JUDGMENT
M.S. Deshpande, J.
1. By these two writ petitions the orders passed by the Maharashtra State Co-operative Appellate Court, Bombay (‘Appellate courts’ for short) in two revision application affirming the order passed by the Co-operative Court, one allowing the application for adding parties and the other for consequential amendment passed on 4th and 27th February, 1985, are being challenged.
2. Nine disputants, present respondents Nos. 3 to 11 filed Election Dispute No. 663 of 1984 before the Co-operative Court, Nagpur against petitioners Nos. 4 to 16 challenging the elections to various offices of the petitioner No. 1, the Posts and Telegraphs Central Co-operative Society, Ltd. The dispute was resisted by the written statement dated 7-11-1984 on various grounds, one of them being that the dispute was bad as the society and other necessary parties to the dispute had not been impleaded. It may be mentioned that the results of the elections which were being disputed, were declared on 24th September, 1984 and the dispute was raised on 19-10-1984. After the contentions were raised in the written statement on 7-11-1984 an application for joining parties and amendments was filed on 19-11-1984. The contesting respondents filed reply to it on 7-12-1984 and the order permitting the addition of parties was passed on 4-2-1985 and the amendment came to be allowed by another order passed on 7-2-1985. These orders were questioned by filing two separate revisions before the Appellate Court which were dismissed on 11-10-1985.
3. The contentions raised by Shri R.B. Pendharkar, the learned Counsel for the petitioners in these petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution are that the dispute could not have been entertained by the Co-operative Court as it was not a properly constituted dispute and amendment to an election dispute was not permissible. Secondly, it was urged that since the procedure provided by the Code of Civil Procedure in regard to suits had to be followed as far as it can be made applicable in all proceedings in any Court of Civil jurisdiction, in view of the provisions of section 141 of the Civil Procedure Code, the requirements of Order 1, Rule 10(5) had to be satisfied and as the period of limitation prescribed for election petition was of two months under section 92(1)(d) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, and as under sub-rule (5) of Rule 10 of Order 1, the proceedings as against the person added as respondent shall be deemed to have begun only after the service of the summons the claim against the newly added respondents to the dispute was barred by time.
4. Chapter X of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 deals with settlement of disputes. Section 91 deals generally with disputes while section 92 has reference to limitation. It is necessary to reproduce section 92 on which most of the arguments were addressed. It runs as follows:
92(1). Notwithstanding anything contained in the Limitation Act, 1963 but subject to the specific provisions made in this Act, the period of limitation in the case of a dispute referred to the Co-operative Court under the last preceding section shall-
(a) when the dispute relates to the recovery of any sum including interest thereon, due to a society by a member thereof be computed from the date on which such member dies or ceases to be a member of the society;
(b) when the dispute is between a society or its committee, and any past committee, any past or present officer, or past or present agent, or past or present servant or the nominee, heir or legal representative of a deceased officer, deceased agent or deceased servant of the society, or a member, or past member, or the nominee, heir or legal representative of a deceased member and when the disputes relates to any act or omission on the part of either party to the dispute, be six years from the date on which the act or omission with reference to which the dispute arose, took place;
(c) when the dispute is in respect of any matter touching the constitution, management or business of a society which has been ordered to be wound up under section 102, or in respect of which nominated committee or an administrator has been appointed under section 77-A or 78, be six years from the date of the order issued under section 102, or section 77-A or 78 as the case may be;
(d) when the dispute is in respect of an election of a committee or officers of the society, be two months from the date of the declaration of the result of the election.
(2) The period of limitation in the case of any other dispute except those mentioned in the forgoing sub-section which are required to be referred to the Co-operative Court under the last preceding section shall be regulated by the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, as if the dispute were a suit and the Co-operative Court a Civil Court.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) and (2), the Co-operative Court may admit a dispute after the expiry of the limitation period, if the applicant satisfies the Co-operative Court that he had sufficient cause for not referring the dispute within such period and the dispute so admitted shall be a dispute which shall not be barred on the ground that the period of limitation had expired.”
Section 94 deals with the procedure for settlement of disputes and powers of the Co-operative Court. For this submission that the dispute was not properly constituted and if it was not properly constituted, it would not be amended and new parties included. Shri Pendharkar referred to the observations of the Supreme Court in Mohan Raj v. Surendra Kumar, and K. Venkataswara Rao v. Bekkam Narasimha Reddi, , but both these cases were under the Representation of the People Act. After referring to the enabling provisions of Order 1, Rule 10 and Order 6, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Supreme Court observed that these provisions cannot be used by the Court to avoid the consequence of non-joinder for which the special provision is to be found in the Representation of the People Act, under which the petition had to be dismissed if the necessary parties were not joined and the power of amendment or to strike out the parties cannot be used at all. That was because section 82 shows who was necessary party to an election petition which must be filed within 45 days of the election as laid down in section 81 and under section 86(1) it is incumbent on the High Court to dismiss the election petition which does not comply with the provisions of section 81 or 82. Similar provisions are not to be found relating to election disputes in the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, and the rulings on which reliance was placed by Shri Pendharkar would not lend any assistance to petitioners.
