarily, for, the Court, in Bina Bhattacharjee (2006 AIHC 64) (supra), pointed out that even an erroneous decision, in absence of any other ground, is not amenable to writ jurisdiction.

45. What clearly surfaces from the above discussion is that though not in explicit terms, the decisions, in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (supra) and Krishna Kakati (supra), hold that the conclusions reached in Rejina Begum (supra) and Gauri Roy (Deb) (supra) were incorrect and not in consonance with the pronouncement of the Apex Court in Sadhana Lodh (supra). The indication is that the Court, in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (supra) (i.e. WP (C) No. 3614/2005) and Krishna Kakati (supra), did not agree with the exposition of law in Rejina Begum (supra) and Gauri Roy (Deo) (supra), namely, that curtailment of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court by a given statute does not divest and cannot divest the High Court of its constitutional jurisdiction to issue, in an appropriate case, a writ in the nature of certiorari, though the High Court, while acting in exercise of its constitutional power under Articles 226/227, cannot ignore the law or override it; rather, exercise of writ jurisdiction has to subserve the ends of law and not transgress them.

46. The above controversy caught the attention of a Division Bench, in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Guwahati (FTC No. 1) reported in 2006 (1) GLT 746 : 2006 AIHC 2947. The Division Bench, in Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Guwahati, (FTC No. 1) (supra), held that the Full Bench decision, in Milon Rani Saha AIR 2000 Gauhati 136 (supra), is no more a good law in the light of the authoritative pronouncement of law in Sadhana Lodh (supra). The Division Bench also held that the decisions, rendered in Rejina Begum (supra), and Gauri Roy (Deb) (supra), that a writ petition would lie against an award, at the instance of insurer, on grounds other than those mentioned in Section 149 of the Act of 1988, is not correct and overruled.

47. We carefully and minutely read and re-read the decisions, in Rejina Begum (supra) and Gauri Roy (Deb) (supra), but we do not find that in any of these two decisions, the Court had held that ‘on grounds other than those mentioned in Section 149(2)’, an insurer would be able to maintain a writ petition. In fact, the decisions, in Rejina Begum (supra) and Gauri Roy (Deb) (supra), hold (as reflected by para 47 in Rejina Begum (supra), thus:

47. The authorities cited above clearly show that the power of the High Court under Articles 226 and/or 227 cannot be restricted by a statute. The restraint of not interfering with an order, which is adhered to by the High Courts, is really a self-imposed restriction and this restriction will not stand in the way of exercise of writ jurisdiction if the grounds for exercise of such powers exist. In other words, notwithstanding the relief provided, within the scheme of an enactment, against an order passed by a Court or Tribunal, the High Court can still exercise jurisdiction of issuing writ of certiorari under Articles 226 and/or 227. when the Tribunal or the Court, subordinate to the High Court, is found to have acted without jurisdiction i.e. by assuming jurisdiction, where no such jurisdiction exists, or refuses to exercise jurisdiction, where the jurisdiction exists, or acts beyond its jurisdiction or acts in flagrant disregard of law or rule governing its function or in violation of the principles of natural justice occasioning thereby failure of justice or when its order is based on clear misreading or utter disregard of the provisions of law or when it acts under a statute, which is ultra vires. Though a mere erroneous decision is not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 and/or 227. yet when an error is apparent on the face of the proceedings. such as. when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby, the power to issue writ of certiorari under supervisory jurisdiction may be resorted to, though this power should be resorted. to sparingly and only in appropriate cases, where the judicial consciousness of the High Court dictates it to act, lest a gross violation of justice or grave injustice should occasion.

(Emphasis is supplied)

48. We do not find that the above exposition of law, in Rejina Begum (supra), go contrary to the well-established principles of exercise of power of certiorari jurisdiction by the High Court. We do not find Rejina Begum (supra) and/or Gauri Roy (Deb) (supra) having laid down and held anywhere that an insurer can maintain a writ application under Articles 226 and/or 227 ‘on grounds other than those mentioned in Section 149(2)’. We, with utmost humility, point out that the Division Bench, in Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Guwahati (FTC No. 1) (2006 AIHC 2947) (supra), has not correctly appreciated the decisions in Rejina Begum (supra) and/or Gauri Roy (Deb) (supra).

