JUDGMENT
Rajamannar, C.J.
1. The main question in, this application is whether the Madras Restriction of Habitual Offenders Act (Act 6 of 1348) in its entirety or any of its provisions has become void after the coming into force of the new Constitution as being inconsistent with the provisions of Part III of it. The 16 petitioners are residents of Ramjeenagar, a village in Tiruchirapalli taluk or Tiruchirapalli District. One of them, namely, the first petitioner, was served with a memorandum of the proceedings of the District Magistrate, Tiruchirapalli, dated 12-5-1951. It is alleged that similar notices were intended to be served on the other petitioners and other persons The memorandum is in the following terms:
“Memorandum for imposing restrictions on Habitual offenders:
It is hereby informed that as the person whose name and address is described below has been registered under the Criminal Tribes Act, 1924, and as he within a period of five years immediately preceding 29-4-1948 had been either ordered to give security for good behaviour with reference’ to Section 110, Cr. P. C. or convicted of an offence under Section 24 of the said Act or of a non-bailable offence under any other law, a notification is deemed to have been issued under Section 3, Sub-section (1), Restriction of the Habitual Offenders Act, 1948, he is declared to be subject to all the provisions of the said Act, and further subject to all the restrictions imposed under the Criminal Tribes Act before 29-4-1948. Further the said person is informed that he is bound to intimate to village or police officers of the place mentioned in column 5 of the schedule hereunder every change or intended change of his residence. (By order)
Sd. G.M. Muthuswami,
for District Magistrate,
Fascimile of Muthukannu,
Huzur Head Clerk.
SCHEDULE
No.
No. under Criminal Tribes Act
Name
Father’s Name
Residence
Particulars of the place to which the person is confined.
1
2
3
4
5
6
14
26C/TRIKEP
Arumngnin Semi
Ponniah Palani-sudi
Ramjeenagar’
Within five uniles round Itam-jeenagar Area.
To understand the implication of this notice and the contentions of learned counsel for the petitioners it is necessary to refer to the provisions of the impugned Act as well as the prior enactments, namely, the Criminal Tribes Act, 1924, and the Madras Restriction of Habitual Offenders Act, 1943.
2. The Criminal Tribes Act was passed by the Indian Legislature in 1924 and was amended by the Criminal Tribes (Madras Amendment) Act, 1943 and another amending Act of 1945. It is useful to first refer to its main provisions as they stood before the amendments. Under Section 3 of that Act, if the Provincial Government had reason to believe that any tribe, gang or class of persons or any part thereof was addicted to the systematic commission of non-bailable offences, it was empowered to declare by notification that such tribe, gang or class of part thereof was a criminal tribe for the purposes of that Act. Sections 4 to 9 deal with the registration of members of any criminal tribe or part of a criminal tribe by the District Magistrate. The District Magistrate had to publish a notice at the place where the register was to be made and other places as he thought fit calling upon all the members of the criminal tribe to appear at a time and place specified before the person appointed in that behalf and to give that person such information as may be necessary to enable him to make the register. The District Magistrate was given the power of exempting any member from registration. After the preparation of the register, no person’s name could be added to the register nor any register cancelled except by or under an order in writing by the District Magistrate. Section 7, Sub-section (2) expressly provides that before the name of any person is added to the register the Magistrate shall give notice to the person concerned. Section 8 is as follows:
“Any person deeming himself aggrieved by any entry made, or proposed to be made, in such register, either when the register is first made or subsequently, may complain to the District Magistrate against such entry, and the Magistrate shall retain such person’s name on the register, or enter it therein or erase it therefrom, as he may think fit.”
