ORDER
K. Ramaswamy, J.
1. The petitioners herein arc the teachers. They filed this application against the respondent under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act (Act 70 of 1971), for short ‘the Act’, for wilful disobedience of the orders of this Court D/-19-3-1986 made in W. P. No. 2149 of 1986. They alleged in their affidavit and also stated in the evidence of the 1st petitioner examined today as P. W. 1 that on 12-5-1986 the petitioners went to the ! respondent and made a representation in writing that the orders of transfer may be implemented. Till 25-5-1986, the respondent took no action. On 26-5-1986, they again made another representation and no action was taken. On 3-6-1986 again, they went and made an oral request to the respondent. Yet, he did not take any action. Therefore, they issued a legal notice through counsel on 4-6-1986, requesting the respondent to implement the orders, or else it amounts to disobedience of the orders of this Court. Despite receiving the above representations no action has been taken. On the other hand, the respondent sent a reply dt. 10th or 12th June, 1986 stating that, since the Government has imposed ban on transfers of the teachers, he cannot implement the orders of this Court unless the Government lifts the ban. Again, on 14-6-1986, they approached the respondent for implementation of the order. He stated that he knows how to implement the orders of the court and he cannot implement the order as they approached this Court and they can approach the court and obtain orders. In the meanwhile, it is stated by the respondent in the counter-affidavit that he addressed a letter to the District Development Officer whether he can implement the order of the court and the District Development Officer, in turn, has written letter to the Government seeking clarification and the Government, by their letter dt. 30-6-1986, stated that the ban imposed by the Government does not stand in the way of the respondent to implement the order of this Court.
2. In the evidence of P. W. 1, he stated that, on 5-7-1986, when they again approached the respondent he stated that, since the petitioners have approached this Court for contempt he would say to the court what he wanted to say and he need not implement the order and; therefore he did not implement the order. On 7-7-1986, since the respondent received orders of promotion, he left the place without implementing the order. Subsequently, his successor implemented the order. Thus, it is the case of the petitioners that the respondent has deliberately or wilfully failed to implement the orders of this Court. It amounts to contempt of this Court.
3. In the counter-affidavit filed by the respondent, it is admitted that, on the receipt of the orders of this Court, he did not implement the order and the stand taken in the counter-affidavit is thus:
It is submitted that thereafter the petitioners have served a legal notice through their advocate on 4-6-1986 for implementation of the Court order or else they will be constrained to take legal proceedings with the cost and consequences against the Block Development Officer for which a reply was given informing that the orders of the Hon’ble Court could be considered after the ban imposed by the Government is lifted. Under these circumstances the Block Development Officer, Panchayat Samithi, Hanumakanda requested the District Development Officer, Zilla Parishad, Warangal for clarification as to whether the order of the court could be implemented and in turn the District Development Officer, Zilla Parishad, Warangal addressed the Government, informing the facts of the case and sought clarification whether to implement the court orders even in the ban period because the exemption was not given in the G.O.
(Emphasis supplied)
4. It is stated that he has no intention to deliberately or wilfully disobey the orders of this Court. It is to mention that, after the evidence of P. W. 1 was closed, though the respondent is present in court, his learned Counsel stated that the respondent is not examining himself as witness. Thus, the evidence of P. W. 1 remained unrebutted.
5. From this narration, the admitted facts are thus: this Court passed an order on March 19, 1986 stating that, in the normal circumstances, the writ would have been allowed since the academic year is coming to a close, any order passed would have a chain reaction the respondent is directed “to consider the case of the petitioners for, retransfer to the respective places during the next academic year”. Admittedly, the orders were received by the respondent on May 12, 1986. The petitioners gave in writing to the: respondent, requesting to implement the order. No action was taken till May 25, 1986. j On May 26, 1986 again they made a representation. Yet, no action was taken. On {June 3, 1986 again oral representation was made and even then no action as taken. The I legal notice was issued on June 4, 1986, calling | upon the need of the respondent to implement I the order, and the consequences that would | follow for non-implementation. The respondent appears to have written a letter to the District Development Officer seeking clarification and the District Development Officer, in turn, by letter dt. June 6, 1986 wrote to the Government for clarification. Rules relating to competent authorities to transfer teachers in Panchayat Samithis and Zilla Parishads issued through G.O. Ms. No. 428, dt. Aug. 19, 1983 cover the field of orders of transfer of teachers in the respective units viz., teachers working within the jurisdiction of the Panchayat Samithi and the teachers working within the jurisdiction of; the Zilla Parishad. As far as the teachers] working in the panchayat samithis are concerned, admittedly under R. 8(a) the, competent authority is the Block Development Officer, Panchayat Samithi with i the prior approval of the President, Panchayat Samithi. We are not concerned with regard to the transfer by the District Development Officer. For the academic year 1986-87, the schools reopen in the first week of June 1986. Once this Court gave a direction to consider the case of the petitioners for retransfer in the academic year 1986-87, it is the bounden duty of the respondent to implement the orders of this Court issued in W. P. No. 2149/86 dt. March 19, 1986. The petitioners repeatedly approached the respondent to implement the orders and no action was taken and revoked no response. On the other hand, the stand taken even in the counter-affidavit, admittedly, is that the case of the petitioner will be considered only, after the ban imposed by the Government is lifted. The question is whether this conduct on the part of the respondent amounts to deliberate or wilful disobedience of the orders passed by this Court.