49. Apart from the fact that the Division Bench’s observations, in Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Guwahati (FTC No. 1) (supra), do not fit into the position of law, which was decided in Rejina Begum (supra) and Gauri Roy (Deb) (supra, the effect of the decision rendered in Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Guwahati (FTC No. 1) (supra), is that the Full Bench decision, in Milon Rani Saha (supra), is no longer a good law. In fact, the Full Bench decision, in Milan Rani Saha AIR 2000 Gauhati 136 (supra), had two parts. While at para 13, the Full Bench holds that ‘the award or decision of a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is not immune from judicial review’, it holds, at para 19, that ‘an application for judicial review under Article 226/227 is maintainable against an award of the Tribunal under the M.V. Act at the instance of the insurer on the grounds other than those mentioned under Section 149 of the M.V. Act, 1988’. The latter part of the law, laid down in Milan Rani Saha (supra), appears to go contrary to what Sadhana Lodh (supra) has laid down. But what about the Full Bench’s exposition of law, in Milon Rani Saha (supra), that ‘an award or decision of a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is not immune from judicial review?’ The effect of holding the decision, in Milan Rani Saha (supra), as no longer correct law without clearly specifying as to what part of this decision is no longer correct law gives an impression that whatever has been held, in Milan Rani Saha (supra) by the Full Bench, is incorrect. Are we, now, to understand, in the light of the decision in Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Guwahati (FTC No. 1) (supra), that an award or decision, given by a Claims Tribunal, is immune from judicial review, for, taking such a view would run wholly contrary to the authoritative pronouncement of the Constitution Bench in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India . Even Sadhana Lodh (supra), with great respect, does not, to our mind, lay down any such law. It is time, now, that we put Sadhana Lodh (supra) to a clinical analysis for the purpose of ascertaining as to what Sadhana Lodh (supra) really lays down.

50. Let us, first, put the facts of the case as are discernible from the decision referred to in Sadhana Lodh (supra). The facts, in brief, appear to be thus : Against an award of Rs. 3,50,000/- the insurer came before this Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. While a learned single Judge dismissed the writ application, the Division Bench entertained the same and interfered with the award by reducing the amount of compensation from Rs. 3,50,000/- to Rs. 3,00,000/-. It was in the factual see nario of this kind that the decision in Sadhana Lodh (supra) needs to be appreciated. It was contended before the Supreme Court, on behalf of the claimant, that when a remedy of appeal is available to the insurer, an application under Article 227 was misconceived. This submission was sought to be countered by the insurer by contending that since an insurer has limited grounds of appeal available to it under Section 173 of the M.V. Act, 1988, and when, by availing any of these grounds, an insurer cannot challenge the award questioning the quantum of compensation, it should be opened for the insurer to file a writ application under Article 226/227. This argument, raised on behalf of the insurer, was repelled by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the manner as indicated in para 6 of the decision, which is reproduced hereinbelow:

The right of appeal is a statutory right and where the law provides remedy by filing an appeal on limited grounds, the grounds of challenge cannot be enlarged by filing a petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution on the premise that the insurer has limited grounds available for challenging the award given by the Tribunal. Section 149(2) _ of the Act limits the insurer to file an appeal on those enumerated grounds and the appeal being a product of the statute it is not open to an insurer to take any plea other than those provided under Section 149(2) of the Act. (See National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nicolletta Rohtagi ). This being the legal position, the petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution by the insurer was wholly misconceived. Where a statutory right to file an appeal has been provided for, it is not open to High Court to entertain a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. Even where a remedy by way of an appeal has not been provided for against the order and judgment of a District Judge, the remedy available to the aggrieved person is to file a revision before the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Where remedy for filing a revision before the High Court under Section 1 15 of Code of Civil Procedure has been expressly barred by a State enactment, only in such case a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution would lie and not under Article 226 of the Constitution. As a matter of an illustration, where a trial Court in a civil suit refused to grant temporary injunction and an appeal against refusal to grant injunction has been rejected and a State enactment has barred the remedy of filing revision under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code, in such a situation a writ petition under Article 227 would lie and not under Article 227 of the Constitution. Thus where the State legislature has barred a remedy of filing a revision petition before the High Court under Section 115. Civil Procedure Code, no petition under Article 226 of the Constitution would lie for the reason that a mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