Under Section 10 the Provincial Government may, by notification, issue in respect of any criminal tribe either or both the following directions, namely, that every registered member shall in the prescribed manner (a) report himself at fixed intervals and (b) notify his place of residence and any change or intended change of residence and any absence or intended absence from his residence. Section 11 provided that if the Provincial Government considered it expedient that any criminal tribe or any part or member of such tribe should be restricted in its or his movements to any specified area or settled in any place of residence, it could declare that such tribe, part of the tribe or member shall be restricted in its or his movements to the areas specified in the notification, or shall be settled in the place of residence so specified as the case may be. Before making such a declaration the Provincial Government had to consider certain matters set out in Section 11(2). Power to vary the specified area of restriction was given to the Government under Section 12. Sections 16 to 19 dealt with the establishment of industrial, agricultural or reformatory settlements and provided for placing members of the tribe in such settlements. There is also provision for establishing schools for children of the criminal tribe. Section 20 confers on the Provincial Government the power to make rules. Sections 21 and 22 deal with the penalties for breach of the sections or rules framed under the Act. Section 24 is a special section providing for punishment even when no actual offence is committed, It is in these terms:
“Whoever, being a registered member of any criminal tribe, is found in any place under such circumstances as to satisfy the court, —
(a) that he was about to commit or aid in the commission of, theft or robbery, or
(b) that he was waiting for an opportunity
to commit theft or robbery, shall be punish
able with imprisonment for a term which
may extend to three years and shall also be
liable to fine which may extend to one
thousand rupees,”
3. The other provisions are not material for this application.
4. This Act was amended by Madras Act 29 of 1943. The important amendments carried out by this Act are as follows:
1. The epithet “criminal” was substituted by “notified” in describing the tribe.
2. In Section 3 of the Act a proviso was added that before a notification was issued reasonable opportunity should be given to the tribe, community, group or class or part thereof which ‘ will be affected by the notification to show cause against the issue.
3. Likewise, in Section 5 a proviso was added that before registering any member the District Magistrate shall give him a reasonable opportunity to show cause against such registration.
4. A similar proviso was added to Sub-section (2) of Section 7.
5. Section 8 was deleted.
Along with this Amending Act another Act was passed, Madras Act 30 of 1943, called the Madras Restriction of Habitual Offenders Act. “Habitual offender” was defined for the purposes of the Act as meaning any person
“(a) who has committed not less than three non-bailable offences, or
(b) who has been ordered to give security for good behaviour with reference to Section 110, Cr. P. C., 1898, or
(c) who, by repute as established at a Magisterial enquiry, is addicted to the commission of offences against the public peace or against property or is of such a character that it is necessary to impose restrictions on him under this Act.”
Under Section 3(1) of this Act, if the Provincial Government were satisfied that any person was a habitual offender they could declare that he shall be subject to any of the provisions of the Criminal Tribes Act, 1924 and the rules made thereunder with modifications and restrictions, if any. Section 3(3) provided for a reasonable opportunity being given to the person concerned before any notification was issued in respect of him to show cause against such issue. Section 5 barred the jurisdiction of Courts to question the validity of any notification issued under the Act. Under Section 6, the Provincial Government was empowered to make rules to carry out the purposes of the Act.
5. The Criminal Tribes Act was repealed so far as Madras was concerned by the Criminal Tribes (Madras Repeal) Act, 1947, except for the purpose of Section 3, Madras Restriction of Habitual Offenders Act, 1943.
6. The Madras Restriction of Habitual Offenders Act) 1948 came into force on 29-4-1948. It repealed the Madras Restriction of Habitual Offenders Act, 1943. The definition of a “habitual offender” for the purposes of this Act is as follows:
” ‘Habitual offender’ means a person who before or after the commencement of this Act, has been sentenced to a substantive term of imprisonment, such sentence not having been set aside in appeal or revision, on not less than three occasions, for one or another of the offences under the Indian Penal Code, set forth in the schedule) each of the subsequent sentences having been passed in respect of an offence committed after the passing of the sentence on the previous occasion;
Explanation: The passing of an order requiring a person to give security for good behaviour with reference to Section 110, Cr. P. C., 1898, shall be deemed to amount to the passing of a sentence of substantive imprisonment within the meaning of this clause.”