5. Having regard to the scheme of the Maharashtra Co-operation Societies Act, and the provisions to be found in chapter IX, it is apparent that the authorities will adjudicate the dispute for all intents and purpose and discharges the same function and duties in the same manner as a Court of law. They satisfy the essential condition to constitute a Court in the sense that the Court should have apart from some trappings of a judicial tribunal the power to give a decision or definitive judgment which has finality and authoritativeness which are essential tests of judicial pronouncement. Section 141 if the Code of Civil Procedure, was held to apply to a pauper Petition in respect of an application made by assessee under section 256(2) of the Income Tax Act in Jatashankar Dayaram v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, 76 Bom.L.R. 811. In Ramchandra v. State of U.P, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1988 proceeding before the Civil Court arising out of a reference to it under section 146(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, was held to be civil proceeding as contemplated by section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In respect of a proceeding before the Registrar’s Nominee under Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961, it was held in Dharangadhra Taluka Sahakari Kharid Vhechan Sangh v. Rampratap Hakimchand and Co., that as the proceeding before the Registrar’s Nominee under the Gujarat Co-op. Societies Act, are civil proceedings before a Court, there cannot, therefore, be any doubt that a procedure provided in the Code of Civil Procedure would apply to be proceedings the Co-operative court as far as it can be made applicable.
6. The question as to whether the provision of sub-rule (5) of Rule 10 of Order 1 of the Code Civil Procedure, would in terms apply to the election disputes under section 92(1)(c) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, would have to be answered to reference to the text of that section. Section 92(1) opens with the non-obstante clause notwithstanding anything contained in the Limitation Act, 1963, but subject to the specific provisions made in this Act. The prescribed period of limitation is respect of the disputes under section 92 Clauses (a), (b) and (c) is six years from the date on which the act or omission with regard to the disputes arose, took place, while in respect of the disputes in respect of the election of a committee or officer of the society under Clause (d) the period of limitation prescribed is two months from the date of declaration on the result of the election. A separate period of limitation is prescribed in respect of the matters covered by sub-section (2), and sub-section (3) provided for enlargement of time in certain cases. These provisions have to be read in relation to section 94 which prescribes the procedure for settlement of disputes and powers of the Co-operative Court. Shri Pendharkar emphasised that the first part of section 94(1) requires that the Co-operative Court shall hear the disputes in the manner prescribed, that is in the context of the definition of “prescribed” under section 2(21) meaning prescribed by rules, while the later portion of sub-section (1) only deals with the powers to summon and enforce attendance of witnesses including the parties, recording of evidence and production of documents, which has to be done in the same manner as is provided in the case of a civil suit in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
7. The subject of joinder of parties is dealt with by Clause (c ) of sub-section (3) of section 94 and the provisions are similar to those of Order 1, Rule 10(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the question of addition or deletion of parties is dealt with by Clause (c) which is similar to sub-rule (2) of Order 1, Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code. It is important to note that there is no clause similar to Order 1, Rule 10(5) of the Civil Procedure Code and when detailed provisions about limitation and joiner of parties came to be made, it is evident that the omission to make a provision similar to Order 1, Rule 10(5) was deliberate and it was not intended that the proceedings against any person added as a respondent shall be deemed to have begun only on service of summons. Considering the detailed provisions made with regard to the limitation and procedure, it was evident that the dispute should be raised in respect of the election within two months from the date of the declaration of the result of the election and if any necessary party is to be added to the dispute he should be added within two months from the date of the declaration of the result of the election; otherwise the dispute would be rendered improperly constituted by the omission to join the necessary party. It would not be permissible in these circumstances by recourse to section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to introduce into Chapter IX of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, Order 1, Rule 10(5) of the Code of Civil Provision, in the face of the clear provisions which so far as limitation is concerned, constitute a complete Code in itself.
8. The next point urged by Shri Pendharkar was that the Order impleading the parties and allowing the amendment should have been made within two months of the declaration of the result. It is true that a suit is not said to be properly constituted unless all the necessary parties are impleaded and persons who thought to be joined as parties are made parties as they are the persons necessary to the constitution of the suit. However, it was not necessary as urged by Shri Pendharkar that the order about the addition of parties and allowing the amendment should have been made within two months from the date of the declaration of the result. All that is necessary is that the application for addition of a party to a suit must be made within the period prescribed for the suit and when that is done, it is immaterial if the order allowing the application comes to be made after the prescribed period of limitation. The party will be deemed to have been added on the date when the application was made and not on the date of the order. This is because after making the application, the party would have no control on the proceedings before the Court and it cannot be held responsible for the delay that may be occasioned in passing the order. I am supported in this view by the observations in Ramkrishna Moreshwar v. Ramabai, I.L.R. 17 Bom. 29 and Chandubhai Explosives Private Ltd. v. Union Bank of India, 1984 Mh.L.J. 108. In the present case this requirement was satisfied and the application for impleaded the new parties and for amendment could not have been rejected as being beyond time.
9. It was urged on behalf of the respondents that as the order passed by the two authorities below were discretionary orders, this Court should not interfere with the observations of a Division Bench of this Court in Mrs. Vijayalaxmi H. Paradkar v. Trimbak V. Dongre, 1982, All India Co-operative Tribunal Journal, 166. However, in the view that I have taken on the points of law which have arisen, it is not necessary also to interfere on merits.
10. In the result, I see no merit in the two writ petitions. The rule is discharged with costs.