51. We are unable to locate, in the decision of Sadhana Lodh (supra), any observation made by the Supreme Court to the effect that in view of the limited right of appeal provided to an insurer under Section 149(2) of the M.V. Act, 1988. interference with such an award by invoking Articles 226 and/or 227, is impermissible even if recognized principles for interference with such an award exists; for instance, when the Claims Tribunal has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction or in flagrant disregard of law or rules or procedure or in violation of the principles of natural justice occasioning failure of justice. Undoubtedly, a mere wrong decision by a Tribunal, which has the jurisdiction to decide, cannot be a ground for interference under Article 226 and/or 227. The Apex Court observed, in Sadhana Lodh (supra), that a mere wrong decision without anything more’ is not enough to attract jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The expression without anything more’, used in Sadhana Lodh (supra), is, to our mind, of greatest significance. The decision, in Sadhana Lodh (supra), has to be read in the background of the authorities, which lay down the parameters of exercise of writ jurisdiction by High Courts under Articles 226 and 227, and when read in this light, it clearly follows that what the Apex Court has laid down, in Sadhana Lodh (supra), is that a writ Court cannot convert itself into a Court of appeal and thereby enlarge the limited grounds on which an award can be impugned in the appeal by an insurer. Sadhana Lodh (supra), nowhere, lays down that a decision or award of a Claims Tribunal is immune from judicial review or even when, in a given case, well-accepted norms for exercise of writ jurisdiction and present, such exercise of power under Articles 226/227 is not possible, because of the limitations imposed by Section 149(2). We are of the view that if the conditions precedent for exercise of powers Under Article 226/227 exist, the same cannot be ignored merely because the State has not provided an unlimited right of appeal, for, doing so would amount to accepting a proposition that by providing a right of appeal, limited or otherwise, the Legislature can take away the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 and/or 227. No doubt, the writ jurisdiction shall be exercised, as laid down in Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India , to effectuate the rule of law and not to abrogate it and while the powers under Article 226 cannot be circumscribed by any enactment, the legislative intent, as evidenced by the enactment, must be given due regard and the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 has to be consistent with the provisions of the enactment and not contrary thereto. In short, thus, when the M.V. Act, 1988, prescribes a complete scheme for the relief of granting of compensation and lays down, with the help of the provisions, such as, Section 149(2), the conditions subject to which an insurer can exercise right of appeal, the High Court cannot, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 and/or 227, convert itself into a Court of appeal and determine the correctness of the decision; but when the Claims Tribunal oversteps its jurisdiction or indulges in arbitrariness in granting compensation or it acts in denial of the principles of natural justice or acts without jurisdiction or in flagrant disregard of the law or the procedure occasioning thereby failure of justice, interference in exercise of certiorari jurisdiction will not only be possible, but would become imperative, for, non-interference even in such cases, where the exercise of powers under Article 226 and/or 227 is warranted, will amount to abdicating by the High Court its authority under Article 226/227, which forms the basic structure of the Constitution. Such a course, as appears to have been suggested by the Division Bench decision in Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Guwahati, (FTC No. 1) (2006 AIHC 2947) would be contrary to the established principles governing exercise of writ jurisdiction and cannot, in any way, be described to be in tune with what Sadhana Lodh (supra) lays down.