Section 3, Sub-section (1) provides that the Government may by notification declare that a person shall be subject to the provisions of the Act to such extent and subject to such restrictions if any as may be specified if they are satisfied that he is a habitual offender. They may also cancel or modify such declaration. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 provides for reasonable opportunities being given to the person concerned to show cause against such issue or modification, if the modification was to his disadvantage. Under Section 4 the Government were empowered to delegate their powers under Section 3 to a District Magistrate. The disabilities of a habitual offender are contained in Sections 5 and 6 Every notified offender shall intimate to the prescribed authority his place of residence, every change or intended change thereof and every absence or intended absence therefrom
(Section 5). The Government may by notification
declare if, in their opinion it was expedient to
do so, that any notified offender shall be restricted in his movements to a specified area.
Before making such a declaration the Government had to consider the nature of the offences,
the circumstances in which they were committed, whether the offender follows any lawful occupation genuinely or only as a pretenceand the suitability of the area to which his
movements are to be restricted, the manner in
which he should earn his living in such area
and the adequacy of the arrangements therein.
Under Section 7 the Government may cancel any
declaration made under Section 6 or alter any notified area. Sections 8 to 10 deal with the establishment of settlements. Section 11 relates
to rule-making, and Sections 12 to 14 to penalties
and procedure. Section 16 is the most import
ant section for the purpose of this application,
and may be cited in full:
“1. In respect of every person who stood registered under the Criminal Tribes Act, 1924 (hereinafter in this section referred to as the said Act) at the commencement of this Act and who, within a period of five years immediately preceding such commencement had been either ordered to give security for good behaviour with reference to Section 110, Cr. P, C., 1898 or convicted of an offence under Section 24 of the said Act or of a non-bailable offence under any other law, a notification shall be deemed to have been issued under Section 3, Sub-section 1 of this Act, declaring him to be subject to all the provisions of this Act; and this Act shall apply to every such person accordingly.
2. Every notification issued in respect of any person under Section 3, Madras Restriction of Habitual Offenders Act, 1943, and in force at the commencement of this Act, shall be deemed to have been issued under Section 3, Sub-section (1) of this Act, all references in that notification to the provisions of the said Act and the rules made under it being construed as references to the corresponding provisions of this Act and the rules made under it.
3. Any notification or order issued or made under the said Act in respect of any person referred to in Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2), and in force at the commencement of this Act, restricting the movements of such person or placing him in a settlement shall be deemed to have been issued or made under this Act.
4. AH settlements established under Section 16 of the said Act and existing at the commencement of this Act shall be deemed to have been established under Section 8 of this Act.”
7. It was not disputed that the petitioners before us stood registered under the Criminal Tribes Act, 1924 at the commencement of Madras Act 6 of 1948, i.e., 29-4-1948. Therefore, if any of them had, within a period of five years immediately preceding 29-4-1948 been either ordered to give security for good behaviour under Section 110, Cr. P. C. or was convicted of an offence under Section 24, Criminal Tribes Act or of a non-bailable offence under any other law, a notification shall be deemed to have been issued under Section 3, Sub-section (1) of the Act declaring him to be subject to all the provisions of the Act. It was not denied by the petitioner’s counsel that one or other of these conditions is fulfilled in respect of every one of the petitioners. If so, under Section 16(1) a notification shall be deemed to have been issued under Section 3, Sub-section (1). Section 16(1) does not contemplate the issue of a fresh notification. Nevertheless the District Magistrate apparently thought it better to bring to the notice of the petitioners and others similarly situated the effect of Section 16 of the Act of 1948. We read the memorandum of the District Magistrate referred to earlier on in this judgment, as nothing more than an intimation to the concerned persons of the effect of the enactment. Section 16(3) declares that any notification or order issued or made under the said Act (Criminal Tribes Act) in respect of any person referred to in Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) which was in force at the commencement of the Act restricting the movements of such person or placing him in a settlement shall be deemed to have been issued or made under this Act. Though the memorandum of the Magistrate does not mention the relevant provisions of the Act in detail, the purport of the proceedings is dear. It is merely a reminder to the petitioners and similar persons and does not purport to be a substantive order passed under any section of the Act.
