JUDGMENT
Jamuar, J.
1. This is an appeal from a judgment and order of the Subordinate Judge and District Delegate at Dhanbad, dated the 25th April 1951.
2. The facts, shortly stated, are these : One Rai Bahadur Shivadas Banerjee died on 13-2-1949, at Dhanbad leaving behind a daughter named Gauri Rani Devi as the sole surviving heir. Musammat Gauri Rani Devi filed an application in the court below for obtaining a succession certificate authorising her to realise certain debts and securities mentioned in a schedule attached to her application. This schedule discloses that there was a sum of Rs. 50,000/- lying in fixed deposit in the Imperial Bank of India at Dhanbad, another sum of Rs. 1,087/12/8 lying in the current ac-
count in the same Bank, and a third sum of Rs. 908/4/7 lying in deposit in the current account in the Chota Nagpur Banking Association, Ltd., at Dhanbad. The total of these three amounts is Rs. 52,746/1/3.
3. There was an objection to the grant of the succession certificate by Prabir Kumar Ganguly who is the son of another daughter of Rai Bahadur Shivadas Banerjee who had predeceased her father. The objection put forward was that the applicant was an heir with limited interest, and, therefore, she had no right to touch the corpus of the properties left by her deceased father. The objector did not object to the grant of a succession certificate to the applicant, but asked the Court to call upon her to furnish security to the extent of the entire amount, as a condition precedent to the grant of a certificate. The Court below made an order granting succession certificate to the applicant, taut refused, in the circumstances of this case, to impose the condition, namely requiring the applicant to furnish security. It is against this latter part of the order that the present appeal was filed by Prabir Kumar Ganguly, the objector in the Court below.
4. Mr. Lala Atul Chandra, who has appeared for the respondents, contended that no appeal lies against the order appealed from, and relied upon the case of — ‘Chitrarekha Dai v. Bansman Rai’, AIR 1932 Pat 117 (A). In my opinion, this contention must prevail. Section 384 (1), Succession Act, provides that an appeal shall lie to the High Court from an order of a District Judge granting, refusing or revoking a certificate under that part. It was argued that the present appeal is not from an order either granting, refusing or revoking a certificate, but that it is from an order refusing to order the applicant to furnish security. In the case reported in AIR 1932 Pat 117 (A), there was an appeal from an order granting a certificate on condition of security being furnished and it was held that the party aggrieved by the grant of the certificate had a right of appeal, but that the portion of the order requiring security was not appealable. Conversely, in my opinion, where a Court grants a succession certificate but refuses to impose any condition of security being furnished, the party aggrieved against the order by the grant of the certificate may appeal; but the portion of the order by which the Court refuses to impose any condition of security is not appealable. Having regard, therefore, to the decision in that case, in my opinion, no appeal lies.
5. Mr. Banerji, who has appeared for the appellant, however invited us to examine his contention in our revisional jurisdiction, which we have done, and here again I am of opinion that no sufficient cause has been made out for interference with the order passed by the Court be]ow.
6. Reference may be made to the case of — ‘Badri Narain v. Lachminia’, AIR 1935 Pat 10 (B) where a widow of a Hindu applied for a certificate to enable her to collect, the debts due to her husband. It was pointed out that, ordinarily, she ought not to be called upon to give security at all, and reliance was placed upon the case of — ‘Mt. Kausilla Kuer v. Mt. Sukhdei’, AIR 1923 All 579 (C) where it was held as follows :
“No doubt there are many revsrsior.ers who
are interested but it is not the business of
the Court to go out of its way to look after the reversioners who have no vested interest, and to assume everything against the widow. The object of a Court is to grant certificates to the persons lawfully entitled to them and not to go out of its way to make it difficult for them to obtain them.” In the circumstances of this case, therefore, no sufficient reason, has been, advanced to enable us to interfere with the discretion exercised by the Court below in refusing to ask for security from the applicant. This is a matter within the discretion of the court below, as is clear from Sub-section (1), Section 375, Succession Act which is to the following effect : “The District Judge shall in any case in which he proposes to proceed under Sub-section (3) or Sub-section (4) of Section 373, and may in any other case require, as a condition precedent to the granting of a certificate, that the person to whom he proposes to make the grant shall give to the Judge a bond with one or more surety or sureties, or other sufficient security, for rendering an account of debts and securities by him and for indemnity of persons, who may be entitled to the whole or any part of those debts and securities.”
7. In the case before us, neither Sub-section (3) nor Sub-section (4) of Section 373 is applicable. The question of making a condition precedent to the granting of a certificate was, therefore, in the present case, entirely within the discretion of the Court below, and, in my judgment, it cannot be said that the discretion has been exercised in any erroneous manner.
8. The result, therefore, is that the appeal fails, and is dismissed but without costs.
Rai, J.
9. I agree.