52. It is trite that a decision is an authority for what is actually decides and not what can be deduced from it. Though even obiter dictum of the Supreme Court is binding on all the Courts the fact remains that to be a binding authority or precedent on any specific issue, the issue must be, at least, raised and answered directly or by implication. Reference may be made to Haryana Financial Corporation v. Jagadamba Oil Mills , wherein the Apex Court has observed, “Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed.” Observations of Courts are not to be read as Euclid’s theorems nor as provisions of the statute. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear”. Reference may also be made to Padma Sundara Rao v. State of Tamil Nadu , wherein the Apex Court has laid down, “Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed.” The Apex Court has explained the doctrine of precedent in Krishna Kumar v. Union of India . thus, “The doctrine of judicial precedent, that is being bound by a previous decision, is limited to the decision itself and as to what is necessarily involved in its.” Clarifying the doctrine of stare decisis, the Apex Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Sun Engineering Works (P.) Ltd. , held, “it is neither desirable nor permissible to pick out a word or a sentence from the judgment of this Court, divorced from the context of the question under consideration and treat it to be the complete ‘Law’ declared by this Court. The judgment must be read as a whole and the observations from the judgment have to be considered in the light of the questions which were before this Court. A decision of this Court takes its colour from the questions involved in the case in which it is rendered and while apply the decision to a later case, the Courts must carefully try to ascertain the true principle laid down by the decision of this Court and not to pick out words or sentences from the judgment-divorced from the context of the questions under consideration by this Court, to support their reasonings. In Madhav Rao Scindia Bahadur v. Union of India this Court cautioned:

It is not proper to regard a word, a clause or a sentence occurring in a judgment of the Supreme Court, divorced from its context, as containing a full exposition of the law on a question when the question did not even fall to be answered in that judgment.

53. Keeping in view the above fundamental principles of interpretation of the doctrine of judicial precedents, when we, once again, revert to the case of Sadhana Lodh (supra), we notice that the limited question raised, in Sadhana Lodh (supra), was as to whether by taking recourse to Article 226/227, the High Court can interfere with the quantum of compensation awarded by a Claims Tribunal merely on the ground of erroneous use of multiplier. It is in this context that Sadhana Lodh (supra) laid down that the writ Court cannot act like a Court of appeal, for, while exercising the certiorari jurisdiction, the Apex Court, as held in Surya Dev (supra), assumes that the subordinate Court, which has the jurisdiction to decide the matter, has also the jurisdiction to decide the same erroneously and whether the decision is correct or incorrect cannot become the subject-matter for assuming jurisdiction under Article 226/227 unless the well recognized conditions precedent for exercise of such powers exist on record.