8. If this is realised, the objection, that the notices issued are vague in character and indefinite in particulars in that they do not give the offences committed by the petitioners, the date of conviction and other details, disappears. The learned Judges who directed a ‘rule nisi’ to issue made a note as follows: “We think however this petition should be admitted on another ground, namely, the defects in the notification bringing the petitioners within the scope of the Act. The notification does not ‘inter alia’ indicate the particulars o£ previous convictions or registration under the Criminal Tribes Act applicable to each petitioner and is merely couched generally in terms of the alternative mentioned in Section 16(1) of Act 6 of 1943.” We too were inclined to take the same view at first. But on closer examination of the provisions of Section 16 it became evident that there was no question of any fresh notification being contemplated under that section. The language employed in Section 16(1) is “a notification shall be deemed to have been issued under Section 3(1) of this Act,” No overt action on the part of the Government is necessary for the application of Section 16(1). If any person satisfied the conditions laid down in that sub-section then he automatically comes within the scope of the operation of the Act. Now it is not denied that the petitioners are all persons who stood registered under the Criminal Tribes Act, 1924, at the commencement of Madras Act 6 of 1948. Nor is it denied that every one of them has been convicted of a non-bailable offence or an offence under Section 24, Criminal Tribes Act within a period of five years immediately preceding the commencement of Act 6 of 1948. The schedule appended to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State, the accuracy of which was not disputed, clearly establishes the fact that every one of the petitioners comes within the mischief of Section 16(1). We therefore find that this objection is without substance.
9. Mr. Bhashyam’s main contentions on the constitutional invalidity of the provisions of the Act were based on Articles 14 and 19(1)(d) of the Constitution. Article 14 was sought to be invoked on two grounds. The first is that the Act was discriminatory because it left to the discretion of Government or the Magistrate to take action in respect of the same class of persons, viz., habitual offenders either under Section 110, Cr. P. C. or under the provisions of the Act. Section 110, Cr. P. C., runs thus: “Whenever a Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate, or Sub-divisional Magistrate of the first class specially empowered in this behalf by the Provincial Government receives information that any person within the local limits of his jurisdiction-
(a) is by habit a robber, house breaker, thief, or forger, or
(b) is by habit a receiver of stolen property knowing the same to have been stolen, or
(c) habitually protects or harbours thieves or aids in the concealment or disposal of stolen property, or
(d) habitually commits, or attempts to commit, or abets the commission of, the offence of kidnapping, abduction, extortion, cheating or mischief, or any offence punishable under Chap. XII, I. P. C.; or under Section 48D-A, Section 489-B, Section 489-C or Section 489-D of that Code, or
(e) habitually commits, or attempts to commit, or abets the commission of offences involving a breach of the peace, or
(f) is so desperate and dangerous as to render his being at large without security hazardous to the community.
Such Magistrate, may, in manner hereinafter provided, require such person to show cause why he should not be ordered to execute a bond, with sureties, for his good behaviour for such period, not exceeding three years, as the Magistrate thinks fit to fix.”
A comparison of this section with Section 2(4) which defines “habitual offender” and Section 16, Sub-section (1) which brings certain registered members of tribes notified under the Criminal Tribes Act within the Act demonstrates the difference in the scope of the two enactments. Persons who can be dealt with under Section 110, Cr. P. C. may not necessarily fall within the definition of “habitual offender” in the Act though a “habitual offender” within the meaning of Section 2(4) of the Act may be liable to be proceeded against under Section 110, Cr. P. C. In that case there is nothing to prevent such a person being dealt with both under the Act and under Section 110 of the Code. It will not be accurate to say that the same person is being punished twice for the same offence because neither a declaration under Section 3(1) of the Act nor an order under Section 110 of the Code can be said to be tantamount to punishment for an offence. Both enactments only provide for safeguards in the public Interests, in one case the safeguard consisting in the execution of a security bond for good behaviour and in the other consisting in restriction of movement and an obligation to intimate the whereabouts of the person.
