ORDER
H. Rangavittalachar, J.
1. The writ petitioner is a Chartered Accountant. He has filed this petition seeking for a writ of mandamus against the President of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India and the Chairman, Bangalore Branch of SIRC, for a direction to them to pay all sums of money which he is legally entitled to receive as per Annexure-C to the writ petition.
2. It is stated in the petition that he was a Member of the faculty in the Institute of Chartered Accountants’ and at the direction of the respondents, he was taking various coaching classes and sessions under the banner of “Management Development Programme’ from the year 1991 to December 2001. The institute paid him the remuneration till about the year 1995. Later, it has refused to pay for the period 1995 to 2001. Hence, this writ petition.
3. It is contended in the objections of the 1st respondent that the petitioner was one of the members of the Managing Committee of the Bangalore Branch of the South India Regional Council of the Institute from the year 1991 and for some time he was also the Chairman. He was not directed by any specific resolution or letters of contract to take part
in the teaching programme. It is also stated that he being the member of the Managing Committee, cannot claim remuneration for teaching. The claim of the petitioners being essentially one for recovering the money, the same cannot be done by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.
4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner before this Court while arguing submitted there is no prohibition under the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 or Regulations for a member of the Managing Committee to claim remuneration in respect of the teaching work done by him. This is also the view of the Chairman of the Institute. In his letter dated 30-12-1999, Annexure-B, the Chairman had also agreed to pay the amount, but the Council is refusing to pay.
5. To the preliminary objection that the writ petition is not maintainable, it is the submission of the petitioner’s Counsel that the respondents are statutory bodies created under the statute viz., the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949, and any action or inaction on their part in not paying the remuneration should be construed as a statutory Act and the petitioner is only seeking to enforce the statutory obligation by the process of this Court. Hence, the petition is maintainable. The decision in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and Ors., was cited in support of the said contention.
6. On merits respondent submitted, by reading Regulation 42 of the Chartered Accountants Regulations, 1988, that a person who is a member of the Managing Committee cannot claim any money towards remuneration for teaching.
7. The objections of the respondents, both on preliminary point and on merits deserves to be accepted.
8. Under the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 a statutory body known as “Institute of Chartered Accountants of India” is constituted. Regulations have been framed called as “Chartered Accountants Regulations, 1988 for the day-to-day functioning of the institute and the manner in which the funds of the institute are to be applied. Regulation 42 relevant for the present purpose is extracted hereunder omitting the other regulations which is not relevant.
“Regulation 42.–There shall be established a fund under the management and control of the Managing Committee into which shall be paid all the moneys received by the Managing Committee and out of which shall be met all the expenses and liabilities properly incurred by the Managing Committee:
Provided that no part of the Fund shall be applied either directly
or indirectly for making any payment to the members of the Man
aging Committee, except to reimburse them any expenses incurred by them in connection with the business of the managing
committee:
Provided however, that no member of the Managing Committee shall be entitled to claim any travelling or other allowances”.
By a reading of Regulation 42, it is manifest that the Managing Committee members are entitled for reimbursement of any monies spent by them for business purposes of the Managing Committee. By no stretch of imagination, the remuneration claimed for teaching by a member of Managing Committee can be said to include “money spent for the business of Managing Committee”. There is no spending of any amount involved in teaching as part of “business of Managing Committee”.
9. Therefore, petitioner cannot sustain his claim on the basis of Regulation 42. Other than the said regulation, no other regulation has been referred or brought to the notice of this Court to make the claim. Therefore, the claim of petitioner cannot be related to any statutory obligation. If so, then the claim at best can be relatable to contract. In the first place, no such contract is produced before the Court for ascertaining the terms and conditions regarding the basis for claiming the remuneration, as is done in the case; secondly, writ petition cannot be a remedy for enforcing the terms of a private contract.
10. Besides, such a claim by the member of the Managing Committee would clearly mean that he would be both an employer and an employee which proposition is difficult to concede on general principles. Therefore, the very claim of the petitioner in this regard, in my view, cannot be upheld.
11. Apart from this, even if the petitioner can make a claim, such a claim comes within the ‘realm of contract’ and for breach of the terms of the contract even with a statutory body aggrieved party’s remedy is not by filing a writ petition to seek for specific performance of the terms of a contract (see the decision of this Court in E. Venkatakrishna v. The Indian Oil Corporation Limited, Bombay and the decision of the Division Bench in Bangalore Construction Company v Executive Engineer, National Highways Division and Ors.). As already stated, learned Counsel for the petitioner is unable to read to me any of the provisions of the Act or the Regulations to show that these rights which the petitioner is claiming are traceable to any one of the provisions of the Act or the Regulations so as to contend that the contract has a statutory flavour.
12. It is well-recognised that only such acts of the statutory bodies
which are traceable to any of the provisions of the Act, Rules or Regulations are amenable to writ jurisdiction but, where the statutory bodies
enter into private contracts not in pursuance of a statute and if any
party were to claim any rights under such contracts, enforcement of
such contractual rights cannot be done by invoking the aid of Article 226
of the Constitution. Petitioner in his case is precisely asking this Court
to enforce his contractual rights for payment of money for services rendered.
13. The petitioner’s Counsel by relying on the decisions in Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal Khodidas Barot and Ors. ; Popular Plantation and Anr. v. State of Kerala and Ors. and Government of Tamil Nadu and Anr. v. R. Thillaivillalan, contended that where an ordinary remedy of suit was neither adequate or efficacious, it was not improper for the High Court to entertain question of fact in writ jurisdiction. This is besides the point. In none of the decisions cited, this question about the enforcement of a contractual right in a writ petition was the subject-matter. Therefore, all the decisions are distinguishable.
14. Thus, from the discussion made above, it is clear that the petitioner cannot maintain this writ petition for claiming remuneration in respect of the services rendered by him as a teacher, also, the writ petition is not the proper remedy. Hence, I find no merit in the petition.
15. Petition is dismissed. No costs.