54. In fact, it was pointed out in Rejina Begum (supra), while analyzing the decision in Sadhana Lodh (supra) this, “If the objections raised on behalf of the respondents that Sadhana Lodh (supra) bars jurisdiction of the High Court completely under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution is accepted, the same would not only be contrary to the established law of the land, as has been indicated hereinabove, but also prove disastrous, for such an approach would set at naught the whole object with which Articles 226 and 227 stand embodied in the Constitution. Let me, now, consider some examples in this regard. Let us assume for a moment, that a Tribunal, without giving any notice, in terms of Section 170 of the M.V. Act, to an insurer, determines the amount of compensation and, then, directs the insurer to make payment of the compensation so awarded; such an order, though contrary to the provisions of Section 170 and also in violation of the principles of natural justice, is not appealable under Section 173 of the M.V. Act inasmuch as Section 149(2) makes no mention of the fact that omission to give notice to the insurer can be made a ground to challenge the award. In a situation, such as this, the insurer would be saddled with the liability to indemnify the insured without having been accorded any opportunity of hearing. Such an order would not only be in flagrant disregard of the very scheme of the M.V. Act, but it would also be against the principles of natural justice. Can, in such a factual scenario, the High Court refuse to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226/227 if it is satisfied that what the insurer alleges is correct; the answer to this question has to be an emphatic ‘no’, for, any affirmative answer to the question so posed would be totally contrary to the law and wholly inconsistent with the authorities cited above. An affirmative answer, in this regard, would amount to allowing the legislature to whittle down the powers of the High Court under Article 226 and/or 227, though the same have been held to form part of the basic structure of Constitution. Assume, for a moment, that an insurer is not allowed to be represented by a lawyer of its own choice before the Tribunal under the M.V. Act. In such a case, though Section 149 of the M.V. Act does not entitle the insurer to challenge the award on the ground of its not having been allowed a lawyer of its choice to represent it before the Tribunal, the fact remains that such a right cannot be denied to an insurer and must, therefore, be interfered with by the High Court, if necessary, by taking resort to Articles 226/227, notwithstanding the fact that the denial of such an opportunity is not provided as a ground for appeal to the insurer under Section 149. It me also assume a situation in which the registered owner of a vehicle, while taking out his car from inside his garage located within his compound, injures one of the inmates of his own house. Though the accident has not taken place on account of the use of the vehicle at a public place, no insurance policy existed for such an accident and no compensation can be awarded in such a situation in terms of the insurance policy, yet if the Tribunal awards compensation in such a case, can the insurer challenge the award on the ground that it is statutorily and contractually not liable to pay compensation in the case. In such a case too, non-interference by the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction would be tantamount to allowing the Tribunal to award compensation in respect of an accident, which was outside the ambit of the M.V. Act itself, though such a violation is not perceived as a ground for appeal under Section 149. Similarly, where the evidence given on record is that a deceased rickshaw-puller used to earn Rs. 1,000/- per month, can the Tribunal arbitrarily hold that the rickshaw-puller must be earning Rs. 10,000/- per month and determine compensation on the basis of such an amount. Though a mere error in computing the compensation may not become a ground for exercise of certiorari jurisdiction, yet if the determination of compensation suffers ex facie from arbitrariness, such arbitrariness cannot be allowed to survive by referring to Section 149(2), for, the rule of law abhors arbitrariness and is anathema to the sense of justice. Let us also take the instance, when a finance of a deceased, who met with an accident, raises a claim for compensation on the ground that she was dependent on the deceased. Though no right of compensation is available under Section 166 of the M.V. Act to a person unless he or she is a legal representative, the Tribunal awards compensation to such a claimant. Can the High Court allow such an award to stand good on record merely on the ground that the legislature has chosen not to allow the insurer the right to impugn the award on the ground that the claimant does not have the locus standi. Allowing ‘ such an award to stand good on record will amount to putting seal of approval on arbitrariness of the Tribunal or the act of the Tribunal, which is wholly contrary to the scheme of the very enactment under which the Tribunal functions.

54. One can, thus, multiply the exemples when the High Court may, notwithstanding the limited of right of appeal provided to the insurer under Section 149(2), have to interfere in certiorari jurisdiction in order to keep the Tribunal within the bounds of law. What the High Court cannot do is to convert itself into a Court of appeal, but it will be too much to say that under no circumstances, the High Court under Article 226/227 can interfere with an award passed by a Tribunal even if the award be a nullity in the eyes of law or is completely perverse or even when the award passed is one, which cannot stand most reluctant judicial scrutiny.

56. It is also worth noticing, if 1 may has ten to emphasize, that merely because of the fact that the High Court, as I have held above, does not enjoy the revisional jurisdiction in respect of appealable awards passed by the Tribunals under the M.V. Act, it does not mean that by curtailing the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, its constitutional jurisdiction to issue writ of certiorari has been taken away.

55. We find ourselves broadly in agreement with what Rejina Begum (supra) lays down.

56. Because of the fact that the decision, in Milon Rani Saha AIR 2000 Gauhati 136 (supra), as a whole, has been held to be no longer a good law, the effect is not only that a writ petition on the grounds other than Section 149(2) would not be maintain able at the instance of the insurers, but that an award or decision of the Claims Tribunal would be totally immune from the perview of Article 226/227 except, perhaps, on grounds of fraud.