10. Mr. Bhashyam relied on the decision in — ‘Deodat Rai v. State’, (A), in support of this contention of his. There the learned Judges were dealing with the provisions of an Act similar to Madras Act 6 of 1948 but certainly not in ‘pari materia’. The main provision of that Act is Section 3 which lays down that if a Magistrate is, on a police report or otherwise, satisfied with respect to any person that ho is by repute a bad character and is either a habitual offender or a person who habitually manufactures, imports or sells an intoxicant in contravention of the provisions of the. Excise Act of that State or is a keeper of a gambling den or a person who has committed or is about to commit a non-bailable offence contained in Chapter XVI or XVII, I. P. C., or that he is a person who habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences involving a breach of the peace or that he is a person who is so dangerous as to render his being at large without security hazardous to the community, he (that is, the Magistrate) may cause to be served on such person a notice to show cause why he should not be ordered to enter into a bond for his good behaviour or keeping the peace or both. In addition to the order, requiring the person to enter into a bond the Magistrate may also require such person to leave the State if he is not a resident of that State or to leave such area as may be specified or to report his presence or movements in such manner as may be specified. The learned Judges held that the Act is discriminatory; the discrimination lay in the fact that some are left to be prosecuted under Section 110 of the Code while the others are prosecuted under the Act, according to the fancy or whim of the Magistrate or the Police who moved him. Desai J. says:
“It was open to the Legislature of Uttar Pradesh to make a special law regarding habitual criminals or offenders. Making one law for habitual criminals and another law for other criminals would not, by itself, contravene Article 14. Habitual criminals would, of necessity, require a different treatment; so long as the treatment meted out to them has some reasonable connection with their being habitual criminals, they cannot complain on the. ground of inequality of laws. But the law regarding habitual criminals must apply to all habitual criminals alike and should not discriminate between some and others. The impugned Act, however, discriminates between habitual criminals who have acquired a bad reputation and others who have not and the difference in the treatment meted out to them has no intelligible connection with the acquisition, or non-acquisition of a reputation as bad character. There is no reason why habitual criminals who have not acquired a bad reputation should be dealt with under Section 110 of the Code while those who have acquired a bad reputation may be dealt with under the Act.”
Earlier on in his judgment the learned Judge sums up the law as regards the classification and discrimination thus:
“The law that I gather from the above authorities is this. It is absurd to speak of one law for all circumstances; it is sheer impossibility because there must be different laws to deal with different circumstances. What the equal protection clause means is simply this that the same law should govern those similarly circumstanced; it cannot and does not prohibit different laws for these differently circumstanced. The Legislature has full freedom to classify people according to circumstances and enact different laws for different classes; but it must treat equally all similarly circumstanced or falling in one class and the difference in treatment must have some intelligible or rational connection with the difference in circumstances and not be arbitrary. Discrimination among persons in one class or similarly circumstanced whether apparent on the face of the statute or resulting in practice is all that is prohibited under the clause. It is competent for the Legislature to leave it to the discretion of an authority to apply different laws to people in different circumstances but always provided that it lays down a rational standard to guide its discretion or such a standard can be presumed to exist; it cannot leave it to its arbitrary or naked discretion.”
11. With these general observations we are in entire agreement. Whether, applying these general principles, learned Judges were right in holding that the Uttar Pradesh Act which they were considering was unconstitutional in certain respects, it is not necessary for us to say. But clearly these principles have not been violated by the provisions of the Madras Act, which differs widely from the Uttar Pradesh Act. It is obvious that all persons against whom action can be taken under Section 110. Cr. P. C. would not necessarily fall within the definition of “habitual offenders” in Section 2(4) or within Section 16(1) of the Act. There may be instances of overlapping in the sense that the same person may fall within the scope of both the enactments. But then, in such a case action could be taken under both.
12. Mr. Bhashyam, then contended that the Act also made a discrimination between persons coming under Section 2(4) and persons coming under Section 16(1) of the Act. Under Section 3(1) the discretion is vested in the Government or the District Magistrate to whom the powers of Government are delegated to declare or not to declare a person to be subject to the provisions of the Act. It is also provided that before any notification is issued in respect of any person under Sub-section (1) of Section 3 a reasonable opportunity shall be given to him to show cause against such issue of a notification. But under Section 16, Sub-section (1), there is no discretion vested in the Government nor is there any provision for a reasonable opportunity being given to a person who is deemed to be subject to all the provisions of the Act. Undoubtedly this difference is real. But the question is whether persons falling within Section 2(4) and persons falling within Section 16(1) can be said to be both similarly situated. We think not.
