ORDER
Jagadeesan, J.
1. The petitioner has filed this contempt application against the respondent on the ground that contrary to the order of interim stay granted by this Court, the respondents had demolished the superstructure put up by the petitioner. Admittedly the petitioner had encroached upon the government porambokc land and put up the construction. Her case is that without following the procedure laid down under the Madias Land Encroachment Act, the respondents tried to evict the petitioner. Hence the writ petition has been filed.
2. On 23.5.95 this Court passed the following order;
“In view of the petitioner’s averment that no notice under Section 7 of the Act was given to her, notice of motion returnable in three weeks. Petitioner not to be dispossessed by respondent in the meanwhile. Government Advocate is directed to take notice.”
Subsequently the W.M.P. was listed on 30.6.95 and this Court passed the following order:
“Interim order is extended by two weeks. Post the writ petition on 10.7.1995.”
Again on 25.7.95 this Court passed an order as follows:
“Post on 1.8.95 for orders. Interim order to continue till then.”
The petitioner’s case is that inspite of the interim order on 1.8.95 the third respondent as well as the second respondent demolished the superstructure. Hence the present contempt application.
3. The second respondent has filed counter affidavit stating that there had been a number of encroachments on the Highways in the area which was causing hindrance to the free flow of vehicular traffic. In view of this position and with a bona fide intention, action had been taken to evict and clear the unauthorised encroachments. The action has been taken to remove and clear the encroachments only after observing the formalities. Nevertheless due to misfortune and also due to sheer inadvertance the encroachment in relation to the applicant’s area had also been removed.
In view of the pendency of the writ petition, the encroachment in respect of the applicant ought not to have been removed. The removal is only by mistake which should have been avoided. But it was not intentional or done with ulterior motive. The second respondent tendered his unconditional apology and further stated that he has given the immediate possession of the land to the petitioner.
4. The counsel for the petitioner contended that when after hearing both the counsel this court has passed an interim order restricting the period it is not open to the respondents to remove the encroachment pending final orders. The removal of the obstruction is contrary to the order of this court and with deliberate intention to disobey the order of this court.
5. The learned Additional Government Pleader represents that the interim stay expired as early as 1.8.95 and the obstruction was removed only on 11.8.95 by which date the interim order has not been extended by this Court. On the date of action of the respondents, there was no interim order at all and hence there is no contempt on the part of the respondents. He also relied upon the judgment reported in Rathinasabapathy v. Palaniappa Kandar, .
7. I carefully considered the contention of both the counsel. It is true that the interim order had been extended till 1.8.95 and after that there was no extension of the interim order. The respondents had removed or demolished the superstructure of the petitioner on 11.8.95 on which date there was no interim order. Though technically the respondents can take shelter under this, still there is no bona fide on their conduct in demolishing the superstructure while a writ petition is pending before this court. The second respondent has admitted in his counter that the removal of the obstruction ought not to have been done in view of the pendency of the writ petition. But, however, the same has been done by mistake and sheer inadvertance. The second respondent who is the District Collector, the administrative head of the District level, having occupied such a high post, it is rather pathetic that he files an affidavit to the effect that the encroachment had been removed by sheer inadvertance. If these small things arc happened due to sheer inadvertance, it is quite natural that serious misdeeds also may happen under this sheer inadvertance. But having expressed his unconditional apology and having stated that there is no intentional or deliberate disobedience of the order of this Court, taking a lenient view, I accept the explanation given by the second respondent in his counter affidavit.
7. In the judgment relied upon by the Government Pleader it is stated that when the interim order is granted for a particular period and thereafter the interim order is not extended and the authorities have done something after the expiry of the interim order. They cannot be made liable for the contempt. In the judgment reported in Rathinasabapathy v. Palaniappa Kandar, the Supreme Court has held as follows:
“With respect to the High Court we find it difficult to comprehend how the blame could be laid at the doors of the appellants. There is no doubt that the operation of the injunction was limited to three weeks. It is nobody’s case that it was extended thereafter. The appellants showed respect to the order of the Court by stopping the construction as soon as the injunction order was received. After the expiry of three weeks when they did not receive any order continuing the injunction, they proceeded with the construction. As such it is difficult to understand how it can be said that the appellants had shown disrespect to the order passed by the Court. On the contrary, they showed respect by not proceeding with the construction as soon as the injunction order was received and they continued with the construction only after its period expired. Therefore, the High Court was wrong in stating that the appellants committed gross violation of the spirit and intention of the order “as if it had been effective only for a period of three weeks from the date of pronouncement of the order.” There is no question of the order being in existence after the expiry of three weeks. The expression ‘as if used in the abstracted part of the order is totally unwarranted because indisputably, it was effective only for a period of three weeks. There was, therefore, absolutely no violation of the Court’s order.”
The above judgment relied upon by the Additional Government Pleader cannot be said to apply for this case squarely. Because in this case, when the interim order was granted from the beginning, the Government Pleader was asked to take notice and the interim orders were passed in the presence of the Additional Government Pleader. When the Government Pleader put on notice about the interim order, then it is deemed that the respondents also put on notice about the same especially in the absence of the plea that the respondents have not been communicated about the interim orders by the Government Pleader. But, however, on the date of removal of the obstruction, as contended by the Government Pleader, the interim order was not in force. But on this technical ground the respondents cannot be said to have committed the disobedience of the order of this Court. But, however when the question of wilful or intentional disobedience comes in, I am of the view that the explanation submitted by the second respondent can be accepted. More over the second respondent has stated in his counter affidavit that he had instructed his authorities to restore possession to the petitioner. Taking into consideration of this aspect also, I find that the respondents have not committed any wilful contempt of court. The petition is accordingly dismissed.