57. We find ourselves in complete agreement with the views expressed, in Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. Guwahati (FTC No. 1) (2006 AIHC 2947) (supra), that a writ petition, at. the instance of an insurer. would not lie on grounds other than those mentioned in Section 149(2)’ and to this extent. Milon Rani Saha (supra) may be held to be no longer a good law. But as regards the decision, in Milon Rani Saha (supra), to the effect that a Claims Tribunal’s award or decision is not immune from judicial review, we find that that it is still a correct position of law. Similarly, the decision, rendered in Rejina Begum (supra) and followed in Gauri Roy (Deb) (supra), is correct to the effect that when a Claims Tribunal acts without jurisdiction, i.e., by assuming jurisdiction, where no such jurisdiction exists, or refuses to exercise jurisdiction, where the jurisdiction exists, or acts beyond its jurisdiction or acts in flagrant disregard of law or rule governing its function or in violation of the principles of natural justice occasioning thereby failure of justice or when its order is based on clear misreading or utter disregard of the provisions of law, the High Court’s power under Articles 226 and/or 227 can be invoked. True it is that a mere erroneous decision of a Claims Tribunal is not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227, yet when an error is apparent on the face of the proceedings, such as, when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby, the power to issue writ of certiorari under supervisory jurisdiction may be resorted to, though this power should be resorted to sparingly and only in appropriate cases, where the Judicial consciousness of the High Court dictates it to act, lest a gross violation of justice or grave injustice should occasion.

58. We agree that an insurer cannot maintain a writ petition ‘on grounds other than those mentioned in Section 149 (2), but we need to restate that the award or decision, rendered by a claims Tribunal, is not wholly immune from judicial review. Hence, it cannot be said a correct proposition of law that under no circumstances, an insurer can invoke extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226/227. It would, therefore, essentially depend upon the ground(s), on which a writ petition is filed by an insurer, challenging an award. If the writ petition seeks merely to expand the limited right of appeal given to the insurer under Section 149 (2), then, the writ petition would not lie; but if the writ petition challenges an award on the accepted and well-established grounds, exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 cannot be barred and the doors of the High Court cannot be shut on the face of the insurer and it cannot be held that the constitutional remedy under Articles 226 and 227 would never be available to the insurers unless an award is obtained by fraud. The decisions, in Rejina Begum (supra) and Gauri Roy (Deb) (supra), nowhere, took the view that ‘on grounds other than those mentioned in Section 149 (2), an insurer can maintain a writ petition, for, such an exposition of law would have obviously run contrary to the decision in Sadhana Lodh, (supra), which has made it clear that the limited right of appeal given to the insurer, under Section 149, cannot be expanded by taking recourse to Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. In fact, even the Division Bench, in Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Guwahati (FTC No. 1), (2006 AIHC 2947) (supra), does not appear to have boldly held that even when well-established principles governing exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 exist, an insurer cannot maintain a writ application against an award of a Claims Tribunal. The effect, however, of overruling the decisions, in Rejina Begum (supra) and Gauri Roy (Deb) (supra), is that even when a Claims Tribunal acts without jurisdiction i.e. by assuming jurisdiction, where no such jurisdiction exists, or refuses to exercise Jurisdiction, where the jurisdiction exists, or acts beyond its jurisdiction or acts in flagrant disregard of law or rule governing its function or in violation of the principles of natural justice occasioning thereby failure of justice or when its order is based on clear misreading or utter disregard of the provisions of law, no writ petition would lie. With greatest respect, we find ourselves unable to subscribe to such limitations having been imposed by Sadhana Lodh (supra). True it is that a mere erroneous decision of a Claims Tribunal is not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227, yet when an error is apparent on the face of the proceedings, such as, when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law or gross failure of justice has occasioned “thereby, the power to issue writ of certiorari under supervisory jurisdiction may be resorted to, though this power should be resorted to sparingly and only in appropriate cases, where the judicial consciousness of the High Court dictates it to act, lest a gross violation of justice or grave injustice should occasion. A High Court would not remain a mute spectator and refuse to exercise jurisdiction if an insurer comes to the High Court with a writ application under Articles 226 and/or 227 with any of such grievances as indicated hereinbefore.