6. Section 2(b) of the Act defines civil contempt that “Unless the context otherwise requires, civil contempt’ means wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction order or writ or other process of a court of wilful breach of an undertaking given to a Court”. Section 12 of the Act is the punishing section. Sub-section (1) Section 12 postulates that “Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act or in any other law, a contempt of court may be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both”. Sub-section (3) of. Section 12 posits that “Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, where a person is found guilty of civil contempt, the court, if it considers that a fine will not meet the ends of justice and that a sentence of imprisonment is necessary shall, instead of sentencing him to simple imprisonment, direct that he be detained in a civil prison for such period not exceeding six months as it may think fit.” Therefore, if the court finds that the contemnor has deliberately and wilfully disobeyed the orders of this Court, he is liable for conviction under Section 12 of the Act for imposition of a fine or sentence or with both, and if the circumstances do warrant the imposition of a sentence notwithstanding the power to impose, a fine, it also can punish the contemnor for simple imprisonment and detain the contemnor in a civil prison for a period not exceeding six months.
7. In the light of this legal position and undisputed or unrebutted facts set out hereinbefore, the question is whether the respondent has committed wilful disobedience of the orders, of this Court. As stated earlier, the undisputed fact is that, after the receipt of the orders of the Court and despite repeated representations made by the petitioners, the respondent has not implemented the orders of this Court. He, being-the competent authority under the Rules, is bound to implement the orders of this Court. Yet, he did not implement the orders of this Court. On the other hand, he leisurely wrote a letter to the District Development Officer, who is not a competent authority nor bound by this order, pretending to seek clarification. No , doubt, in the G.O. No. 168 imposing the ban On transfer by the Government, no exemption Jib the orders passed by this Court is given. It is implicit. The Government cannot sit over the orders passed by this Court. The orders passed by this Court have to be implemented disregard of the ban or any direction given by the Government. It is not the case of the respondent that he is not the competent authority to implement the orders of this Court. Therefore, right from the date of the receipt of the orders, the respondent did not implement the order and he left the place, on receipt of the orders of transfer by promotion. From these facts, the question is whether the respondent has deliberately or wilfully disobeyed the orders of this Court. Mere statement that he has no intention to deliberately or wilfully disobey the orders of this Court is not sufficient. It is an inferential fact to be deduced from proved or admitted facts and circumstances demonstrable from the record or conduct of the contemnor. From the narration of the facts and looking from the conduct of the respondent, I have no hesitation to conclude that the respondent has deliberately and wilfully disobeyed the orders of this Court. The only suggestion given to P. W. 1 and also stated in the counter-affidavit is that the petitioners have threatened the respondent with dire consequences. On the face of it, it appears to be highly improbable and unacceptable. P. W. 1 has denied the suggestion to him. The petitioners are small fry in the heirarchy. On the other hand, the respondent appears to have thought that despite his orders of transfer, the petitioners have gone to the Court and got it nullified and he is expecting orders of promotion and, till that date, he intended to dilly dally it and thereby could avoid implementation of the direction of this Court. It is also demonstrative from the definite stand taken by the respondent in the counter-affidavit that the orders of this Court will be considered, after the ban is lifted by the Government, and he is positive and definite that he need not implement the orders of this Court till the ban is lifted by the Government. Thus considered, the only inevitable conclusion is that the respondent has wantonly, deliberately and wilfully disobeyed the orders of this Court.
8. Then what is the punishment to be imposed on the respondent is the question. The test to determine the hight of civilisation in a society is to be found in the extent of honour, respect and regard paid in that society to the judiciary. The greater the respect, the higher the civilization. In a democratic polity, judiciary is the sentinel to protect the rights of the citizen and correct the executive excesses and a balancing wheel between the citizen and the State and citizen and citizen, etc. In AG of Bihar v. M. P. Khair Industries , Chinnappa Reddy, J. speaking for the Court held that:
The public have an interest, an abiding and a real interest and a vital stake in the effective and orderly administration of justice, because unless justice is so administered, there is the peril of all rights and liberties perishing. The Court has the duty of protecting the interest of the public in the due administration of justice and so, it is entrusted with the power to commit for contempt of court, not in order to protect the dignity of the Court.
When the contemnor has deliberately or wilfully disobeyed the order of the Court or obstructed the course of justice, etc., the law shall not be seen to be limping; person violating law go scot free and the person seeking vindication of majesty of justice go with a feeling that efficacy of law is a mere paper tiger. Committing a person for contempt, “is a mode of vindicating the majesty of law in its active manifestation against obstruction and outrage”, as held by Frankfurter, J. in Offutt v. U. S. (1954) 348 US 11. Considered from this perspective, in the light of the utter disregard, shown by the respondent to implement the direction of this Court, to vindicate the majesty of justice, that mere imposition of fine alone is not sufficient. I accordingly convict the respondent for his detention in a civil prison for a period of fifteen days under Section 12 of the Act and impose fine of Rupees one thousand only, in default, to undergo imprisonment for a further period of one week. One month’s time from today is granted to the respondent to pay the fine. The respondent shall be kept in civil prison at Warangal for the above period. The contempt case is accordingly allowed.