A person may be registered as a member of a notified tribe under the Criminal Tribes Act even if he has not actually committed any of the offences mentioned in Section 2(4) of the Act & even though he may not have been required to give security for good behaviour under Section 110, Cr. P. C. He might have been registered because he happened to be a member of a tribe which is addicted to the systematic commission of non-bailable offences. If before the registration under the Criminal Tribes Act a person is given an opportunity to show cause why his name should not be entered in the register or if after the registration a person included in the register is given an opportunity of getting his name removed, it may be said that the Legislature did not find any necessity for again giving him an opportunity to show cause against the application of the Act to him. But the Government may cancel the declaration which is deemed to have been made under Section 3(1). This the Government can do not only in the case of persons falling within Section 2(4) but also in the case of persons falling under Section 16(1) of the Act. Though it might have been more satisfactory if even persons falling under Section 16(1) had been given an opportunity to show cause against the automatic application of the Act to them, yet we cannot hold that because there is no such provision, the Act is discriminatory.
13. The next contention of Mr. Bhashyam was that the provisions of the Act are inconsistent with Article 19(1)(d) of the Constitution which confers the right on all citizens “to move freely throughout the territory of India”. Sub-clause (d) has of course to be read with Article 19(5) which runs as follows:
“Nothing in Sub-clauses (d), (e) and (f) of the said clause (Clause 1) shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights conferred by the said sub-clauses either in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any schedule tribe.”
Undoubtedly the Act does impose restrictions on the right of free movement. The question therefore is whether the restrictions imposed can be said to be reasonable and in the interests of the general public, because in this case it is not suggested that the restrictions are for the protection of the interests of any schedule tribe. It has been pointed out time and again that there cannot be any precise or exhaustive definition of the term “reasonable” nor can any definite tests be laid down to ascertain whether a particular restriction is or is not in the interests of the general public. In this case, however, we do not think that it can be seriously contended that the restrictions imposed by the Act are not in the interests of the general public. Obviously the purpose of the Act is to prevent the commission of crime by persons who by reason of hereditary and traditional inclinations or by inherent nature are prone to commit serious offence. Any legislation which has such a purpose must necessarily be in the interests of the general public who must be protected against a comparatively small section of the community likely to injure the members of the entire community.
14. Are the restrictions then reasonable? Mr. Bhashyam contended that they are not. He impugned both the substantive and procedural provisions of the Act as not being reasonable. Section 5 only requires every notified offender to intimate to the prescribed authority his place of residence and every change or intended change thereof and every absence or intended absence therefrom. The section does impose obligations on a notified offender which it does not impose on other citizens. But there are many other conceivable cases in which intimation of change of residence and notice of absence is necessary. Sometimes such intimation is necessary for official purposes. We see nothing in the provisions of this section which can be said to impose restrictions on the right of free movement, still less any unreasonable restrictions on that right.
15. Section 6 undoubtedly, indeed expressly, provides for the restriction of the movements of notified offenders. It is not every notified offender that is made subject to the restrictions under this section. It is only if, in the opinion of the Government, it is expedient to do so in the case of any particular notified offender that a notification declares him to be restricted in his movements to a specified area. Before malting such a declaration the Government have to consider several important facts and circumstances, for example, the nature of the offences of which the offender has been convicted and the circumstances in which they were committed and whether the offender follows any lawful and bona fide occupation. The suitability of the area to which his movements are to be restricted has also to be considered and the Government should have regard to the opportunity which the offender is likely to have to earn his living in such area adequately. The obvious intention is that these restrictions are imposed only on persons whose record shows that they are likely to be a menace to the general public. The Government are also empowered under Section 7 to cancel any declaration made under Section 6. In — ‘Dr. N.B. Khare v. State of Delhi’, (B), the Supreme Court upheld an externment order which restricted the movements of Dr. Khare in the interests of public safety. It is true that the action in that case was taken under a temporary enactment, whereas the Restriction of Habitual Offenders Act is a permanent one. It is also true that the notification imposing restrictions under Section 6 need not fix any period. If the Government do not choose to cancel the declaration the restrictions may continue till the end of the life of the notified offender. Nevertheless we think that the validity of the impugned provisions must be upheld as reasonable because of the purpose behind such restriction. It is assumed that the notified offenders are persons who commit serious offences by habit and not on momentary provocation. If the movements of such persons are not restricted and they are allowed to be at large it may be difficult for the Government through their police to have a control over them and prevent them from committing offences. In spite of the provisions of the Criminal Tribes Act being applied to them we find from the schedule appended to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State that some of the petitioners who belong to Tiruchirapalli district have been convicted of offences at Jamshedpur, Jullunder, Poona, Bombay, Alipore and Ranchi. We hold, therefore, that Section 6 of the Act is not void as the restrictions imposed by it must be deemed to be reasonable and in the interests of the general public.