59. What the High Court in exercise of power under Articles 226 and/or 227, cannot do is to convert itself into a Court of appeal and start appreciating or correcting every error in an award or decision of a Claims Tribunal, for, when a Claims Tribunal has jurisdiction and has taken a decision, such decision, even if erroneous, cannot be interfered with unless there is something more than a mere error.

Though the Division Bench has held, in Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Guwahati (FTC No. 1) (2006) AIHC 2947 (supra), that Rejina Begum (supra) and Gauri Roy (Deb) (supra) have laid down an incorrect proposition of law, we find ourselves unable to agree to, for, Rejina Begum (supra) and Gauri Roy (Deb) (supra) do not lay down any such law as has been ascribed to these two decisions to have laid down.

60. What crystallizes from the above discussion is that Sadhana Lodh, (supra) has not made an award of a Claims Tribunal wholly immune from the power of judicial review and superintendence of the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227. The insurer cannot be wholly denied the guarantee of constitutional remedy under Articles 226/227 on the ground that entertaining a writ petition against an award or decision of a Claims Tribunal would amount to expanding the limited right of appeal given to the insurer under Section 149 (2), for, this would amount to saying that even the Registry of a High Court would refuse to register a writ petition filed by an insurer rather than the High Court examining the writ petition and decided as to whether or not it would entertain the writ petition. Logically, therefore, a High Court has the duty to, at least, examine each writ petition and, then, decide for itself as to whether it would, in a given case, interfere or not with an award of decision of a Claims Tribunal.

61. What follows from he above discussion is that the doors of the High Court cannot be shut permanently at the face of the insurer except when the insurer challenges an award on the ground of fraud. The Registry of a High Court cannot, therefore, refuse to register a writ petition filed by an insurer against an award of a Claims Tribunal, for, it will be for the High Court to decide, on judicial side, in every writ petition, if, in the facts and circumstances of a given case, writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 can or cannot be invoked. To put it a little differently, in an appropriate case, there is no complete bar for the High Court to exercise jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 and the High Court cannot decide the question as to whether it should or it should not exercise such jurisdiction unless it examines the grievances made by an insurer in every writ petition. With greatest of respect and with utmost humility, we point out that there is no justification in overruling the decisions, in Rejina Begum (supra) and Gauri Roy (Deb) (supra), for, overruling of these decisions, on a wholly incorrect ground (as discussed above), would convey an impression that the High Court’s jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 would not be available to an insurer even in an appropriate case, for, neither Regina Begum (supra) nor Gauri Roy (Deb (supra) has held anywhere that ‘on grounds other than mentioned under Section 149 (2) of the MV Act, 1988’, a writ petition, at the instance of the insurer, under Articles 226/227, is maintainable. There was, we point out with utmost reluctance, no justification in overruling the decisions in Rejina Begum (supra) and Gauri Roy (Deb) (supra). A lager Bench is, therefore, to our mind required to look into the entire series of judgments and lay down a correct position of law with regard to the role of the High Court under Articles 226/227 on a petition if filed, under Articles 226/227, by an insurer against an award of a Claims Tribunal. We are, therefore, of the view that the matter needs to be laid before an appropriate Bench.

62. Considering, therefore, the matter in its entirety and in the interest of justice, the Registry is hereby directed to lay the matter before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for consideration if the matter need be placed before an appropriate Bench for laying down a correct position of law on the insurer’s right to invoke High Court’s jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 against an award or decision of a Claims Tribunal in the backdrop of the limitations imposed by Sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the MV Act, 1988.