16. Mr. Bhashyam then contended that the procedural provisions of the Act are not reasonable in so far as they relate to persons coming under Section 16(1) of the Act. There are safeguards against hasty and illconsidered action so far as persons falling within the definition of Section 2(4) of the Act are concerned. Firstly, they are given an opportunity to show cause against the issue of a notification under Section 3(1). The Government are given discretion to issue or not to issue a notification. The rules framed under the Act provide even for the filing of a written statement and permit the person against whom action is intended to be taken to appear in person or by pleader. But in the case of a person coming under Section 16(1), learned counsel submitted there is no such opportunity given. He drew our attention to the two decisions of the Supreme Court of United States in Minnesota Ex. Rel. –‘Pearson v. Probate Court’, (1940) 84 Law Ed. 744(C) and –‘Buck v. Bell’, (1926) 71 Law Ed. 1000(D), to show that before the fundamental rights of a citizen are curtailed adequate safeguards are provided to ensure against the misapplication of the provisions of a statute which has the effect of so curtailing his rights. There is some force in this complaint. An opportunity to show cause against the application of the Act to a person coming under Section 16(1) was evidently thought unnecessary presumably because such person had that opportunity before he was notified under the Criminal Tribes Act. Section 8 of the original Act gave an opportunity to any person deeming himself aggrieved by any entry made or ‘proposed to be made’ in the register of notified persons to complain to the District Magistrate. The amendments to the Act made by Act 29 of 1943 expressly provided for a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the issue of a general notification under Section 3 and before the registration of any member of the notified tribe. The fact however remains that such opportunity would have been given only before the passing of Madras Act 6 of 1948 and a long time might have elapsed since the registration under the Criminal Tribes Act. It would have been more satisfactory, if, before the new Act of 3948 was made applicable, the person concerned had been given an opportunity to show cause against it and the Government had a discretion either to issue or not to issue a notification under Section 3(1). Nevertheless we do not feel constrained to hold that on this account Section 16(1) is void. The expression “reasonable” is so wide and elastic that a Court should not ordinarily strike down any restrictive provision as void as being not reasonable, unless it appears to the Court that a different view could not be taken with any justification.
17. Lastly, Mr. Bhashyam, contended that the provisions of the Act imposing obligations and restrictions are inconsistent with Article 20(2) of the Constitution which says : “No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once”. It is impossible to describe the restrictive precautions taken under the Act as prosecution and punishment. “Prosecuted and punished” have definite meaning and significance in the administration of criminal justice, and in that sense the impugned Act does not provide for any prosecution or punishment except it be for contravening the provisions of the Act itself, in which case there is no question of any person being prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once. There is nothing in this objection.
18. Mr. Bhashyam referred to the general policy of all civilised Governments to reclaim even the worst offenders and to make them honest citizens of the land by improving their conditions and giving them opportunities to lead a clean life and urged that the Act is not in accordance with such a policy as it more or less segregates certain persons as perpetual offenders. It is not the province of this Court to embark on considerations of policy. The Legislature might feel that certain restrictions are necessary in the interests of general security and make special provision for settling those persons, though it is neither adequate nor comprehensive. In any event we cannot hold that any of the provisions of the Restriction of Habitual Offenders Act is unconstitutional and void because it is not in consonance with social idea.
19. The application is therefore dismissed.
There will be no order as to costs.